Category Archives: State Law Claims

W.D.N.Y.: Common Law Claims Not Preempted To the Extent They Provide a Remedy Not Available Under the FLSA

Gordon v. Kaleida Health

In an unusual procedural posture, this case was before the court on plaintiffs’ motion to remand their state common law claims, based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  The court held that it had subject matter jurisdiction however, because of FLSA preemption considerations.  As discussed here, the court held that common law claims seeking to recover straight-time compensation otherwise not covered under the FLSA are not preempted by the FLSA.

Discussing the issue the court reasoned:

“In many district court cases where this issue has arisen, the plaintiffs’ common law claims were brought in conjunction with FLSA claims, based on the same facts, and seeking the same relief. In such cases, most courts have had no trouble dismissing the common law claims as preempted to the extent recovery is available under the FLSA, even where the plaintiff also brought wage claims under a parallel state statute. See, e.g., Guensel v. Mount Olive Bd. of Educ., Civ. No. 10–4452, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132102, at *19, 2011 WL 5599717 (D.N.J. Nov. 16, 2011) (common law claims that are “directly covered” by FLSA must be brought under the FLSA); DeMarco v. Northwestern Mem. Healthcare, Civ. No. 10–C–397, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88541, at *17–18, 2011 WL 3510905 (N.D.Ill. Aug. 10, 2011) (unjust enrichment and other state common law claims seeking relief available under the FLSA are preempted); Bouthner v. Cleveland Constr., Inc., Civ. No. RDB–11–244, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79316, at *21–22, 2011 WL 2976868 (D.Md. July 21, 2011) (although common law claim made no reference to FLSA, it was preempted where claim sought wages mandated by FLSA).

Two courts in this Circuit have expressly concluded that common law claims are preempted to the extent they seek recovery available under the FLSA, but are not preempted to the extent that state law provides a remedy not available under federal law. DeSilva v. N. Shore–Long Island Jewish Health Sys., 770 F.Supp.2d 497, 532–33 (E.D.N.Y.2011) (finding common law claims preempted by FLSA to extent they sought overtime wages, but not preempted to extent they sought straight-time pay not available under the FLSA); Barrus v. Dick’s Sporting Goods, Inc., 732 F.Supp.2d 243, 263 (W.D.N.Y.2010)  (dismissing common law claims seeking unpaid overtime as preempted by FLSA, but allowing claim for unpaid straight time wages to go forward). Other district courts have held likewise. See, e .g., Monahan v. Smyth Auto., Inc., No. 10–CV–00048, 2011 Dist. LEXIS 9877, at *9–11, 2011 WL 379129 (S.D. Oh Feb. 2, 2011) (unjust enrichment claim not preempted where it was based on alleged failure to pay the state’s minimum wage, which was higher than FLSA minimum wage rate); Mickle v. Wellman Prods. LLC, No. 08–CV–0297, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63697, at *10–11, 2008 WL 3925266 (N.D.Okla.2008) (while state statute created a distinct cause of action for overtime compensation, the plaintiffs’ common law claim seeking such relief was duplicative of remedies provided by the FLSA and was preempted).

The law on this issue is by no means settled—some courts have declined to find common law claims preempted where a state’s statute incorporates the FLSA’s minimum wage and/or overtime provisions, and others have dismissed entirely common law claims for which the FLSA provides only partial relief. However, I find the foregoing cases from within this Circuit persuasive. As the DiSilva court noted, the FLSA’s savings clause expressly provides that wage and hour actions may be brought under state wage statutes, “it says nothing about a party’s ability to pursue general common law claims that have no specific relevance to the labor law context.” 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27138, at *93 (emphasis in original).

Here, Plaintiffs common law claims are not brought in conjunction with any claim for relief under the FLSA or the NYLL. They refer generally to statutory law only as the basis for calculating damages. This vague reference to “state law” is not enough to draw purely common law claims into the ambit of the FLSA’s savings clause. Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiffs are seeking unpaid overtime wages that are available under the FLSA, their common law claims are preempted, and to the extent they are seeking straight-time wages for which no federal relief is available, they are not.”

Click Gordon v. Kaleida Health to read the entire Decision and Order.

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Florida’s Minimum Wage Increases to $7.31 Per Hour

The Florida minimum wage increased to $7.31 per hour, effective today, June 1, 2011.  Florida law requires the Agency for Workforce Innovation to calculate an adjusted minimum wage rate each year.  The annual calculation is based on the percentage change in the federal  Consumer Price Index for urban wage earners and clerical workers in the South Region for the 12-month period prior to September 1, 2010.

On November 2, 2004, Florida voters approved a constitutional amendment which created Florida’s minimum wage.  The minimum wage applies to all employees in the state who are covered by the federal minimum wage.

