Tag Archives: Fair Labor Standards Act

S.D.N.Y.: Existence of Arbitration Agreements for Some (Not All) Employees in Putative Class, Irrelevant re “Similarly Situated” Inquiry at Stage I

Romero v La Revise Associates, L.L.C.

This case was before the court on plaintiff’s motion for conditional certification. The case concerned allegations of impermissible tip credit, inadequate notice of same (under 203(m)), and other allegations of unpaid minimum wages. As further discussed here, defendants largely focused their attack on their twin contentions that the class proposed by plaintiff was not similarly situated to him and/or was too broad, because it contained English speakers (the plaintiff did not speak English) and employees and former employees who had signed arbitration agreements (the plaintiff did not). The court rejected both of these contentions, and reasoned that neither of these factors were appropriately considered at Stage I, the conditional certification stage.

Rejecting the defendant’s arguments in this regard, and holding that such issues were more properly reserved for Stage II or decertification analysis, the court reasoned:

The Court disagrees with defendants’ arguments. Case law imposes only a very limited burden on plaintiffs for purposes of proceeding as a conditional collective action. “[C]ourts have conditionally certified collective actions under the FLSA where plaintiffs, based on their firsthand observations, identify an approximate class of similarly situated individuals.” Hernandez v. Immortal Rise, Inc ., 2012 WL 4369746, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2012). Here, Romero has done just that, stating in his declaration that he “personally observed … Defendants’ policy to pay below the statutory minimum wage rate to all tipped employees,” that he and other tipped employees were compensated “all at rates below the minimum wage,” that he has never seen a tipped employee “receive proper notice explaining what a tip credit is,” that he and other tipped employees had to spend more than 20% of their daily time in non-tipped related activities, that he observed defendants engaging in time-shaving, that he observed when employees were sent home without call-in pay if the restaurant was not busy, and that he “personally observed that all non-exempt employees received the same form of wage and hour notice.” Romero Decl. ¶¶ 2–9. The affidavit of a plaintiff attesting to the existence of similarly situated plaintiffs is sufficient for the purposes of a motion to approve a collective action. See Cheng Chung Liang v. J.C. Broadway Restaurant, Inc., 2013 WL 2284882, at *2–3 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2013) (“For the purposes of this motion, … plaintiffs’ evidence—in the form of [one employee's] affidavit—is sufficient to establish that … there may be class members with whom he is similarly situated.”). Thus, Romero has made a sufficient showing that he and potential plaintiffs “were victims of a common policy or plan that violated the law.” Hoffman, 982 F.Supp. at 261.

Defendants’ principal argument is that because other employees signed arbitration agreements, Romero is not similarly situated to these other employees. Def. Mem. at 6–14. Defendants assert that the claims here are “properly pursued solely in arbitration, on an individual basis, by all of Ruhlmann’s employees who signed such an agreement” and therefore that “Ruhlmann’s employees are dissimilar from Plaintiff Romero and must pursue any claims they may have in an arbitral forum rather than federal court.” Def. Mem. at 8–9. Romero challenges both the enforceability and the validity of these arbitration agreements. He argues that the agreements are not enforceable because they violate the fee-shifting provision of the FLSA. Reply at 6–7. Romero also argues that defendants caused several of these agreements to be signed by coercion, that it is highly likely that several employees did not actually sign arbitration agreements, and that the validity of the signatures on several agreements are questionable. Reply at 7–9; Pl. May 31 Letter at 2. Additionally, he asserts that the agreements are unenforceable because they limit the statute of limitations on employees’ claims to six months and because they were not provided to employees in their native language. Pl. Aug. 20 Letter at 2–3.

As already noted, the question on a motion to proceed as a collective action is whether the proposed plaintiffs are similarly situated “with respect to their allegations that the law has been violated.” Young, 229 F.R.D. at 54; accord Meyers, 624 F.3d at 555 (in conditional collective action approval, question is whether the proposed plaintiffs are similarly situated to the named plaintiffs “with respect to whether a FLSA violation has occurred”). The arbitration agreements do not create any differences between Romero and the proposed plaintiffs with respect to Romero’s claims that defendants have violated the FLSA. That is, the validity vel non of the agreements is unrelated to any claims of a violation of the FLSA. Under this reasoning, the existence of differences between potential plaintiffs as to the arbitrability of their claims should not act as a bar to the collective action analysis. Indeed, courts have consistently held that the existence of arbitration agreements is “irrelevant” to collective action approval “because it raises a merits-based determination.” D’Antuono v. C & G of Groton, Inc., 2011 WL 5878045, at *4 (D.Conn. Nov. 23, 2011) (citing cases); accord Hernandez, 2012 WL 4369746, at *5;Salomon v. Adderly Indus., Inc., 847 F.Supp.2d 561, 565 (S.D.N.Y.2012) (“The relevant issue here, however, is not whether Plaintiffs and [potential opt-in plaintiffs] were identical in all respects, but rather whether they were subjected to a common policy to deprive them of overtime pay ….”) (alteration in original) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

In support of its argument that the existence of arbitration agreements merits denial of collective action approval, defendants make arguments about the eventual enforceability of the arbitration agreements and rely on cases in which courts granted motions to dismiss and compel arbitration because of such agreements. See Def. Mem. at 6–7. Critically, defendants do not even address the cases holding that consideration of the validity of arbitration agreements is inappropriate in the context of a motion to approval an FLSA collective action. The situation here is thus akin to the situation in Raniere v. Citigroup Inc., 827 F.Supp.2d 294 (S.D .N.Y.2011), rev’d on other grounds, 2013 WL 4046278 (2d Cir.2013), in which the court remarked:

Defendants have failed to cite a single authority finding that due to the possibility that members of the collective [action] might be compelled to bring their claims in an arbitral forum, certification is not appropriate. Such arguments are best suited to the second certification stage, where, on a fuller record, the court will examine whether the plaintiffs and opt-ins are in fact similarly situated.

Id. at 324.

Defendants’ strongest argument is that “[i]t would be a waste of judicial and party resource to force defendants” to send notice to individuals ultimately bound to arbitrate claims. Def. June 4 Letter at 3. But the notice requirement is not unduly burdensome in this case and the defendants’ proposal essentially amounts to an invitation for the Court to adjudicate the validity of the arbitration agreements. But, as already noted, case law makes clear that this sort of merits-based determination should not take place at the first stage of the conditional collective action approval process. Plaintiff has raised at least colorable arguments to support the invalidity or unenforceability of the arbitration agreements, some of which are fact-intensive. Case law holds, however, that issues of fact surrounding arbitration agreements are properly resolved at the second stage of the two-step inquiry. D’Antuono, 2011 WL 5878045, at *5; accord Salomon, 847 F.Supp.2d at 565 (“[A] fact-intensive inquiry is inappropriate at the notice stage, as Plaintiffs are seeking only conditional certification.”) (citing cases); Ali v. Sugarland Petroleum, 2009 WL 5173508, at *4 (S.D.Tex. Dec. 22, 2009) (“The Court will make the determination [of whether to exclude those who signed arbitration agreement from the class] at the conclusion of discovery, when it may properly analyze the validity of the arbitration agreement.”). Defendants not only fail to distinguish these cases, they do not even proffer any argument as to why the reasoning of these cases is wrong.

Defendants have submitted evidence contradicting Romero’s claim that he is similarly situated to other employees with respect to other aspects of his claims, such as his understanding of the tip credit. See Collin Decl. ¶ 9. However, “the two-stage certification process exists to help develop the factual record, not put an end to an action on an incomplete one.” Griffith v. Fordham Fin. Mgmt., Inc., 2013 WL 2247791, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 2013) (granting collective action approval where defendant had put forth “contravening evidence”) (emphasis omitted) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). For these reasons, Romero’s motion for conditional approval of a collective action is granted.

Click Romero v La Revise Associates, L.L.C. to read the court’s entire Opinion & Order.

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N.D.Ohio: Where Defendant Retains Right to Reject Contracts Obtained by Door-to-Door Solicitors, Otherwise Allowed by Law to Enter Into Contracts, Outside Sales Exemption Inapplicable

Hurt v. Commerce Energy, Inc.

Following the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., courts continue to grapple with the issue of who is engaged in making sales, within the definition of the FLSA’s outside sales definition versus who simply helps solicit or promote sales to be made by others. This recent case distinguished door-to-door solicitors, who worked for the defendant energy company, from Christopher, and held that their duties could be non-exempt and more akin to those of the student salesman and military recruiters that Christopher in turn had distinguished from the pharmaceutical sales reps involved in that case. As such, the court denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. In so doing, the court provided some needed guidance on the issue of who is engaged in sales and who is not, for purposes of application of the “outside sales exemption.”

The court discussed the following facts relevant to this issue:

The Plaintiffs worked as door-to-door salespeople for Just Energy Marketing. They worked at various times from 2009 to 2013 at Just Energy’s Beachwood, Ohio office. During most of that time, Dennis Piazza was the regional distributor for the Beachwood office. Just Energy says that Piazza is an independent contractor himself, and his business is separately incorporated as Star Energy, Inc.

A. Ohio Regulations & PUCO

Because Just Energy operates in multiple states, it adopted policies to have its door-to-door workers comply with Ohio regulations. Specifically, in Ohio, the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (“PUCO”) regulates energy suppliers like Just Energy. Generally, PUCO requires suppliers who solicit door-to-door to provide customers with acknowledgment forms; have independent third-party verification of at least fifty percent of all its customers; print terms and conditions in tenpoint type or greater; and require the door-to-door solicitors to display a valid photo identification.

