E.D.Tex.: Notwithstanding Settlement Agreement Stating Plaintiffs Were Not “Prevailing Party,” Plaintiffs Were Prevailing Party, Entitled To Attorneys Fees And Costs Under FLSA
Champion v. ADT Sec. Services, Inc.
The case was before the court on Plaintiffs’ motions for attorneys fees and costs, following the settlement of their FLSA claims. The Defendant argued that Plaintiffs were not entitled to recover attorneys fees and/or costs, because the settlement agreement contained language stating that Plaintiffs were not the “prevailing party,” despite the fact that they had successfully resolved their case by settlement.
Rejecting Defendant’s argument, the court reasoned:
“The Court concludes that Plaintiffs are prevailing parties, for the purposes of the fee-shifting statute, and are thus entitled to attorney’s fees. Under the FLSA, the court may award reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party. Saizan, 448 F.3d at 799. “A typical formulation is that plaintiffs may be considered prevailing parties’ for attorney’s fees purposes if they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983) (internal quotes omitted); see also Abner v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 541 F.3d 372, 379 (5th Cir.2008). The Court holds that the plaintiffs are prevailing parties for these purposes because the plaintiffs succeeded in procuring a favorable settlement. ADT initially made payments for the owed overtime to seven of the named plaintiffs that totalled $11,324.48, and the settlement obtained for those seven plaintiffs totalled $48,500.00. (See P’s Reply Br., Dkt. No. 57 at 13-14.) Thus, the plaintiffs have certainly “achiev[ed] some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433. In the present case, however, Defendant ADT argues Plaintiffs are not prevailing parties for two reasons: (1) this case was resolved by settlement; and (2) the settlement agreement signed by the parties states that Plaintiffs shall not be deemed a prevailing party. For the following reasons, the Court disagrees with Defendant on both points and concludes that Plaintiffs are prevailing parties.
First, settlement does not preclude Plaintiffs from being considered prevailing parties. The Supreme Court has held that settlement agreements enforced through a consent decree may serve as the basis for an award of attorney’s fees. Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129-30, 100 S.Ct. 2570, 65 L.Ed.2d 653 (1980). “Although a consent decree does not always include an admission of liability by the defendant … it nonetheless is a court-ordered change in the legal relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant.” Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. +West Virg. Dep’t of Health & Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598, 604, 121 S.Ct. 1835, 149 L.Ed.2d 855 (2001) (internal quotes omitted). In the present case, the Court entered a consent decree in the Court’s Order approving the settlement as a fair and reasonable compromise of the dispute under the FLSA. (Dkt. No. 50.) Therefore, the settlement does not limit Plaintiffs’ ability to be prevailing parties.
Second, regarding the settlement agreement signed by both parties and submitted to this Court, the agreement states in one part:
No Admission of Liability. The Parties agree and acknowledge this Agreement is the result of a compromise and shall not be construed as an admission of liability, responsibility, or wrongdoing as alleged in the Lawsuit. It is expressly understood by the Parties that [plaintiffs] shall not be deemed a “prevailing party” for any purpose, including any fee shifting statute, rule, or agreement. (Plaintiff’s Unopposed Motion to Approve FLSA Settlement, Settlement Agreement, Dkt. No. 48, Ex. 1, ¶ E.) Defendant argues this settlement agreement, which was signed by the parties and submitted to the Court, means the plaintiffs are not prevailing parties because the settlement agreement acknowledges that they are not prevailing parties. The Court disagrees.