Employers must pay their employees the hourly state minimum wage for all hours worked in Florida.  The definitions of “employer”, “employee”, and “wage” for state purposes are the same as those established under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).  Employers of “tipped employees” who meet eligibility requirements for the tip credit under the FLSA, may count tips actually received as wages under the Florida minimum wage.  However, the employer must pay “tipped employees” a direct wage.  The direct wage is calculated as equal to the minimum wage ($7.31) minus the 2003 tip credit ($3.02), or a direct hourly wage of $4.29 as of June 1, 2011.

Go to the Palm Beach Post’s website or the State of Florida’s Agency for Workforce Innovation to read more about the increase.

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Pennsylvania Laborers Like New Law That Defines “Employees,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette Reports

The Pittsburgh Post-Gazette reports that a new law defining who is an employee (versue independent contractor) is being greated enthusiastically by Pennsylvania workers:

“Union laborers are claiming victory now that Gov. Ed Rendell has signed a law aimed at curtailing construction companies’ ability to skirt taxes — and cut its own costs and liability — by labeling its workers independent contractors.

By classifying their workers as “independent contractors” instead of employees, companies can avoid paying unemployment compensation and workers’ compensation taxes.

Avoiding those taxes, according to labor groups, reduces employer costs and allows such companies to underbid contracting companies that are following the letter of the law.

The new law — formerly House Bill 400 and now Act 72 — is called the Construction Workplace Misclassification Act. Contracting companies that violate the act could be subject to fines and criminal prosecution. There’s also an “acting in concert” provision, which would penalize anyone who knowingly hires a contractor that is in violation of the act.

“It really will start to separate responsible contractors from irresponsible contractors,” said Jason Fincke, executive director of the Builders Guild of Western Pennsylvania, a labor management and contractor association group.

The point of the law isn’t to eliminate the use of independent contractors in the construction industry, he said.

“If there’s a service that you need that you don’t normally provide, you would get someone to do that for you,” Mr. Fincke said. “That’s a legitimate independent contractor.”

The law applies to the construction field only, to the regret of the Teamsters, who had hoped the law would be expanded to include truck drivers (and other kinds of workers) as well. The Teamsters have been fighting with Moon-based FedEx Ground, which classifies its drivers independent contractors. FedEx says its drivers are “small business owners” because they own their own equipment.”

To read the entire article go to Pittsburgh Post-Gazette.

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Oregon State Minimum Wage To Rise By .10¢ Per Hour In January, Stateman Journal Reports

StatemanJournal.com is reporting that Oregon is set to raise the State Minimum Wage by .10¢ per hour in January.

“Oregon’s minimum wage will rise to $8.50 per hour on Jan. 1, State Labor Commissioner Brad Avakian said Monday.

The 10-cent increase mirrors a 1.15 percent increase in the Consumer Price Index since August 2009. Oregon’s minimum wage rate has been $8.40 per hour since January 2009.

Washington, where the minimum wage is currently $8.55 per hour, will announce its adjustment on Sept. 30.”

According to the story, “Ballot Measure 25, enacted by Oregon voters in 2002, requires a minimum wage adjustment annually based on changes in inflation as measured by the Consumer Price Index. The Commissioner of the Bureau of Labor and Industries is directed to adjust the minimum wage for inflation every September, rounded to the nearest five cents.”

To read the entire article, click here.

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S.D.N.Y.: NYLL Unpaid Gratuities and FLSA Overtime Claims Not Precluded By LMRA or CBA; No Interpretation of CBA Required To Determine Whether Defendant Violated Law

Alderman v. 21 Club Inc.

Plaintiffs, unionized waitstaff who worked Defendant’s private banquets filed suit seeking the recover of unpaid tips, pursuant to the New York Labor Law, and unpaid overtime, pursuant to the FLSA.  Plaintiffs specifically sought the portion of service charges charged by Defendant, but not paid to Plaintiffs as “tips” as required by New York law.  The Defendant moved to dismiss, asserting that Plaintiffs’ claims for unpaid tips were precluded by the LMRA (the CBA stated that banquet waitstaff would receive the equivalent of 18% of the gross price of any banquet they worked).  The Court denied Defendant’s Motion, because the claims were pendant not on the CBA, but on the NYLL.

The Court explained:

“As described earlier, plaintiffs’ first claim is under NYLL § 196-d for unpaid gratuities to plaintiffs who worked banquet events at the ’21′ Club. Defendants contend that this claim in reality is one under Section 301 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185, which preempts the application of state labor law. Section 301 of the LMRA provides:

Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce … may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.