But Just Energy’s door-to-door solicitors have additional requirements. In 2010, Commerce Energy entered into a settlement agreement with the Ohio PUCO to renew its retail natural gas supplier certificate. That agreement resulted from an investigation into customer complaints about the sales, solicitation, and enrollment practices of Just Energy’s residential door-to-door solicitors.

In the settlement, Commerce Energy agreed to implement an in-state quality assurance program “to provide the company with additional oversight of its sales force, as well as retrain all Ohio sales agents to assure compliance with PUCO’s rules.” Commerce also agreed that all its new customers would be subject to a new third-party independent verification process. That process requires door-to-door solicitors to initiate a third-party verification call before leaving the premises. The solicitors cannot be present on the premises during the call, and they cannot return to the premises after the call. Just Energy’s policies for its Ohio door-to-door solicitors reflect these requirements.

B. Hiring and Orientation

For its door-to-door solicitors, Just Energy often hires low-skill workers, many without prior sales experience. At its Beachwood office, Just Energy regional distributors and supervisors conducted short interviews before hiring these workers, sometimes completing the interviews in large groups. After the interviews, Just Energy required its solicitors to sign employment contracts.

The contracts required the Plaintiffs to comply with federal, state, and local laws and regulations and Just Energy Marketing’s codes of behavior. Further, the contracts said that the Plaintiffs would be paid a commission “according to the commission schedule in place at the time.” During the Plaintiffs’ employment, the commission schedule said that Just Energy paid the Plaintiffs approximately $35 for every order that they obtained. According to Just Energy, the Plaintiffs also “enjoyed the potential to earn productivity bonuses and additional commissions if customers remained with Commerce for certain periods of time.” But if “a customer cancelled an agreement after signing, then no commissions were paid at all; if the customer cancelled after the commission was already paid, it was subject to recoupment.”

After signing their employment contracts, Just Energy required its door-to-door workers to attend an orientation session led by a regional distributor. These orientation sessions covered a number of topics “including company and industry background, the products and services being sold, and helpful sales techniques.” After the orientation, Just Energy generally required the Plaintiffs to shadow a more experienced solicitor in the field for one or two days before soliciting customers on their own. Just Energy provided a script for the workers to use with customers. The Plaintiffs used these scripts to varying degrees.

C. Disputed Roles and Responsibilities

Just Energy and the Plaintiffs disagree about their respective roles and responsibilities. According to Just Energy, the Plaintiffs’ primary responsibilities were “knocking on potential customers’ doors, selling Commerce’s services and obtaining signed sales agreements for Commerce’s energy supplies.” Just Energy says that the “Plaintiffs were absolutely allowed to travel and work independently.” It says that they worked free from supervision, and Just Energy did not require them to work particular hours. Both parties agree, however, that the Plaintiffs worked approximately six to seven days a week for approximately twelve hours a day.

In contrast, the Plaintiffs say that Just Energy subjected them to significant supervision. They say that Just Energy regional distributors and supervisors controlled the length of the Plaintiffs’ work week and work day by assigning them to a work crew and van, sending the vans to solicit specific neighborhoods, and prohibiting the vans from returning to the office before 9 p.m. The Plaintiffs also say that Just Energy regional distributors required the Plaintiffs to knock on a specific number of doors and obtain a certain number of orders, required the Plaintiffs to report to the office every morning, prevented the Plaintiffs from working independently, controlled the Plaintiffs’ break time, and required the Plaintiffs to purchase and wear Just Energy branded clothing.

Initially, the court rejected the defendant’s contention that the plaintiffs “made sales” as defined by the outside sales exemption, as a matter of law:

The Plaintiffs’ evidence raises a genuine issue of material fact about whether they were “making sales,” and thus, qualified as outside salesman. FLSA does not define “outside salesman,” instead leaving it to be “defined and delimited … by regulations of the Secretary [of Labor].” The Department of Labor defines “outside salesman” as “any employee … [w]hose primary duty is … making sales within the meaning of [29 U.S.C. § 203(k) ]” and who is “customarily and regularly engaged away from the employer’s place or places of business in performing such primary duty.” Section 203(k) defines a “sale” as “any sale, exchange, contract to sell, consignment for sale, shipment for sale, or other disposition.”

In Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., the United States Supreme Court found that pharmaceutical representatives were exempt outside salespeople even though they did not actually accomplish a “sale” of drugs to the patient. Because Congress meant to define sales broadly to “accommodate industry-by-industry variations in methods of selling commodities,” the Supreme Court said that courts should consider the impact of regulatory requirements or “arrangements that are tantamount, in a particular industry, to a paradigmatic sale of a commodity.” Thus, because federal regulations prevented the pharmaceutical representatives from engaging in the actual sale of drugs to the patient, the Supreme Court found it was enough that the representatives “promoted” sales to doctors who in turn made “nonbinding commitments” to prescribe the drugs to their patients.

In Clements v. Serco, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that military recruiters were not exempt outside salespeople because they lacked the authority to enlist a recruit. There, recruiters “sold” potential recruits on the idea of the Army, but the Army retained the authority to enlist recruits. The Tenth Circuit held that the recruiters did not “make sales” because the Army required the recruits to report to a military processing station for a physical, job selection, and an oath before enlisting. Because the Army retained discretion to enlist a recruit, the recruiters were not outside salesman.

Similarly, in Wirtz v. Keystone Readers, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that “student salesman” were not outside salesman. There, a company hired student salesman to “obtain orders” for magazine subscriptions by door-to-door solicitation. The company required the student salesman to give their order cards to a “student manager,” who then contacted the customer, verified the customer met the company’s qualifications, and passed the order on to a “verifier.” The verifier then checked the order to make sure that the customer met the company’s qualifications. Only then did the company execute a contract. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the student salesman were not outside salesman because they did not “mak[e] sales of their own.”

Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, Just Energy fails to show, as a matter of law, that the Plaintiffs “made sales.” Just Energy says that Christopher should control because the Plaintiffs obtained “far more” than the nonbindinding commitments at issue in Christopher. The Court agrees that the Plaintiffs obtained contracts, but Christopher is distinguishable.

The court reasoned that unlike the pharmaceutical reps in Christopher, here the plaintiffs were not prohibited from entering into binding contracts as a matter of law, rather it was defendant’s internal policies alone that stopped them from doing so:

Unlike the pharmaceutical representatives in Christopher, the Plaintiffs are not prohibited from completing a contract by state or federal regulations. Instead, Just Energy prevented the Plaintiffs from completing a sale by retaining unlimited discretion to accept and reject the orders obtained by the Plaintiffs. For example, in Just Energy’s New Customer User Guide, Just Energy says: “This Agreement will become firm and binding when (i) Just Energy accepts this Agreement, and (ii) the LDC [local distributor] accepts and successfully implements the Customer’s enrolment submission from Just Energy.” Similarly, in Just Energy’s Regional Distributor Services Agreement, Just Energy says: “The Service Provider and the Principal understand and agree that JUST ENERGY or any Affiliate thereof retain the sole and unfettered discretion to reject any Energy Contract submitted (whether by an Independent Contractor, the Principal or the Service Provider).”

Here, neither Ohio law nor the PUCO agreement require Just Energy to retain unlimited rejection authority. And Just Energy has failed to provide evidence showing that this right to reject contracts was necessary to comply with regulations or the PUCO agreement. Just Energy has not shown that it accepts agreements that comply with the applicable regulations. The contracts the Plaintiffs bring to Just Energy are merely proposals until Just Energy accepts them. Therefore, because Just Energy retains an unlimited right of rejection, the Plaintiffs are more like the student salesman in Wirtz and the military recruiters in Serco whose employers retained discretion to accept and reject their orders.

Additionally, like the magazine company in Wirtz, Just Energy required the Plaintiffs to submit their orders for further review before Just Energy chose to accept or reject them. While it is true that Just Energy’s evidence shows that the PUCO agreement requires Just Energy to conduct third-party verification, Just Energy has failed to show that the regulations require a credit check and approval of the customer by the local distributor. Thus, the Plaintiffs’ evidence raises a genuine issue of material fact about whether the Plaintiffs were “making sales,” and thus, qualified for the outside salesman exemption.

The court also reasoned that the “external indicia” did not support defendant’s contention that the plaintiffs were engaged in outside sales, further distinguishing the case from Christopher. Last, the court relied on the FLSA’s purpose, and reasoned that here- unlike the $70,000 a year (plus) pharmaceutical reps at issue in Christopher- the FLSA’s guiding principles supported a finding that the plaintiffs were not outside sales exempt.

Subsequent to this decision, the defendant sought interlocutory review of the decision, but the motion for same was denied. Nonetheless, this one is likely headed to the Sixth Circuit, and it’s unclear what they will do with it. Stay tuned for a further update here if/when the Sixth Circuit ultimately weighs in.

Click Hurt v. Commerce Energy, Inc. to read the full Opinion and Order.

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6th Cir.: Purportedly “Volunteer” Firefighters, Paid Per Call as Independent Contractors, Are “Employees” Under FLSA

Mendel v. City of Gibraltar

This case was before the Sixth Circuit, following the district court’s order granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Although the case concerned the issue of whether the defendant-City met the prerequisite for FMLA coverage (number of employees), the issue considered by the Sixth Circuit was “purportedly volunteer firefighters who receive a substantial hourly wage for responding to calls whenever they choose to do so are “employees” or “volunteers” for purposes of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”).” The Sixth Circuit held that the firefighters at issue were employees rather than volunteers, such that the defendant met the number of employee requirement to trigger FMLA coverage.