As an initial matter, the settlement agreement is treated as a contract and will be interpreted under Texas law. The Texas Supreme Court has recently explained the law:
In construing [a contract], we first determine whether it is possible to enforce the contract as written, without resort to parol evidence. Deciding whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law for the court. Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tex.1983). In construing a written contract, the primary concern of the court is to ascertain the true intentions of the parties as expressed in the instrument. R & P Enters. v. LaGuarta, Gavrel & Kirk, Inc., 596 S.W.2d 517, 518 (Tex.1980); City of Pinehurst v. Spooner Addition Water Co., 432 S.W.2d 515, 518 (Tex.1968). To achieve this objective, we must examine and consider the entire writing in an effort to harmonize and give effect to all the provisions of the contract so that none will be rendered meaningless. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Daniel, 150 Tex. 513, 243 S.W.2d 154, 158 (1951). No single provision taken alone will be given controlling effect; rather, all the provisions must be considered with reference to the whole instrument. Myers v. Gulf Coast Minerals Mgmt. Corp., 361 S.W.2d 193, 196 (Tex.1962); Citizens Nat’l Bank v. Tex. & P. Ry. Co., 136 Tex. 333, 150 S.W.2d 1003, 1006 (1941). A contract is unambiguous if it can be given a definite or certain legal meaning. Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. New Ulm Gas, Ltd., 940 S.W.2d 587, 589 (Tex.1996). On the other hand, if the contract is subject to two or more reasonable interpretations after applying the pertinent rules of construction, the contract is ambiguous, creating a fact issue on the parties’ intent. Id. J.M. Davidson, Inc. v. Webster, 128 S.W.3d 223, 229 (Tex.2003). Further, under Texas law, “[c]ourts interpreting unambiguous contracts are confined to the four corners of the document, and cannot look to extrinsic evidence to create an ambiguity.” Texas v. Am. Tobacco Co., 463 F.3d 399, 407 (5th Cir.2006). Parol evidence may only be used if the contract is first found to be ambiguous. Id.
Keeping these principles in mind, the Court concludes that the contract is unambiguous and the plaintiffs are entitled to attorney’s fees, or in other words, the settlement agreement does not prevent the plaintiffs from being considered prevailing parties. The Court recognizes that the settlement agreement states that the plaintiffs “shall not be deemed a prevailing party’ for any purpose, including any fee shifting statute, rule, or agreement.” (Plaintiff’s Unopposed Motion to Approve FLSA Settlement, Settlement Agreement, Dkt. No. 48, Ex. 1, ¶ E.) But the agreement also states:
The parties have made no agreement regarding the payment of Champion’s attorney fees, court costs and a portion of the mediation fees, beyond that provided for in Paragraph A above. Champion’s counsel intends to apply to the Court for an award of attorney’s fees, and ADT reserves the right to contest this application.(Plaintiff’s Unopposed Motion to Approve FLSA Settlement, Settlement Agreement, Dkt. No. 48, Ex. 1, ¶ B.) The Court concludes the contract is unambiguous when considering only the four corners of the document and attempting to “harmonize and give effect to all the provisions of the contract so that none will be rendered meaningless.” The parties agreed that there was “no agreement regarding the payment of [Plaintiffs’] attorney fees.” (Plaintiff’s Unopposed Motion to Approve FLSA Settlement, Settlement Agreement, Dkt. No. 48, Ex. 1, ¶ B.)
But on the other hand, the parties agreed that the plaintiffs shall not be “deemed” a prevailing party. (Id. at ¶ E.) In harmonizing these statements together, the Court concludes that when the agreement states that the plaintiffs shall not be “deemed” a prevailing party, the parties were agreeing that whether the plaintiffs are a prevailing party is to be determined by the Court. In other words, the parties were not deeming the plaintiffs as a prevailing party. Further, the specific language stating the plaintiffs “shall not be deemed a prevailing party” is located in the section of the agreement titled “No Admission of Liability,” which confirms the parties’ intention was merely to not admit the plaintiffs were the prevailing party. (Id.) Rather, the parties were confirming that “ADT reserves the right to contest this application” of awarding attorney’s fees. (Id. at ¶ B.)
Therefore, the Court interprets the settlement agreement as unambiguously allowing the Court to determine whether the plaintiffs are the prevailing parties and entitled to attorney’s fees. The Court concludes for the abovementioned reasons that the plaintiffs are prevailing parties for the purposes of the statute and are entitled to attorney’s fees.”
Not quoted here, the court noted that there were emails between counsel prior to the settlement agreement, wherein the parties made clear that they intended the settlement agreement to resolve the issue of damages only and not the issue of attorneys’ fees or costs.
9th Cir.: Repayment Provision In CBA That Required Repayment Of Training Costs Did Not Constitute Impermissible “Kick-Back”
Gordon v. City of Oakland
In this case, a former employee brought a putative class action, alleging that the Defendant violated the minimum wage provisions of Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), and related state laws, by requiring her to reimburse it for part of her training costs due to voluntarily leaving city’s employment before completing five years of service. Holding that such repayment was not an impermissible kick-back, the lower court dismissed. The Ninth Circuit agreed and affirmed.
