Tag Archives: Informal Complaints

8th Cir.: Recording Overtime Over Defendant-Employer’s Objections Not Protected Activity Under 29 U.S.C. § 215

Ritchie v. St. Louis Jewish Light

Plaintiff brought this case under 29 U.S.C. § 215.  Holding that informal complaints are not protected activity under the FLSA’s anti-retaliation provisions, the lower court dismissed and Plaintiff appealed, arguing that such informal complaints are protected activity.  The Eight Circuit did not reach that issue however, because it held that Plaintiff had not even made such informal complaints, because it held continuing to record overtime worked, despite Defendants’ instructions not to does not constitute a “complaint.”  As such, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision.

Reasoning that Plaintiff had not engaged in activity that would be protected under § 215, even if § 215 protected informal complaints, the court explained:

“We need not decide today whether informal complaints are protected activity under the FLSA because there is nothing in Ritchie’s verified federal court complaint that alleged that Ritchie made any sort of complaint to either Levin or St. Louis Jewish Light. The verified complaint alleged that:

7. Starting on or about May or June 2009, Levin asked Ritchie to perform work (“Work”) [formerly] performed by two employees by herself which Ritchie commenced to do.

8. Levin asked Ritchie to perform the Work without recording overtime.

9. The Work required that Ritchie perform overtime hours (more than 40 hours in a week) (“Overtime”) which Ritchie recorded.

10. Levin complained to Ritchie about her recording the Overtime and again requested that she perform the Work without recording overtime.

11. When Ritchie continued to record the Overtime, she was terminated by Levin and [St. Louis Jewish Light].

(Appellant’s App. at 1-2.)

Even assuming that informal complaints are sufficient to trigger the anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA, a legal conclusion we do not make, Ritchie failed to allege sufficient facts to indicate that she made even an informal complaint to either Levin or St. Louis Jewish Light. The only complaining asserted in her pleading goes the other way-Levin complaining to Ritchie. Ritchie asserts that she complained pursuant to the FLSA when she gave “Levin notice that she believed Levin’s instructions were a violation of the law because she, in fact, recorded the overtime hours in writing despite his orders not to record them.” (Appellant’s Reply Br. at 4.) In fact, rather than constituting an affirmative complaint that would trigger the anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA, her recording of her overtime could be nothing more than mere insubordination, she having been instructed to the contrary. Insubordination is not protected under the FLSA, and insubordination is not sufficient to trigger the anti-retaliation provision in 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3). As appellees’ counsel noted at oral argument, if merely recording one’s overtime is a “complaint” that triggers the anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA, an employer would not be able to discipline an employee for working unauthorized overtime so long as the employee recorded the overtime.

As the Supreme Court has recently said, the plausibility standard, which requires a federal court complaint “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face, … asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (internal quotation marks omitted). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]-‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ “ Id. at 1950 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)).

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the FLSA, Ritchie would have to show that she participated in statutorily protected activity, that the appellees took an adverse employment action against her, and that there was a causal connection between Ritchie’s statutorily protected activity and the adverse employment action. See Grey v. City of Oak Grove, 396 F.3d 1031, 1034-35 (8th Cir.2005). The facts pleaded in Ritchie’s complaint do not permit us to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct. Thus, Ritchie’s complaint merely alleged, but did not show, that Ritchie is entitled to relief.

Thus, the district court did not err in granting the appellees’ motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Carton, 611 F.3d at 454.”

Click Ritchie v. St. Louis Jewish Light to read the entire decision.

Leave a comment

Filed under Retaliation

E.D.Mo.: Informal Workplace Complaints Are Not “Protected Activity” Under § 215(a)(3)

Bartis v. John Bommarito Oldsmobile-Cadillac, Inc.

Plaintiff worked for Defendant as a car salesman. Plaintiff alleged that he was fired after he complained about and refused to comply with what he believed to be unlawful employment practices. Plaintiff asserted claims for retaliatory discharge under the Fair Labor Standards Act and under state law. Defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that, by simply complaining to his supervisor, Plaintiff did not engage in any protected activity that would shield him from retaliatory discharge. The Court agreed and concluded the FLSA and Missouri state law do not prohibit an employer from terminating an employee merely because the employee raised workplace complaints. Therefore, the Court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss.

The Court explained, “In the Eighth Circuit, district courts are guided by the decision in Brennan v. Maxey’s Yamaha, Inc., 513 F.2d 179 (8th Cir.1975). In Brennan, the government brought suit against an employer after the employer withheld overtime compensation from its employees. The employer had agreed to pay the overtime after a Department of Labor investigation found violations of the FLSA. But then the employer required the employees to endorse their back-wage checks over to the employer. One employee was terminated after she refused to do so. Id. at 180. The court held that the employee’s discharge was unlawful retaliation in violation of § 215(a)(3). According to the court, “her discharge was a direct result of her insistence upon receiving retroactive benefits required under the [FLSA].” Id. at 181. Thus, “the immediate cause or motivation” of the discharge was the employee’s assertion of statutory rights, thereby violating § 215(a)(3). Id. That the employee did not “file” a complaint or “initiate” a proceeding was irrelevant.

The decision in Brennan provides some support for the plaintiff here, but it is not dispositive. In Brennan, unlike this case, there was already an agreement in place between the Department of Labor and the employer regarding the payment of back wages. This agreement was necessarily a “proceeding” covered by § 215(a)(3). The FLSA protected the employee seeking to vindicate her FLSA rights where the formal proceeding was already in place when the employee complained and was terminated.

The Eighth Circuit decisions interpreting § 215(a)(3) make clear that the employee must engage in protected activity in order to be shielded from retaliation. See Grey, 396 F.3d at 1034-35. The “protected activities” are listed explicitly in the statute: filing a complaint, instituting or testifying in a proceeding, or serving on a committee. Workplace complaints are not included. Raising informal objections with one’s supervisor is not included. Bartis is correct to point out that within the protected activities enumerated in the FLSA, there is room for broad interpretation. See Saffels v. Rice, 40 F.3d 1546, 1549-50 (8th Cir.1995) (holding that the anti-retaliation provision protects an employee who was fired because the employer had a mistaken belief that the employee filed a complaint with the Department of Labor). But the statute cannot be construed so broadly as to depart from its plain and clear language. See Brown v. L & P Indus., No. 5:04CV379JLH, 2005 WL 3503637 (E.D.Ark. Dec. 21, 2005) (employee who merely contemplated filing a complaint with the Department of Labor and threatened to do so was not covered by anti-retaliation provision). See also Haug v. Bank of America, N.A., 317 F.3d 832, 835 (8th Cir.2003) (“Where the language of a statute is unambiguous, the statute should be enforced as written unless there is clear legislative intent to the contrary.”).

Moreover, the FLSA anti-retaliation language stands in stark contrast to the anti-retaliation provision found in another labor statute, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. That statute prohibits employer retaliation against any employee who has ” opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (emphasis added). Protection for anyone who “opposes a practice” is far broader than the protection found in the narrow limitations of the FLSA. Congress knows how to afford broad protection against retaliation when it wants to. Unlike Title VII, the FLSA anti-retaliation provision is limited in its scope and does not extend to activities that fall outside its clear text. For these reasons, Bartis’s claim for unlawful retaliation under the FLSA must be dismissed.”

The decision demonstrates the continuing interpretation throughout the country as to what constitutes “protected activity” thereby giving rise to the protections of 215(a)(3), the FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision.

Leave a comment

Filed under Retaliation