The Sixth Circuit laid out the following facts relevant to its inquiry of whether the firefighters were properly deemed to be employees or volunteers:

The volunteer firefighters of Gibraltar must complete training on their own time without compensation.  While they are not required to respond to any emergency call, they are paid $15 per hour for the time they do spend responding to a call or maintaining equipment. They do not work set shifts or staff a fire station; they maintain other employment and have no consistent schedule working as volunteer firefighters.  The firefighters generally receive a Form–1099 MISC from the City. They do not receive health insurance, sick or vacation time, social security benefits, or premium pay. The City does have an employment application for the firefighters, and it apparently keeps a personnel file for each firefighter. A volunteer firefighter may be promoted or discharged.  [The Plaintiff] introduced evidence below of what several other local communities pay their full-time firefighters. According to his wife’s affidavit, she and Mendel discovered that certain other communities in the area pay hourly wages ranging from approximately $14 to $17 per hour. Also, the City pays its own part-time Fire Chief $20,000 per year, and the Chief testified in his deposition that he “tr[ies] to work 20 hours per week at the [Gibraltar] fire station.” Based on this information, the Secretary of Labor notes in her amicus brief that if one assumes the Fire Chief works fifty-two weeks per year, he effectively earns $19.23 per hour.

After explaining that the FMLA’s definition of “employees” incorporates the FLSA’s definition, the Court then examined the issue under the FLSA. Holding that the firefighters were employees and not volunteers, the Court explained:

Here, it appears that the Gibraltar firefighters fall within the FLSA’s broad definition of employee. The firefighters are suffered or permitted to work, see
29 U.S.C. § 203(g), and they even receive substantial wages for their work.

This is not the end of our analysis, however. In 1986, Congress amended the FLSA to clarify that individuals who volunteer to perform services for a public agency are not employees under the Act. Section 203(e) now includes the following provision:

The term “employee” does not include any individual who volunteers to perform services for a public agency which is a State, a political subdivision of a State, or an interstate governmental agency, if—

(i) the individual receives no compensation or is paid expenses, reasonable benefits, or a nominal fee to perform the services for which the individual volunteered; and

(ii) such services are not the same type of services which the individual is employed to perform for such public agency.

29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(4)(A).

Thus, the question becomes whether the Gibraltar firefighters fall within this exception to the FLSA’s generally broad definition of “employee.” Specifically, the question before us is whether the wages paid to the firefighters constitute “compensation” or merely a “nominal fee.” If the hourly wages are compensation, then the firefighters are employees under the FLSA. Conversely, if the wages are merely a nominal fee, then the firefighters are volunteers expressly excluded from the FLSA’s definition of employee.

The official regulations provide guidance at this juncture. The regulations define “volunteer” as “[a]n individual who performs hours of service for a public agency for civic, charitable, or humanitarian reasons, without promise, expectation or receipt of compensation for services rendered.” 29 C.F.R. § 553.101(a); see also 29 C.F.R. § 553.104(a) (employing similar language). The regulations proceed to recognize, “Volunteers may be paid expenses, reasonable benefits, a nominal fee, or any combination thereof, for their service without losing their status as volunteers.” 29 C.F.R. § 553.106(a). The specific provision addressing nominal fees provides, in part, “A nominal fee is not a substitute for compensation and must not be tied to productivity. However, this does not preclude the payment of a nominal amount on a ‘per call’ or similar basis to volunteer firefighters.” 29 C.F.R. § 553.106(e). Finally, the regulations caution, “Whether the furnishing of expenses, benefits, or fees would result in individuals’ losing their status as volunteers under the FLSA can only be determined by examining the total amount of payments made (expenses, benefits, fees) in the context of the economic realities of the particular situation.” 29 C.F.R. § 553.106(f).

In the context of the economic realities of this particular situation, we hold that the hourly wages paid to the Gibraltar firefighters are not nominal fees, but are compensation under the FLSA. The firefighters do not receive “a nominal amount on a ‘per call’ or similar basis.” 29 C.F.R. § 553.106(e). Rather, they render services with the promise, expectation, and receipt of substantial compensation. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 553.101(a), 553.104(a). Each time a firefighter responds to a call, he knows he will receive compensation at a particular hourly rate—which happens to be substantially similar to the hourly rates paid to full-time employed firefighters in some of the neighboring areas. Essentially, the Gibraltar firefighters are paid a regular wage for whatever time they choose to spend responding to calls. These substantial hourly wages simply do not qualify as nominal fees. Cf. Purdham v. Fairfax Cnty. Sch. Bd., 637 F.3d 421, 433–34 (4th Cir.2011) (holding that a School Board’s payment of a fixed stipend to a golf coach was a nominal fee where: (1) the stipend amount did not change based on either how much time and effort the coach expended on coaching activities or how successful the team was; and (2) the approximate hourly rate to which the coach’s stipend could be converted was only a fraction (less than¼) of the hourly wage he received as a full-time security assistant employed by the School Board).

Notably, the Supreme Court has held that those who “work in contemplation of compensation” are “employees” within the meaning of the FLSA, even though they may view themselves as “volunteers.” Tony & Susan Alamo Found., 471 U.S. at 300–02, 306, 105 S.Ct. 1953. Despite the fact that the Gibraltar firefighters are referred to as “volunteers,” the inescapable fact nevertheless remains that they “work in contemplation of compensation.” Thus, the Gibraltar firefighters are “employees” and not “volunteers” within the meaning of the FLSA. See Krause v. Cherry Hill Fire Dist. 13, 969 F.Supp. 270, 277 (D.N.J.1997) (“In view of the fact that the plaintiffs [firefighters] both expected and received hourly compensation, in an amount greater than a ‘nominal’ fee, it is clear that plaintiffs were not volunteers….”).

Finally, the Court rejected the defendant’s contention—apparently adopted by the court below, that the firefighters were not “employees” under the FLSA, because they fell within the purview of 207(y).

Thus, the Court concluded “under the relevant authority and the facts of this case, we are constrained to hold that, simply put, the substantial wages paid to these firefighters constitute compensation, not nominal fees, which makes the Gibraltar firefighters employees, not volunteers, for purposes of the FLSA and FMLA.”

Click Mendel v. City of Gibraltar to read the entire Opinion. Click DOL Amicus Brief, to read the DOL’s Brief in support of the Plaintiff-Appellant, relied upon in part by the Court.

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W.D.Tex.: Hourly Pay for Weekend Work, Identical to Work Performed During Week and Purportedly Paid at “Day Rates,” Rendered So-Called “Hybrid” Day Rates Impermissible

Rodriguez v Republic Services, Inc.

This case was before the court on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. At issue was whether the defendants pay policy—whereby they paid their trash collector employees purported “day rates” for days worked during the week (i.e. Monday-Friday) and hourly pay for weekend work—complied with 29 C.F.R. § 778.112, the regulation governing payment of day rates. The court held that it did not, because violated the clear language of the regulation and because the plaintiffs performed the same work during the week for the defendants as they did on the weekends (i.e. it was 2 different forms of pay for the same type of work). Following the court’s order denying their motion for summary judgment, the defendants sought reconsideration, which was also denied by the court with a further explanation. Both order are discussed here.

Discussing the facts relevant to its inquiry, the court explained:

Defendant BFI Waste Services of Texas, LP d/b/a Allied Waste Services of San Antonio (“BFI”) operates a residential collection, recycling and waste disposal business in and around San Antonio, Texas. Gilbert Rodriguez (“Plaintiff Rodriguez”) and Refugio Campos (“Plaintiff Campos”) were employed by BFI as Residential Route Drivers and thus were primarily responsible for driving through various residential garbage routes collecting and disposing of residential waste. Plaintiff Rodriguez worked for BFI from August of 2012 until February of 2013, while Plaintiff Campos worked for BFI from September of 2012 until November of 2012. 

During the relevant time period, BFI paid Plaintiff Rodriguez and Plaintiff Campos (collectively “Plaintiffs”) under a “hybrid compensation plan” that included payments based on both a daily and hourly rate. For the five regularly scheduled work days of the week, Plaintiffs were paid a base day rate of $120. Plaintiffs were also required on occasion to work a day during the weekend (the “Sixth Day”) at the discretion of their supervisor. On the Sixth Day, despite Plaintiffs performing the same work as on the regularly scheduled days, Plaintiffs were paid at an hourly rate based upon each employee’s regular rate of pay for a trailing thirteen-week average. In addition, it appears that Plaintiffs were provided “incentive payments” of $10 for each day worked, including both the regularly scheduled days and the Sixth Day.

If Plaintiffs worked for more than forty hours in a workweek, BFI paid them overtime. The way in which BFI calculated this overtime is exemplified by the pay stub of Plaintiff Rodriguez for the week ending on September 1, 2012. During this week, Plaintiff Rodriguez worked for a total of 51.23 hours at a day rate of $120 over the five regularly scheduled work days. In addition, Plaintiff Rodriguez worked for 6.12 hours on the Sixth Day at an hourly rate of $15. Thus, when taking into account the $60 incentive payment, Plaintiff Rodriguez’s compensation for 57.35 hours was $751.80.

