On the heels of last month’s Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, the Supreme Court had the chance to decide a case which actually would help define the true parameters of the mootness doctrine, visa vis cases where the plaintiff claims finite (and typically relatively small) individual damages, but seeks to represent a putative class. However, as in the Symczyk, the Supremes left some observers scratching their heads and declined to answer the question posed to it. Although the Zinni case was a case brought under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) and not the FLSA, the issue presented is common in FLSA cases.  Specifically, the issue presented by the Zinni case was:

Does an offer to provide a plaintiff with all of the relief he has requested, including more than the legal amount of damages plus costs and reasonable attorney’s fees, fail to moot the underlying claim because the defendant has not also offered to agree to the entry of a judgment against it?

Previously, the Eleventh Circuit had held that such an offer, absent an agreement by the defendant to allow entry of a judgment against it, necessarily cannot moot a claim, because it fails to truly give the plaintiff all of the relief sought which he or she may obtain by litigating the case. Given the high court’s decision to deny cert on the case, this remains good law and parties should govern themselves accordingly.

Click Convergent Outsourcing, Inc. v. Zinni to read the Eleventh Circuit’s underlying decision and ScotusBlog to view the briefing and orders at the Supreme Court.

What effect, if any, does an unaccepted “full relief” offer of judgment have on the ability of a named plaintiff to continue with his or her putative collective action claims under the FLSA? This was the question FLSA practitioners had eagerly awaited the answer of from the Supreme Court, ever since the Court accepted certiorti of the Symczyk v. Genesis Healthcare Corp. However, in a decision of almost no real world value, the Court elected to dodge this question and instead answer its own hypothetical question/issue, so limited in scope, that Justice Kagan (in her dissent) points out, it has absolutely no value in practical application. For this reason, at least one practitioner surveyed regarding the opinion stated, “I don’t care about this decision at all.  Really pretty meaningless.”  In order to understand why such a seemingly important opinion actually means so little we must examine exactly what the Court decided and on what facts it made its decision.

As stated by the Court, its actual holding was that:

a collective action brought by single employee on behalf of herself and all similarly situated employees for employer’s alleged violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) was no longer justiciable when, as conceded by plaintiff-employee, her individual claim became moot as result of offer of judgment by employer in amount sufficient to make her whole.

Describing the relevant facts the Court explained:

In 2009, respondent, who was formerly employed by petitioners as a registered nurse at Pennypack Center in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, filed a complaint on behalf of herself and “all other persons similarly situated.” App. 115–116. Respondent alleged that petitioners violated the FLSA by automatically deducting 30 minutes of time worked per shift for meal breaks for certain employees, even when the employees performed compensable work during those breaks. Respondent, who remained the sole plaintiff throughout these proceedings, sought statutory damages for the alleged violations.

When petitioners answered the complaint, they simultaneously served upon respondent an offer of judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68. The offer included $7,500 for alleged unpaid wages, in addition to “such reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses … as the Court may determine.” Id., at 77. Petitioners stipulated that if respondent did not accept the offer within 10 days after service, the offer would be deemed withdrawn.

After respondent failed to respond in the allotted time period, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Petitioners argued that because they offered respondent complete relief on her individual damages claim, she no longer possessed a personal stake in the outcome of the suit, rendering the action moot. Respondent objected, arguing that petitioners were inappropriately attempting to “pick off” the named plaintiff before the collective-action process could unfold. Id., at 91.

The District Court found that it was undisputed that no other individuals had joined respondent’s suit and that the Rule 68 offer of judgment fully satisfied her individual claim. It concluded that petitioners’ Rule 68 offer of judgment mooted respondent’s suit, which it dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Although discussed in detail by Justice Kagan in her dissent, the Court’s majority opinion, penned by Justice Thomas ignored the fact that the plaintiff actually received no money, no judgment and no settlement as a result of the unaccepted offer of judgment. Nonetheless, the Court reasoned, because the plaintiff had ostensibly stipulated at the district court that her claim was mooted by the unaccepted offer of judgment, and she had failed to cross-appeal to the Supreme Court (a decision which was entirely in her favor), the Court refused to entertain the plaintiff’s argument that the unaccepted OJ could not have mooted the case in the first place. Instead, charging ahead, under the false pretense that the unaccepted OJ had in fact mooted the plaintiff’s individual claim, the Court went on to hold that under such (imagined) circumstances, a defendant could “pick off” an FLSA collective action, where the plaintiff has not sought conditional certification of a collective action at the time he or she receives an offer of judgment that he or she acknowledges moots his or her individual claim.

While the Court’s majority went to great length to distinguish the collective action mechanism of 216(b) from the Rule 23 class action mechanism on which the reasoning of Circuit Courts have relied in reaching the opposite conclusion, the Court failed to acknowledge it was deciding an issue that was really not even before it, and in practicality unlikely to ever appear before any court ever again.

In a stinging must-read dissent Justice Kagan pointed this out and ridiculed the conservative majority for essentially wasting everyone’s time with a meaningless opinion. The Court ultimately failed to answer the real issue of interest- what effect does an unaccepted “full relief” offer of judgment have on the ability of a named-plaintiff to pursue a collective action.  As Justice Kagan noted, the text of Rule 68 dictates it should have no effect at all.  Pointing out that the plaintiff had actually received no recovery in the case, because the offer of judgment at issue was not accepted, Kagan went reasoned, the majority’s opinion had virtually no application outside of the contrived facts on which it was based. Kagan began:

The Court today resolves an imaginary question, based on a mistake the courts below made about this case and others like it. The issue here, the majority tells us, is whether a ” ‘ collective action’ ” brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., “is justiciable when the lone plaintiff’s individual claim becomes moot.” Ante, at ––––. Embedded within that question is a crucial premise: that the individual claim has become moot, as the lower courts held and the majority assumes without deciding. But what if that premise is bogus? What if the plaintiff’s individual claim here never became moot? And what if, in addition, no similar claim for damages will ever become moot? In that event, the majority’s decision—founded as it is on an unfounded assumption—would have no real-world meaning or application. The decision would turn out to be the most one-off of one-offs, explaining only what (the majority thinks) should happen to a proposed collective FLSA action when something that in fact never happens to an individual FLSA claim is errantly thought to have done so. That is the case here, for reasons I’ll describe. Feel free to relegate the majority’s decision to the furthest reaches of your mind: The situation it addresses should never again arise.

