Tag Archives: Similarly Situated

S.D.N.Y.: Existence of Arbitration Agreements for Some (Not All) Employees in Putative Class, Irrelevant re “Similarly Situated” Inquiry at Stage I

Romero v La Revise Associates, L.L.C.

This case was before the court on plaintiff’s motion for conditional certification. The case concerned allegations of impermissible tip credit, inadequate notice of same (under 203(m)), and other allegations of unpaid minimum wages. As further discussed here, defendants largely focused their attack on their twin contentions that the class proposed by plaintiff was not similarly situated to him and/or was too broad, because it contained English speakers (the plaintiff did not speak English) and employees and former employees who had signed arbitration agreements (the plaintiff did not). The court rejected both of these contentions, and reasoned that neither of these factors were appropriately considered at Stage I, the conditional certification stage.

Rejecting the defendant’s arguments in this regard, and holding that such issues were more properly reserved for Stage II or decertification analysis, the court reasoned:

The Court disagrees with defendants’ arguments. Case law imposes only a very limited burden on plaintiffs for purposes of proceeding as a conditional collective action. “[C]ourts have conditionally certified collective actions under the FLSA where plaintiffs, based on their firsthand observations, identify an approximate class of similarly situated individuals.” Hernandez v. Immortal Rise, Inc ., 2012 WL 4369746, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2012). Here, Romero has done just that, stating in his declaration that he “personally observed … Defendants’ policy to pay below the statutory minimum wage rate to all tipped employees,” that he and other tipped employees were compensated “all at rates below the minimum wage,” that he has never seen a tipped employee “receive proper notice explaining what a tip credit is,” that he and other tipped employees had to spend more than 20% of their daily time in non-tipped related activities, that he observed defendants engaging in time-shaving, that he observed when employees were sent home without call-in pay if the restaurant was not busy, and that he “personally observed that all non-exempt employees received the same form of wage and hour notice.” Romero Decl. ¶¶ 2–9. The affidavit of a plaintiff attesting to the existence of similarly situated plaintiffs is sufficient for the purposes of a motion to approve a collective action. See Cheng Chung Liang v. J.C. Broadway Restaurant, Inc., 2013 WL 2284882, at *2–3 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2013) (“For the purposes of this motion, … plaintiffs’ evidence—in the form of [one employee's] affidavit—is sufficient to establish that … there may be class members with whom he is similarly situated.”). Thus, Romero has made a sufficient showing that he and potential plaintiffs “were victims of a common policy or plan that violated the law.” Hoffman, 982 F.Supp. at 261.

Defendants’ principal argument is that because other employees signed arbitration agreements, Romero is not similarly situated to these other employees. Def. Mem. at 6–14. Defendants assert that the claims here are “properly pursued solely in arbitration, on an individual basis, by all of Ruhlmann’s employees who signed such an agreement” and therefore that “Ruhlmann’s employees are dissimilar from Plaintiff Romero and must pursue any claims they may have in an arbitral forum rather than federal court.” Def. Mem. at 8–9. Romero challenges both the enforceability and the validity of these arbitration agreements. He argues that the agreements are not enforceable because they violate the fee-shifting provision of the FLSA. Reply at 6–7. Romero also argues that defendants caused several of these agreements to be signed by coercion, that it is highly likely that several employees did not actually sign arbitration agreements, and that the validity of the signatures on several agreements are questionable. Reply at 7–9; Pl. May 31 Letter at 2. Additionally, he asserts that the agreements are unenforceable because they limit the statute of limitations on employees’ claims to six months and because they were not provided to employees in their native language. Pl. Aug. 20 Letter at 2–3.

As already noted, the question on a motion to proceed as a collective action is whether the proposed plaintiffs are similarly situated “with respect to their allegations that the law has been violated.” Young, 229 F.R.D. at 54; accord Meyers, 624 F.3d at 555 (in conditional collective action approval, question is whether the proposed plaintiffs are similarly situated to the named plaintiffs “with respect to whether a FLSA violation has occurred”). The arbitration agreements do not create any differences between Romero and the proposed plaintiffs with respect to Romero’s claims that defendants have violated the FLSA. That is, the validity vel non of the agreements is unrelated to any claims of a violation of the FLSA. Under this reasoning, the existence of differences between potential plaintiffs as to the arbitrability of their claims should not act as a bar to the collective action analysis. Indeed, courts have consistently held that the existence of arbitration agreements is “irrelevant” to collective action approval “because it raises a merits-based determination.” D’Antuono v. C & G of Groton, Inc., 2011 WL 5878045, at *4 (D.Conn. Nov. 23, 2011) (citing cases); accord Hernandez, 2012 WL 4369746, at *5;Salomon v. Adderly Indus., Inc., 847 F.Supp.2d 561, 565 (S.D.N.Y.2012) (“The relevant issue here, however, is not whether Plaintiffs and [potential opt-in plaintiffs] were identical in all respects, but rather whether they were subjected to a common policy to deprive them of overtime pay ….”) (alteration in original) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

In support of its argument that the existence of arbitration agreements merits denial of collective action approval, defendants make arguments about the eventual enforceability of the arbitration agreements and rely on cases in which courts granted motions to dismiss and compel arbitration because of such agreements. See Def. Mem. at 6–7. Critically, defendants do not even address the cases holding that consideration of the validity of arbitration agreements is inappropriate in the context of a motion to approval an FLSA collective action. The situation here is thus akin to the situation in Raniere v. Citigroup Inc., 827 F.Supp.2d 294 (S.D .N.Y.2011), rev’d on other grounds, 2013 WL 4046278 (2d Cir.2013), in which the court remarked:

Defendants have failed to cite a single authority finding that due to the possibility that members of the collective [action] might be compelled to bring their claims in an arbitral forum, certification is not appropriate. Such arguments are best suited to the second certification stage, where, on a fuller record, the court will examine whether the plaintiffs and opt-ins are in fact similarly situated.