The Supreme Court has interpreted Section 301 “as a congressional mandate to the federal courts to fashion a body of federal common law to be used to address disputes arising out of labor contracts.” Allis-Chalmers Group v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 209 (1985). When a state law claim alleges a violation of a labor contract or when the resolution of a state law claim depends on an interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement, Section 301 preempts that claim. See Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 261 (1994). But if a state “prescribes rules or establishes rights and obligations that are independent of a labor contract, actions to enforce such independent rights or rules would not be preempted by section 301.” Vera v. Saks & Co., 335 F.3d 109, 115 (2d Cir.2003). Indeed, the “bare fact that a collective-bargaining agreement will be consulted in the course of state-law litigation plainly does not require the claim to be extinguished.” Livadas v.. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 124 (1994). In order to determine whether a state law claim is preempted because it requires interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement, the court must analyze whether the “legal character” of the state law claim is truly independent of the rights conferred under the collective bargaining agreement. Salamea v. Macy’s East, Inc., 426 F.Supp.2d 149, 153-54 (S.D.N .Y.2006).

In the present case, plaintiffs bring their gratuities claim under NYLL § 196-d and not under the CBA. Both § 196-d and the CBA give employees rights in respect to gratuities, although they are worded differently in ways that have significance in this case. Specifically, the CBA guarantees gratuities in the amount of 18% of the total bill for the function. Section 196-d guarantees to the employees whatever has been charged to provide gratuities, without reference to a specific percentage. It is necessary, therefore, for the court to define exactly what plaintiffs’ claim is and then to determine whether it fits under § 196-d or under the CBA or both.

The relevant portions of the complaint are paragraphs 21 and 22 in the factual allegations and paragraphs 33 and 34 stating the claim:

21. For private events, Defendants charged gratuities to the hosts of the events equal to a percentage of the cost of the events.

22. While Defendants distributed a potion of these gratuities to the service staff that worked these parties, Defendants did not distribute all of the gratuities. Thus, Defendants illegally retained substantial portions of the gratuities paid by private event hosts, instead of distributing them in their entirety to service staff.

33. Defendants received gratuities from customers for all private banquets.

34. Defendants retained portions of Plaintiffs’ tips and Class members’ tips.

On their face, the allegations of the complaint do not refer to 18%. However, they are not precise in excluding the possibility that in fact plaintiffs are seeking the 18% referred to in the CBA. But the court believes that the December 29, 2008 letter of union president Bill Granfield is relevant in construing the nature of the gratuities claim. This letter makes a demand that the ’21′ Club pay to employees “the difference between your service charge rate and the 18% gratuity rate contained in the contract.” The reference to “the contract” presumably means the CBA. Thus, in late 2008, the Union was claiming that the service charges were greater than the 18% referred to in the CBA and was demanding that the entire amount be paid to the employees.

The court concludes that the complaint should be taken on its own terms and cannot properly be construed as actually referring only to the 18%.

The complaint asserts that it is made under NYLL § 196-d. That statute provides:

No employer or his agent or an officer or agent of any corporation, or any other person shall demand or accept, directly or indirectly, any part of the gratuities, received by an employee, or retain any part of a gratuity or of any charge purported to be a gratuity for an employee. This provision shall not apply to the checking of hats, coats or other apparel. Nothing in this subdivision shall be construed as affecting the allowances from the minimum wage for gratuities in the amount determined in accordance with the provisions of article nineteen of this chapter nor as affecting practices in connection with banquets and other special functions where a fixed percentage of the patron’s bill is added for gratuities which are distributed to employees, nor to the sharing of tips by a waiter with a busboy or similar employee.

The first sentence of the statute prevents an employer from taking the gratuities received by an employee. The relevant part of the last sentence states that nothing in the statute affects the practice in connection with functions where a fixed percentage is added to the patron’s bill for gratuities which are distributed to employees. The statute is somewhat confusing because the assurance of the employee’s rights in the first sentence is followed by the latter portion of the last sentence which states that the statute is not applicable to functions where an amount is added to the patron’s bill for gratuities.

Plaintiffs cite authorities that they contend give them rights under the statute. It is not the province of the court on the present motion to resolve questions which may arise as to the exact construction of the statute. It is sufficient to say that, as far as state law is concerned, plaintiffs would surely be entitled to attempt to recover under the statute. What defenses there may be under state law, and how the issues are resolved, remains to be seen. One thing is clear under § 196-d, and that is that there is no reference to 18% or any limit of 18%.

On the question of whether plaintiffs’ gratuities claim should be construed as in reality coming under the CBA so that federal law applies, the language of the CBA was quoted earlier in this opinion. The CBA only guarantees 18%. Consequently, a claim for more than 18% is not properly one under the CBA. It is properly made under § 196-d.

The result is, and the court so holds, that the gratuities claim is not preempted by federal law.

The court notes the contention that the history of the Union submissions by way of grievances constitutes an admission that the gratuities claim in the present case properly falls within the ambit of the CBA. The court rejects this argument. The employees did not give up their right to assert a gratuities claim under § 196-d in the present action.”

The Court also ruled that Plaintiffs were not required to submit their claims to arbitration, based on the language in the CBA.

To read the entire opinion, click here.

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D.Nev.: FLSA Precluded Nevada State Law Class Action

Daprizio v. Harrah’s Las Vegas, Inc.

