10th Cir.: Feedlot Manure Handler Exempt From Overtime Under FLSA Agricultural Exemption
Porter, et al. v. T.J. Crowder and Sons, LLC
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in an unreported decision, recently affirmed a defense judgment in an FLSA overtime case brought by a Colorado feedlot worker and his wife. In Porter v. T.J. Crowder and Sons, LLC, the court held that a worker who loaded cattle manure from feedlot pens and transported it to an on-site composting area was employed in agriculture and therefore exempt from the FLSA’s overtime requirement.
The decision also rejected the wife’s unpaid-wage claim on a separate ground: she did not establish that she was an employee during the period in which she claimed to have performed unpaid work.
Although the court’s order is nonprecedential and may be cited only for its persuasive value under Tenth Circuit rules, it offers a useful illustration of the fact-intensive analysis courts use when applying the FLSA’s agricultural exemption.
Case Background
T.J. Crowder and Sons, LLC, doing business as Humalfa, operated a composting business that converted raw cattle manure into fertilizer. One of its composting operations was located at a Five Rivers Cattle Feeding feedlot in Yuma, Colorado.
Five Rivers employees cleaned cattle pens and accumulated manure in piles. Humalfa employees then loaded the manure onto trucks, moved it to an on-site compost yard, and placed it in windrows for composting.
Christopher Porter worked for Humalfa as a “manure handler” from 2007 through 2021, with a break in 2019. He generally worked 40 to 50 hours per week and sometimes as many as 70 hours, but Humalfa paid straight time rather than overtime.
Mr. Porter alleged that Humalfa violated the FLSA by not paying overtime. His wife, Breanna Porter, separately alleged that she performed unpaid work for Humalfa, including occasionally assisting Mr. Porter, obtaining parts, and delivering weight tickets.
After two bench trials, the district court concluded that Mr. Porter’s work was agricultural and exempt from overtime, while Ms. Porter had not proven an amount of recoverable unpaid wages. The Porters appealed.
The FLSA Agricultural Exemption
The FLSA ordinarily requires covered employers to pay overtime at one-and-one-half times an employee’s regular rate for hours worked beyond 40 in a workweek. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1).
But 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(12) exempts from the overtime requirement “any employee employed in agriculture.”
The statute defines agriculture to include both traditional farming activity and certain work performed by a farmer or on a farm “as an incident to or in conjunction with” farming operations. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(f).
The second category is commonly described as “secondary agriculture.” To qualify, the activity must be performed by a farmer or on a farm and must be incident to or connected with farming operations.
The employer had the burden to prove the exemption by a preponderance of the evidence.
Why the Court Found the Work Agricultural
There was no meaningful dispute that Mr. Porter performed his work on a farm: the cattle pens and the compost yard were located on the feedlot property. The issue was whether his work was sufficiently connected to the feedlot’s cattle-raising operations.
The district court determined that removing manure was an “undisputably integral step” in the feedlot’s operation because leaving manure in the cattle pens would restrict the cattle’s movement.
The Tenth Circuit agreed. It emphasized the close relationship between raising cattle and Mr. Porter’s role loading raw manure directly from livestock pens and moving it elsewhere on the same farm.
The court relied on the statutory text and on Department of Labor regulations directing courts to examine the overall relationship of the work to farming rather than mechanically apply isolated factors.
Separate Businesses Did Not Control the Result
Mr. Porter argued that Humalfa was an independent composting business and that Five Rivers was a separate feedlot operator. He further argued that Humalfa operated for its own commercial benefit, not for the farmer.
Those facts did not change the outcome. The court focused on the work Mr. Porter actually performed—not all work performed by Humalfa employees. His job involved collecting and transporting raw manure within the feedlot, rather than processing the manure or transporting finished compost off-site.
The court reasoned that this work more closely resembled collecting an agricultural byproduct at the farm than operating a separate off-farm processing or transportation business.
Importantly, the court expressly declined to decide whether employees working in other parts of Humalfa’s composting operation would be exempt. The exemption inquiry remained tied to the particular worker’s duties and circumstances.
Wife’s Unpaid-Wage Claim Failed at the Employee-Status Stage
Breanna Porter sought FLSA wages for work allegedly performed after one period of formal employment ended and before she was later rehired.
The appellate court affirmed judgment against her, but not solely because of the proof of damages. Instead, it concluded that she had not met her threshold burden to establish that she was an employee during the disputed period.
The court applied the FLSA’s economic-realities test, which assesses whether an asserted employment relationship actually existed.