Although this was a case watched most by FLSA practitioners for obvious reasons, it is a case which further highlights the absurd pro-big business mentality employed by today’s conservative majority on the court. In fact, as an aside Kagan took another parting shot at the similarly limited opinion just issued by the court in the Comcast case. (In footnote 2 to her dissent, she notes, “[f]or similarly questionable deployment of this Court’s adjudicatory authority, see Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. ––––, ––––, 133 S.Ct. 1426, 1437, ––– L.Ed.2d –––– (2013) (joint opinion of GINSBURG and BREYER, JJ.) (observing in dissent that “[t]he Court’s ruling is good for this day and case only”).”).

In sum, this decision will leave practitioners scratching their heads. It is unclear what, if any, actual effect it will have on future cases. For this reason, one has to wonder- why did the Court take up the case in the first place.  It would seem that absent a stipulation by a plaintiff that his or her case is mooted by a Rule 68 offer of judgment (which in fact is an impossibility) or an acceptance of such an offer of judgment, a defendant still may not moot a putative collective action with an offer of judgment.

Click Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk to read the Court’s entire opinion and Justice Kagan’s dissent.

This case was before the court on the defendant’s motion to compel arbitration and dismiss the plaintiffs operative (second amended) complaint. Of significance, joining several recent courts, the court considered the effect of the NLRA’s Section 7, as it relates to a purported waiver of employees’ rights to proceed under the FLSA’s collective action mechanism. Reasoning that a waiver of the right to proceed as a collective action basis, “bars [plaintiff] from asserting a substantive right that is critical to national labor policy,” the court held that same was unenforceable.

Discussing prior precedent and explaining that same failed to consider the argument that the NLRA forbids such a waiver the court explained:

Several Circuits have cited the dicta in Gilmer to uphold waivers of the FLSA’s collective action rights—these Circuits hold that the waiver affects only the employee’s procedural right to bring a collective action, not his substantive right to seek recovery under the FLSA for himself, and thus the waiver is valid. Caley v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 428 F.3d 1359, 1378 (11th Cir.2005); Carter v. Countrywide Credit Industries, Inc., 362 F.3d 294, 298 (5th Cir.2004); Adkins v. Labor Ready, Inc., 303 F.3d 496, 503 (4th Cir.2002). The Ninth Circuit has reached the same result but in an unpublished decision that cannot be cited for any purpose.

These cases did not address, however, the issue of whether a waiver of FLSA collective action rights violates the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Section 7 of the NLRA vests in employees the right “to engage in … concerted activities for the purpose of … mutual aid or protection.” 29 U.S.C. § 157. The right to engage in concerted action for “mutual aid or protection” includes employees’ efforts to “improve terms and conditions of employment or otherwise improve their lot as employees through channels outside the immediate employee-employer relationship.” Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 565–566, 98 S.Ct. 2505, 57 L.Ed.2d 428 (1978). Those “channels’ include lawsuits. See Brady v. National Football League, 644 F.3d 661, 673 (8th Cir.2011) (holding that “a lawsuit filed in good faith by a group of employees to achieve more favorable terms or conditions of employment is ‘concerted activity’ under 29 U.S.C. § 157“).

The National Labor Relations Board has recently held that an employee’s lawsuit seeking a collective action under the FLSA is “concerted action” protected by Section 7 of the NLRA. In re D.R. Horton, Inc., 2012 WL 36274 (N.L.R.B. Jan.3, 2012). Although some Section 7 rights can be waived by a union acting on behalf of employees, see Metro. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 707–08, 103 S.Ct. 1467, 75 L.Ed.2d 387 (1983), it is unlawful for the employer to condition employment on the waiver of employees’ Section 7 rights. Retlaw Broadcasting Co. v. NLRB, 53 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir.1995). That is precisely what Brown alleges happened here.

Under Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984), the Court must defer to the Board’s interpretation of the NLRA if its interpretation is rational and consistent with the Act. Local Joint Executive Bd. of Las Vegas v. NLRB, 657 F.3d 865, 870 (9th Cir.2011). The Board’s interpretation in Horton of Section 7 of the NLRA is rational and consistent with the Act: A collective action seeking recovery of wages for off-the-clock work falls easily within the language of Section 7 protecting “concerted action” brought for the “mutual aid and protection” of the employees.

Holding that it had the power to invalidate the waiver, and doing so, the court reasoned:

Thus, Citicorp’s arbitration agreement waives Brown’s Section 7 rights to bring an FLSA collective action. As discussed, an arbitration agreement may, by the terms of the FAA, be declared unenforceable “upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” See 9 U.S.C. § 2. Do legal grounds exist to revoke an agreement to waive Section 7 rights?

Section 7 rights are protected “not for their own sake but as an instrument of the national labor policy.” Emporium Capwell Co. v. W. Addition Cmty. Org., 420 U.S. 50, 62, 95 S.Ct. 977, 43 L.Ed.2d 12 (1975). Thus, Citicorp’s arbitration agreement does more than merely waive Brown’s right to a procedural remedy; it bars her from asserting a substantive right that is critical to national labor policy. A contract that violates public policy must not be enforced. See United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 42, 108 S.Ct. 364, 98 L.Ed.2d 286 (1987) (citing the “general doctrine, rooted in the common law, that a court may refuse to enforce contracts that violate law or public policy”). Moreover, it is unlawful for the employer to condition employment on the waiver of employees’ Section 7 rights. Retlaw Broadcasting Co. v. NLRB, 53 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir.1995).

For these reasons, the Court finds that under the FAA, there are legal grounds to revoke the arbitration agreement’s waiver of Brown’s right to bring a collective action under the FLSA and a class action under the IWCA. Accordingly, the Court will deny Citicorp’s motion to compel arbitration and to dismiss Brown’s claims.