The Court laid out the following pertinent procedural/factual background:
“The facts here are taken from Gordon’s Proposed First Amended Complaint and the attachments thereto. Since the late 1990s, the City and the collective bargaining unit for City police officers, the Oakland Police Officers’ Association, have entered into successive collective bargaining agreements. These agreements provide that officers who voluntarily separate from the City’s employment prior to completing five years of service must repay a pro rata share of their police academy training costs. The agreement at issue here states that the cost of the training is $8,000, and it establishes the following repayment schedule:
|Length of Service||% of Repayment Due|
|Separation prior to 1 year||100% repayment of the $8,000.|
|Separation after 1 year but before completing the second year||80% repayment of the $8,000.|
|Separation after 2 years but before completing the third year||60% repayment of the $8,000.|
|Separation after 3 years but before completing the fourth year||40% repayment of the $8,000.|
|Separation after 4 years but before completing the fifth year||20% repayment of the $8,000.|
|Separation after 5 years||0% repayment|
Gordon was a successful applicant for the position of Police Officer Trainee. She was advised that she was required to sign the “Conditional Offer of Position as a Police Officer Trainee” (“Conditional Offer”) to complete the hiring process. The Conditional Offer restated the training repayment schedule established in the collective bargaining agreement but it did not include a statement that the City would withhold an officer’s paycheck in satisfaction of any repayment owed. Gordon accepted and signed the Conditional Offer and became a police officer trainee employed by the City. The City directed her to attend its police academy, and she successfully completed her training in June 2006. She then became a police officer for the City.
On January 25, 2008, before completing her second year of service, Gordon resigned. At that time, she was earning $37.8025 per hour. In her final two weeks of work, Gordon was compensated for sixty hours. Her regular hourly pay, combined with an educational incentive in the amount of $117.33, resulted in Gordon earning $2,385.48 in gross pay for her final two workweeks. Gordon received a final paycheck reflecting this amount.
On the same day as her resignation, the City’s Fiscal Services Division notified Gordon that the City was entitled to recover $6,400 (eighty percent of $8,000) in training costs as set forth in the Conditional Offer Gordon signed. This notification stated that the City had withheld, in partial satisfaction of these claims, the paychecks for Gordon’s accrued unused vacation ($1,295.57) and compensatory time off ($654.77). Thus, the City’s total remaining demand was $4,449.66.FN2 This unpaid demand increased to $5,268.03 in March 2008 with the addition of a “collection fee.”
Gordon, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated, filed this action in district court seeking damages and declaratory relief under the FLSA, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and various California state laws. The district court granted the City’s motion to dismiss Gordon’s complaint for failure to state a claim and gave Gordon fourteen days within which to file a motion for leave to file an amended complaint.
Following the court’s dismissal, Gordon paid the City the $5,268.03 it claimed was due and moved for leave to file her Proposed First Amended Complaint. The new complaint eliminated all but the FLSA claims and included that she paid the City $5,268.03 for “training reimbursement” and “collection costs.” The district court concluded that the proposed amended complaint still did not demonstrate that Gordon was paid less than the federal minimum wage during any workweek, and it denied her leave to file her minimum wage claim in the amended complaint. The district court did, however, grant Gordon leave to amend to assert a claim for violation of the overtime wage requirements under 29 U.S.C. § 207(o). Gordon subsequently dismissed with prejudice all overtime wage claims under 29 U.S.C. § 207(o) and entered into a Stipulation for Judgment of Dismissal for the purpose of facilitating this appeal.”
Holding that the repayment scheme laid out in the CBA was not a prohibited kick-back, the Court reasoned:
“The issue in this case is whether the Conditional Offer’s training reimbursement agreement, which required Gordon to repay $6,400 at the time of her resignation, caused her to receive less than the federal minimum wage during her final workweek. Gordon contends that there is no legal difference between deducting a sum from an employee’s check and directly demanding the employee surrender a sum after being paid. She maintains that after subtracting the costs she paid to the City for the training program, she was actually paid a negative sum for her last week of work. The district court, however, concluded that because the City issued Gordon a paycheck exceeding the minimum wage amount, the City’s reimbursement demand did not violate the FLSA’s minimum wage provision. We affirm.