To calculate Plaintiff Rodriguez’s overtime compensation, BFI first determined the “regular rate of pay” by dividing Plaintiff Rodriguez’s total non-overtime compensation for the week by his total number of hours worked. Specifically, BFI divided Plaintiff Rodriguez’s total non-overtime compensation of $751.80 by his 57.35 hours worked. Accordingly, the resulting “regular rate of pay” obtained by BFI for the week ending on September 1, 2012, was $13.11.

BFI then paid Plaintiff Rodriguez overtime for all hours worked in excess of forty at half their regular rate of pay. For the week ending on September 1, 2012, this meant that BFI paid Plaintiff Rodriguez 17.35 hours of overtime at $6.55 per hour, for a total of $113.72 in overtime pay. BFI then added this overtime amount to Plaintiff Rodriguez’s “straight-time” compensation, found by applying the regular rate of $13.11 to all 57.35 hours, to arrive at Plaintiff Rodriguez’s total compensation of $865.52 for the week.

After a brief discussion of 778.112 and 778.115 (the regulation which permits an employer to pay 2 different amounts/types of pay for 2 different types of work), the court explained that 778.115 was inapplicable to the case, because the plaintiffs here performed the same type of work, regardless of the day of the week (i.e. the defendants could not substantiate the hourly pay on this ground). The court similarly analyzed and disposed of the defendants’ 3 remaining arguments as well.

First, the court rejected the defendants’ reliance on a 1967 DOL opinion letter, again reasoning same was distinguishable because there the employees performed 2 different types of work, unlike here:

Defendants have provided the Court with a 1967 DOL opinion letter which Defendants argue demonstrates the DOL’s approval of a compensation plan “very similar to the one at issue in this case.” The scenario addressed in the opinion letter revolved around school bus drivers who were also employed as custodians and who were compensated at a day rate of $10. In addition, these bus drivers were paid $2.00 per hour for taking extra bus trips. The letter goes to outline the method for calculating an employee’s regular rate of pay under sections 778.112 and 778.115, before appearing to conclude that the regular rate of pay for these employees could be calculated under section 778.112 by adding the wages earned at both the day and hourly rates and then dividing by the total hours worked in the week. From this, Defendants reason that the DOL has previously approved “essentially the same compensation structure” as the one at issue.

As an initial matter; and despite Defendants assertions to the contrary, the Court finds that the scenario described in the DOL opinion letter is distinguishable from the compensation scheme employed by BFI. Specifically, it is stated in the letter that the employment arrangement being addressed is one “[w]here employees perform two types of duties.” As noted above, however, the employment arrangement between BFI and its Residential Route Drivers involves the performance of identical work on different days for different rates. Accordingly, the Court finds the arrangement described in the 1967 DOL letter to be different from BFI’s employment arrangement and compensation scheme in this significant respect. Moreover, the Supreme Court has recognized that opinion letters like the one provided by Defendants are “entitled to respect in proportion to their power to persuade.” Wos v. E.M. A., ––– U.S. ––––, ––––, 133 S.Ct. 1391, 1402, 185 L.Ed.2d 471 (2013). Here, in indicating that the employees could be compensated under the day rate regulation despite receiving an additional hourly rate, the opinion letter appears to completely ignore the language in section 778.112 concerning any “other form of compensation.”

Next the court rejected the defendants contentions relying on the text of 778.112 itself:

Defendants also argue that, when viewed in the proper context, the DOL regulation concerning day rates supports BFI’s “hybrid” compensation plan. To reach this conclusion, Defendants correctly note that following section 778.109 in the FLSA regulations is a list of “some” different compensation arrangements and the proper method for calculating the employee’s regular rate of pay under each. See 29 C.F.R. § 778.109. Given this context, Defendants reason that section 778.112 merely sets forth one specific situation in which the DOL chose to illustrate the proper regular rate calculation. In other words, Defendants believe that section 778.112 only demonstrates the proper calculation method for scenarios in which an employee is paid a day rate and “no other form of compensation for services.” Defendants therefore conclude that while this regulation exemplifies one way that a regular rate of pay may be determined, it does not serve as a categorical rule prohibiting employers from providing additional compensation to employees paid on a day rate basis.

Once again, the Court is not persuaded by Defendants’ argument. The Court does not find that the DOL regulations provide support for the possibility of a compensation scheme awarding both day and hourly rates for the completion of the same type of work. The only regulation which explicitly covers employment arrangements involving two different rates being paid to an employee is section 778.115, and this section expressly requires that the employee undertake “different kinds of work.” See
29 C.F.R. § 778.115 (section titled “Employees working at two or more rates”). Further, section 778.112, upon which Defendants rely, appears to directly contradict the notion that an employee may be compensated on the basis of both a day and hourly rate. Rather, section 778.112 states that it covers employees that are paid a day rate and who also receive “no other form of compensation for services.” Id. at § 778.112.

Finally, the court rejected the defendants’ reliance on 778.111:

Finally, Defendants argue that BFI’s payment scheme is consistent with the compensation arrangement set out in section 778.111 which discusses employees compensated on a piece rate basis. See 29 C .F.R. § 778.111. Defendants assert that the piece rate regulation endorses a hybrid compensation plan like BFI’s because it provides an example of an arrangement under which an employee is paid on both a piece rate and hourly basis.14 The example cited by Defendants appears in the regulation as follows:

[I]f the employee has worked 50 hours and has earned $ 491 at piece rates for 46 hours of productive work and in addition has been compensated at $ 8.00 an hour for 4 hours of waiting time, the total compensation, $ 523.00, must be divided by the total hours of work, 50, to arrive at the regular hourly rate of pay—$ 10.46.

29 C.F.R. § 778.111.

The Court is not persuaded by Defendants’ analogy between BFI’s hybrid compensation plan and the arrangement described in the piece rate regulation. Rather, the Court finds that it is more appropriate to compare this example, which involves payment based upon both a flat piece rate as well as an hourly rate to compensate the employee for waiting time, to the scenario in which hospital personnel are compensated for being on-site and on-call. This latter scenario was at issue in Townsend v. Mercy Hospital of Pittsburgh, a Third Circuit case involving hospital personnel that received one wage for their performance of active duties, and another for working “on-premises-on-call” shifts. 862 F.2d at 1010–11. During these “on-premises-on-call” shifts, the hospital personnel were required to stay on the hospital’s premises, but had no assigned duties and were free to eat, sleep, read, and watch television. Id. at 1011. Given the substantive difference in duties, the Third Circuit determined that the personnel’s active periods constituted a different kind of work from the on-call shift when the only responsibility was to be present. Id. at 1011–12.

Viewing the section 778.111 example in light of such authority, the Court finds that the “waiting time” compensation described therein is easily analogous to the “on-premises-on-call” compensation received by the hospital personnel in Townsend. Thus, the employee’s “waiting time” in the example is best viewed as a different kind of work from the active duties being compensated under a piece rate. As noted above, however, the work being performed by BFI’s Residential Route Drivers remains the same throughout the entirety of the workweek, including the occasional Sixth Day. Consequently, rather than endorsing a hybrid compensation arrangement like the one employed by BFI, the example provided in the piece rate regulation and cited by Defendants is distinguishable.

In light of the foregoing, the court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and held the plaintiffs’ motion in abeyance.

Thereafter, the defendants sought reconsideration of the Order denying their motion for summary judgment. The court denied the defendants’ motion and granted the plaintiffs’ still pending motion for summary judgment. Using even stronger language the second time around, and again denying the defendants’ motion, the court reasoned:

In this case the parties appear to agree that if Plaintiffs only worked Monday through Friday and Defendants had merely paid the Plaintiffs their day rate, section 778.112 would apply. In this scenario, rather than receiving overtime at one and one-half times the regular rate, Plaintiffs would only receive overtime at half-time the regular rate. For whatever business reasons, the employer here employed two additional compensation methods in the payroll system. To acquiesce to this system, however, the court would have to rewrite section 778.112 as follows: If the employee is paid a flat sum for a day’s work … without regard to the number of hours worked in the day …, and if he receives no other form of compensation for services, his regular rate is determined by totaling all the sums received at such day rates … in the workweek and dividing by the total hours actually worked. See Rodriguez v. Carey Intern., Inc., 2004 WL 5582173 (S.D.Fla. Sept.15, 2004) (“[Section 778.112] does not provide definitional contours, nor is there case law to explain the clause. But the most logical and likely reasoning is that the regulation does not apply if one of the other forms of compensation delineated in the surrounding regulations is also utilized, or if the employee is given some other form of compensation separate and apart from the job rate. For example, if besides a job rate, an employee also receives an hourly rate, salary, or commission, for some of his work, the job rate regulation would not apply.”).

While these 2 decisions should seem to be “no-brainers” based on the clear statutory language of 778.112, surprisingly not all courts have agreed the language in 778.112 means what it says. For this reason, these decisions are noteworthy.

Click Rodriguez v Republic Services, Inc. to read the initial Order denying the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and Order on Reconsideration for the Order denying the motion for reconsideration.

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11th Cir.: Absent Judgment in Plaintiff’s Favor, Offer Did Not Moot FLSA Claims; Mandatory Attorney’s Fees Due

Wolff v Royal American Management, Inc.

Following an order approving the settlement between the parties and an award of attorneys’ fees and costs to the plaintiff, as the prevailing party, the defendant appealed arguing that their tender of damages to plaintiff in exchange for a general release mooted the claims. Rejecting this assertion, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the order below and held that an FLSA defendant cannot moot a claim for unpaid wages, absent an offer of judgment in favor of the plaintiff.