Given the lack of clarity on this issue (see, e.g., here), and the fact that courts continue to come down on opposite sides of it, this issue is likely to end up at the Supreme Court at some point in the relatively near future. However, this case was certainly a win for employees in the ongoing battle.  Stay tuned for further developments.

Click Brown v. Citicorp Credit Services, Inc. to read the entire Memorandum Decision and Order.

This case was before the Court on the Plaintiff’s motion to approve settlement, following his acceptance of an offer of judgment tendered by defendant pursuant to Rule 68. Although the plaintiff brought the case as a putative collective action, the accepted offer of judgment purported to resolve the case on an individual basis. Prior to the defendant having answered or appeared in the case, the plaintiff filed a notice of acceptance of an offer of judgment that defendant had made under Fed.R.Civ.P. 68. The offer of judgment provided that the case would be settled on an individual basis (not as a collective or class action) for $5000 payable to plaintiff, plus attorney’s fees of $4590, “which represents 7.65 hours at $600 an hour.” The court initially declined to enter judgment under Rule 68, instead issuing an order requiring the parties to seek the court’s approval of the settlement. Subsequently, the plaintiff complied with the October 19th Order, and filed a motion in an effort to explain that the settlement and his attorney’s fees had a reasonable basis. Upon consideration of the motion it had initially required however, the court essentially reversed itself, and in a lengthy opinion held that under the circumstances of the case- where the employee had filed a lawsuit and was represented by counsel- the parties’ private settlement of the claims did not require judicial approval.

Initially, the court discussed longstanding United States Supreme Court jurisprudence holding that employees cannot enter binding settlements waiving their rights under the FLSA, absent a showing there was a “bona fide dispute.”

Comparing the case before it the court reasoned the situation was not that contemplated by the Supreme Court, because the plaintiff had filed a lawsuit and was represented by counsel:

Curiously, however, none of the cases expressly consider the issue presented in this case, and that is presented in many others before me—settlement of a claim after the FLSA case has been commenced, i.e., a “private” settlement occurring in the context of a public lawsuit, where neither side invites, and in some cases, one or both sides actually resist, the Court’s determination of whether the settlement is fair and reasonable.

When an employer chooses to resolve an FLSA claim without pending litigation, or merely “under threat of suit” as opposed to actual suit, it is obviously taking a reasoned gamble. If the employee later sues notwithstanding the release, the employer may find itself in front of a court that simply disregards the release because it was not previously approved by a court or the Department of Labor. There are at least several reasons why an employer might take this risk: (1) it may be confident that it had a bona fide dispute with the employee; that the release fairly compromises that dispute; and that it will therefore be upheld; or (2) the employer may conclude that as a practical matter, the risk of the settling employee bringing a subsequent suit is small enough in relation to the amount paid as to warrant the settlement; or (3) the employer may not want the settlement publicized among other employees who may well want the same remedial treatment, and therefore may take the risk of subsequent litigation with the settling employee to reduce the likelihood of suit by other employees. The case law cited above, for the most part, involves employers who made these kinds of judgment calls, and when the releases have been subsequently challenged, the courts have either approved them or not.

In the cases before this Court, an employer rarely makes a different analysis just because the case is pending. In other words, the factors that compel parties to settle before litigation is commenced, notwithstanding the possibility that a release that an employer receives will be ineffective, often seem to be equally compelling in reaching a settlement once the litigation is commenced. Except in the less frequent context of a settled class action under the state supplemental claims or a collective action with a substantial number of opt-in plaintiffs, I have never had an employer ask me to conduct a fairness hearing so that it has the protection of a court-approved release. To the contrary, the usual context is the one I am seeing here—no participation by the employer at all, not even an appearance. In the usual case, I merely receive advice from plaintiff’s counsel that the case is over, either by a notice of voluntary dismissal under Rule 41 or a letter saying the same thing (often received the day before the scheduled initial status conference). I have then, following past practice, set the case down for a fairness hearing.

The instant case is somewhat different, but I think not materially so in terms of what steps, if any, this Court needs to take next—plaintiff has simply filed an acceptance of a Rule 68 offer of judgment. I would not even know who the attorney for the employer is but for the signature on the offer of judgment, which has been filed by plaintiff, not defendant. The employer seems quite content to have judgment entered against it, which presumably the employer will satisfy. Perhaps it views a satisfaction of judgment as more protective than a noncourt-approved release, and perhaps, with at least the possibility that a judgment will have res judicata effect where a release might not, it is. But until some court determines that there was a bona fide dispute as to how much plaintiff was owed in wages, and that the offer of judgment fairly compromises it, the employer has not eliminated its risk.

Initially the court concluded that FLSA cases are not exempt from FRCP 41, which permits parties to stipulate to dismissal:

I cannot agree with the largely unstated assumption in the cases that refuse to allow voluntary dismissals that the FLSA falls within the “applicable federal statute” exception to the Rule. Nothing in Brooklyn Savings, Gangi, or any of their reasoned progeny expressly holds that the FLSA is one of those Rule 41–exempted statutes. For it is one thing to say that a release given to an employer in a private settlement will not, under certain circumstances, be enforced in subsequent litigation—that is the holding of Brooklyn Savings and Gangi—it is quite another to say that even if the parties want to take their chances that their settlement will not be effective, the Court will not permit them to do so.

The court then went on to examine Lynn’s Food and distinguished the case from the facts before it:

I believe Lynn’s Food should be confined to its rather egregious facts. Not only did the employer settle on the cheap with unsophisticated employees, but it circumvented the DOL’s investigation in doing so, and then had the audacity to seek a judicial imprimatur validating its aggressive strategy. A narrower reading of Lynn’s Food would be that if the proposed settlement would never have been approved if presented in the context of a pending litigation, then it cannot be approved in a subsequent litigation. In contrast, had the employer paid 100% of the maximum to which the employees might have been entitled plus liquidated damages in a bona fide dispute, the broad language used by the Eleventh Circuit might well have been unnecessary. Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit has recently expressed a similar view. See Dionne v. Floormasters Enterprises, Inc., 667 F.3d 1199 (11th Cir.2012) (if the employer tenders 100% of the unpaid wages claimed by the employee, plus liquidated damages, even while denying liability, the case is moot and no fairness hearing is necessary, nor is the employee a prevailing party entitled to an attorney’s fee). It is hard to conceive of any reason why, if a court is presented with an eminently reasonable, albeit after-the-fact, settlement, it is precluded from giving it legal effect. That is essentially what the Fifth Circuit held recently in upholding a private settlement, distinguishing Lynn’s Food because of its one-sided facts. See Martin v. Spring Break ’83 Productions, L.L .C., 688 F.3d 247, 253–256 & n. 10 (5th Cir.2012).

