Tag Archives: Motion in Limine

D.Conn.: Time and a Half is the Proper Measure of Damages in a “Salary Misclassification” Case

Hasan v. GPM Investments, LLC

Yet another court has weighed in on the FWW (“half-time”) versus time and a half issue in so-called “salary misclassification” cases, and this time it’s a victory for employees. This case was before the court on the plaintiffs’ motion in limine regarding the methodology for calculating damages, in the event the plaintiffs prevailed on their misclassification claims at trial. Addressing all of the arguments typically proffered by plaintiff-employees and defendant-employers, the court held that the fluctuating work week methodology was inapplicable because the defendant failed to meet several of the prerequisites for its use. Thus, the court held that any damages had to be calculated using the FLSA’s default time and a half methodology.

After a lengthy discussion of the Missel case, a history of the FWW and recent salary misclassification decisions, the court discussed why the FWW could not apply to a salary misclassification case. Framing the issue, the court explained:

Plaintiffs contend that the fluctuating work week method of compensation is never appropriate in a case where an employer has misclassified an employee as exempt from the FLSA’s protections. They argue that misclassification cases only present one issue—how to reconstruct what the rate of pay would have been absent a violation. Defendants counter that in a misclassification case “a fixed salary is always meant to compensate for all hours worked,” and under Missel, a fluctuating work week calculation “provides the precise remedy.” Def. Opp. at 12. In other words, a misclassification case does not require that the court recreate a rate, but, instead, that it convert a unusual payment method into an hourly rate. Plaintiffs have the better argument and one need look no further than the DOL’s guidance to understand why.

Initially, the court noted that where an employer has classified an employee as exempt, logically there is never a mutual understanding that overtime will be paid at varying rates, because the parties agreement is that there will be no overtime at all.

When an employer misclassifies an employee, the resultant employment contract will never fulfill any of the requirements of section 778.114. First, parties who believe that an employee merits no overtime payment cannot simultaneously believe that any overtime will be paid at varying rates. Put another way, in a misclassification case, the parties never agreed to an essential term of a fluctuating work week arrangement—that overtime would be paid at different rates depending on the number of hours worked per week. See Perkins v. Southern New England Telephone Co., 2011 WL 4460248 at *3 (D.Conn. Sept. 27, 2011), Russell, 672 F.Supp.2d at 1013–14,Rainey v. Am. Forest & Paper Assoc., 26 F.2d 82, 100–02 (D.D.C.1998). To assume otherwise converts every salaried position into a position compensated at a fluctuating rate.

Next, the court noted the lack of contemporaneous overtime payment at the time the work in question was performed, pursuant to the parties agreement that there would be no overtime:

Second, misclassified employees will never have received any kind of bonus or premium for overtime. Indeed, parties will have explicitly agreed, as they did in this case, that employees will not earn extra money for long hours. See Def. Opp. Ex. A Job Description (listing the position as explicitly “exempt” from overtime compensation). At best, an employer could argue that the flat salary had an overtime bump embedded within it, that it was high enough so that employees remained well compensated for the hardship of working more than 40 hours per week. But this argument fails for two reasons: First, such an agreement would be illegal. An employee would have to waive her statutory right to extra compensation for overtime. Barrentine v. Arkansas–Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728, 740 (1981) (noting that “FLSA rights cannot be abridged by contract” because this would “nullify the purposes of the statute”). Second, Missel explicitly rejected such an argument. The court reasoned that the contract at issue did not comply with the FLSA because “it [did not include a] provision for additional pay in the event the hours worked required minimum compensation greater than the fixed wage.” Missel, 316 U.S. at 581.

Further, here the court noted that while the plaintiffs’ hours fluctuated, the never worked fewer than 40 hours. Thus, the court concluded this was not a situation where short weeks were balanced against longer weeks and the plaintiffs were nonetheless receiving the type of steady income envisioned by the FWW as the supposed benefit for employees:

In this case, GPM also fails to meet a third criterion enunciated in the DOL’s guidance—that an employee’s hours actually fluctuate. After it lays out the requirements for a contract for a fluctuating rate, the rule warns that “typically, such salaries are paid to employees who do not customarily work a regular schedule of hours” and are “in amounts agreed on by the parties as adequate straight-time compensation for long work weeks as well as short ones .” 29 C.F.R. § 778.114(c). For a fluctuating work week arrangement to make sense to both parties, employees should offset their relative loss from a grueling work week far above forty hours with the benefit of full pay for weeks that clock-in at less than forty hours. Otherwise, employees have not bargained for anything but decreasing marginal pay as they work longer and longer hours at work. This is what the Court divined in Missel; a rate clerk would sometimes work long hours when shipments flooded in, and sometimes not at all when business dried up. Here, plaintiffs never had a short week; GPM’s job description stated that store managers were expected to work a minimum of 52 hours per week. See Def. Opp. Ex. A, Job Description. To the extent their hours fluctuated, it was because they sometimes worked almost 100 hours per week. See Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine, Ex. A, Timesheets. This variance, between weeks with a moderate amount of overtime hours, and weeks where a majority of hours worked exceeded the 40 hour threshold, is not the same as the up and down fluctuation contemplated by the DOL and by the Court in Missel.