This case was before the Court on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ state law claims on several grounds.  As discussed here, the Court ruled that the FLSA precludes Nevada State Law Class Action claims. 

“The Court finds that the FLSA precludes the state law class action. The conflict between the two mass action schemes involves the mechanisms by which parties become members of a suit. Defendant argues that “allowing the parallel claims to be pursued concurrently would allow the application of the collective action opt-out mechanism of Rule 23, invoked by the state law claims, to govern what Congress intended to be a more limited situation of opt-in collective action [under the FLSA].” (Mot. Dismiss 13, ECF No. 2). The Court agrees. The FLSA states that, “No employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such action unless he gives consent in writing to become such a party and such consent is filed in the court in which such action is brought.” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). This is the “opt-in” provision used for FLSA collective actions, under which a putative class member is not bound unless he or she affirmatively opts in to the suit. Gardenvariety class actions, however, are governed by Rule 23, which states that “the court will exclude from the class any member who requests exclusion.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(c)(2)(B)(v). This is the “opt-out” provision, under which members of a certified class must affirmatively opt out of the class or be bound by the class action litigation. This divergence between the respective opt-in and opt-out procedures of a FLSA collective action and a garden-variety class action results in a class action under state labor laws being preempted by the FLSA’s collective action scheme.

The Ninth Circuit has based its preemption analysis on the Supreme Court’s three categories: (1) express preemption-“where Congress explicitly defines the extent to which its enactments preempt state law”; (2) field preemption-“where state law attempts to regulate conduct in a field that Congress intended the federal law exclusively to occupy”; and (3) conflict preemption-“where it is impossible to comply with both state and federal requirements, or where state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”  Williamson v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 208 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir.2000) (citing Indus. Truck Ass’n, Inc. v. Henry, 125 F.3d 1305, 1309 (9th Cir.1997) (citing English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-80 (1990))). “Consideration of the issues arising under the Supremacy Clause ‘start[s] with the assumption that the historical police powers of the states [are] not to be superseded by … Federal Act unless that [is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’ “ Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947)). “Preemption issues must be decided on a case-by-case basis.”   Williamson, 208 F.3d at 1155.

A court of this District has ruled that the FLSA precludes state-law labor class actions. In Williams v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc., the court found that “the class action mechanisms of the FLSA and Rule 23 are incompatible. It would be inappropriate to permit Plaintiff’s attempt to circumvent the restrictive opt-in requirement of the FLSA….” No. 2:05-CV-0605-RCJ-LRL, 2007 WL 2429149 at *4 (D.Nev. Aug. 20, 2007) (Jones, J.). In Trendwest Resorts, the defendant’s employees were attempting to recover overtime wages under the FLSA as well as under California state labor law. The court pointed out that notice was sent to 1578 employees of Trendwest Resorts in California and Nevada, but only 194 individuals had opted into the putative class. Id. Had Rule 23 been implemented, the other 1100 California employees who failed to affirmatively opt in would have been brought into the case. Id . In the present case, there is only one complaining party and an unknown number of potential class members. “[T]he policy behind requiring FLSA plaintiffs to opt in to the class would largely be thwarted if a plaintiff were permitted to back door the shoehorning in of unnamed parties through the vehicle of calling upon similar state statutes that lack such an opt-in requirement.” Leuthold v.. Destination Am., Inc., 224 F.R.D. 462, 470 (N.D.Cal.2004) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Plaintiff argues that no preemption issue exists since none of the three types of preemption apply. Express and field preemption are not in dispute since neither side alleges that the federal law expressly preempts state law or that labor disputes are strictly a federal issue. Conflict preemption, Plaintiff argues, also does not apply because the “Nevada overtime and minimum wage claims do not ‘stand as an obstacle’ to Congress’ purpose in enacting the FLSA.” (Resp. Mot. Dismiss 9:11-12, ECF No. 14). In support of this argument, Plaintiff points to the “savings clause” of the FLSA which allows states to enact wage and hour laws more favorable to workers than the minimum requirements of the FLSA and quotes Williamson, which states that, “the FLSA’s ‘savings clause’ is evidence that Congress did not intend to preempt the entire field.” 208 F.3d at 1151 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 218(a)). This argument is unpersuasive for two reasons. First, the savings clause of the FLSA that Plaintiff mentions deals expressly with minimum wages and child labor laws. The language leaves little room for broader inference and probably no room for broader application. Second, the quote from Williamson Plaintiff mentions explicitly refers to field preemption, a type of preemption Plaintiff explicitly disclaims. The savings clause simply means that plaintiffs may bring FLSA collective actions based on violations of state wage and hour laws that are stricter than federal requirements. But the fact that Congress permits suit based on a state’s wage and hour requirements that are stricter than those in the FLSA does nothing to ameliorate the conflict between the FLSA opt-in provision and the Rule 23 opt-out provision.