More importantly, Lynn’s Food does not expressly address the issue of whether parties can voluntarily withdraw a case under Rule 41. It does not preclude the plaintiff or the parties from proceeding unilaterally or bilaterally, depending on the timing, from withdrawing a case and taking their, principally the employer’s, chances in effectuating a settlement without court approval. It simply says, like all of the cases in this area, that the courts will not recognize an unreasonable FLSA settlement, whether the settlement is asserted by the employer as a defense in the settling employee’s subsequent suit, or, as in Lynn’s Food, as the basis for declaratory relief in an action that the employer has brought. Lynn’s Food thus does not dispose of the issue of whether parties in a pending action can voluntarily dismiss the case without any judicial assurances if that is what they want to do.

Recognizing the risks of unsupervised settlements of FLSA cases, the court said:

This is not to say that there is an absence of arguably undesirable consequences in allowing private settlements of FLSA litigation without court oversight. As noted above, in the typical cases I have, like this one, where private resolutions are reached and judicial scrutiny is neither sought nor desired, the case is brought as a collective action but resolved before a collective action notice has gone out to other employees. Although one employee, the named plaintiff, has presumably benefitted to at least some extent from the private resolution, other similarly situated employees will likely not even know about it, and to the extent they have not received their minimum wages or overtime, they will be no better off. Indeed, in at least one case, I have had the employer’s attorney candidly tell me that the reason he wished to avoid a fairness hearing was to prevent other employees from learning of the settlement and seeking the same relief.

I am not suggesting that plaintiff in the instant case or his attorney, who is an experienced and well-regarded practitioner in this Court, have committed any impropriety. But the scenario is conducive to a dynamic that allows both a plaintiff and his employer—not to mention the plaintiff’s attorney, who frequently receives a fee that greatly exceeds the plaintiff’s recovery—to leverage a comparatively cheap settlement on the backs of the plaintiff’s co-employees. This obviously runs contrary to the intent of Congress in enacting the FLSA and in particular to its creation of the collective action mechanism. Using the potential of a collective action as a Sword of Damocles to extract a small settlement and a large, but still comparatively small in relation to the exposure the employer would face in a true collective action, attorney’s fee could not have been what Congress had in mind in authorizing collective actions.

The court went on to discuss issues of confidentiality (the body of law that says there should be no confidential settlements of FLSA cases because same flies in the face of the remedial nature of the statute) and dismiss the typical argument against non-supervised settlements (the threat that they may end up being settled on the cheap), ultimately recognizing that the defendant is the one that is taking a risk often where there is no approval, rather than vice versa:

The problem of non judicially approved confidentiality provisions in private settlements is resolved by the same allocation of employer risk as is the case with private settlements of FLSA claims generally—if a settling employee subsequently breaches the confidentiality provision, then the employer is going to have to try to enforce it, or seek rescission or damages for its violation. At that point, under the authorities cited above, the courts may well hold it unenforceable.

Unlike the recent Fifth Circuit case discussed here, this case does not seem to signal any significant change in longstanding jurisprudence, prohibiting (binding and enforceable) private settlements of FLSA cases. Rather, here the court simply confirmed that the parties to an FLSA case can resolve the case and circumvent the court’s approval, leaving open the question of whether such settlements are enforceable.

Click Picerni v. Bilingual Seit & Preschool Inc. to read the entire Memorandum Decision and Order.

This case was before the court on the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment, regarding a variety of issues. As discussed here, one of the issues concerned the applicability of the so-called retail sales exemption, commonly referred to as 7(i), to defendant, a debt settlement company. The court held that the defendant was not a “retail or service establishment” within the meaning of 7(i), and held that the plaintiffs were not retail or service exempt as a matter of law.

Rejecting the defendant’s argument that the plaintiffs were subject to the retail exemption, because they engaged in telephone sales of a specific retail product to the general public, the court explained:

To determine whether an employer is a “retail or service establishment,” courts look to the former statutory definition in Section 13(a)(2) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(2), which defines a “retail or service establishment” as one in which 75% of the annual dollar volume of sales of goods or services is “not for resale” and “is recognized as retail sales or services in the particular industry.” See 29 C.F.R. 779.319; Geig, 407 F.3d at 1047.

“Determination of whether a business fits the retail concept is not without difficulty.” Brennan, 477 F.2d at 296. In making their determinations, courts consistently rely on the expertise of the Department of Labor, which has promulgated an extensive series of regulations and interpretive rules that accompany the statute. See 29 C.F.R. § 779.300 et seq. Although courts are not bound by interpretative bulletins, they do provide guidance because they reflect the position of those most experienced with the application of the Act. Brennan, 477 F.2d at 296–97. Courts must consider all circumstances relevant to the business at issue. 29 C.F.R. 779.318(b).

After quoting the relevant section of the CFR, the court reasoned:

The Department of Labor’s regulations consistently emphasize that the exemption is meant to apply to “traditional” local retail establishments. 29 C.F.R. §§ 779.314, 779.315, 779.317. To assist the public, the regulations identify certain establishments as traditional local retail or service establishments—e.g., restaurants, hotels, barber shops, and repair shops. The regulations also seek to assist the public by identifying establishments that do not fall within the exception—e.g., insurance companies that sell insurance and electric companies that sell power. 29 C.F.R. §§ 779.316, 779.317. The Fifth Circuit has noted this ” ‘demonstrates that not everything the consumer purchases can be a retail sale of goods or services’ and ‘industry usage is not controlling.’ ” Brennan, 477 F.2d at 295 (citation omitted).

