Tag Archives: Recording Overtime

2d. Cir.: Where Employee’s Falsification of Time Records Was Carried Out at Employer’s Behest, Employer Cannot Be Exonerated by Fact That Employee Entered Erroneous Hours on Timesheets

Kuebel v. Black & Decker Inc.

This case was before the Second Circuit on Plaintiff’s appeal of an order awarding Defendant summary judgment.  Plaintiff asserted two distinct claims below: (1) that work performed on his PDA and in Defendant’s computer system (at home) extended his continuous workday such that Defendant’s failure to pay him for all time up to including such work was a violation of the FLSA; and (2) that he was entitled to be paid for off-the-clock work that he did not report because his supervisors instructed him not to.  While the court affirmed summary judgment on the “continuous workday” claim, it reversed as to the off-the-clock claim, holding that “[a]t least where the employee’s falsifications were carried out at the instruction of the employer or the employer’s agents, the employer cannot be exonerated by the fact that the employee physically entered the erroneous hours into the timesheets.”

With respect to the off-the-clock claims, the relevant facts cited by the court were:

“[plaintiff] asserts that he falsified his timesheets because his supervisors instructed him not to record more than forty hours per week. He testified that at monthly meetings, “there was always a point that [Idigo] and Mr. Davolt and [another manager] would always indicate that we [Retail Specialists] were not to put more than forty hours on our time sheet,” and that Davolt “told all of the reps that they were only to record forty hours a week, … no matter what they worked during that particular week.” Kuebel further testified that during a personal discussion with Davolt on February 22, 2007, Davolt said to him, “you can’t work overtime, you’re only supposed to put forty hours on your timecard.”

Discussing the viability of the off-the-clock claims that Plaintiff asserts he was owed overtime wages for time he allegedly worked, but admittedly did not report, the court first discussed the general legal principles applicable to FLSA claims where the Plaintiff alleges Defendant failed in its recordkeeping obligations (to maintain accurate time records), under Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 686–87 (1946).  The court below had determined that Plaintiff was not entitled to Anderson’s lenient burden of proof where, as here, he acknowledged that he falsified his own records.  However, the Second Circuit disagreed, holding:

“At least where the employee’s falsifications were carried out at the instruction of the employer or the employer’s agents, the employer cannot be exonerated by the fact that the employee physically entered the erroneous hours into the timesheets. As the district court emphasized, Kuebel admits that it was he who falsified his timesheets, notwithstanding B & D’s official policy requiring accurate recordkeeping. But his testimony—which must be credited at the summary judgement stage—was that he did so because his managers instructed him not to record more than forty hours per week. He specifically testified that at company meetings and during discussions with one of his supervisors, it was conveyed to him that he was not to record overtime no matter how many hours he actually worked. In other words, Kuebel has testified that it was B & D, through its managers, that caused the inaccuracies in his timesheets. While ultimately a factfinder might or might not credit this testimony, that is a determination for trial, not summary judgment. In sum, we hold that because Kuebel has presented evidence indicating that his employer’s records are inaccurate—and that although it was he who purposefully rendered them inaccurate, he did so at his managers’ direction—the district court should have afforded Kuebel the benefit of Anderson’s “just and reasonable inference” standard. See Allen, 495 F.3d at 1317–18 (finding just and reasonable inference standard applicable at summary judgment where plaintiffs had not recorded overtime, but “testified that they were discouraged from accurately recording overtime work on their time sheets, and were encouraged to falsify their own records by submitting time sheets that reflected their scheduled, rather than actual, hours”).  A contrary conclusion would undermine the remedial goals of the FLSA, as it would permit an employer to obligate its employees to record their own time, have its managers unofficially pressure them not to record overtime, and then, when an employee sues for unpaid overtime, assert that his claim fails because his timesheets do not show any overtime.”

Given the procedural posture of the case, the court found that Plaintiff had presented an issue of fact for the jury to decide, thus rendering summary judgment inappropriate, reasoning:

“Ultimately, the dispute as to the precise amount of Kuebel’s uncompensated work is one of fact for trial. As stated above, a plaintiff establishes a violation of the FLSA by proving that he performed uncompensated work of which his employer was or should have been aware. The Anderson test simply addresses whether there is a reasonable basis for calculating damages, assuming that a violation has been shown. Brown, 534 F.3d at 596. It does not entitle an employer to summary judgment where the employee’s estimates of his uncompensated overtime are somewhat inconsistent.

The district court further held that, in any event, the following evidence was sufficient to “negate the inference that [Kuebel] had performed work off-the-clock”: (1) B & D’s written policies and training materials stating that time worked must be accurately recorded; (2) Kuebel’s own time records; and (3) Beacon reports for Kuebel showing low in-store hours. Kuebel II, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46533, at *39–40. We disagree. B & D’s evidence raises factual and credibility questions for trial, but it does not afford a basis for summary judgment. First, while the existence of B & D’s official policies requiring accurate timekeeping may detract from Kuebel’s credibility, it does not entitle B & D to judgment as a matter of law in light of Kuebel’s testimony that he was instructed by his managers not to record all of his hours. Second, that Kuebel’s timesheets do not show any overtime does not resolve the central question necessitating a trial, which, as we have seen, is whether Kuebel worked overtime but did not record it at his managers’ behest. Finally, to the extent that Kuebel’s Beacon hours—or, for that matter, his manager’s testimony that the condition of his stores was often subpar—suggest that Kuebel typically worked less than forty hours a week, such evidence also raises a factual issue for trial.”

