Tag Archives: Named-Plaintiff

E.D.N.Y.: Named-Plaintiff’s Failure to File Consent to Join Not Fatal to Collective Action, Where Defendants Acknowledged Intent to Proceed as Collective Action in Answer and Plaintiff Filed Sworn Affidavit

Ahmed v. T.J. Maxx Corp.

This case was before the court on the plaintiff’s motion to conditionally authorize a collective action, pursuant to Section 216 of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. As discussed here, the court held that the plaintiff had “commenced” his FLSA case for the purposes of serving as the representative plaintiff in a collective action, notwithstanding his initial failure to file a formal consent to join, as required by 216(b), by virtue of the defendant’s admissions regarding same in their answer and the fact that plaintiff filed an sworn (signed) affidavit in support of his motion.

Discussing the issue, the court explained:

Defendants maintain, as an initial matter, that Ahmed’s case cannot proceed as a collective action because Ahmed himself has not filed a consent form as required by section 216(b) of the FLSA. (Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Conditional Certification, hereinafter “Def. Mem. of Law in Opp’n”, at 19.) It is defendant’s position that the FLSA requires a plaintiff—even a named plaintiff—to opt-in to his or her own action in order to proceed as a collective action. (Id.)

Although the cases upon which defendants rely provide that all plaintiffs must affirmatively opt in to a suit in order to proceed as part of a collective action, see, e.g. Gonzalez v. El Acajutla Restaurant, Inc., No. 04 Civ. 1513, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19690, at *14–15 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2007), courts in this Circuit have held that the FLSA itself does not require such written consent in order for a plaintiff to file a motion for conditional certification, see, e.g. Aros v. United Rentals, Inc., 269 F.R.D. 176, 181 (D.Conn.2010) (“The court concludes that denying the Motion for Conditional Certification … would undermine the FLSA’s broad remedial purpose”). Moreover, “[t]he purpose of this consent requirement … is to put the Defendants on notice, which many courts have noted is somewhat redundant with regard to named plaintiffs,” particularly when the named plaintiff has submitted sworn affidavits to the court, participated in depositions, and otherwise taken necessary action to pursue his claims and demonstrate that he “intends to participate in the lawsuit.” D’Antuono v. C & G of Groton, Inc., No. 11 Civ. 33, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49788, at *6–7, 10–11 (D.Conn. Apr. 9, 2012).

Given that defendants expressly acknowledged, in their answer, that Ahmed purports to bring this action “pursuant to FLSA, 20 U.S.C.s. 216(b), on behalf of ‘Assistant Mangers’ employed in T.J. Maxx stores” (see Answer at ¶ 8), it cannot be said that defendants lacked notice of Ahmed’s consent, nor can it be said that defendants were unaware of Ahmed’s intent to pursue his claims as part of a collective action, particularly as Ahmed has already participated in a deposition and has submitted an affidavit in support of the instant motion. Consequently, while the form of Ahmed’s consent may not have strictly adhered to the preferred standard in FLSA collective actions, the substance of Ahmed’s complaint and his conduct throughout the discovery process was sufficient to satisfy the purpose of the written consent requirement. Furthermore, since defendants first raised this issue, Ahmed has filed a formal written consent with the Court. At this point, Ahmed is in compliance with not only the spirit, but also the letter of the written consent requirement. Thus, this Court finds that defendants had sufficient notice of Ahmed’s intent to proceed with a collective action, and this Court will therefore consider Ahmed’s request for conditional certification as a collective action on its merits.

Click Ahmed v. T.J. Maxx Corp. to read the entire Memorandum Opinion and Order.

While this case is certainly helpful to practitioners in the situation where the named-plaintiff has not filed a consent to join, as a practical matter (especially in courts outside of the Second Circuit), the best practice is to file a consent to join on behalf of all plaintiffs and opt-in plaintiffs, including the named-plaintiffs, to avoid the necessity of even addressing this issue.  Further, it should be noted that even in this case, the named-plaintiff ultimately did file a consent to join, after the issue had been raised by the defendants in their opposition to his motion for conditional certification.