The regulations elaborate further on the definition by stating that “an establishment, wherever located, will not be considered a retail or service establishment within the meaning of the Act, if it is not ordinarily available to the general consuming public.” 29 C.F.R. § 779.319. “An establishment does not have to be actually frequented by the general public in the sense that the public must actually visit it and make purchases of goods or services on the premises in order to be considered as available and open to the general public. A refrigerator repair service shop, for example, is available and open to the general public even if it receives all its orders on the telephone and performs all of its repair services on the premises of its customers.” Id.

In this case, Defendants operated a debt settlement business from the eighth and tenth floors of an office building in Dallas, Texas. There were three main aspects to this debt settlement operation—sales, customer service, and negotiation with creditors. The Salespeople recruited the clients. They were constantly making telephone calls (around 300 calls a day)—to prospective customers all over the country—trying to sell a service. This is not the type of service that is utilized by the general public in the course of their daily living. Defendants were not “serv[ing] [an] everyday need [ ] of the community.” Defendants did not operate from a store front. They did not serve the general public by providing a retail product or service in the traditional sense. Defendants’ debt negotiation and settlement business was similar to other establishments that lack a “retail concept”—such as banks, brokers, credit companies, and loan offices. 29 C.F.R. § 779.317.

For these reasons, the Court finds that Defendants did not establish their burden of proving they operate a retail or service establishment within the meaning of the FLSA. The Court hereby DENIES Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the retail or service establishment exemption and finds as a matter of law the salespeople Plaintiffs are not exempt from overtime pay under the retail or service exemption.

Click Parker v. ABC Debt Relief, Ltd. Co. to read the entire Memorandum Opinion and Order.

This case was before the court on the plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment as to the defendant’s twenty-sixth affirmative defense, which asserted that the claims were barred based on the six-month limitations provision contained in an agreement between the parties that the plaintiff was required to sign as part of his employment with the defendant. The plaintiff argued that the clause in the agreement between the parties shortening the time in which the plaintiff had to bring his claims was unconscionable, rendering the agreement unenforceable, and his claims timely. The court granted the plaintiff’s motion holding that the six-month limitations period was in fact unconscionable under California law.

Initially the court held the agreement was procedurally unconscionable, because the agreement was a contract of adhesion. Discussing this issue, the court reasoned:

The threshold inquiry in California’s unconscionability analysis is whether the … agreement is adhesive.” Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1281 (9th Cir.2006) (quoting Armendariz, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 745, 6 P.3d at 689). A contract of adhesion is “a standardized contract, which, imposed and drafted by the party of superior bargaining strength, relegates to the subscribing party only the opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject it.” Armendariz, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 745, 6 P.3d at 689. A finding that a contract is adhesive is essentially a finding of procedural unconscionability.   Nagrampa, 469 F.3d at 1281;Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir.2002) (“The [contract] is procedurally unconscionable because it is a contract of adhesion….); Flores v. Transamerica HomeFirst, Inc., 93 Cal.App.4th 846, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 376, 382 (Cal.Ct.App.2001). The critical factor for determining both adhesion and procedural unconscionability is whether the contract “was presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis” and “oppressive due to an inequality of bargaining power that result[ed] in no real negotiation and an absence of meaningful choice.” Nagrampa, 469 F.3d at 1281.

Goodwill’s senior human resources administrator, Grizelda Guzman, states that “all employees were presented with [agreement at issue] in 2008.” Dkt. No. 32–1 ¶ 5. This suggests that the agreement was a standard contract, drafted by Goodwill. As the moving party, however, it is Bowlin’s burden to show that there is no genuine factual dispute that the manner in which the contract was presented to him renders it procedurally unconscionable. To this end, Bowlin submits a declaration and avers that “a manager presented [him] with a copy of the agreement … to initial and sign while [he] was working,” that no one “reviewed the terms or content of the agreement with [him],” and that he “was not able to discuss, negotiate or modify any of the terms or content of the agreement.” Dkt. No. 29–1 ¶¶ 2–4… Accordingly, the Court finds that as a matter of law, the agreement is procedurally unconscionable.

The court then held that the agreement was also substantively unconscionable, holding that, as a matter of law, applying a six-month limitations period to wage and hour claims is unduly harsh.

Because the court held that the agreement was both procedurally and substantively unconscionable, it struck the six-month limitations period from the parties’ agreement and granted the plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment.

Click Bowlin v. Goodwill Industries of Greater East Bay, Inc. to read the entire Order Granting Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

This case was before the court on the consolidated appeal of three student externs who sued the administrators of their respective externships asserting that they had not been paid proper minimum wages. The courts below had all granted the respective defendants summary judgment, holding that the plaintiffs could not satisfy the “economic reality” test, and therefore they were not “employees” subject to the FLSA’s coverage. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, applying the DOL’s six-factor test applicable to trainees. In so doing, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ contentions that the defendants benefitted from their work, while they essentially received no academic or monetary benefit.

The court reasoned:

Although Kaplan and O’Neill argue that their externship experiences were of little educational benefit, they did in fact engage in hands-on work for their formal degree program. Kaplan and O’Neill also received academic credit for their work and, by completing an externship, were eligible to earn their degrees.

Kaplan and O’Neill argue that, because they were performing tasks for Defendants’ businesses, Defendants benefitted economically from their work. The undisputed evidence, however, demonstrates that Defendants’ staff spent time—time away from their own regular duties—training Plaintiffs and supervising and reviewing Plaintiffs’ work. Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs caused Defendants’ businesses to run less efficiently and caused at least some duplication of effort. Defendants received little if any economic benefit from Plaintiffs’ work. Thus, under the “economic realities” test, Plaintiffs were not “employees” within the meaning of the FLSA. See New Floridian Hotel, Inc., 676 F.2d at 470.

The Eleventh Circuit applied the DOL’s six factor test, derived from the Supreme Court’s decision in Portland Terminal—pertinent to determining whether a trainee qualifies as an employee under the FLSA, to reach its holding.

