Tag Archives: Airport Shuttle

S.D.Fla.: Airport Shuttle Operating Within A Single State Without An Arrangement With The Air Carrier(s) Is Not Engaged In Interstate Commerce; MCA Exemption Inapplicable

Gilbert v. Southern Shuttle Services Inc.

This case was before the Court upon Defendant Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law, or in the Alternative, Motion for New Trial (DE 90). The Motion is fully briefed and ripe for review, following a verdict for Plaintiffs, drivers for Defendant, a company that primarily provides transportation services to people who are going to and from local airports. Denying Defendant’s Motion, the Court explained the “interstate” travel requirements of a Defendant seeking to claim the Motor Carrier Act (MCA) Exemption in Order to avoid FLSA liability.

Discussing the issue before the Court, the Court stated, “Defendant challenges only the portion of the instruction regarding the interstate commerce requirement. (Mot. at 4-5). The Motor Carrier Exemption, 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(1), mandates that overtime pay is not required for any employee with respect to whom the Secretary of Transportation (“Secretary”) has power to establish “qualifications and maximum hours of service pursuant to section 21502″ of the Motor Carrier Act. Thus, the question of whether a plaintiff is exempt from the overtime provisions of the FLSA under 29 U.S.C. 213(b)(1) turns on whether the Secretary had such power with respect to the plaintiff. Baez v. Wells Fargo Armored Service Corp., 938 F.2d 180, 181 (11th Cir.1991).

A requirement of the motor carrier exemption is that the carrier transports persons by motor carrier between a place in a state and a place in another state or “in the practical continuity of movement in the flow of interstate commerce.”See Powell v. Carey Intern., Inc., 483 F.Supp.2d 1168, 1179 (S.D.Fla.2007); see also29 C.F.R. § 782.2 (“The activities of drivers … in connection with transportation which is not in interstate or foreign commerce within the meaning of the Motor Carrier Act provide no basis for exemption under section 13(b)(1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act.”); see also McIntyre v. FLX of Miami, Inc., 2008 WL 4541017, *5 (S.D.Fla.2008) ( “Transportation within a single state may remain ‘interstate’ in character when it forms a part of a ‘practical continuity of movement’ across state lines from the point of origin to the point of destination.”) (citations omitted).

Even if the passengers came from or were destined to points in another state, the carrier is not engaged in interstate commerce if the carrier operates within a single state unless there is a “common arrangement” or through-ticketing between the motor carrier and the air carrier for continuous passage or interchange. See James T. Kimball-Petition for Declaratory Order, 131 M.C.C. 908, 1980 WL 14197 (1980) ((“Kimball” );Motor Transp. of Passengers Incidental to Air, 95 M.C.C. 526 (1964); see also Powell, 483 F.Supp.2d at 1179-82 (holding that plaintiffs limousine service drivers did not fall under the jurisdiction of the Department of Transportation for purposes of the Motor Carrier Exemption where there was insufficient evidence of through-ticketing arrangement between defendants and Virgin Atlantic); Rossi v. Associated Limousine Services, Inc., 438 F.Supp.2d 1354, 1362 (S.D.Fla.2006) ( “Notwithstanding, a through-ticketing arrangement must be between the motor carrier and air carrier for continuous passage in order to render the motor carrier’s operation interstate transportation. See In re Kimball, supra.Associated has no such arrangement with any air carrier.”). A common travel arrangement with a ground transportation company or a travel agency is insufficient to meet the interstate commerce requirement. See id.; Kimball, 131 M.C.C. at 918; Morrison v. Quality Transports Services, Inc., 474 F.Supp.2d 1303, 1310 (S.D.Fla.2007). The Court concludes that the instruction given was legally correct. Accordingly, the Court finds that it did not err in instructing the jury on the Motor Carrier Exemption.

Finally, the Court rejects Defendant’s claims that the evidence at trial established that it fell within the Taxicab and Motor Carrier Exemptions to the FLSA. The jury instructions were correct, both legally and in light of the evidence presented at trial, and the jury’s verdict was not against the weight of the evidence.” Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion was denied.

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