Summarizing the relevant facts and procedural history, the Eleventh Circuit explained:

The relevant background is this. After filing a complaint alleging FLSA violations, Wolff calculated that RAM had failed to pay her $1800 in overtime wages. Liquidated damages under the FLSA in the same amount brought her total itemized damages claim to $3600. In December 2011, RAM tendered $3600 to plaintiff through her attorney, and moved to dismiss the complaint; Wolff’s counsel returned the check. In December 2012, RAM offered to settle the case for $5000, but Wolff’s counsel claimed that he never submitted the offer to Wolff because it was never put into writing. Nevertheless, in February 2012, Wolff received a 1099 form reflecting a payment of $3600, and called RAM to determine the reason for the 1099. RAM informed Wolff for the first time of the prior tender to her counsel, and Wolff said she wanted to settle the case. Wolff then met with RAM, signed a general release and took the $3600 check. Thereafter, the parties moved the court to determine whether the payment and release rendered the action moot, stripping Wolff of attorneys’ fees on the ground that there was no judgment in the case to indicate that Wolff was the prevailing party. The district court ultimately approved the settlement as reasonable, even though the parties reached the settlement without the participation of Wolff’s counsel. The district court further found that the settlement had not mooted the lawsuit, and later awarded Wolff’s counsel $61,810.44 in fees and costs. This timely appeal follows.

Discussing recent FLSA jurisprudence regarding mandatory fees and the ability (or lack thereof) of a defendant to moot a claim for same, the Court explained:

Under the FLSA,

Any employer who violates the provisions of section 206 or section 207 of this title shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be, and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages …. The court in such action shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney’s fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the action.

29 U.S.C. § 216(b). We have said that because the FLSA seeks to protect employees from “inequalities in bargaining power between employers and employees,” Congress had made its provisions mandatory. Lynn’s Food Stores, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t. of Labor, 679 F.2d 1350, 1352 (11th Cir.1982). Thus, “FLSA rights cannot be abridged by contract or otherwise waived because this would nullify the purposes of the statute and thwart the legislative policies it was designed to effectuate.” Id. (quotation omitted). We’ve also held that “[t]he FLSA plainly requires that the plaintiff receive a judgment in his favor to be entitled to attorney’s fees and costs.” Dionne v. Floormasters Enters., Inc., 667 F.3d 1199, 1205 (11th Cir.2012).

The Supreme Court, considering the fee-shifting provisions in “[n]umerous federal statutes [that] allow courts to award attorney’s fees and costs to the ‘prevailing party,’ ” has recognized that a plaintiff is a prevailing party only when she obtains either (1) a judgment on the merits, or (2) a settlement agreement “enforced through a consent decree.” Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t. of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 603–604 (2001), superseded by statute on other grounds, Open Government Act of 2007, Pub.L. No. 110–175, 121 Stat. 2524. The Buckhannon Court reasoned that a prevailing party needs a judgment or consent decree to prove that there has been an “alteration in the legal relationship of the parties.” Id. at 605. Thus, in the absence of a judgment on the merits, to be a prevailing party, the FLSA plaintiff needs a stipulated or consent judgment or its “functional equivalent” from the district court evincing the court’s determination that the settlement “is a fair and reasonable res[o]lution of a bona fide dispute over FLSA provisions.” Lynn’s Food Stores, 679 F.2d at 1355;
American Disability Ass’n, Inc. v. Chmielarz, 289 F.3d 1315, 1317, 1320 (11th Cir.2002) (holding that the district court’s approval of the terms of a settlement coupled with its explicit retention of jurisdiction are the functional equivalent of a consent decree, which renders the settlement a “judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties” for purposes of the “prevailing party” determination necessary for attorneys’ fees).

In Dionne, we held that an employer, who denied liability for nonpayment for overtime work, did not need to pay attorneys’ fees and costs under the FLSA if the employer tendered the full amount of overtime pay claimed by an employee, and the employee conceded that “the claim for overtime should be dismissed as moot.” 667 F.3d at 1200. In other words, we concluded that Dionne was not a prevailing party under the FLSA because in granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the district court did not award a judgment to the plaintiff. Notably, however, we expressly limited our holding, emphasizing on rehearing that:

Our decision in this matter addresses a very narrow question: whether an employee who conceded that his claim should be dismissed before trial as moot, when the full amount of back pay was tendered, was a prevailing party entitled to statutory attorney’s fees under § 216(b). It should not be construed as authorizing the denial of attorney’s fees, requested by an employee, solely because an employer tendered the full amount of back pay owing to an employee, prior to the time a jury has returned its verdict, or the trial court has entered judgment on the merits of the claim.

Id. at 1206 n. 5 (emphasis added).

Thereafter, in Zinni, we held that a settlement offer for the full amount of statutory damages requested under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), without an accompanying offer of judgment, did not offer full relief to an FDCPA plaintiff and therefore did not render the plaintiff’s claim moot. 692 F.3d at 1167–68. Zinni involved three cases that were consolidated on appeal: in each case, the debt collector offered to settle for $1,001, an amount exceeding by $1 the maximum statutory damages available to an individual plaintiff under the FDCPA, as well as an unspecified amount of attorneys’ fees and costs. Id. at 1164–66. None of the plaintiffs accepted the settlement offers. Id. The district court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction because the offers left the plaintiffs with “no remaining stake” in the litigation. Id. at 1164.

On appeal, we reversed, holding that “the failure of [the debt collectors] to offer judgment prevented the mooting of [the plaintiffs'] FDCPA claims.” Id. at 1168. We said that a settlement offer for the “full relief requested” means “the full amount of damages plus a judgment.” Id. at 1166–67. The court explained that judgment is important to a plaintiff because it is enforceable by the district court, whereas a settlement offer without an offer of judgment is “a mere promise to pay” which, if broken, required the plaintiff to sue for breach of contract in state court. Id. at 1167–68 (quoting from and relying on Simmons v. United Mortg. & Loan Inv., LLC, 634 F.3d 754, 766 (4th Cir.2011) (FLSA overtime case)). We also noted that “even if the [settlement] check had been tendered [to the plaintiff], that fact would not change our ultimate conclusion.” Id. at 1164 n. 5. In fact, we said that even if the plaintiff accepted the offer, without an offer of judgment, full relief had not been offered. Id. at 1167 n. 8 (“The issue of whether the offer was accepted or rejected, while argued by the parties, is not relevant to our analysis because Appellees never offered full relief.”).

Applying these principles to the case at bar, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that absent an offer of judgment in plaintiff’s favor, the defendant could not and did not moot the plaintiff’s claims, not withstanding the plaintiff’s acceptance of the monies tendered:

Here, RAM’s settlement offer to Wolff did not include an offer of judgment in Wolff’s favor and against RAM. Rather, Wolff signed a release providing that she “acknowledge[d] receipt of [the $3600] check as full and complete satisfaction of any monies owed to [Wolff] from Royal American.” As a result, under Zinni—which expressly relied on a FLSA case from the Fourth Circuit—we are compelled to conclude that RAM’s offer did not constitute full relief of Wolff’s FLSA claim. We recognize that in Zinni, the plaintiff did not accept the settlement check, but here, Wolff accepted the check and signed a release. However, Zinni made clear that so long as a settlement agreement does not include an offer of judgment against a defendant (and it did not in this case), whether a plaintiff accepted the settlement makes no difference. Thus, RAM’s settlement with Wolff did not moot her FLSA claim, and she was entitled to seek attorneys’ fees and costs from RAM.

Rejecting the defendant’s contention that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Genesis required a different result, the court stated:

RAM argues that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 133 S.Ct. 1523 (2013), requires a different result. There, the Supreme Court held that a “collective action” brought under the FLSA—wherein an employee brings an action to recover damages for FLSA violations on behalf of himself and other “similarly situated” employees—became non justiciable when the lone plaintiff’s individual claim became moot. Id. at 1526. However, Genesis involved a settlement offer that included an offer of judgment-unlike the offer here, and unlike the one in Zinni. See id. at 1527 (“When petitioners answered the complaint, they simultaneously served upon respondent an offer of judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68.”). What’s more, Genesis explicitly said that it was “assum[ing], without deciding, that [an employer's] Rule 68 offer mooted [an employee's] individual claim.” See id. at 1529; see also id. n. 4 (“[W]e do not resolve the question whether a Rule 68 offer that fully satisfies the plaintiff’s claims is sufficient by itself to moot the action.”). Accordingly, Genesis is not directly on point, and expressly does not answer the question before us.

Affirming the district court’s award of attorneys fees to plaintiff, the Court reasoned:

We also find unavailing RAM’s claim that the district court abused its discretion in awarding the fees in this case. As for RAM’s claim that Wolff was not a prevailing party for purposes of obtaining FLSA attorneys’ fees, we are unpersuaded. As we’ve said, to be entitled to fees under the FLSA, a plaintiff must “receive a judgment in [her] favor.” Dionne, 667 F.3d at 1205. Here, the district court plainly found that the settlement—which RAM admits included the full amount of back pay as well as an equal amount for liquidated damages—was reasonable, and by doing so, the district court entered a judgment in Wolff’s favor. See Lynn’s Food Stores, 679 F.2d at 1355;
Chmielarz, 289 F.3d at 1317, 1320. RAM provides us with no reason to depart from Lynn, which directs a district court to enter a judgment after “scrutinizing” for fairness a proposed settlement entered into between the employee and the employer in an action brought for back wages under the FLSA. Id. at 1353. Further, unlike in Thomas v. State of La., 534 F.2d 613, 615 (5th Cir.1976), it is unclear in this case whether Wolff received “everything to which [she was] entitled under the FLSA at the time the agreement [wa]s reached,” since the district court found that the parties did not intend the settlement agreement to preclude attorneys’ fees under the FLSA.