As explained in footnote 2, under the Administrator’s test, a trainee is not an “employee” if these six factors apply:

(1) the training, even though it includes actual operation of the facilities of the employer, is similar to that which would be given in a vocational school; (2) the training is for the benefit of the trainees; (3) the trainees do not displace regular employees, but work under close supervision; (4) the employer that provides the training derives no immediate advantage from the activities of the trainees and on occasion his operations may actually be impeded; (5) the trainees are not necessarily entitled to a job at the completion of the training period; and, (6) the employer and the trainees understand that the trainees are not entitled to wages for the time spent in training. Wage & Hour Manual (BNA) 91:416 (1975); see also Donovan v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 686 F.2d 267, 273 n. 7 (5th Cir.1982).

Reasoning that the externs at issue were not “employees” the court concluded:

The externship programs at Code Blue and EFEI satisfy all six of the Administrator’s criteria. The training provided was similar to that which would be given in school and was related to Plaintiffs’ course of study. The training benefitted Plaintiffs, who received academic credit for their work and who satisfied a precondition of graduation. Both Kaplan and O’Neill were supervised closely and did not displace Defendants’ regular employees. Defendants received no immediate advantage from Plaintiffs’ work and, at times, were impeded by their efforts to help train and supervise Plaintiffs. And both Kaplan and O’Neill admit that they were unentitled to a job after their externships and that they understood that the externship would be unpaid.

Click Kaplan v.Code Blue Billing & Coding, Inc. to read the entire decision.

This case was before the court on the plaintiffs’ motion for conditional certification as well as the plaintiffs’ motion for corrective action regarding meetings the defendant acknowledged having with putative class members after learning of the lawsuit. The court had previously denied the plaintiffs’ motion to strike declarations obtained from such putative class members, but deferred on the motion for corrective action. As discussed here, after the plaintiffs had commenced their putative collective action, but prior to the time they filed their motion for conditional certification, the defendant required putative class members to attend meetings with its management where it had putative class members sign blank declarations and a mandatory arbitration agreement. The court held that the documents may not be enforceable, and that class members who felt they signed same under duress would not be bound by the documents they previously signed.

Discussing the issue the court explained:

The court deferred ruling on the plaintiffs’ request for a corrective letter or court supervised notice that was embedded in the motion to strike. (Doc. 51, at 10–11). After the parties’ May 31, 2012 Status Conference and before the Plaintiffs’ deadline for filing their Motion for Conditional Certification and Notice, Citi Trends initiated company-wide in-person meetings between two corporate representatives and its SMs, who are potential collective class members in this case. At these meetings, with only a few exceptions, every SM completed a fillin-the-blank declaration about their job duties (doc. 40–7 and following) and signed an arbitration agreement that bound every SMs to arbitrate any claims he or she had against Citi Trends (doc. 47–6). The Human Resources Representative also presented every SM with a disclosure about this lawsuit and the effect of the arbitration agreement on his or her rights in the lawsuit. (Doc. 47–2).

As the court expressed in its memorandum opinion on the motion to strike, the individualized meetings that occurred between SMs and Citi Trends Human Resources Representatives are cause for concern. At these meetings, SMs waived their rights to bring any claims against Citi Trends in court, including participation in this litigation.

Especially when the employer-employee relationship is in play, the possibility of abuse is ripe in these type of unilateral communications. The Eleventh Circuit recognized the potential for coercion in such situations and held that the court had authority in Rule 23 class actions to invalidate opt-outs when they were procured through fraud, duress, or other improper conduct. Kleiner v. First Nat. Bank of Atl., 751 F.2d 1193, 1212 (11th Cir.1985). In cases such as this where Citi Trends has an obvious interest in diminishing the size of the potential class, a risk exists that these types of unsupervised communications will sabotage the employee’s independent decision-making regarding their involvement in the action. See id. at 1206. The court takes seriously its responsibility to see that an employer not engage in coercion or duress to decrease the size of a collective class and defeat the purpose of the collective action mechanism of the FLSA. Because of these concerns as more fully stated on the record, the court will GRANT IN PART AND DENY IN PART the Plaintiffs’ motion for court-supervised notice. Any potential plaintiffs who felt they signed the mandatory arbitration agreement under duress will still be allowed to opt-in to this collective action; the language of the notice will reflect that right.

Click Billingsley v. Citi Trends, Inc. to read the entire Memorandum Opinion and Order discussed here, and Memorandum Opinion to read the court’s prior Memorandum Opinion on the Motion to Strike.

Rodriguez v. Pure Beauty Farms, Inc.

In the first case, the Eleventh Circuit held that employees who worked for their employer, a commercial nursery, and maintained their employer’s plants at Home Depot locations, for ultimate sale to third-party customers were subject to the secondary agricultural exemption. The court reasoned that the plaintiffs’ work caring for plants displayed in stores was incident to or in conjunction with nursery farming operations, and so qualified for secondary agricultural exemption. In so holding, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ contention that the employees were engaged in separate business enterprise of selling plants, since they handled only their employers’ plants, albeit in Home Depot locations, and held that the Home Depots where they performed their work qualified as “farms” within the meaning of the regulation.

Initially the court laid out the three prerequisites for application of the secondary agricultural exemption: (1) the “practice must be performed either by a farmer or on a farm”; (2) it must “be performed either in connection with the farmer’s own farming operations or in connection with farming operations conducted on the farm where the practice is performed”; and (3) it must be “performed ‘as an incident to or in conjunction with’ the farming operations.” 29 C.F.R. § 780.129; see also Sariol, 490 F.3d at 1279–80.