EDITOR’S NOTE:  Within days of the Ahmed decision, another court- this one in the Eleventh Circuit- was faced with a similar issue.  In that case the plaintiff had actually styled his complaint as an individual claim, excluding language that he sought to proceed on a collective action basis.  Nonetheless, the court held that the defendants had adequate notice of plaintiff’s intent to proceed as a collective action, and ultimately granted plaintiff’s motion for conditional certification.  See  Hogan v. Allstate Beverage Co., Inc., 2012 WL 6027748, at *5 (M.D. Ala. Dec. 4, 2012).

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D.Conn.: Although Named Plaintiff Must File Consent to Join, Affidavit Submitted in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Satisfied Consent Requirement

D’Antuono v. C & G of Groton, Inc.

This case was before the court on defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The defendant contended that the case should be dismissed, due to plaintiff’s failure to file a written consent to join within the relevant 3 year statute of limitations, as required by the FLSA. The case revolved around the somewhat novel issue of whether a named Plaintiff, who fails to file a written consent to join her own FLSA case, can nonetheless be deemed to have satisfied the consent requirement, by virtue of filing a written affidavit with the court that states her intention to proceed with an FLSA claim in court. Here, the court found that, on the facts presented, it was a close call. However, in line with the remedial purposes of the FLSA, the court agreed that plaintiff “consented” to join her FLSA case when she filed a prior affidavit in opposition to defendant’s motion to dismiss, because it was written evidence of her intention to participate in the case.

Framing the issue before it, the court explained:

The question presented is whether Mr. Cruz’s signed March 11, 2011 affidavit, attached as an exhibit to Plaintiffs’ response in opposition to a motion to dismiss, constitutes a signed, written consent filed with the court. In full, the only possibly relevant statement provides: “Given my current financial circumstances and my understanding of the costs associated with arbitration, I cannot afford to arbitrate my claims and I could not afford to undertake this litigation and pursue my rights if I had the risk of paying the Defendants’ costs if I lost at arbitration.” Pls.’ Mem. in Opp’n [doc. # 26–4] Ex. D ¶ 9 (Decl. of Ramona Cruz). At the time it was filed, Ms. Cruz was one of three named plaintiffs in this suit. All of the three named plaintiffs submitted signed affidavits with final paragraphs substantially similar to the text quoted above. See Pls.’ Mem. in Opp’n [docs. # 26–2, 26–3] Ex. B ¶ 13 (Decl. of Nicole D’Antuono), Ex. C ¶ 12 (Decl. of Karen Vilnit).

Discussing the authority cited by the parties, the court found no case to be on all fours with the facts presented:

The Court has located no dispositive precedent or closely analogous case. The cases most often cited by the parties are all distinguishable on the facts. See, e.g., Manning, 2011 WL 4583776, at *2–3 (finding that named plaintiff who had submitted a signed declaration stating ” ‘I am the named Plaintiff in this action’ ” and describing the facts of the litigation had met the consent requirement, but that named plaintiffs who had been deposed but had submitted no signed documents did not); Perkins, 2009 WL 3754097, at *3 n. 2 (holding that named plaintiff who submitted a signed declaration in support of a motion for class certification describing her job duties and stating that she ” ‘did not release any claims relating to unpaid overtime wages which are the subject of this litigation’ … insufficient to demonstrate her desire to take part in this action as a plaintiff”); Mendez, 260 F.R.D. at 52 (finding that named plaintiff who had submitted a signed affirmation in support of a motion for class certification stating ” ‘I am the Named Plaintiff in the above-captioned matter’ ” sufficient to meet the consent requirement).

Holding that plaintiff’s prior affidavit satisfied the requirement that all plaintiffs file a consent to join, the court reasoned:

Defendants’ arguments on the facts of prior cases are not convincing. It is irrelevant that Ms. Cruz does not explicitly claim to be a named plaintiff in the action; furthermore, the caption on her signed declaration states as much. Additionally, the fact that her declaration was submitted in response to a motion to dismiss, rather than in support of a motion for class certification, carries little weight. While a declaration attached to a motion for class certification may bolster a plaintiff’s argument that the declaration was meant to serve as a notice of consent, the inverse is not true.

