E.D.Va.: Notwithstanding Prior Conditional Certification Of Almost Identical Class, Class Conditionally Certified

Pollard v. GPM Investments, LLC

This case was before the court on the plaintiff’s motion for conditional certification.  The defendant opposed the motion on several grounds.  As discussed here, the court rejected the defendant’s arguments that conditional certification was inappropriate because: (1) the case and proposed class were largely duplicative of another case that had previously been certified, and (2) the plaintiffs had waited too long to move for conditional certification.

Rejecting the defendant’s argument that the case was not appropriate for certification, due to another almost identical case, that had previously been certified, the court stated:

“A class action filed in the District of Connecticut makes nearly identical allegations against Defendant as the instant case. Store managers who worked for Defendant between March 14, 2005, and October 22, 2008 received notice of the Connecticut litigation and were invited to join the class action. Plaintiffs argue that the Court should order that notice of the present litigation be issued to all store managers employed by Defendant since February 22, 2007, including those who received notice of the Connecticut litigation. Plaintiffs assert that the store managers who were given notice of the Connecticut litigation and those who joined that litigation should be given the opportunity to join the instant litigation to ensure that they are properly compensated for the overtime hours they may have worked since the Connecticut litigation’s notice period. Plaintiffs further assert that choosing not to join one § 216(b) action should not preclude a person from joining another action.

Defendant, on the other hand, argues that the Court should limit notice to (1) deli managers and (2) store managers who were not noticed in Connecticut case. Defendant states that this is fair because one of the goals of § 216(b) is to avoid “a multiplicity of duplicative suits….” Hoffmann, 493 U.S. at 172. Defendant also asserts that it is not asking the Court to limit or prohibit a second FLSA class action that has the same pool of plaintiffs. Instead, Defendant asks the Court to put the burden on Plaintiffs to show that the rights of the potential class members who received notice but did not join the Connecticut litigation will be prejudiced if they are not given a second opportunity to opt-in. Defendant argues that Plaintiffs cannot satisfy this burden because there is no evidence that the store managers who received notice of the Connecticut case and declined to join would be prejudiced if they did not receive a second notice. Defendant also asserts that the forty-eight store managers who are already plaintiffs in the Connecticut case should not be re-noticed because they chose to join the Connecticut litigation and that decision should not be disturbed.

Defendant has imposed upon Plaintiffs a burden where none exists. Furthermore, Defendant acknowledges that there is no authority that limits the right of potential plaintiffs to receive notice of § 216(b) lawsuits. As such, the Court will not impose this burden on Plaintiffs. To the extent Defendant believes potential class members should not be permitted, Defendant may raise those arguments at the second stage of the process.”

Rejecting the defendant’s argument regarding the timeliness of plaintiff’s motion, the court stated:

“Defendant argues that Plaintiffs unreasonably delayed in bringing the instant Motion in an attempt to obtain a four or five month delay in the trial of this matter. Defendants note that Plaintiffs waited nearly six months after filing the Complaint to request Court-supervised notice pursuant to § 216(b) of the FLSA. Because Plaintiffs’ requested notice period would expire after the November 22, 2010 trial date in this matter, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ request is untimely and should be denied. Plaintiffs assert that Defendant has made no argument that it has been prejudiced by Plaintiffs’ delay in bringing the Motion and that continuing the trial date should not present an issue because “[t]he judicial system benefits by efficient resolution in one proceeding of common issues of law and fact arising from the same alleged discriminatory activity.” Hoffman, 493 U.S. at 170.

Because Defendant has not shown that it has suffered prejudice due to the timing of Plaintiffs’ Motion, the Court finds that the Motion is not untimely.”

2 Comments

Filed under Collective Actions

2 responses to “E.D.Va.: Notwithstanding Prior Conditional Certification Of Almost Identical Class, Class Conditionally Certified

  1. J. Page

    In reading this, as far as timeliness where does this case stand

  2. J. Page

    I am confused. Has the judge ruled for or against the store managers. Is there another class action suit against GPM Investments?

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