The FLSA requires all covered employers to pay their employees at least the federal minimum hourly wage every workweek. 29 U.S.C. § 206. As a “public agency,” the City is a covered employer under the FLSA and must comply with the FLSA’s minimum wage requirements. 29 U.S.C. § 203(d). Additionally, employees cannot waive the protections of the FLSA, Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 707, 65 S.Ct. 895, 89 L.Ed. 1296 (1945), nor may labor organizations negotiate provisions that waive employees’ statutory rights under the FLSA. Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728, 740-41, 101 S.Ct. 1437, 67 L.Ed.2d 641 (1981). Consequently, neither the Conditional Offer nor the collective bargaining agreement limit Gordon’s right to receive at least minimum wage.
The United States Department of Labor has adopted regulations outlining employers’ FLSA obligations. One such regulation is 29 C.F.R. § 535.31, which provides in pertinent part:
Whether in cash or other facilities, ‘wages’ cannot be considered to have been paid by the employer and received by the employee unless they are paid finally and unconditionally or ‘free and clear.’ The wage requirements of the Act will not be met where the employee ‘kicks-back’ directly or indirectly to the employer or to another person for the employer’s benefit the whole or part of the wage delivered to the employee. This is true whether the “kick-back” is made in cash or in other than cash.
Because Gordon did not allege she was paid below the federal minimum wage for any given week, the only way Gordon has stated a cognizable claim is if her payment to the City for a portion of her training costs is a “kick-back” payment as described in section 535.31.
While this court has not previously addressed this issue, we find persuasive the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in Heder v. City of Two Rivers, Wisconsin, 295 F.3d 777 (7th Cir.2002). Heder was decided in the context of a similar reimbursement scheme for city firefighters. The City of Two Rivers funded its firefighters’ mandatory paramedic training but required a firefighter to reimburse the city for the costs of training if the firefighter left the city’s employment before completing three years of service. Id. The Seventh Circuit upheld the reimbursement agreement, comparing it to a loan; the cost of the training was a loan the city made to its firefighters, repayment of which was forgiven after three years. Id. at 781-82. If, however, a firefighter left before three years of service, the loan became due. Id. As long as the city paid departing firefighters at least the statutory minimum wage, it could collect the training costs as an ordinary creditor. See id. at 779.
The Seventh Circuit’s analysis is applicable here. The $5,268.03 payment Gordon made to the City is repayment of a voluntarily accepted loan, not a kick-back. Instead of requiring applicants to independently obtain their police training prior to beginning employment, which the City could do by only hiring individuals already possessing a POST certification,FN5 the City elected to essentially loan police officer trainees like Gordon the cost of their police academy training. The Conditional Offer Gordon signed explained that the City would forgive her repayment obligation at the specified rate and that she would owe nothing after five years of service. Gordon, however, chose not to serve the five years necessary to secure complete forgiveness. Despite the debt Gordon owed following her resignation, the City satisfied the FLSA’s requirements by paying Gordon at least minimum wage for her final week of work. The City was therefore free to seek repayment of Gordon’s training debt as an ordinary creditor.
Because Gordon’s repayment of her training costs is not a kick-back under section 531.35, the training reimbursement agreement does not violate the FLSA since she was paid at least minimum wage for her final workweek. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s partial denial of Gordon’s Motion for Leave to File her Proposed First Amended Complaint.”
M.D.Fla.: Magistrate Judge’s Order Requiring That FLSA Defendant Take Out-of-State Opt-in Plaintiff’s Deposition In Opt-in’s Home Forum Upheld
Fiore v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.
This matter was before the Court on defendant’s Objection to Order on Plaintiff’s Motion for Protective Order Regarding the Location of an Opt-In Plaintiff Deposition. Previously, the Magistrate Judge had granted in part a protective order by declining to compel an opt-in plaintiff who resides in Texas to come to the Middle District of Florida for a deposition, and further required the deposition to be held in Texas. The Magistrate Judge found that “forcing an out of state opt-in plaintiff to travel hundreds of miles to take a deposition would undermine the purpose of this collective action, and effectively destroy any benefits gained by proceeding as a class under the [Fair Labor Standards Act] FLSA. It would be unreasonable to force Wandell to attend a deposition in Tampa, Florida. Wandell did not choose the Middle District as his forum, the forum was chosen for him.”