Instead, the Court must determine, as a matter of law, whether Ms. Cruz’s signed declaration manifests a clear intent to be a party plaintiff. This question is a close one, and one which would not have arisen had Ms. Cruz’s counsel simply ensured that a written consent form was filed along with the complaint. Despite this lapse, the Court reads Ms. Cruz’s affidavit broadly as implicitly verifying the complaint, expressing an interest that legal action be taken to protect her rights, and expressing an interest in being a party plaintiff. See Manning, 2011 WL 4583776, at *3; Perkins, 2009 WL 3754097, at *3 n. 2; Mendez, 260 F.R.D. at 52. Unlike the plaintiff in Perkins, Ms. Cruz has expressed an interest not only in preserving her legal claims, but in “undertak[ing] this litigation and pursu[ing her] rights.” Pls.’ Mem. in Opp’n [doc. # 26–4] Ex. D ¶ 9 (Decl. of Ramona Cruz). Furthermore, while participation in a deposition is not dispositive or sufficient for the notice requirement, see Manning, 2011 WL 4583776, at *3, the Court finds that the fact that Ms. Cruz has already willingly undergone a lengthy deposition relevant in the evaluation of whether she intended to participate in this case. Finally, the Court notes that the two potential purposes of the notice requirement-ensuring both that the Defendants are aware of all potential plaintiffs and that each individual plaintiff intends to participate in the lawsuit—are both satisfied.

Thus, the court concluded that plaintiff’s affidavit was sufficient to meet the notice requirement.  Moreover, since the affidavit was filed within the three year statute of limitations, the court determined that plaintiff had satisfied the notice or consent requirement of the FLSA.

Click D’Antuono v. C & G of Groton, Inc. to read the entire Memorandum of Decision.

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3d Cir.: Defendant May Not “Pick Off” a Putative Collective Action by Tendering Full Relief to Named-Plaintiff at Outset

Symczyk v. Genesis Healthcare Corp.

In an issue that has now been addressed by several circuits in recent years, the Third Circuit was presented with the question of whether a defendant-employer in an FLSA case may “pick off” a putative collective action (prior to conditional certification), where it tenders full relief to the named-Plaintiff.  Consistent with other circuits to have taken up this issue, the Third Circuit held that a defendant may not do so and that such an offer of judgment (OJ) does not moot a putative collective action.  As such, the court reversed the decision below, dismissing the case on mootness grounds.

In dismissing the case initially, the trial court below reasoned, “[Plaintiff] does not contend that other individuals have joined her collective action. Thus, this case, like each of the district court cases cited by Defendants, which concluded that a Rule 68 offer of judgment mooted the underlying FLSA collective action, involves a single named plaintiff. In addition, Symczyk does not contest Defendants’ assertion that the 68 offer of judgment fully satisfied her claims….”

After discussing the application of full tender relief offers in the Rule 23 context, the court concluded that the same reasoning precludes picking off the named-plaintiff in a representative action brought pursuant to 216(b).  Instead, the court held that a motion for conditional certification in an FLSA case made within a reasonable time “relates back” to the time of the filing of the Complaint and thus such a representative action may proceed, notwithstanding to purportedly “full tender” offer to the named-plaintiff.  The court explained:

“Although the opt-in mechanism transforms the manner in which a named plaintiff acquires a personal stake in representing the interests of others, it does not present a compelling justification for limiting the relation back doctrine to the Rule 23 setting. The considerations that caution against allowing a defendant’s use of Rule 68 to impede the advancement of a representative action are equally weighty in either context. Rule 23 permits plaintiffs “to pool claims which would be uneconomical to litigate individually.” Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809, 105 S.Ct. 2965, 86 L.Ed.2d 628 (1985). Similarly, § 216(b) affords plaintiffs “the advantage of lower individual costs to vindicate rights by the pooling of resources.” Hoffmann–La Roche, 493 U.S. at 170. Rule 23 promotes “efficiency and economy of litigation.” Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 349, 103 S.Ct. 2392, 76 L.Ed.2d 628 (1983). Similarly, “Congress’ purpose in authorizing § 216(b) class actions was to avoid multiple lawsuits where numerous employees have allegedly been harmed by a claimed violation or violations of the FLSA by a particular employer.” Prickett v. DeKalb Cnty., 349 F.3d 1294, 1297 (11th Cir.2003).