As for RAM’s claim that it was denied due process when the district court entered the judgment, the record shows that RAM was given an opportunity to respond to Wolff’s motions on this matter, and that RAM expressly made arguments regarding its liability in its papers before the district court. Nor has RAM shown, based on the record of this case—including the record of attorney and party conduct on both sides—that the district court abused its considerable discretion in granting attorneys’ fees using the lodestar analysis. This is especially true given that in cases like this one where attorney fees are allowed to the prevailing party by federal statute, the compensable fees include time spent litigating both the entitlement to and amount of fees incurred; i.e. “fees for litigating fees.” Thompson v. Pharmacy Corp. of Am., Inc., 334 F.3d 1242, 1245 (11th Cir.2003) (statutory fees for civil rights litigants includes “fees for litigating fees”). Accordingly, we affirm.

Click Wolff v Royal American Management, Inc. to read the entire unpublished Per Curiam Opinion.

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N.D.Ga.: Where Weekly Compensation of RNs and PTs Not Guaranteed and Comprised of Fees Per Visit as Well as Other Pay Based on Time Worked, Not “Salary” or “Fee Basis;” Clinicians Entitled to Overtime

Rindfleisch v Gentiva Health Services, Inc

As discussed here, this case was before the court on the parties’ respective cross-motions for summary judgment. Plaintiffs, registered nurses (RNs) and physical therapists (PTs)(collectively “clinicians”), paid in part by-the-visit to defendant’s patient’s homes asserted that they were entitled to unpaid overtime under the FLSA. Defendant contended that plaintiffs were exempt from overtime pursuant to the so-called “professional exemption.” Granting the plaintiffs’ motion and denying that of the defendant, the court held that the plaintiffs did not qualify for such exemption, because they were not paid on a “salary basis” or “fee basis,” a requisite element for application of the exemption.

Describing the pay policy at issue, the court stated:

Gentiva provides home healthcare services to patients throughout the United States[Doc. No. 508, 1].1 To provide these services, Gentiva employs registered nurses and physical or occupational therapists to provide in-home healthcare to Gentiva’s patients (collectively “Clinicians”) [Doc. No. 508, 1]. Since December of 2008, Gentiva pays the majority of its Clinicians on a pay per-visit plan (the “PPV Plan”) [Doc. No. 586, 4–5].2 Under the PPV Plan, Clinicians are paid a set fee for a “routine visit” to a patient’s home (“visit fees”) [Doc. No. 586, 14]. These visit fees do not vary based on the time it takes Clinicians to complete a specific in-home visit [id. at 15]. In addition, Clinicians under the PPV Plan are also paid on what Gentiva describes as a “flat rate” for non-visit related work (“non-visit fees”) [id. at 19]. In setting the amount of non-visit fees, Gentiva factors in the amount of time it takes Clinicians to perform a specific non-visit related activity [id.].

Gentiva maintains that the PPV Plan constitutes a “fee basis” payment under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. [id. at 14]. Therefore, Gentiva classifies all of its Clinicians compensated under the PPV Plan as professional employees exempt from overtime compensation under the FLSA [id. at 10].

The court framed the issue before it as follows: 

In summary, the only issue for the Court to determine at this stage of the litigation process is whether or not the PPV Plan is unlawful under the FLSA.

After explaining the elements required for the application of the professional exemption, and noting that here it was undisputed that plaintiffs me the duties prong of the exemption, the court addressed whether or not the defendant’s pay scheme was a “fee basis” or “salary basis” within the meaning of the applicable regulation:

The DOL regulations state that, in order to satisfy the salary basis test, a professional employee can be paid “on a fee basis, as defined in § 541.605.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.600(a). Section 541.605 states an employee can be paid on a “fee basis” that satisfies the salary basis test if “the employee is paid an agreed sum for a single job regardless of the time required for its completion.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.605(a). Subsection (b) of section 541.605 states that, in order for a particular fee payment to satisfy the salary basis test, “the amount paid to the employee will be tested by determining the time worked on the job and whether the fee payment is at a rate that would amount to at least $455 per week if the employee worked 40 hours.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.605(b).

In the alternative, the DOL regulations, under section 541.604, allow an employee exempt from overtime pay to receive “extra” compensation that does not satisfy the salary basis test. Specifically, section 541.604 allows two forms of “extra” payment, articulated respectively in subsections (a) and (b). Anani v. CVS RX Servs., Inc., 788 F.Supp.2d 55, 66 (E.D.N.Y.2011). Subsection (a) of section 541.604 allows an employee to receive “additional compensation,” that does not satisfy the salary basis test, “based on hours worked for work beyond the normal workweek.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.604(a). Subsection (b) allows an employee to receive payment on an hourly, daily, or shift basis without losing the overtime exemption, so long as he is guaranteed weekly payment of at least $455 and there is a “reasonable relationship” between the guaranteed weekly payment and the employee’s usual weekly earnings. 29 C.F.R. § 541.604(b).

Summarizing the parties’ respective positions, the court explained:

In its motion for partial summary judgment, Plaintiffs argue that the PPV Plan, because the non-visit fees vary based on the amount of time it takes a Clinician to complete a non-visit activity, violates the salary basis test. Therefore, Plaintiffs argue the PPV Plan violates the FLSA and, as a result, that they are owed overtime compensation. In its response to Plaintiffs’ motion, as well as in its own motion for partial summary judgment on the lawfulness of its fee payments, Gentiva asserts the following two arguments: 1. Pursuant to subsection (b) of section § 541.605, the non-visit fees can vary based on the time it takes Clinicians to complete a non-visit activity and still satisfy the salary basis test; and 2. Even if Gentiva’s non-visit fees improperly consider time, Gentiva’s visit fees properly satisfy the salary basis test and, therefore, the non-visit fees constitute “extra” payments under section 541.604. The Court will discuss each of Gentiva’s arguments below.

The court rejected both of the defendant’s arguments in this regard. First, the court concluded that the defendant’s payment of non-visit fees did not satisfy the salary basis test under 29 C.F.R. § 541.605, because they were variable and depended on the amount of time a clinician spent on non-appointment activities:

Subsection (a) of § 541.605 clearly states that a fee for an activity, in order to satisfy the salary basis test, cannot be based on “the time required for [the activity's] completion.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.605(a). Subsection (a) further states that “[p]ayments based on the number of hours or days worked and not on the accomplishment of a given single task are not considered payments on a fee basis.” Id. Based on this clear and unambiguous language, a “fee” that varies based on the amount of time it takes to complete a specific activity does not satisfy the DOL regulation’s salary basis test. See Bread Political Action Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 455 U .S. 577, 580 (1982) (stating that, in the absence of clearly expressed legislative intention, the plain language of a statute controls its construction and must be considered conclusive); see also Evenson v. Hartford Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 244 F.R.D. 666, 667 (M.D.Fla.2007) (“As a general rule of interpretation, the plain meaning of a regulation governs.”).

Gentiva argues that subsection (b) of § 541.605 allows it to alter the amount of its non-visit fees based on the time it takes Clinicians to complete a non-visit activity. Subsection (b) of § 541.605 provides that, in order for a fee to satisfy the salary basis test, the fee must “amount to at least $455 per week if the employee worked 40 hours.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.605(b). To illustrate this point, subsection (b) provides the following example: “[t]hus, an artist paid $250 for a picture that took 20 hours to complete meets the minimum salary requirement for exemption since earnings at this rate would yield the artist $500 if 40 hours were worked.” Id. Based on this language, Gentiva argues that subsection (b) allows an employer to alter the amount of a fee based on the time it takes an employee to complete a specific activity, so long as the fee is not set on a straight hourly basis.

In essence, Gentiva argues that it can consider the amount of time it takes Clinicians to perform certain non-visit activities prospectively, thereby allowing its non-visit fees to vary based on time. Specifically, Gentiva argues that its non-visit fees factor in time “for the purpose of accommodating the clinician for missed visits that she would have otherwise performed” [Doc. No. 512–1, 25]. In support of this argument, Gentiva provides the following example:

in accordance with one of its conversion charts, Gentiva may pay a visit rate equivalent of $30 for a training that lasted 45 minutes and a rate of $60, equivalent to two visits, for a different training that lasted 3 hours. If, however, Gentiva simply set a flat rate for all trainings at the visit rate equivalent of $30, the training that took 3 hours would not qualify as a bona fide fee ($30 ÷ 3=$10 an hour or $400 over a 40–hour work week)

[id. at 54]. In comparison, Plaintiffs argue that subsection (b) of § 541.605 “describes how to evaluate the payments after the job is completed to determine whether the clinician has been compensated sufficiently to meet the exemption or is instead overtime eligible” [Doc. No. 584, 13]. In summary, Gentiva argues that subsection (b) is in place to allow an employer, in setting a fee for a specific activity, to vary the fee based on the amount of time it takes to complete said activity before it is complete. In contrast to Gentiva’s position, Plaintiffs argue subsection (b) is in place for the purpose of determining if a set fee satisfies the $455/40 hour requirement after the specific activity is complete.