The court quickly disposed of the first two elements, finding that they clearly applied. Turning to the third element, the court held that the work performed by the employees was indeed incident to or in conjunction with the defendant’s farming operations, reasoning:

The parties’ dispute focuses primarily on the third requirement—whether the practices Rodriguez and Hernandez performed for the Farms, but on Home Depot store-sites, were “incident to or in conjunction with” the Farms’ farming operations. See 29 C.F .R. § 780.129. “Generally, a practice performed in connection with farming operations is within the statutory language only if it constitutes an established part of agriculture, is subordinate to the farming operations involved, and does not amount to an independent business.” 29 C.F.R. § 780.144. When, as here, the practice is performed on “agricultural or horticultural commodities,” to determine whether “the practice is conducted as a separate business activity rather than as a part of agriculture,” consideration is given to, among other things: (1) whether “the type of product resulting from the practice” remains in its raw or natural state or changes; (2) “the value added to the product as a result of the practice and whether a sales organization is maintained for the disposal of the product”; and (3) whether the product is “sold under the producer’s own label rather than under that of the purchaser.” 29 C.F.R. § 780.147. A farmer or his employees selling the farmer’s own agricultural commodities is also a practice “incident to or in conjunction with the farming operations” as long as “it does not amount to a separate business.” 29 C.F.R. § 780.158(a).

In addition, the Department of Labor has specific regulations addressing employees of nurseries. If nursery employees are engaged in “[p]lanting, cultivating, watering, spraying, fertilizing, pruning, bracing, and feeding the growing crop,” they are employed in agriculture. 29 C.F.R. § 780.205. “Employees of a grower of nursery stock who work in packing and storage sheds sorting the stock, grading and trimming it, racking it in bins, and packing it for shipment are employed in ‘agriculture’ provided they handle only products grown by their employer and their activities constitute an established part of their employer’s agricultural activities and are subordinate to his farming operations.” 29 C.F.R. § 780.209 (emphasis added). However, if the “grower of nursery stock operates, as a separate enterprise, a processing establishment or an establishment for the wholesale of retail distribution of such commodities, the employees in such separate enterprise are not engaged in agriculture.” Id. (citations omitted). “Although the handling and the sale of nursery commodities by the grower at or near the place where they were grown may be incidental to his farming operations, the character of these operations changes when they are performed in an establishment set up as a marketing point to aid the distribution of those products.” Id.

After briefly discussing similar cases, the court explained:

Here, the Farms handles and sells only its own plants, and Rodriguez and Hernandez watered, pruned, and cared for only the Farms’ plants situated at the Home Depot stores. Unlike the employees in Mitchell, Rodriguez and Hernandez did not work in a wholesale distribution center for other growers’ horticultural products. Cf. Mitchell, 267 F.2d at 290–91; see also Adkins v. Mid–American Growers, Inc., 167 F.3d 355, 357 (7th Cir.1999) (explaining that when an employer “buys plants and then resells them without doing significant agricultural work it is operating as a wholesaler rather than as a grower, and wholesalers of agricultural commodities are not exempt from the Act”); Wirtz v. Jackson & Perkins Co., 312 F.2d 48, 51 (2d Cir.1963) (stating that “[w]ere any significant portion of the stock handled in defendant’s storages purchased from … independent sources” the agricultural exemption would not apply because it “is inapplicable to services performed by employees of mere distributors of agricultural products”). Rodriguez and Hernandez are more akin to the flower shop employees in Walling, who handled and sold only their employer’s own nursery stock. See Walling, 132 F.2d at 6.

In any event, the kind of work Rodriguez and Hernandez performed on the Farms’ plants is explicitly identified in the regulations as “agricultural,” such as watering them, pruning away dead limbs, leaves and buds and preparing them for market by handling, inspecting and sorting them. See 29 C.F.R. § 780.205. Nothing Rodriguez and Hernandez did to the plants changed them from their natural state, such that they could be said to be engaged in the separate enterprise of processing or manufacturing. Cf. Mitchell v. Budd, 350 U.S. 473, 480–82, 76 S.Ct. 527, 532, 100 L.Ed. 565 (1956) (concluding that workers at tobacco-bulking plant, where a lengthy fermentation process substantially changed the tobacco’s physical properties and chemical content, were not exempt as agricultural workers). Indeed, by ensuring that the Farms’ plants continued to receive adequate water and light and were pruned and insect-free while in the staging areas, Rodriguez and Hernandez’s work was directly connected with and subordinate to the Farms’ own nursery-farming operations.

Click Rodriguez v. Pure Beauty Farms, Inc. to read the entire Opinion.

Williams v. Hilarides

In the second case, there were three issues regarding the application of the agricultural exemption before the court: (1) whether the fact that Plaintiff occasionally transported feed for the dairy cows to Defendant’s dairy ranch has any effect on the court’s determination of Plaintiff’s exempt status; (2) whether Plaintiff’s usual activity of hauling milk from the farm constituted agricultural work within the meaning of the exemption; and (3) whether application of the agricultural exemption is appropriate where the product shipped by Defendant to the cheese plant was a product which Plaintiff characterizes as being manufactured from raw milk by a process of ultrafiltration which removes significant amounts of water.

The court quickly disposed of the first issue, noting that the amount of time that an employee spends on so-called “agricultural” activities each week is determinative of whether the exemption applies (week-to-week):

The first issue—whether the fact that Plaintiff occasionally hauled feed for the dairy cows to Defendant’s farm—requires little discussion. Put simply, exemption from overtime pay entitlement under FLSA is an all-or-nothing proposition. If any portion of the employee’s workweek is spent in work that is not agricultural and therefore not exempt, no exemption may be claimed by the same employer for any amount of work that is agricultural under FLSA. Wyatt v. Holtville Alfalfa Mills, Inc., 106 F.Supp. 624, 629 (S.D.Cal.1952). In other words, an employee’s hours worked in a given workweek are not exempt under the agriculture exemption unless all the work performed that week was exempt agricultural work. Thus, it is of no import to the court’s determination of Plaintiff’s overtime exemption status that Plaintiff may have spent some small amount of time hauling hay for feed for the cattle if it is determined that Plaintiff’s trips to the Hilmar Cheese Plant are determined to be not agricultural in nature.

Discussing the second issue, the court analyzed the CFR regulations and case law pertaining to employees engaged in hauling agricultural goods and concluded that the hauling of such goods necessarily constitutes secondary agricultural work falling within the scope of the exemption.