Because of the tension between the opt-in procedure of an FLSA collective action and the opt-out procedure of a garden-variety Rule 23 class action, a conflict exists. See, e.g., Rose v. Wildflower Bread Co., No. CV09-1348-PHX-JAT, 2010 WL 1781011, at *3 (D.Ariz. May 4, 2010). The Ninth Circuit has stated even more broadly in dicta that “[c]laims that are directly covered by the FLSA (such as overtime and retaliation disputes) must be brought under the FLSA.” Williamson, 208 F.3d at 1154. This could be read as preempting even Plaintiff’s individual claim, but that question is not before the Court.”

There continues to be a rift between various circuits (and even within circuits) as to whether so-called hybrid FLSA Collective Actions may co-exist with State Law Class claims.  Stay tuned to see whether the Supreme Court will ultimately weigh in.

To read the entire decision, click here.

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7th Cir.: 203(o) Does Not Preempt State Law; Notwithstanding The Fact That Time Spent Donning/Doffing Of PPE Constitutes Changing “Clothes” Under the FLSA, Such Time Is Compensable Under WI State Law And Not Waivable By CBA

Spoerle v. Kraft Food Global, Inc.

In this case, the Plaintiff-employees brought a collective action against employer under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and state law, contending that hourly employees at employer’s plant should be paid for time spent donning and doffing safety and sanitation articles and walking to and from their work stations at the beginning and end of their shifts.  The trial court granted employees’ motion for summary judgment, and employer appealed.  The Seventh Circuit held that the employees’ claims were not preempted by FLSA and affirmed.

The Court framed the issue as “whether § 203(o ) preempts state law that lacks an equivalent exception[?]”  Answering in the negative, the Court reasoned:

“The Fair Labor Standards Act has a saving clause:

No provision of this chapter … shall excuse noncompliance with any Federal or State law or municipal ordinance establishing a minimum wage higher than the minimum wage established under this chapter or a maximum work week lower than the maximum workweek established under this chapter…. No provision of this chapter shall justify any employer in reducing a wage paid by him which is in excess of the applicable minimum wage under this chapter, or justify any employer in increasing hours of employment maintained by him which are shorter than the maximum hours applicable under this chapter.

29 U.S.C. § 218(a). This means, the district court concluded, that donning and doffing time counts toward the workweek (and overtime rates) if state law so provides. Kraft Foods concedes that Wisconsin requires time spent donning and doffing safety gear to be compensated at the minimum wage or higher, and that this time counts toward the limit after which the overtime rate kicks in. See Wis. Stat. §§ 109.03, 103.02; Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 272.12(2)(e). (This makes it unnecessary to decide whether federal law would require payment for this time, in the absence of a § 203(o ) agreement. See Pirant v. United States Postal Service, 542 F.3d 202, 208-09 (7th Cir.2008) (discussing which kinds of required safety gear are “integral and indispensable” for purposes of the analysis in IBP ).) Kraft Foods contends, however, that § 203(o ) preempts Wisconsin’s law. The district judge rejected that argument and entered judgment in plaintiffs’ favor as a matter of Wisconsin rather than federal law, see 626 F.Supp.2d 913 (W.D.Wis.2009), a step supported by the supplemental jurisdiction of 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Kraft Foods contends that § 203(o ) embodies a federal decision to permit a collectively bargained resolution to supersede the rules otherwise applicable to determining the number of hours worked. That’s an accurate statement, as far as it goes. But “as far as it goes” means “as far as § 203(o ) itself goes.” And the statute tells us exactly how far it goes. The first words of § 203(o ) are: “In determining for the purposes of sections 206 and 207 of this title the hours for which an employee is employed …”. Section 206 sets the federal minimum wage per hour worked. Section 207 specifies how many hours a person may work in a given period before overtime pay commences. These are rules of federal law. States are free to set higher hourly wages or shorter periods before overtime pay comes due. That’s what § 218(a) says. Nothing in § 203(o ) limits the operation of § 218(a).

As far as we can tell, this is the first time an employer’s argument that § 203(o ) preempts state law has reached a court of appeals. All three district judges who have considered this argument have rejected it. In addition to the decision under review, see In re Cargill Meat Solutions Wage & Hour Litigation, 632 F.Supp.2d 368, 392-94 (M.D.Pa.2008); Chavez v. IBP, Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29714 at *112-22 (E.D.Wash. May 16, 2005). If Wisconsin had provided for a minimum hourly wage exceeding the rate in the collective bargaining agreement between Kraft Foods and Local 538, the state law would trump the CBA. And if this is so for the hourly rate, it must be equally so for the number of hours, because how much pay a worker receives depends on the number of hours multiplied by the hourly rate. It would be senseless to say that a state may control the multiplicand but not the multiplier, or the reverse, because control of either one permits the state to determine the bottom line (provided that the state’s number exceeds the federal minimum; § 218(a) does not allow a state to authorize employers to pay less than the federal floor).