The 2003 version of the fee basis regulation, former 29 C.F.R. § 541.313, is persuasive authority on this point. In the preamble to rule 29 C.F.R. § 541.605, the Department of Labor (the “DOL”) states that “[p]roposed section 541.605 simplified the fee basis provision in the current rule, but made no substantive change.” Dep’t of Labor, Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions for Executive, Administrative, Professional, Outside Sales and Computer Employees, 69 Fed.Reg. 22122, 22184 (Apr. 23, 2004). Based on the lack of substantive change, it can be inferred that 29 C.F.R. § 541.605 is consistent with the language of former 29 C.F.R. § 541.313. See Belt v. Emcare, Inc., 444 F.3d 403, 414 (5th Cir.2006) (“The amendments effectively adopted § 541.314 after notice and comment, without substantive change, [ ] thereby tending to show that the text of § 541.3(e) does not contradict the former § 541.314.”).

Former 29 C.F.R. § 541.313 provides that “[t]he adequacy of a fee payment … can ordinarily be determined only after the time worked on the job has been determined.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.313(c) (2003) (emphasis added). To illustrate this point, 29 C.F.R. § 541.313 provides the following example:

An illustrator is assigned the illustration of a pamphlet at a fee of $150. When the job is completed, it is determined that the employee worked 60 hours. If the employee worked 40 hours at this rate, the employee would have earned only $100. The fee payment of $150 for work which required 60 hours to complete therefore does not meet the requirement of payment at a rate of $170 per week and the employee must be considered nonexempt.

29 C.F.R. § 541.313(d)(3) (2003). Based on this language, the Court agrees with Plaintiffs that 29 C.F.R. § 541.605(b) articulates how to determine a fee for a specific activity satisfies the salary basis test after the activity is completed. Therefore, 29 C.F.R. § 541.605(b) does not authorize an employer to prospectively alter a fee based on the amount of time it takes an employee to perform a specific work activity.

Without question, Gentiva’s non-visit fees vary based on the amount of time it takes Clinicians to complete a specific non-visit activity. Therefore, the non-visit fees violate the clear language of 29 C.F.R. § 541.605(a), which specifies a fee only satisfies the salary basis test when it is “an agreed sum for a single job regardless of the time required for its completion.” Subsection (b) of 29 C.F.R. § 541.605 merely provides a basis for determining whether or not a fee for a specific activity satisfies the salary basis test after the activity is complete. Therefore, Gentiva cannot rely on subsection (b) as justification for varying its non-visit fees based on the amount of time it takes Clinicians to complete a non-visit activity. Such a reading of subsection (b) would completely contradict and negate the clear and unambiguous language of subsection (a). Therefore, Gentiva’s non-visit fees do not satisfy the salary basis test under 29 C.F.R. § 541.605.

The court also rejected the defendant’s alternative argument that the non-visit fees constituted an “extra” payment under 29 C.F.R. § 541.604:

Section 541.604 provides that “[a]n employer may provide an exempt employee with additional compensation without losing the exemption or violating the salary basis requirement, if the employment arrangement also includes a guarantee of at least the minimum weekly-required amount [$455] paid on a salary basis.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.604(a). Gentiva argues that, because its visit fees satisfy the salary basis test, its non-visit fees constitute extra payments under section 541.604. The Court does not find this argument persuasive under either subsection (a) or subsection (b) of section 541.604.

Subsection (a) of section 541.604 allows an exempt employee to receive “extra” payment as “additional compensation … paid on any basis (e.g., flat sum, bonus payment, straight-time hourly amount, time and one-half or any other basis), and may include paid time off.” Id. However, such “extra” or “additional” compensation is only available under subsection (a) for “extra” or “additional” work, meaning “hours worked for work beyond the normal workweek.” Id. Under subsection (a), “beyond the normal workweek” signifies hours worked in excess of forty. See Anani, 788 F.Supp.2d at 67 (stating “common sense as well as the purpose of the FLSA supports the interpretation that the words ‘the normal workweek’ clearly contemplate a forty (40) hour workweek because the FLSA itself generally establishes the right to overtime for hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours.”) (internal quotation marks, alterations and citation omitted).

Here, Gentiva does not designate non-visit activities as additional work only performed after Clinicians have completed forty hours of in-home visits [Doc. No. 586, 34–35]. Instead, in the weeks non-visit activities are performed, non-visit fees are a part of the Clinicians’ compensation for a normal forty hour workweek. Therefore, non-visit fees are not a form of compensation separate from the Clinicians’ forty hour workweek, but are instead a part of the Clinicians’ compensation for a forty hour workweek that includes non-visit activities. Because non-visit activities, and by extension the non-visit fees, are not designated as separate from the Clinicians’ normal workweek, it is irrelevant that Gentiva’s visit fees satisfy the salary basis test. The visit fees do not encompass the complete form of payment for a Clinicians’ normal workweek and, therefore, do not justify payment of the non-visit fees which do not satisfy the salary basis test. As a result, the non-visit fees cannot be considered “extra” payment under subsection (a) of 29 C.F.R. § 541.604.

Subsection (a) of 29 C.F.R. § 541.604 does not allow an employee to receive two forms of payment, with one form failing to satisfy the fee basis test, for two forms of activities completed as part of an employee’s forty hour workweek. An additional form of payment that does not satisfy the salary basis test can only be awarded for work outside of an employee’s normal workweek. As Gentiva’s non-visit fees are a part of the Clinicians’ compensation for a normal workweek that includes non-visit activities, they do not constitute an “extra” payment under subsection (a) of section 541.604.

 Subsection (b) of section 541.604 allows an employer to pay its employee on an hourly, daily or shift basis without negating the overtime exemption “if the employment arrangement also includes a guarantee of at least the minimum weekly required amount paid on a salary basis [$455] regardless of the number of hours, days or shifts worked, and a reasonable relationship exists between the guaranteed amount and the amount actually earned.” 29 C.F.R. § 541 .604 (emphasis added). In summary, subsection (b) allows an employee to be paid on an hourly, daily, or shift basis without losing the overtime exemption, so long as the “reasonable relationship” test is met. Anani, 788 F.Supp.2d at 62. Subsection (b) provides that “[t]he reasonable relationship test will be met if the weekly guarantee is roughly equivalent to the employee’s usual earnings at the assigned hourly, daily or shift rate for the employee’s normal scheduled workweek.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.604(b).

Perhaps most significantly, the court noted that the defendant apparently conceded that there was no guarantee that the clinicians would receive at least $455.00 per week, regardless of the characterization of the non-visit fees:

In its reply brief regarding its motion for summary judgment on the lawfulness of its fee payments, Gentiva appears to concede that the visit fees do not guarantee Clinicians paid under the PPV Plan even $455 in a given week [Doc. No. 617, 24–25]. Based on this concession, Gentiva argues that “fee-based employees need not be guaranteed pay of at least $455 per week to be eligible for extras under section 541.604, they only need to be guaranteed fees that pay them at a rate that would result in at least $455 if they were to work a full 40–hour week performing those fee-compensated tasks” [id. at 25]. This argument, when applied to Clinicians and their usual weekly earnings, supports the very form of payment scheme that the reasonable relationship test of subsection (b) is attempting to guard against…

Here, Gentiva argues in favor of a compensation framework, without even establishing a set amount of “guaranteed” weekly payment, that allows an even greater discrepancy between the Clinicians’ normal weekly earnings and their “guaranteed” weekly payment. Specifically, Gentiva argues that Clinicians can receive one visit fee in a given week and still meet the guarantee requirement of subsection (b), so long as that single fee satisfies the fee basis test under section 541.605. However, under that scenario, Clinicians would have to receive an amount of non-visit fees that is significantly greater than the amount received from the one visit fee. For example, Gentiva asserts “the more productive opt-in clinicians in this action were able to earn more than $150,000 per year, and one plaintiff earned over $240,000″ [Doc. No. 512–1, 15].11 To earn this amount of compensation in a given year, Clinicians have to receive a weekly amount of earnings that greatly exceeds $455, let alone an undetermined amount that is less than $455. Therefore, under the compensation framework put forth by Gentiva, Clinicians’ “guaranteed” payment is an illusion, having no reasonable relationship to the amount of pay that Clinicians usually receive in a given week. See Dep’t of Labor, 69 Fed.Reg. at 22184 (stating “if an employee is compensated on an hourly basis, or on a shift basis, there must be a reasonable relationship between the amount guaranteed per week and the amount the employee typically earns per week. Thus, if a nurse whose actual compensation is determined on a shift or hourly basis usually earns $1,200 per week, the amount guaranteed must be roughly equivalent to $1,200; the employer could not guarantee such an employee only the minimum salary required by the regulation.”). Therefore, Gentiva’s non-visit fees do not constitute an “extra” payment under subsection (b) of 29 C.F.R. § 541.604.

Thus, the court held that the defendant’s payment plan failed to satisfy the salary or fee basis requirement and thus the professional exemption was inapplicable to the plaintiffs.

Click Rindfleisch v. Gentive Health Services, Inc to read the entire Order.

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S.D.Fla.: Contractor Engaged in Heavy-Duty Cleaning of Airplanes Not Air-Carrier Exempt Under Railway Labor Act (RLA)

Roca v Alphatech Aviation Services, Inc.

In this case, an employee sued his employer, a company that provided heavy-duty cleaning of airplanes, alleging failure to pay overtime in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The case was before the court on the defendant cleaning company’s motion for summary judgment. Specifically, the defendant asserted that it was entitled to the air-carrier exemption under the Railway Labor Act (RLA), because its work involved cleaning airplanes pursuant to contracts with air carriers covered that were covered by the exemption. The court disagreed and denied the defendant’s motion.