When Rule 68 morphs into a tool for the strategic curtailment of representative actions, it facilitates an outcome antithetical to the purposes behind § 216(b). Symczyk’s claim-like that of the plaintiff in Weiss—was “acutely susceptible to mootness” while the action was in its early stages and the court had yet to determine whether to facilitate notice to prospective plaintiffs. See Weiss, 385 F.3d at 347 (internal quotation marks omitted). When the certification process has yet to unfold, application of the relation back doctrine prevents defendants from using Rule 68 to “undercut the viability” of either’ type of representative action. See id. at 344.

Additionally, the relation back doctrine helps safeguard against the erosion of FLSA claims by operation of the Act’s statute of limitations. To qualify for relief under the FLSA, a party plaintiff must “commence” his cause of action before the statute of limitations applying to his individual claim has lapsed. Sperling v. Hoffmann–La Roche, Inc., 24 F.3d 463, 469 (3d Cir.1994).  For a named plaintiff, the action commences on the date the complaint is filed. 29 U.S.C. § 256(a). For an opt-in plaintiff, however, the action commences only upon filing of a written consent. Id. § 256(b). This represents a departure from Rule 23, in which the filing of a complaint tolls the statute of limitations “as to all asserted members of the class” even if the putative class member is not cognizant of the suit’s existence. See Crown, Cork & Seal Co. 462 U.S. at 350 (internal quotation marks omitted). Protracted disputes over the propriety of dismissal in light of Rule 68 offers may deprive potential opt-ins whose claims are in jeopardy of expiring of the opportunity to toll the limitations period—and preserve their entitlements to recovery—by filing consents within the prescribed window.

In sum, we believe the relation back doctrine helps ensure the use of Rule 68 does not prevent a collective action from playing out according to the directives of § 216(b) and the procedures authorized by the Supreme Court in Hoffmann–La Roche and further refined by courts applying this statute. Depriving the parties and the court of a reasonable opportunity to deliberate on the merits of collective action “conditional certification” frustrates the objectives served by § 216(b). Cf. Sandoz, 553 F.3d at 921 (explaining “there must be some time for a[n FLSA] plaintiff to move to certify a collective action before a defendant can moot the claim through an offer of judgment”). Absent undue delay, when an FLSA plaintiff moves for “certification” of a collective action, the appropriate course—particularly when a defendant makes a Rule 68 offer to the plaintiff that would have the possible effect of mooting the claim for collective relief asserted under § 216(b)—is for the district court to relate the motion back to the filing of the initial complaint.

Upon remand, should Symczyk move for “conditional certification,” the court’ shall consider whether such motion was made without undue delay, and, if it so finds, shall relate the motion back to December 4, 2009the date on which Symczyk filed her initial complaint. If (1) Symczyk may yet timely seek “conditional certification” of her collective action, (2) the court permits the case to move forward as a collective action (by virtue of Symczyk’s satisfaction of the “modest factual showing” standard), and (3) at least one other similarly situated employee opts in, then defendants’ Rule 68 offer of judgment would no longer fully satisfy the claims of everyone in the collective action, and the proffered rationale behind dismissing the complaint on jurisdictional grounds would no longer be applicable. If, however, the court finds Symczyk’s motion to certify would be untimely, or otherwise denies the motion on its merits, then defendants’ Rule 68 offer to Symczyk—in full satisfaction of her individual claim—would moot the action.

For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the judgment of the District Court and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.”

Thus, while ultimately the OJ might have the effect of mooting the case, it could not do so prior to a reasonable opportunity to plaintiff of seeking conditional certification of same.

Click Symczyk v. Genesis Healthcare Corp. to read the entire decision.

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