Tag Archives: TCA

August 27, 2012 · 8:05 am

W.D.Mo.: Under Motor Carrier Act (MCA), Weight of Vehicle Measured by Gross Vehicle Weight Rating (GVWR) Which Includes the Weight of Trailer Pulled

McCall v. Disabled American Veterans Ernestine Schumann-Heink Missouri Chapter 2

This case was before the court on the parties dueling motions for summary judgment. Specifically, the motions addressed the applicability of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) to drivers employed by the defendants, in light of the Motor Carrier Act (“MCA”). As discussed here, the court was required to opine on the method by which the 10,001 pound threshold is calculated under the MCA, in order to determine whether a vehicle qualifies as a covered vehicle for the purposes of the MCA’s application to its driver(s). While the plaintiff argued that the actual weight of the truck, when loaded was less than 10,000 pounds, the court held that this was not dispositive of the issue. Instead, the court held that the plaintiff came within the MCA’s exemption to the FLSA because, “[t]he uncontroverted facts demonstrate[d] the truck’s gross vehicle weight rating (“GVWR”) exceeded 12,000 pounds.”

After surveying the MCA and the recent amendments thereto under SAFETA–LU and the TCA, the court- applying the post-TCA standard (due to the dates of plaintiff’s employment/claim) explained:

The TCA does not specify how the vehicle weight is to be determined: whether the vehicle is weighed loaded or unloaded, fueled or unfueled, or some sort of average is to be utilized. On November 4, 2010, the Department of Labor (“DOL”) issued Field Assistance Bulletin No.2010–2 (“the Bulletin”) to explain its interpretation of the TCA. Among other matters, the Bulletin announces DOL’s method for determining whether a vehicle weighs 10,000 pounds or less, stating the Wage and Hour Division “will continue to use the gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) or gross combined vehicle weight rating in the event that the vehicle is pulling a trailer.”

The parties agree the Bulletin is entitled to deference because it represents DOL’s interpretation of statutory provisions it is charged with enforcing, but they disagree as to the Bulletin’s meaning. The Court believes the interpretation is quite clear: a vehicle’s GVWR is its weight for purposes of the TCA and, hence, applicability of the FLSA. If the vehicle is pulling a trailer, the combined GVWR of the vehicle and the trailer will be used. Plaintiff’s interpretation—that GVWR is to be used only if the vehicle is pulling a trailer makes no sense. There is no reason to use GVWR in one instance and not in another, and Plaintiff’s interpretation renders part of the Bulletin a nullity (or, at worst, surplusage) by purporting to have the Bulletin explain how vehicles are weighed if they pull a trailer but failing to explain how vehicles are weighed if they are not. The Court also notes DOL’s interpretation is reasonable because it not only leads to certainty but it is consistent with the Secretary of Transportation’s entire statutory and regulatory framework, which elsewhere typically relies on GVWR when referencing the weight of vehicles.

Plaintiff contends this interpretation thwarts Congress’ intent by diminishing the reach of the FLSA. The Court disagrees. Before 2005, the Secretary of Transportation had authority over all motor private carriers regardless of the weight of the vehicle, and the FLSA did not apply to any motor private carriers. With the passage of SAFETEA–LU in 2005, Congress removed the Secretary’s authority over motor private carriers using vehicles with a GVWR of 10,000 pounds or less—and thereby expanded the FLSA’s reach. The TCA restores the Secretary’s authority to all motor private carriers regardless of a vehicle’s weight, but specifies that the FLSA’s reach will remain as it was expanded with SAFETEA–LU’s passage. In short, the TCA expanded the Secretary’s authority, but it was not intended to further expand the FLSA’s reach—it remained exactly where it was before the TCA was passed.

Thus the court concluded:

There is no dispute that the GVWR of the vehicle Plaintiff drove exceeded 10,000 pounds. Therefore, the FLSA does not apply and the moving Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Click McCall v. Disabled American Veterans Ernestine Schumann-Heink Missouri Chapter 2 to read the entire Order and Opinion.

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May 31, 2009 · 12:20 pm

D.Mass.: Motor Carrier Act (MCA) Exemption Not Fleet-wide For Drivers Of Vehicles Less Than 10,000 Pounds, Where Defendant Not Overwhelmingly Commercial Carrier

Brooks v. Halsted Communications, Ltd.