Agreeing that the Magistrate Judge’s order was not contrary to law or clearly erroneous, reviewing the prior order, the District Judge reasoned:
“A district court reviews an objection to a non-dispositive order of a magistrate judge to determine whether the order was clearly erroneous or contrary to law. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a). Defendant argues that the Magistrate Judge was clearly erroneous and disregarded Middle District of Florida Local Rule 3.04(b), and that Wandell should appear for his deposition in the Middle District of Florida. Because the Order was neither clearly erroneous nor contrary to law, defendant’s objection is overruled.
The Court finds that the Magistrate Judge applied the correct law and that her decision was not clearly erroneous. Control of discovery in a civil case is committed to the sound discretion of the court. Chrysler Int’l Corp. v. Chemaly, 280 F.2d 1358, 1360 (11th Cir.2002). This is the standard recognized by the Magistrate Judge in her Order. (Doc. # 73, p. 2.)
A reviewing court applies an abuse of discretion standard in its review of a decision on a motion to compel. Holloman v. Mail-Well Corp., 443 F.3d 832, 837 (11th Cir.2006). A judge abuses her discretion if she applies an incorrect legal standard, follows improper procedures in making the determination, or makes findings of fact that are clearly erroneous. Morgan v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 551 F.3d 1233, 1260 (11th Cir.2008). Additionally, a court “abuses its discretion when it misconstrues its proper role, ignores or misunderstands the relevant evidence, and bases its decision upon considerations having little factual support.” Serra Chevrolet, Inc. v. GMC, 446 F.3d 1137, 1147 (11th Cir.2006). Absent such situations, discretion means that a magistrate judge is allowed a range of choices, and should not be second-guessed unless the decision reflects a clear error of judgment. Holloman, 443 F.3d at 837.
The Court concludes that the magistrate judge did not abuse her discretion. Control over discovery, including the location of a deposition, is committed to the sound discretion of the Court. The decision was not clearly erroneous, i.e., there has been no showing that the location of the deposition was a clear error in judgment. The Magistrate Judge recognized Local Rule 3.04(b), and stated adequate reasons for her decision as to the location. Her decision is well within the permissible range of choices allowed in the sound exercise of discretion.”
However, the Court clarified that it was ruling on the issue before it only, (whether the Magistrate Judge had abused her discretion):
“The Court does not hold that an opt-in [plaintiff’] cannot be required to give a deposition within this District. The Court only holds that, as to Mr. Wandell, there was no abuse of discretion in requiring a deposition in his home district. If this case is certified as a collective action, there may be other considerations as to the locations of depositions. That issue, however, is not before the Court at this time. The Court also does not necessarily adopt the FLSA rationale articulated by the Magistrate Judge.”
Click Fiore v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. to read the entire Opinion and Order.
11th Cir.: Res Judicata Did Not Bar Claims Of FLSA Retaliation; Such Claims Arose After The Original Pleading Was Filed In The Earlier Litigation, So Not Previously Litigated
Moore v. Sei Pak
This case was before the Eleventh Circuit on Plaintiffs’ appeal of summary judgment in favor of their employer (“Pak”), in their suit against Pak for retaliation under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3). The Plaintiffs sued Pak for retaliation because Pak denied them positions as independent contractors after they initiated an earlier FLSA suit against Pak for unpaid overtime compensation. The Plaintiffs filed the separate retaliation suit while the overtime compensation suit, which the parties ultimately settled, was still pending. The magistrate judge granted Pak’s summary judgment motion on res judicata grounds after it concluded that the Plaintiffs had raised their retaliation claim in the prior suit. On appeal, Plaintiffs argued that their prior FLSA overtime compensation lawsuit does not preclude their current retaliation suit, because the facts underlying the retaliation suit occurred subsequent to the filing of the original case. The Eleventh Circuit agreed and reversed the lower court reasoning:
“We review de novo a district court’s order on a motion for summary judgment and construe the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Van Voorhis v. Hillsborough Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 512 F.3d 1296, 1299 (11th Cir.2008). We also review de novo a district court’s application of res judicata. EEOC v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 383 F.3d 1280, 1285 (11th Cir.2004). We apply federal law “because federal preclusion principles apply to prior federal decisions.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
“Under res judicata … a final judgment on the merits bars the parties to a prior action from re-litigating a cause of action that was or could have been raised in that action.” In re Piper Aircraft Corp., 244 F.3d 1289, 1296 (11th Cir.2001). “Res judicata applies not only to the precise legal theory presented in the previous litigation, but to all legal theories and claims arising out of the same operative nucleus of fact.” Manning v. City of Auburn, 953 F.2d 1355, 1358-59 (11th Cir.1992) (quotation marks omitted).