Similarly, the court held that Plaintiff had created an issue of fact despite Defendant’s contention that it lacked knowledge of any unrecorded off-the-clock hours allegedly worked by Plaintiff, stating:

“We conclude that Kuebel has raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether B & D knew he was working off the clock. Kuebel testified that on several occasions, he specifically complained to his supervisor, Davolt, that he was working more than forty hours per week but recording only forty. The district court discounted Kuebel’s testimony, relying on the fact that he never lodged a formal complaint using B & D’s anonymous reporting hotline. Id. at *44–45. But while that fact might conceivably hurt Kuebel’s credibility at trial, it does not warrant summary judgment for B & D.”

While it remains to be seen whether Plaintiff will actually prevail on his claims, given the FLSA’s non-delegable duty on employers, there can be little question that the Second Circuit reached the correct conclusion in holding that an employer who requires an employee to falsify his or her time records may not then benefit from such falsification.  Stay tuned to see how this one turns out…

Click Kuebel v. Black & Decker Inc. to read the entire opinion.

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8th Cir.: Recording Overtime Over Defendant-Employer’s Objections Not Protected Activity Under 29 U.S.C. § 215

Ritchie v. St. Louis Jewish Light

Plaintiff brought this case under 29 U.S.C. § 215.  Holding that informal complaints are not protected activity under the FLSA’s anti-retaliation provisions, the lower court dismissed and Plaintiff appealed, arguing that such informal complaints are protected activity.  The Eight Circuit did not reach that issue however, because it held that Plaintiff had not even made such informal complaints, because it held continuing to record overtime worked, despite Defendants’ instructions not to does not constitute a “complaint.”  As such, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision.

Reasoning that Plaintiff had not engaged in activity that would be protected under § 215, even if § 215 protected informal complaints, the court explained:

“We need not decide today whether informal complaints are protected activity under the FLSA because there is nothing in Ritchie’s verified federal court complaint that alleged that Ritchie made any sort of complaint to either Levin or St. Louis Jewish Light. The verified complaint alleged that:

7. Starting on or about May or June 2009, Levin asked Ritchie to perform work (“Work”) [formerly] performed by two employees by herself which Ritchie commenced to do.

8. Levin asked Ritchie to perform the Work without recording overtime.

9. The Work required that Ritchie perform overtime hours (more than 40 hours in a week) (“Overtime”) which Ritchie recorded.

10. Levin complained to Ritchie about her recording the Overtime and again requested that she perform the Work without recording overtime.

11. When Ritchie continued to record the Overtime, she was terminated by Levin and [St. Louis Jewish Light].

(Appellant’s App. at 1-2.)

Even assuming that informal complaints are sufficient to trigger the anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA, a legal conclusion we do not make, Ritchie failed to allege sufficient facts to indicate that she made even an informal complaint to either Levin or St. Louis Jewish Light. The only complaining asserted in her pleading goes the other way-Levin complaining to Ritchie. Ritchie asserts that she complained pursuant to the FLSA when she gave “Levin notice that she believed Levin’s instructions were a violation of the law because she, in fact, recorded the overtime hours in writing despite his orders not to record them.” (Appellant’s Reply Br. at 4.) In fact, rather than constituting an affirmative complaint that would trigger the anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA, her recording of her overtime could be nothing more than mere insubordination, she having been instructed to the contrary. Insubordination is not protected under the FLSA, and insubordination is not sufficient to trigger the anti-retaliation provision in 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3). As appellees’ counsel noted at oral argument, if merely recording one’s overtime is a “complaint” that triggers the anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA, an employer would not be able to discipline an employee for working unauthorized overtime so long as the employee recorded the overtime.

As the Supreme Court has recently said, the plausibility standard, which requires a federal court complaint “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face, … asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (internal quotation marks omitted). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]-‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ “ Id. at 1950 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)).

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the FLSA, Ritchie would have to show that she participated in statutorily protected activity, that the appellees took an adverse employment action against her, and that there was a causal connection between Ritchie’s statutorily protected activity and the adverse employment action. See Grey v. City of Oak Grove, 396 F.3d 1031, 1034-35 (8th Cir.2005). The facts pleaded in Ritchie’s complaint do not permit us to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct. Thus, Ritchie’s complaint merely alleged, but did not show, that Ritchie is entitled to relief.

Thus, the district court did not err in granting the appellees’ motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Carton, 611 F.3d at 454.”

Click Ritchie v. St. Louis Jewish Light to read the entire decision.

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