This case was before the Court on cross motions for partial summary judgment filed by the parties with respect to the fleet-wide applicability of the Motor Carrier Act (MCA), to the entire putative class, Defendants’ employees who drove vehicles weighing less than 10,000 pounds, prior to August. The Court framed the issue as “whether, for the period following SAFETEA-LU but prior to the enactment of the TCA, Defendants have carried their burden of showing that the MCA exemption applied to employees who exclusively operated light vehicles.” Whereas Defendants asserted, as a “commercial carrier” all of its drivers were/are exempt, Plaintiffs cited to well-established law that only those individual drivers coming within the MCA’s definition could be potentially exempt. The Court agreed with Plaintiffs entering a detailed Order discussing the issue, and denying Defendants’ motion for summary judgment:

“Plaintiffs are technicians employed by Defendant Halsted Communications, Ltd. (“Halsted, Ltd.”). Defendants are Halsted Ltd.; Halsted Communications, LLC; and Kirk Halsted. The heart of the issue is whether, for a certain period of time, Defendants were obliged to pay Plaintiffs time and a half for overtime as required by the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq., and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151, §§ 1A and 1B, or were freed from any such obligation by virtue of an exemption set forth in the Motor Carrier Act (“MCA”), 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(1) and adopted by Massachusetts, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151, § 1A(8). The maze-like weave between the FLSA requirement and the MCA exemption has evolved through three different federal statutory enactments and has generated a modest burst of conflicting decisional law. The parties’ cross motions seek contrasting interpretations of the law.”

Reciting the relevant facts the Court said, “[e]ach Plaintiff was employed as a technician by Halsted Ltd. at some point between August 10, 2005 and the present. A technician’s job responsibilities included driving vehicles between work sites in connection with the activation, installation and service of satellite television equipment. Not a single plaintiff ever drove a vehicle that weighed more than 10,000 pounds. Indeed, at the relevant time, less than one percent of Halsted Ltd.’s entire fleet comprised vehicles weighing over 10,000 pounds. Since March 13, 2007, Defendant Halsted Ltd. has been a motor carrier registered with the United State Department of Transportation (“USDOT”) based on its operation of one or more vehicles weighing over 10,000 pounds.”

The Court discussed the differing case law at length, “As noted, the question of whether a “hybrid” motor carrier-i .e., one with drivers operating vehicles weighing both above and below 10,000 pounds-was obliged to pay FLSA overtime to its drivers of lighter vehicles before June 6, 2008 has produced conflicting answers. The weight of district court authority (no appellate decision has as yet appeared), however, strongly favors Plaintiffs. Cases supporting Plaintiffs’ position include Hernandez v. Brink’s, Inc., No. 08-20717-CIV, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2726 (S.D.Fla. Jan. 15, 2009) (ruling that mixed fleets containing both commercial and non-commercial vehicles should be treated for FLSA purposes as two separate sub-fleets); Tews v. Renzenberger, Inc., 592 F.Supp.2d 1331, 1346 (D.Kan.2009) (rejecting argument that “the mere presence of commercial motor vehicles in [a] fleet renders all employee-drivers exempt under the MCA exemption”); Vidinliev v. Carey International Inc., 581 F.Supp.2d 1281 (N.D .Ga.2008) (denying summary judgment regarding the applicability of the MCA exemption for claims arising after August 10, 2005 where the defendant operated a mixed fleet of commercial and noncommercial motor vehicles); Kautsch v. Premier Communications, 502 F.Supp.2d 1007 (W.D.Mo.2007) (ruling that the MCA exemption did not apply to the plaintiffs’ claims after August 10, 2005 because they did not operate commercial motor vehicles). Cases supporting Defendants include Collins v. Heritage Wine Cellars, Ltd., No. 07-CV1246, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104555 (N.D.Ill.Dec. 29, 2008) and Tidd v. Adecco USA, Inc., No. 07-11214-GAO, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69825 (D .Mass. Sept. 17, 2008).”

With its detailed analysis of the issue the Court concluded, “the court will side with Plaintiffs here and will hold that Defendants did not enjoy the exemption and Plaintiffs were entitled to overtime pay during the pertinent time period… a contrary ruling would lead to the absurd result that an employer with 1,000 employees all driving vehicles weighing less than 10,000 pounds would be able rid itself of any obligation to pay FLSA overtime to these otherwise covered employees simply by buying one vehicle weighing over 10,000 pounds and assigning one employee to drive it occasionally across state lines. It is a crazy world, but we can hope that it is not yet that crazy.”

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