Turning to the final issue, whether the transport of the raw milk that had been subject the ultra filtration process constituted agricultural work, the court held that issues of fact precluded a finding of same:

Plaintiff’s opposition to Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication raises the issue of whether the product that Plaintiff transported from Defendant’s farm to the cheese plant was a “dairy product” or was an industrial product such that the agriculture exemption was inapplicable. Defendant’s reply to Plaintiff’s contention is essentially limited to the claim that the product hauled by Plaintiff to the cheese plant was milk destined to be made into cheese and the fact that it was treated by ultrafiltration is of no consequence. Plaintiff cites two cases, Mitchell v. Budd, 350 U.S. 473, 76 S.Ct. 527, 100 L.Ed. 565 (1956) and N.L.R.B. v. Tepper, 297 F.2d 280 (1961), to support the contention that the hauling of a dairy product that is the result of the application of a process that removes the dairy product from its raw, natural state does not constitute employment in agriculture for purposes of the FLSA. As the court previously noted, at the time these cases were decided, the overtime provisions of section 7 of the FLSA contained a subsection that exempted those employed in agriculture from overtime but providing that the exemption applied only to activities carried out with respect to commodities in their “raw or natural state.” 29 U.S.C. §§ 207(c), (d) (repealed 1972); Hodgson v. Twin City Foods, Inc., 464 F.2d 246, 250 n. 3 (9th Cir.1972).

Finding no specific regulation directly on point, as to whether the milk that had undergone the ultra filtration was still milk in its “raw” state, the court denied defendant’s motion, noting it had failed to carry its burden of proof on the issue:

As noted above, Defendant has the burden to show that there is no issue of material fact as to whether Plaintiff is exempt from the overtime provisions of 29 U.S.C. § 207(b). Where Defendant fails to carry his burden is in the failure to show the process of transforming milk into the ultrafiltered product that Plaintiff transported to the cheese factory is, in fact, an agricultural, as opposed to manufacturing, function. If the court has no basis upon which it can conclude that the product Plaintiff was hauling to the cheese plant was a “dairy product” (as opposed to a manufactured product), the court cannot conclude that Defendant was engaged in “agriculture” when he shipped his product to the cheese plant or that Plaintiff was correspondingly carrying out an agricultural function. Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication must therefore fail. There is no question that reasonable minds could differ as to both sub-parts (B) and (C) of this opinion. However, the court finds that the application of guidelines established by Congress clearly prevent Defendant from meeting the high burden of production of proof that would allow the court to grant summary adjudication.

Click Williams v. Hilarides to read the entire Memorandum Opinion and Order on Defendant’s Motion for Summary Adjudication.

While district courts that have considered the issue since the NLRB handed down its decision in D.R. Horton last year have reached divergent opinions on its effect regarding the enforceability of class waivers, the first circuit to consider the issue has rejected D.R. Horton’s applicability in the FLSA context. By way of background, last year the NLRB held that the existence of a collective action waiver in an employment agreement constituted an unfair labor practice, because it improperly restricted the “concerted activity” of employees who are subject to same. Following the decision, courts have reached different conclusions as to whether the NLRB’s decision necessarily rendered such waivers unenforceable in the context of FLSA collective action waivers. In this case, the district court held that the parties arbitration agreement was unenforceable, because it contained such a waiver. However, on appeal, the Eight Circuit reversed, holding that the NLRB’s decision in D.R. Horton did not render the arbitration agreement at issue unenforceable.

Discussing this issue, the Eight Circuit opined that it was not obligated to defer to the National Labor Relations Board’s interpretation of Supreme Court precedent, under Chevron or any other principle:

Finally, in arguing that there is an inherent conflict between the FLSA and the FAA, Owen relies on the NLRB’s recent decision in D.R. Horton, which held a class waiver unenforceable in a similar FLSA challenge based on the NLRB’s conclusion that such a waiver conflicted with the rights protected by Section 7 of the NLRA. 2012 WL 36274, at *2. The NLRB stated that Section 7′s protections of employees’ right to pursue workplace grievances through concerted action includes the right to proceed as a class.   Id. However, D.R. Horton carries little persuasive authority in the circumstances presented here. First, the NLRB limited its holding to arbitration agreements barring all protected concerted action. Id. at *16. In contrast, the MAA does not preclude an employee from filing a complaint with an administrative agency such as the Department of Labor (which has jurisdiction over FLSA claims, see 29 U.S.C. § 204), the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the NLRB, or any similar administrative body. Cf. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28, 111 S.Ct. 1647 (upholding an arbitration agreement that allowed Age Discrimination in Employment Act claimants to pursue their claims before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission). Further, nothing in the MAA precludes any of these agencies from investigating and, if necessary, filing suit on behalf of a class of employees. Second, even if D.R. Horton addressed the more limited type of class waiver present here, we still would owe no deference to its reasoning. Delock v. Securitas Sec. Servs. USA, –––F.Supp.2d ––––, ––––, No. 4:11–CV–520–DPM, 2012 WL 3150391 (E.D.Ark. Aug. 1, 2012), at *3 (“The Board’s construction of the [NLRA] ‘is entitled to considerable deference and must be upheld if it is reasonable and consistent with the policies of the Act,’ … the Board has no special competence or experience in interpreting the Federal Arbitration Act.” (quoting St. John’s Mercy Health Sys. v. NLRB, 436 F.3d 843, 846 (8th Cir.2006))). The NLRB also attempted to distinguish its conclusion from pro-arbitration Supreme Court decisions such as Concepcion.  D.R. Horton, 2012 WL 36274, at *16. This court, however, is “not obligated to defer to [the Board's] interpretation of Supreme Court precedent under Chevron or any other principle.” Delock, –––F.Supp.2d at ––––, 2012 WL 3150391, at *3 (quoting N.Y. N.Y. LLC v. NLRB, 313 F.3d 585, 590 (D.C.Cir.2002)). Additionally, although no court of appeals has addressed D.R. Horton, nearly all of the district courts to consider the decision have declined to follow it.

The court also opined that there is nothing inherently wrong with a collective action waiver in employment agreements.

Click Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc. to read the entire Opinion.