As Kraft Foods sees things, Wisconsin is meddling with collective bargaining, so that federal labor law preempts state law if § 203(o ) does not do the trick. Yet nothing in the Wisconsin statutes gives a state court, or other state official, any role in interpreting or enforcing a collective bargaining agreement. What Wisconsin requires is that the collective bargaining agreement be ignored, to the extent that it sets lower wages or hours than state law specifies. Cf. Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 108 S.Ct. 1877, 100 L.Ed.2d 410 (1988) (state rules that disregard, rather than interpret, collective bargaining agreements are not preempted by federal labor policy). Suppose the CBA set a wage of $8 per hour, higher than the current federal minimum wage of $7.25, while Wisconsin law set a minimum wage of $8.25. (Wisconsin’s actual minimum wage is $7.25, but some states, including Illinois, use $8.25.) No one would contend that the employer could pay the workers $7.25 an hour, even though that is allowed by federal law if labor and management agree (this is the same sense that excluding donning and doffing time is allowed by § 203(o )). Which rate would prevail: $8 from the CBA or $8.25 from state law? According to § 218(a), the employer must pay $8.25 an hour; state law supersedes the collective bargaining agreement. And if this is so about the wage per hour, it is equally true about the number of hours.

Nothing that labor and management put in a collective bargaining agreement exempts them from state laws of general application. If a CBA were to say: “the workers will receive the minimum wage under FLSA, and not one cent more no matter what state law provides,” that would be ineffectual. So too would an agreement along the lines of: “Because our base hourly rate is more than 150% of the minimum wage, we need not pay overtime rates under state law.” States can set substantive rules that determine the effective net wage, even when a CBA plays a role (as it does when a law requires overtime pay at some multiple of the base pay set in a collective bargaining agreement). Every state’s overtime-compensation rule could affect collective bargaining-knowing that state law requires pay at time-and-a-half, labor and management might agree to a lower base rate per hour-but that effect would not prevent application of the state’s wage-and-hour statutes.

Management and labor acting jointly (through a CBA) have no more power to override state substantive law than they have when acting individually. Imagine a CBA saying: “Our drivers can travel at 85 mph, without regard to posted speed limits, so that they can deliver our goods in fewer compensable hours of work time.” That clause would be ineffectual. And a CBA reading instead that “our drivers can travel at a reasonable rate of speed, no matter what state law provides” would be equally pointless. Making a given CBA hard to interpret and apply (as the word “reasonable” would be) would not preempt state law on the theory that states must leave the interpretation of CBAs to the National Labor Relations Board and the federal judiciary; states would remain free to enforce laws that disregarded CBAs altogether. That is what Wisconsin does when determining which donning and doffing time is compensable.

The district court therefore did not err in concluding that plaintiffs are entitled to be paid for all time required by Wisconsin law, and the judgment is AFFIRMED.”

To read the entire opinion, click here.

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W.D.Ark.: FLSA Does Not Preempt State Common Law Claims; Claims Dismissed On Other Grounds

Montize v. Pittman Properties Ltd. Partnership No.1

This case was before the Court on one of the Defendant’s  Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings filed.  The Plaintiffs did not file any response to the Motion.  Of interest, the Court held that certain non-FLSA state law claims were not preempted by the FLSA.  In so holding, the Court noted its agreement with the Ninth Circuit and disagreement with the Fourth Circuit on this issue.  Nonetheless the claims at issue were dismissed for failure to state a claim, because they failed to allege, with specicificity, the facts on which such claims could rest.

The Court dicussed the following facts (as pled) as relevant to its inquiry:

“In this action, Plaintiffs were migrant agricultural workers employed by Pittman Nursery Corporation for seasonal work. They allege that a former Pittman Nursery employee, Dawood Aydani, extorted money from them over the course of several years, in the form of kickbacks, and that such extortion effectively reduced Plaintiffs’ net compensation below the federal and state minimum wage. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Aydani required Plaintiffs to pay him $1,000 cash to secure and keep their employment. They further allege that these funds were then shared with some of the other Defendants in this action.

Plaintiffs assert causes of action under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), and for negligent supervision. Pittman Nursery asks the Court to dismiss the non-FLSA claims and argues that these claims are preempted by the FLSA.”

Discussing the issue of preemption, the Court held: 

“The FLSA authorizes workers to file private actions to recover unpaid wages, damages, costs, and attorneys’ fees. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Pittman Nursery argues that, because Congress intended that these remedies be exclusive, duplicative claims seeking damages beyond those established under the FLSA are preempted by federal law. In the present case, Pittman Nursery asserts that the FLSA preempts Plaintiffs’ state law and RICO claims because these claims are duplicative. The Court does not agree.