The record included testimony that Humalfa had not requested Ms. Porter to perform the work for which she sought compensation, the lack of employment documentation during the relevant period, and her testimony that she performed tasks in hopes of creating an incentive for Humalfa to hire her.
Because FLSA minimum-wage and overtime protections apply to employees, a plaintiff must establish that an employment relationship existed before relying on rules governing compensation for work the employer knew or should have known was performed.
Key Takeaways
- Agricultural-exemption disputes are highly fact-dependent.The court focused on Mr. Porter’s specific task—removing raw manure from cattle pens and moving it within the feedlot—not the entirety of Humalfa’s composting enterprise.
- Working for a separate contractor does not necessarily defeat the exemption.Here, the connection between the manure-removal work and the feedlot’s livestock operation was sufficient despite the separate corporate identities of Humalfa and Five Rivers.
- Not every composting-related job is necessarily exempt.The court limited its decision to the job duties presented in this case.
- A claim for unpaid work begins with employee status.A person who voluntarily performs tasks in anticipation of future employment may face difficulty proving the required employer-employee relationship.
The Bottom Line
In Porter v. T.J. Crowder and Sons, LLC, the Tenth Circuit concluded that a feedlot manure handler was exempt from FLSA overtime because his work was an integral, on-farm component of the cattle operation.
The decision underscores that FLSA exemption issues turn on the actual work performed, its relationship to the relevant agricultural operation, and the totality of the circumstances.
Click Porter, et al. v. T.J. Crowder and Sons, LLC to read the entire Tenth Circuit Opinion.
6th Cir.: Telecommunications Project Manager Was Computer Exempt From FLSA Overtime Requirements
Bennink v. Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co., LLC
The Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) generally requires employers to pay nonexempt employees overtime—usually one-and-one-half times their regular rate—for hours worked beyond 40 in a workweek. But the statute contains exemptions, including one for qualifying computer employees. In Bennink v. Cincinnati Bell Telephone Company, LLC, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that a telecommunications company’s interactive voice response (“IVR”) project manager fell within that computer-employee exemption and therefore was not entitled to overtime under the FLSA.
The decision is a useful reminder that an employee’s job title, degree, and hands-on coding responsibilities do not necessarily decide whether the exemption applies. Instead, courts examine the employee’s actual primary duties.
Background: A Longtime IVR Project Manager Worked Extensive Hours
Loren Bennink worked on Cincinnati Bell’s contact-center technology for years, first as a contractor and then as a W-2 employee beginning in 2016.
His work centered on the company’s IVR system—the automated telephone platform that presents callers with menu options and routes them to the appropriate assistance or information.
According to the court, Bennink documented the existing and proposed IVR systems, helped determine how the system should connect with company databases, coordinated with other IT personnel, documented system changes, and assisted with major system integration projects.
Bennink alleged that his workload eventually required extremely long days—at times as many as 18 hours—particularly while he was helping integrate Hawaii Telecom’s contact-center operations after Cincinnati Bell acquired that company.
After leaving the company, Bennink sued, alleging that Cincinnati Bell violated the FLSA by failing to pay overtime and breached an agreement to pay him $75 for every hour he worked.
The Central Legal Issue: Did the Computer Employee Exemption Apply?
The FLSA’s computer-employee exemption applies to certain employees whose primary duty includes the design, development, documentation, analysis, creation, testing, or modification of computer systems or programs based on user or system design specifications.
For hourly-paid employees, the exemption also requires compensation of at least $27.63 per hour.
The parties agreed that Bennink’s pay exceeded that threshold, so the appellate court focused on whether his primary duties fit within the exemption.
Cincinnati Bell, as the employer asserting the exemption, bore the burden of proving that the exemption applied by a preponderance of the evidence.
The Sixth Circuit’s Analysis
The IVR Platform Was a Computer System
Bennink argued that he did not work on a computer system in the relevant sense, characterizing his role as the creation of “complicated flowcharts” while other employees performed the actual programming.
The Sixth Circuit disagreed. It concluded that the IVR platform was a complex computer system because it used programmed menus to route calls while drawing information from multiple databases and systems.
His Documentation, Design, and Development Work Was Central to the Job
The court found that Bennink’s IVR responsibilities included several statutory functions: documentation, design, and development.
His documentation did more than merely record information; it mapped how calls moved through the system and gave other personnel an understanding of how the system worked and how it could be changed.
The court also found that Bennink’s work gathering feedback from system users, determining the IVR’s structure, and proposing call flows constituted design and development.
Although Bennink did not personally carry out all programming and performed some project-management functions, the court concluded that his system-focused work was the principal or most important part of his job.