Describing the facts relevant to its inquiry, the court explained:

Alphatech specializes in heavy-duty cleaning of airplanes operated by commercial and freight airlines. In addition to cleaning airplane interiors and exteriors, Alphatech personnel replace components, perform light maintenance, preventive maintenance, and carry out related servicing of the aircraft. D.E. 22–1. As explained by Plaintiff, Alphatech employees “leave the plane clean; all the bathrooms, the galleys, everything, seats, carpeting[,] …. leave like the shell of the plane.” D.E. 25–1, at 13:13–16. In other words, cleaning is performed when an aircraft’s cabin is completely disassembled. D.E. 24–1, at 24:25. This work is primarily performed at the Miami International Airport complex, in a facility owned by AAR Aircraft Services (“AAR”), though Alphatech’s administrative work is performed out of its own office space adjacent to the airport. D.E. 22–1, at 35:3–6.

Alphatech does work for various air carriers, maintaining a separate contractual relationship with each. See D.E. 26–4. The work performed for each air carrier is executed in accordance with that air carrier’s maintenance manual. D.E. 24–1, at 9:12–14. Each air carrier specifies the manner in which it desires for its planes to be cleaned. Id. at 17:17–18. Alphatech employees sometimes work on the same exact model plane for two different air carriers and nevertheless perform their assignments differently, in accordance with each air carrier’s manual for that air craft. Id. at 17:19–22. The air carriers separately contract with AAR to inspect and certify the work that Alphatech performs. Id. at 15:10–13, 16:15–19. AAR “professors” are also responsible for administering the air carrier-specific training that Alphatech personnel must receive before servicing an aircraft. The air carrier representatives “walk [through the plane], they turn around, and they leave.” D.E. 15:9–10. Defendant Brullo testified that he could not remember the names of any air carrier supervisors because they change all the time, coming and going with the particular aircrafts that Alphatech personnel service. D.E. 23–1, at 29:19–22.

Giving an overview of the air-carrier exemption, and concluding that the defendant could not satisfy its burden to demonstrate the applicability of same, the court stated:

The question presented by this Motion is whether Plaintiff is an “employee of a carrier by air” for purposes of the FLSA’s air carrier exemption. Under the FLSA, employers are required to pay their employees at overtime rates for work in excess of 40 hours per week. See
29 U.S.C. § 207. However, certain classes of employers are exempt from this overtime requirement. Thus, the air carrier exemption removes from coverage “any employee of a carrier by air subject to the provisions of Title II of the Railway Labor Act.” Id. § 213(b)(3). Title II of the Railway Labor Act (“RLA”), in turn, covers “every common carrier by air …, and every air pilot or other person who performs any work as an employee or subordinate official of such carrier or carriers, subject to its or their continuing authority to supervise and direct the manner of rendition of his service.” 45 U.S.C. § 181.

Defendants have failed to show that Plaintiff is exempt from overtime coverage. The application of an exemption under the FLSA is an affirmative defense on which the employer has the burden of proof. Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 196–97, 94 S.Ct. 2223, 41 L.Ed.2d 1 (1974). The Eleventh Circuit has found that Title II of the RLA “is certainly unambiguous” in scope, Valdivieso v. Atlas Air, 305 F.3d 1283, 1287 (11th Cir.2002), yet Defendants urge the Court to find that Plaintiff qualifies as an air-carrier employee under a two-pronged conjunctive test promulgated by the National Mediation Board (“NMB”)2 in cases where the employer does not itself fly aircraft. Plaintiff no more satisfies this two-part test than she does the plain text of the subject exemption. Under the NMB’s two-pronged conjunctive test, an employee is covered by the air-carrier exemption if: (1) the nature of the work is that traditionally performed by employees of air carriers (the “function” test); and (2) the employer is directly or indirectly owned or controlled by or under common control with an air carrier (the “control” test). Verrett v. The Sabre Grp., 70 F.Supp.2d 1277, 1281 (N.D.Okla.1999). Both prongs must be satisfied in order for the RLA exemption to apply. Here, neither prong is satisfied.

Discussing each prong in more detail, and finding that defendant here could satisfy neither prong, the court reasoned:

1. Function Test

Defendants have not shown that the work performed by Alphatech employees is of the sort traditionally performed by air-carrier employees. Indeed, Defendants’ own witnesses have severely undercut their position. Mr. Pichardo testified that the air carriers hire outside contractors to perform the sort of heavy-duty cleaning work performed by Alphatech. When Alphatech works on an aircraft, it does so for an extended period of time, rather than between scheduled flights. In fact, Alphatech’s witnesses repeatedly clarified at deposition that the company’s work is not at all akin to the rapid cabin cleanup performed by air carrier personnel between flights. Indeed, Defendants have not presented any evidence tending to show that the work performed by Alphatech is ever performed by air-carrier employees, let alone that it is “traditionally” performed by those workers.

The RLA’s definition of a “carrier” sheds additional light on what should be considered work traditionally performed by carrier employees. Under the RLA, the term “carrier” includes actual carriers as well as “any company … which operates any equipment or facilities or performs any service (other than trucking service) in connection with the transportation, receipt, delivery, elevation, transfer in transit, refrigeration or icing, storage, and handling of property transported.” 45 U.S.C. § 151. The focus, then, tends to be on companies performing the auxiliary functions of loading, unloading, and shipping to and from carriers’ depots and terminals for the ultimate transportation of whatever is being carried in interstate commerce.

What Defendants have presented in their defense are NMB decisions purporting to hold that aircraft cleaning is a function traditionally performed by air-carrier employees. The Court finds these non-precedential decisions to be distinguishable and otherwise unpersuasive.3 Defendants also rely on Moyano v. Professional Contractors Services, Inc., No. 1:07–cv–22411 (S.D.Fla. Mar. 7, 2008), a case involving mechanic contractors. Moyano offers little analysis under either prong, but does rely on the NMB’s analysis in In re Empire Auto Center, Inc., 33 NMB 3, 2005 WL 3089356 (Oct. 13, 2005). In that case, the employees also worked for an independent contractor and performed their tasks according to maintenance manuals provided by the air-carrier clients. 2005 WL 3089356, at *6. However, Empire’s chief financial officer testified that Empire employees performed maintenance work identical to maintenance work performed by aircraft employees employed by commercial air carriers. Alphatech’s owner, by contrast, acknowledges that the work performed by Alphatech is traditionally contracted out by the air carriers. Moreover, the nature of the work at issue in Empire does not at all appear to be similar to the work Plaintiff performed while at Alphatech. Empire’s employees all fell into one of four categories: exhibit air frame and power plant mechanic; non-destructive test technician; aircraft sheet metal technician; and aircraft avionics and electrical mechanic. Id. at 10. These maintenance and repair operations are similar to the work at issue in Moyano, but not similar to the work performed by Plaintiff. The Court finds that Defendants have failed to show that Plaintiff satisfies the function prong of the NMB test.

2. Control Test

Defendants’ argument that Alphatech’s air carrier clients indirectly control the company’s operations would convert most independent contractors into “carriers” for purposes of the RLA, so long as their clients are air carriers. But entering into a contractual relationship, while perhaps necessary, is certainly not sufficient to satisfy the control test. Courts find that carriers control a contractor’s employees “[w]here the carrier controls the details of the day-to-day process by which the contractor provides services—for example, the number of employees assigned to particular tasks, the employees’ attire, the length of their shifts, and the methods they use in their work.” Cunningham v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., No. 06–3530, 15 Wage & Hour Cas.2d (BNA) 1891, 2010 WL 1223084, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.31, 2010) (citing In re Ogden Aviation Serv., 23 NBM 98, 104 (Feb. 5, 1996)). Defendants insist that the air carriers have ultimate control over Alphatech employees because they have an absolute say over the means by which their aircrafts are cleaned, and because individual Alphatech employees must be approved to work on each given aircraft. But Defendants’ deposition testimony establishes that the air carriers have absolutely no control over what Alphatech pays its employees, when and how they are promoted or given pay raises, which shifts they work, how many hours they work per shift, or how many employees are scheduled to work on an aircraft at once.

Meticulous work instructions and prior approval of an independent contractors’ employees will not convert those employees into a carrier’s employees for RLA purposes. See Dobbs Houses, Inc. v. N .L.R.B., 443 F.2d 1066, 1070 (6th Cir.1971). In Dobbs Houses, the court found that while an airline caterer was “engaged in a business which requires it to please some very meticulous and demanding customers, that fact alone does not establish their ‘control directly or indirectly’ of it or its employees.” Id. at 1072. In so finding, the Sixth Circuit distinguished the case of a catering company employed by a rail carrier under circumstances more indicative of “control.” It found that control was exercised in that case because: the catering company could not do any work for any other client except by the carrier’s explicit permission; the carrier reimbursed the caterer for the total cost of its workers’ wages; the carrier had the explicit right to discharge the caterer’s employees; and the catering employees were directly subject to the carrier’s supervision. Id. at 1071. None of those factors were present in the Dobbs Houses case, and none are present here.

Thus, the court held that the defendant was not an exempt air-carrier and denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Subsequently, the plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment regarding the same issue, and the court granted the motion for virtually identical reasons as stated here.

Click Roca v. Alphatech Aviation Services, Inc. to read the entire Opinion and Order on [Defendant's Motion for] Summary Judgment. Click Roca v. Alphatech Aviation Services, Inc. to read the Order on [Plaintiff's Motion for Partial] Summary Judgment.

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