Tag Archives: Overtime Damages

D.Md.: Compensatory Damages for Emotional Distress Are Available Under §§ 215 and 216(b) for Retaliation Claims

Randolph v. ADT Sec. Services, Inc.

This case was before the court on several pretrial motions of the parties. As discussed here, among the issues briefed before the court was whether compensatory damages are available to a plaintiff-employee pursuing a claim of retaliation under the FLSA. The court answered this question in the affirmative, noting the issue was one of first impression within the Fourth Circuit.

Restating the parties’ respective positions, the court explained:

ADT maintains that, as a matter of law, Plaintiffs are precluded from seeking emotional distress damages because such damages are unavailable under “the very similar damages provision of the ADEA.” (ECF No. 101, at 18). Plaintiffs disagree, pointing to several circuit court opinions upholding such awards. On this issue, Plaintiffs have the better end of the argument.

The court noted that the issue presented was one of first impression in the Fourth Circuit and then examined case law from other circuit and district level courts:

Neither the Fourth Circuit nor any district court within this circuit has previously determined whether a plaintiff may recover compensatory damages from emotional distress in an FLSA action. Four circuit courts of appeal—the Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits—have, however, either directly or indirectly addressed the issue, and all have permitted the recovery of emotional distress damages. Moore v. Freeman, 355 F.3d 558, 563–64 (6th Cir.2004) (explaining that “consensus on the issue of compensatory damages for mental and emotional distress [in FLSA cases] seems to be developing”); Broadus v. O.K. Indus., Inc., 238 F.3d 990, 992 (8th Cir.2001) (upholding a compensatory award that may have included damages for emotional distress); Lambert v. Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997, 1011 (9th Cir.1999) (affirming an award of emotional distress damages in an FLSA action); Avitia v. Metro. Club of Chi., Inc., 49 F.3d 1219, 1226–30 (7th Cir.1995) (reducing an award for emotional distress damages after finding the award excessive, but noting that such damages are available under the FLSA (citing Travis, 921 F.2d at 111–12)).

The compensatory nature of the remedies in § 216(b) supports the outcome in these cases. “The [FLSA’s] statutory scheme contemplates compensation in full for any retaliation employees suffer from reporting grievances.” Moore, 355 F.3d at 563 (citing Snapp, 208 F.3d at 934; Lanza, 97 F.Supp.2d at 740); Republic Franklin Ins. Co. v. Albemarle Cnty. Sch. Bd., 670 F.3d 563, 568 (4th Cir.2012) (citing Snapp and Lanza for the proposition that the relief provided in § 216(b) “is compensatory in nature”). The text of § 216(b) expressly provides for “such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate” this compensatory purpose, employing the broad phrase “without limitation” to indicate that the enumerated remedies within that section are not exhaustive. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). “[L]ike the forms of relief mentioned [therein], damages for mental anguish are intended to compensate the injured party for harm suffered.”   Moore, 355 F.3d at 564.

Certainly, an argument could be made that the availability of liquidated damages [under § 216(b) ] would be sufficient to fully compensate a plaintiff with proof of actual economic damages but only minor, subjective mental anguish occasioned by an employer’s violation of the [FLSA]. However, in a case involving only nominal economic losses but proved retaliation consisting of concerted, directed harassment, resulting in grave emotional distress, such nominal economic damages or the available doubling of those damages would be insufficient to make the plaintiff whole. Damages for mental anguish would be the necessary compensatory legal relief “appropriate to effectuate the purposes of [the anti-retaliation provision].” Bogacki v. Buccaneers Ltd. P’ship, 370 F.Supp.2d 1201, 1203 (M.D.Fla.2005) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)); cf. Snapp, 208 F.3d at 937 (reasoning that “district courts may have to exercise some creativity in awarding relief in retaliation cases” beyond those forms set forth in the statutory text).

The court then rejected the contrary holdings of courts that had held ADEA cases to be persuasive based upon the fact that the ADEA was patterned after the FLSA, noting that such reasoning:

fails to consider that the relief authorized under both statutes must be determined ‘not in isolation, but in conjunction with the other provisions of the Act[s], the policies they further, and the enforcement framework[s] they envision.’ Dean, 559 F.2d at 1038.” The court further distinguished the ADEA legislative framework by pointing out that “[t]he ADEA includes an administrative conciliation process that is critical to its enforcement framework… [and] [l]ooking to this process, circuit courts have repeatedly held that emotional distress damages are unavailable in ADEA actions because they would impede mediation and conciliation by discouraging early resolution of ADEA claims.