Id. at 324.

Defendants’ strongest argument is that “[i]t would be a waste of judicial and party resource to force defendants” to send notice to individuals ultimately bound to arbitrate claims. Def. June 4 Letter at 3. But the notice requirement is not unduly burdensome in this case and the defendants’ proposal essentially amounts to an invitation for the Court to adjudicate the validity of the arbitration agreements. But, as already noted, case law makes clear that this sort of merits-based determination should not take place at the first stage of the conditional collective action approval process. Plaintiff has raised at least colorable arguments to support the invalidity or unenforceability of the arbitration agreements, some of which are fact-intensive. Case law holds, however, that issues of fact surrounding arbitration agreements are properly resolved at the second stage of the two-step inquiry. D’Antuono, 2011 WL 5878045, at *5; accord Salomon, 847 F.Supp.2d at 565 (“[A] fact-intensive inquiry is inappropriate at the notice stage, as Plaintiffs are seeking only conditional certification.”) (citing cases); Ali v. Sugarland Petroleum, 2009 WL 5173508, at *4 (S.D.Tex. Dec. 22, 2009) (“The Court will make the determination [of whether to exclude those who signed arbitration agreement from the class] at the conclusion of discovery, when it may properly analyze the validity of the arbitration agreement.”). Defendants not only fail to distinguish these cases, they do not even proffer any argument as to why the reasoning of these cases is wrong.

Defendants have submitted evidence contradicting Romero’s claim that he is similarly situated to other employees with respect to other aspects of his claims, such as his understanding of the tip credit. See Collin Decl. ¶ 9. However, “the two-stage certification process exists to help develop the factual record, not put an end to an action on an incomplete one.” Griffith v. Fordham Fin. Mgmt., Inc., 2013 WL 2247791, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 2013) (granting collective action approval where defendant had put forth “contravening evidence”) (emphasis omitted) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). For these reasons, Romero’s motion for conditional approval of a collective action is granted.

Click Romero v La Revise Associates, L.L.C. to read the court’s entire Opinion & Order.

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Filed under Arbitration, Collective Actions

S.D.Fla.: Defendant Compelled To Give Plaintiff Names, Addresses And Telephone Numbers Of All Employees Similarly Situated To Plaintiff, Prior To Conditional Certification

Disimone v. Atlas Service, Inc.

This case was before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Defendant to respond to certain discovery items.  Among the discovery items in dispute, Plaintiff sough the name, addresses and telephone numbers of all employees who had similar job duties to Plaintiff, and who were paid in the same way as Plaintiff for the three (3) years preceding the filing of the lawsuit.  The Court granted this portion of Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel.

The specific interrogatories at issue were,

“(13)  Please identify all employees of Defendant (including former employees) whose duties were similar to those performed by Plaintiff for Defendant and who were compensated in a manner similar to Plaintiff between April 2007 and the present. For all such individuals, please provide the last known mailing address and telephone number.” and

“(14) Please identify all employees of Defendant (including former employees) whose duties were similar to those performed by Plaintiff for Defendant and who were compensated in a manner similar to Plaintiff between April 2006 and March 2007. For all such individuals, please provide the last known mailing address and telephone number.”

The Court noted that, “Defendant objected on a variety of grounds, including overbreadth, irrelevance, materiality, undue burden and expense and prematurity given that Plaintiff has not received opt-in notice status.”

Rejecting Defendant’s arguments, the Court stated, “[t]hese objections are not well-taken. Interrogatories No. 13 and 14 properly seek the identification (through the provision of employees’ names, addresses, and telephone numbers) of all employees who performed similar duties to Plaintiff, and who have been compensated in a similar manner to Plaintiff while working for Defendant during the relevant two (2) year and three (3) year statute of limitations period. See Donahay v. Palm Beach Tours & Transp., Inc., Case No. 06-61270, 2007 WL 1119206, *1 (S.D.Fla. Apr. 16, 2007) (denying on grounds of overbreadth motion to compel production of personnel files of all employees similarly situated to plaintiff for the previous six years, but noting that a request seeking the names and addresses of said employees would be acceptable). The current and/or former similarly situated employees not only likely have knowledge of the actual hours Plaintiff worked during his employment with Defendants, but these individuals may very well possess knowledge of Defendants’ time/record keeping, lunch deduction policies and compensation practices, which will corroborate (or possibly refute) Plaintiffs claims that he and/or other employees were not paid for the full extent of their overtime hours worked. Plaintiff is not required to obtain Opt-In Notice Status before receiving identification of other witnesses who performed the same job duties or who were compensated in a manner similar to Plaintiff. See Hammond v. Lowe’s Home Centers, Inc., 216 F.R.D. 666, 671 (D.Kan.2003) ( “provisional certification is not necessarily a prerequisite for conducting limited discovery necessary for defining the proposed class”); Tucker v. Labor Leasing, Inc., 155 F.R.D. 687, 689 (M.D.Fla. Feb. 1, 1994) (same); Dupervil v. Asplundh Construction Co., Case No. 04-81106-CIV-MIDDLEBROOKS (DE 19, p. 2) (same). It should not be an “undue burden or expense” to provide the names, last known mailing address and telephone number of these employees, as Defendant is in possession of such information.”

Thus the Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel in part, ordering the Defendant to respond to Interrogatories No. 13 and 14, outlined above.

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Filed under Collective Actions, Discovery