The Eighth Circuit has not addressed the issue of whether the remedies under the FLSA are exclusive. The Court is aware that the Fourth Circuit has held that the FLSA preempts claims that “depend on establishing that [the employer] violated the FLSA.” Anderson v. Sara Lee Corp., 508 F.3d 181, 193 (4th Cir.2007). Several other district courts outside of the Eighth Circuit have ruled that state claims are preempted by the FLSA where those claims merely duplicate the FLSA claims. Id. at 194. On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit has held that the FLSA does not preempt common law fraud claims and that the FLSA does not provide exclusive remedies for violating its provisions. Williamson v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 208 F.3d 1144, 1151-53 (9th Cir.2000). Also, several district court cases within the Eighth Circuit have held that the FLSA does not provide the exclusive remedy for its violations and does not preempt state law claims even when there is a common core of operative facts. See Cortez v. Neb. Beef, Inc., Nos. 8:08CV90, 8:08CV99, 2010 WL 604629 (D.Neb. Feb.16, 2010); Bouaphakeo v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 564 F.Supp.2d 870, 886 (N.D.Iowa 2008); Robertson v. LTS Management Services, LLC, 642 F.Supp.2d 922, 928 (W.D.Mo.2008); Osby v. Citigroup, Inc., No. 07-CV-06085-NKL, 2008 WL 2074102 (W.D.Mo. May 14, 2008). Most district courts in the Eighth Circuit agree that the FLSA’s savings clause, which allows states to enact stricter wage, hour, and child labor provisions, indicates that the FLSA does not provide an exclusive remedy for its violations. Bouaphakeo, 564 F.Supp.2d at 882. In fact, “it would seem that state law may offer an alternative legal basis for equal or more generous relief for the same alleged wrongs.” Cortez, 2010 WL 604629, at *6.

Here, the Court is more persuaded by the opinions of district courts within the Eighth Circuit and adopts the view that the FLSA does not provide an exclusive remedy for violations of its provisions. Accordingly, the Court does not agree with Pittman Nursery that Plaintiffs’ non-FLSA claims are preempted by the FLSA.”

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9th Cir.: Complaint That Failed To Allege Entity Exercised Control Over Nature And Structure Of The Employment Relationship Did Not Properly Allege Defendant Was “Employer”

Dianda v. PDEI, Inc.

Plaintiff-appellant Joseph Dianda worked for two days as a “best boy” in the production of a television commercial, but was allegedly paid three days late. Dianda sued the production company and PDEI, Inc. (“PDEI”) for various violations under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and California law.  In the case below, all defendants moved to dismiss the action. The district court denied the motion as to the production company, but granted the motion as to PDEI after determining that PDEI was not Dianda’s “employer” under the FLSA or California law.  Dianda appealed and the 9th Circuit affirmed, discussing the requirements for an “employer” under both the FLSA and California law.  Here, because the Complaint failed to adequately allege that PDEI exercised control over the nature and structure of the Plaintiff’s employment, the Court affirmed the dismissal as to PDEI.

“I. ‘Employer’ Status Under California’s Labor Code and FLSA

The essence of the test for “employer” status under the California Labor Code is “whether the principal has the right to control the manner and means by which the worker accomplishes the work.” Estrada v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 327, 335 (Cal.Ct.App.2007). FLSA’s test is broader, asking whether the “individual [here, PDEI] exercises control over the nature and structure of the employment relationship.” Boucher v. Shaw, 572 F.3d 1087, 1090-91 (9th Cir.2009) (quotation marks omitted).

Dianda has not shown that PDEI had the right to control the details of his work or that PDEI exercised control over his employment relationship. In his deposition, Dianda admitted that PDEI did not tell him how to do his job, PDEI did not hire him, PDEI did not terminate him, PDEI never communicated with him in any way, and Dianda never took instructions or directions from PDEI concerning the commercial. Nonetheless, Dianda argues that his pay stub and W-2 form identify PDEI as the “employer.” However, “[t]he parties’ label is not dispositive and will be ignored if their actual conduct establishes a different relationship.” Estrada, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d at 335-36. See also Real v. Driscoll Strawberry Assocs., Inc., 603 F.2d 748, 755 (9th Cir.1979) (“Economic realities, not contractual labels, determine employment status for the remedial purposes of the FLSA.”). Furthermore, PDEI’s alleged use of its own account to pay wages and PDEI’s maintenance of payroll records are explainable as part of the service it provides as a payroll company. See, e.g., Moreau v. Air France, 356 F.3d 942, 950-52 (9th Cir.2004) (determining that Air France was not a joint employer of contracted service workers where Air France’s involvement was to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements).”

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D.Mass.: Skycaps’ State Law Claims Preempted By Airline Deregulation Act Of 1978 (ADA)

Travers v. JetBlue Airways Corp.