Thus, the court concluded:

Because “full compensation is the evident purpose and paramount policy” in an FLSA retaliation action, “the more reasoned approach” would permit a plaintiff who makes a proper showing to recover damages for emotional distress. Id.; Moore, 355 F.3d at 563–64. Neither party here has addressed the strength or weakness of Plaintiffs’ evidence of alleged emotional distress. Until the parties do so at trial, the court cannot conclude—as a matter of law—”that damages for mental anguish should be disallowed.” Id. at 1205–06.  Plaintiffs will be permitted to seek emotional distress damages through a jury trial, and their motion on this issue will, therefore, be granted.

In light of the continuing disagreement of courts regarding this issue, this might be one to watch for further appellate level developments in the future.

Click Randolph v. ADT Sec. Services, Inc. to read the entire Memorandum Opinion.

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M.D.Fla.: Employer Not Entitled to Offset Unpaid Overtime Damages Based on Provision of Car, Car Insurance, Gasoline, or a Cell Phone It Provided

Vancamper v. Rental World, Inc.

This case was before the court on plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.  Among the issues of interest ruled upon, the court held that plaintiff’s pre-arranged shuttling of defendants’ clients to and from the airport to defendants’ rental office for pre-arranged rental of defendant’s cars and the cleaning of such cars, satisfied the individual coverage test of the FLSA.  As discussed here, the court also addressed defendants’ argument that it should be entitled to offset plaintiff’s minimum wage and overtime damages, if any, due to its provision of a car, car insurance, gasoline and cell phone to plaintiff, during his employment.  Holding that such offsets are impermissible under the FLSA, the court explained:

“The parties dispute whether Vancamper’s use of a car, car insurance, gasoline, and a cellular phone provided by Rental World offset the overtime compensation that Rental World owed Vancamper as permitted by 29 U.S.C. § 207(h)(2). (Doc. No. 27 at 14; Doc. No. 33 at 5–6.) The Defendants bear the burden of establishing a credit for overtime compensation under Section 207(h)(2). See Leonard, 614 F.Supp. at 1187 (noting that an employer bears the burden of establishing a credit under 29 U.S.C. § 203(m) against the overtime owed to an employee (citing Donovan, 676 F.2d at 473–76)).

Under Section 207(h)(2), the forms of compensation described in 29 U.S.C. § 207(e)(5)-(7) are creditable toward overtime compensation. Those forms of compensation are as follows:

(5) extra compensation provided by a premium rate paid for certain hours worked by the employee in any day or workweek because such hours are hours worked in excess of eight in a day or in excess of the maximum workweek applicable to such employee under subsection (a) of this section or in excess of the employee’s normal working hours or regular working hours, as the case may be;

(6) extra compensation provided by a premium rate paid for work by the employee on Saturdays, Sundays, holidays, or regular days of rest, or on the sixth or seventh day of the workweek, where such premium rate is not less than one and one-half times the rate established in good faith for like work performed in nonovertime hours on other days;

(7) extra compensation provided by a premium rate paid to the employee, in pursuance of an applicable employment contract or collective-bargaining agreement, for work outside of the hours established in good faith by the contract or agreement as the basic, normal, or regular workday (not exceeding eight hours) or workweek (not exceeding the maximum workweek applicable to such employee under subsection (a) of this section, where such premium rate is not less than one and one-half times the rate established in good faith by the contract or agreement for like work performed during such workday or workweek;

29 U.S.C. § 207(e)(5)-(7).

These provisions plainly contemplate a dollar-for-dollar credit against overtime pay for premium pay awarded on particular days and times. Wheeler v. Hampton Twp., 339 F.3d 238, 245 (3d Cir.2005). The parties do not cite, and the Court does not find, any authority that these provisions encompass use of a car, car insurance, gasoline, or a cellular phone provided by an employer. Moreover, because Vancamper’s uncontroverted time sheets show that he was never paid extra compensation for working during the periods described in Section 207(e)(5)-(7), (Doc. No. 27–5 at 1–102), Defendants are not entitled to any overtime credit under Section 207(h)(2).”

Click Vancamper v. Rental World, Inc. to read the entire order.

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