[A] party seeking to invoke the doctrine must establish … four initial elements: (1) the prior decision must have been rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) there must have been a final judgment on the merits; (3) both cases must involve the same parties or their privies; and (4) both cases must involve the same causes of action. In re Piper Aircraft Corp., 244 F.3d at 1296. If these requirements are met, the court must determine whether the new claim could have been raised in the prior suit. Id. The preclusion of claims that “could have been brought” in earlier litigation does not include claims that arose after the original complaint was filed in the prior action, unless the plaintiff actually asserted the claim in “supplemental pleadings or otherwise.” Pleming v. Universal-Rundle Corp., 142 F.3d 1354, 1357 (11th Cir.1998).
We conclude that even if this case satisfies the res judicata elements, the Plaintiffs’ retaliation claim is one “which ar[o]se after the original pleading [wa]s filed in the earlier litigation” and is not barred unless Plaintiffs asserted the claim in the prior litigation. Id. at 1357. The Plaintiffs filed their overtime compensation suit against Pak on March 4, 2008. Construing the facts in the Plaintiffs’ favor, the retaliation claim did not arise until November 21, 2008, when Pak excluded Plaintiffs from an opportunity to apply for independent contractor positions. Therefore, the Plaintiffs’ retaliation claim arose eight months after they filed their original complaint.
The Plaintiffs could not have asserted the retaliation claim in their initial complaint in the overtime compensation suit and were free to decline to do so through supplemental pleadings. We observed in Manning “that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(d), which governs supplemental pleadings, makes such a pleading optional and held that the doctrine of res judicata does not punish a plaintiff for exercising the option not to supplement the pleadings with an after-acquired claim.” Pleming, 142 F.3d at 1357 (citing Manning, 953 F.2d at 1360).
We also conclude that the Plaintiffs never asserted their retaliation claim in their overtime compensation suit “through supplemental pleadings or otherwise.” Pleming, 142 F.3d at 1357 (emphasis omitted). In the overtime compensation suit, the Plaintiffs’ only reference to retaliation occurred in the status report they filed with the court immediately before the case settled. In this report, the Plaintiffs indicated that mediation had failed, and asked the court to try the case “as soon as possible” based on several unresolved concerns, including Pak’s failure “to … offer Plaintiffs the opportunity to become subcontractors for Defendant, an opportunity previously not granted to Plaintiffs because Plaintiffs were named on a lawsuit against Defendant.” This Court has held that while “a litigant may ‘otherwise’ assert a claim, without filing a supplemental pleading … these other means must conform with the rules of procedure.” Pleming, 142 F.3d at 1358. We have identified specific examples of other means of asserting a claim that trigger res judicata, such as “an amendment pursuant to Rule 15(b) or the assertion of a claim through a pretrial order pursuant to Rule 16(e).” Id. Neither of these options was pursued here. Pak concedes that, in light of Pleming, the magistrate judge’s reliance on the status report as the basis for concluding that the Plaintiffs asserted a retaliation claim in the prior litigation “may have been incorrect.”
The Plaintiffs’ reference to Pak’s retaliation is similar to the references we have held insufficient to assert a claim before a district court. In Coon v. Georgia Pacific Corp., 829 F.2d 1563, 1568-71 (11th Cir.1987), we affirmed the district court’s refusal to consider the plaintiff’s claims of specific acts of discrimination, which she included in her briefs, discovery requests, and motions, but never added to her complaint. We explained that “[t]hese claims were not somehow ‘present’ within her complaint, despite her failure to allege them.” Id. at 1570. We also rejected the notion that the claims were before the district court because they were part of a “continuing violation.” Id.; see also Pleming, 142 F.3d at 1358 (collecting cases). We conclude that the Plaintiffs’ reference to retaliation in the status report was insufficient to put their retaliation claim properly before the district court pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
For these reasons, we hold that res judicata does not bar the Plaintiffs’ retaliation claim against Pak. We VACATE and REMAND this case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
Click Moore v. Sei Pak to read the entire decision.