Skycaps, who assist airline passengers with the curbside check-in of their luggage, receive most of their compensation in the form of tips paid by the passengers. The plaintiffs, past and present skycaps for JetBlue Airways Corporation (“JetBlue”), accuse the airline of diverting tip revenue to itself by its imposition of a $2 fee assessed for each bag checked at the curbside (the “curbside check-in fee”). According to the plaintiffs, passengers erroneously believe the $2 fee goes directly to the skycaps because it is cash only, physically collected by the skycaps, and in an amount typically (that is, historically) given as a tip. The plaintiffs allege that the curbside check-in fee has caused their compensation to decrease dramatically because few passengers give a tip in addition to the $2 fee.

The amended complaint asserted claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201, the Massachusetts Minimum Wage Law, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151, §§ 1, 7, the Massachusetts Tips Law, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 152A, and state common law claims for tortious interference with contractual and/or advantageous relations and unjust enrichment/quantum meruit. JetBlue has moved to dismiss all state law claims as expressly preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (“ADA”), 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b) (1), or impliedly preempted by the Federal Aviation Act (“FAA”), 49 U.S.C. § 49191 et seq. Alternatively, JetBlue moves to dismiss the tortious interference and unjust enrichment claims for failure to state a claim.

The Court discussed preemption under the ADA in general stating, “All preemption challenges “ultimately turn[ ] on congressional intent,” Good v. Altria Group, Inc., 501 F.3d 29, 33 (1st Cir.2007), and the “primary indicator of intent is the text of the congressional act claimed to have the preemptive effect,” id. at 34.

The ADA’s preemption provision states: “[A] State … may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier….” 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (emphasis added). Relying on the words “related to,” the Supreme Court has emphasized that the ADA expresses a broad preemptive purpose. Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 384 (1992); see Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 S.Ct. 538, 547 (2008) (recognizing the “unusual breadth of the ADA’s preemption provision”). State law claims are “related to” an airline’s prices, routes, or services, and thus preempted, if the state law either, on its face, “explicitly refers to” or, in application, has a “significant effect” on an airline’s prices, routes, or services. Buck v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 476 F.3d 29, 34 (1st Cir.2007); United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Flores-Galarza, 318 F.3d 323, 335 (1st Cir.2003). On the other hand, state law claims having only a “tenuous, remote, or peripheral” relationship to an airline’s prices, routes, or services are not preempted. Morales, 504 U.S. at 390. Evaluation of this relationship centers “on the effect that the state law has on airline operations,” not on “the state’s purpose for enacting the law.” N.H. Motor Transp. Ass’n v. Rowe, 448 F.3d 66, 78 (1st Cir.2006) (emphasis in original).”

Turning to the facts in the case before it, the Court said, “[t]he question here, therefore, boils down to this: Are the plaintiffs’ state law claims “related to” JetBlue’s prices, routes, or services? The answer seems obvious. The plaintiffs seek to impose liability under the Massachusetts statutory and common law claims for JetBlue’s action in setting (and collecting) a price for a service provided to its customers. To avoid liability under the state claims, JetBlue would have to alter its decisions about its price and services. Potential liability under the state claims, therefore, is a means by which the State effectively regulates JetBlue’s price and service with respect to curbside check-in.

The plaintiffs’ own argument necessarily acknowledges that their claims “relate to” JetBlue’s price for the curbside baggage check-in. They claim not to challenge the existence of JetBlue’s curbside check-in fee, but only the manner in which the fee is collected (i.e., cash-only, by the skycaps, and in an amount typically given as a tip). Two alternatives, which preserve skycap tip income, are proposed by the plaintiffs: JetBlue could charge the $2 fee either when passengers purchase their tickets or during self-check-in, and then list the charges as “baggage handling fees” on the passengers’ receipts. (See Pls.’ Opp’n to Def. JetBlue Airways Corp.’s Mot. to Dismiss 10 n.8.) To propose these two alternatives is to implicitly acknowledge that their state law claims are a vehicle for regulating JetBlue’s assessment and collection of a fee for the curbside check-in service. The question, however, is not whether such regulation would be beneficial or desirable, but whether it is permitted in light of the ADA’s broad preemption of any state regulation of an airline’s “prices” or “services.”

Furthermore, any argument that the state law claims here have no more than a “tenuous, remote, or peripheral” relationship to JetBlue’s prices or services is belied by the plaintiffs’ own complaint. They seek not only money damages for past wrongs, but also injunctive relief “ordering Defendants to cease their violations of the law.”(Am.Compl.10.) Whether indirectly, by threat of liability for money damages, or directly, by injunctive order, the plaintiffs’ broader goal is to compel JetBlue to change its practices with respect to the imposition and collection of the curbside check-in fee. That relationship to JetBlue’s prices and services is not “tenuous, remote, or peripheral.

In sum, the ADA preempts the plaintiffs’ state law claims. The defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) ( dkt. no. 46) is GRANTED. Counts II-V of the amended complaint are dismissed as against JetBlue.”

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