In light of the defendant’s failure to meet any of the prerequisites for the use of the FWW, the court concluded that any damages due would be calculated using the FLSA’s default time and a half methodology.  Thus, it granted the plaintiffs’ motion in limine.

Click Hasan v. GPM Investments, LLC to read the entire Ruling and Order on Motion in Limine to Preclude Use of the Fluctuating Work Week.

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E.D.N.Y.: Defendant Precluded From Offering Evidence of Plaintiffs’ Immigration Status at Trial

Solis v. Cindy’s Total Care, Inc.

This case, brought by the Secretary of Labor, was before the court on the Secretary’s Motion in Limine to exclude any reference to plaintiffs’ immigration status at trial, due to irrelevance.  The underlying case concerned nails techs who worked at defendant’s nail salon, presumably at least some of whom were undocumented workers.  The court agreed with the Secretary that such information was irrelevant to the issues at bar- namely whether defendant had failed to properly compensate plaintiffs for their previous overtime work.

Framing the issue, the court explained:

“At issue here is a motion in limine brought by the Secretary, seeking to preclude Cindy’s from introducing at trial evidence of the immigration status or national origin of any of Cindy’s employees and from questioning employee witnesses as to these subjects. In its answer, Cindy’s had identified the immigration status of its employees as an affirmative defense. Cindy’s stated that employees’ immigration status “is important for future wages” and that claims as to such wages therefore “are barred in this case .” At an October 13, 2011 pretrial conference, counsel for Cindy’s reiterated its intention to elicit evidence of the immigration status and national origin of one or more employees whose wages are at issue.”

 Granting plaintiffs’ motion, the court reasoned:

“In this case, an employee’s immigration status, or national origin, is clearly irrelevant to a claim for back pay for overtime wages under the FLSA. By its terms, the FLSA applies to “any individual” employed by an employer, as the term “employer” is defined by the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1). The Act contains no exception or exclusion for persons who are not U.S. citizens or who are in this country illegally.

For this reason, the courts to consider this issue have uniformly held that any person, regardless of his or her immigration status, who is employed by an employer, may pursue an action under the Act for work actually performed. See, e.g., Corona v. Adriatic Italian Restaurant & Pizzeria, 2010 WL 675702, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.23, 2010) (citing Patel v. Quality Inn South, 846 F.2d 700, 702 (11th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1011, 109 S.Ct. 1120, 103 L.Ed.2d 182 (1989)). Indeed, cases have held that employees’ immigration status or national origin is not even a suitable area for pretrial discovery. See, e . g., Liu v. Donna Karan Int’l, Inc., 207 F.Supp.2d 191, 192 (S.D.N.Y.2002) ( “plaintiff-workers’ immigration status in cases seeking unpaid wages brought under the FLSA” held “undiscoverable”); Renfigo v. Erevos Enter. Inc., 2007 WL 894376, *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.20, 2008) (plaintiff’s “immigration status and authority to work is a collateral issue” and not discoverable).

In its answer, Cindy’s asserted that employees’ immigration status might be relevant in an action seeking to recover “future wages.” There is no occasion to address that issue here. The Secretary has stated clearly that that the monetary relief she seeks to obtain on behalf of Cindy’s employees in this case is exclusively retrospective, in the form of back wages owed to current or former employees as a result of Cindy’s alleged failure to pay them overtime wages for the overtime hours that they worked.

This is also not a case in which an employee’s immigration status may be relevant to impeachment. Where an employee witness had falsely attested to United States citizenship or had fabricated naturalization documents, evidence of the employee’s illegal immigration status might well be relevant to credibility. However, the Court would still have to determine whether the probative value of such evidence was substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice or confusion, see Fed.R.Evid. 403, including the potential chilling, in terrorem effect on undocumented alien employees who might be deterred from coming forward to report FLSA infractions or to testify at trial. See, e.g., Flores v. Amigon, 233 F.Supp.2d 462, 464–65 (E.D.N.Y.2002). Here, however, at the October 13, 2011 hearing, Cindy’s expressly disclaimed an intent to offer immigration status as evidence of impeachment. As a result, no such impeachment evidence will be permitted at trial.”

Click Solis v. Cindy’s Total Care, Inc. to read the entire Opinion and Order.

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Filed under Discovery, Immigration Status