W.D.Va.: Parties May File FLSA Settlement Agreement Under Seal For Limited Time; Good Cause Demonstrated By 800 Similar Cases Pending
Murphy v. Dolgencorp, Inc.
This case is one of many such individual plaintiff cases pending against Dolgencorp (Dollar General), following the decertification of a nationwide collective action pertaining to its alleged misclassification of its “Store Manager” position. The case was before the court on the parties second motion seeking approval of settlements of these related cases under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The court had previously denied approval because of the parties’ insistence on the confidentiality of the settlement terms without showing good cause. Murphy v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 1:09CV00007, 2010 WL 3766946 (W.D.Va. Sept. 21, 2010).
Permitting the parties to file the settlement under seal for a limited time, the court discussed its basis for doing so, under the limited and somewhat unique circumstances of the case:
“I continue to find that I cannot approve the settlements without knowing the terms thereof, although the parties continue to ask me to do so on that basis. As an alternative, they ask me to consider the written terms either secretly, in camera, or by having them stated orally in an open, but hopefully empty, courtroom.
The parties suggest another alterative, which I eluded to in my earlier opinion, which is to file and seal the settlement agreements for a limited period of time. As good cause for such a procedure, they represent that there are approximately 800 similar cases pending against the defendant in this and other federal courts around the nation, in which all of the plaintiffs are represented by the same counsel. They contend that keeping the terms of other settlements from each of these plaintiffs is beneficial in order to allow negotiations to concentrate on the specific merits of each individual case. They represent that plaintiffs’ counsel have agreed that they will not divulge the terms of another settlement to any of their individual clients.
It is true, as the parties assert, that the individual facts of each case are significant. Indeed, I have so ruled in denying summary judgment for the defendant in Teresa Hale’s case. Hale v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 1:09CV00014, 2010 WL 2595313, at *2-3 (W.D.Va. June 23, 2010) (holding that to determine if an individual store employee is exempt from overtime under the FLSA’s executive exemption requires a fact-intensive inquiry, unique to each store’s situation). The issue in each of these cases is whether the employee’s primary duty is management, which requires an analysis of various factors, including the amount of time spent by the employee in managerial duties. Id. Among the many stores operated by the defendant, those factors vary based on the circumstances of each store, as well as the preferences and circumstances of the various district managers. Id. at 4.
Under these circumstances, I find that good cause has been shown to seal the settlement agreements for a limited period of time. While the parties suggest three years, I find that two years ought to allow the parties the opportunity to negotiate settlement in most cases, and adequately balances the needs of the parties with the presumptive right of the public to access court records.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED as follows:
1. In connection with the requested approval of the settlements of these two cases, the parties must file under seal copies of the settlement agreements, together with (a) the amount of the plaintiffs’ overtime and liquidated damages claims, and (b) the amount of attorneys’ fees and expenses paid from the settlements, together with the basis for the calculation of the attorneys’ fees; and
2. The materials described above will be filed under seal, not to be unsealed earlier than two years after filing.”
In what has turned into a hot-button issue in this year’s election cycle, the NY Times discusses the myth, often profferred by conservatives, that the minimum wage hurts workers.
The Times reports that:
“An important new study exploiting this opportunity will appear this month in The Review of Economics and Statistics. The economists Arindrajit Dube of the University of Massachusetts Amherst, T. William Lester of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and Michael Reich of the University of California, Berkeley, closely analyze employment trends for several categories of low-wage workers over a 16-year period in all counties sharing a common border with a county in another state where minimum wage increases followed a different trajectory.
They report that increases in minimum wages had no negative effects on low-wage employment and successfully increased the income of workers in food services and retail employment, as well as the narrower category of workers in restaurants.
The study successfully addresses a number of criticisms previously leveled at the case-study approach and points to flaws in all previous studies that have found negative employment effects.
The level of technical discussion is daunting, but if you don’t want to grapple with concepts like “spatially correlated fictitious placebo minimum wages” you can watch a video instead — Arindrajit Dube clearly explains the issues in a 12-minute interview. He emphasizes that higher minimum wages tend to reduce worker turnover, benefiting both workers and employers.”
Go to the New York Times website to read the entire article.