A Formal Computer Science Background Was Not Required
Bennink also emphasized that he lacked formal education or training in computer systems and coding.
The Sixth Circuit held that neither the statute nor the applicable regulations require a particular degree, job title, or formal credential.
Instead, the court concluded that Bennink’s experience demonstrated that he was capable of performing the exempt system-design, development, and documentation work.
The Court’s Decision
The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Cincinnati Bell.
The court held that Bennink was an exempt computer employee under the FLSA and that the offer letter did not create an enforceable contract requiring payment at $75 per hour for overtime hours.
Because the computer-employee exemption applied, the court did not address Cincinnati Bell’s alternative arguments that Bennink also qualified for the administrative or highly compensated employee exemptions.
Takeaways for Employees and Employers
For employees
This case demonstrates that overtime eligibility does not always turn on whether an IT employee writes code, has a technical degree, or holds a traditionally technical title. The court focused on the real substance of Bennink’s work: whether his central responsibilities involved the design, development, and documentation of a computer system.
Employees questioning an exempt classification should preserve job descriptions, calendars, project records, communications, time records, and evidence showing their day-to-day duties—not merely their title. The FLSA inquiry examines how an employee actually spent working time and whether those activities legally fit an exemption.
For employers
Employers should ensure that FLSA classifications are tied to actual primary duties. An employee who provides routine technical support or follows predetermined procedures may present a different classification question from one who helps design system architecture, translates user needs into system specifications, and creates documentation that directs future development
The Bottom Line
Bennink v. Cincinnati Bell confirms that the computer-employee exemption can cover work beyond direct programming. Where an employee’s primary duties involve designing, developing, or documenting a complex computer system, the exemption may apply even if other staff handle coding and the employee lacks formal technical credentials.
Workers who believe they were improperly denied overtime should document their actual responsibilities and compensation practices. Employers should periodically review whether their exempt IT classifications remain supported by the work employees actually perform.
Click Bennink v. Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co., LLC to read the entire decision.
2d. Cir.: When Employees Required to Arrive Early But Unable to Enter Workplace or Clock In, Pre-Shift Time is Compensable Work
When a worker is told to arrive early but cannot enter the workplace or clock in until a manager arrives, is that time unpaid “waiting”—or time the employer must count as work? In Santos v. Lidl, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit said the worker’s allegations could support a claim for compensation, because waiting time may be paid time when an employer requires an employee to report ready to work and the employee cannot begin for reasons outside their control.
The decision does not establish that Lidl violated wage laws or that Santos is owed wages. The court vacated the dismissal and sent the case back for further proceedings, leaving the underlying claims unresolved.
What Happened in Santos v. Lidl?
Sandra Santos worked as a store clerk and stocker at Lidl grocery stores in West Babylon, New York, from approximately July to November 2021.
She alleged that Lidl scheduled her for opening shifts beginning at 5:00 a.m. but required her and other opening-shift employees to report 15 minutes earlier.
According to the complaint, employees sometimes found the store locked because opening managers had not arrived; workers could not access the time clocks until they were let inside.
Santos alleged that this happened about once a week, resulting in 15 minutes of unpaid time per week, and that overtime wages were implicated during five weeks of her employment.
She brought claims under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and New York Labor Law (NYLL), seeking compensation for the alleged unpaid waiting time.
The Legal Issue: When Is Waiting Time Compensable?
Lidl argued that the Portal-to-Portal Act barred Santos’s claim because the waiting happened before her scheduled shift and was not compensable work time.
That federal law generally excludes certain activities before or after an employee’s principal work, but the Second Circuit explained that not all waiting before a shift is treated the same way.
The key distinction is whether an employee waited to be engaged—for example, by arriving early voluntarily—or was engaged to wait because the employer required the employee to report at a particular time, ready to work, when no work could begin for a reason beyond the employee’s control.
The court rejected Lidl’s argument that this principle applied only to traditional on-call jobs, such as firefighters. It said the regulation’s description of engaged-to-wait time was not limited to particular occupations.
Why the Court Allowed the Claim to Proceed
At this stage, the court had to accept Santos’s factual allegations as true and draw reasonable inferences in her favor.
Santos alleged that Lidl required her to arrive early and be ready to work, but that she could not enter the store or start work until a manager let her in.
The Second Circuit concluded that, if those allegations are proven, the waiting time could be compensable under the FLSA.
The court also declined to dismiss the claim as too minor, or “de minimis,” based only on the complaint. It said it could not then determine that 15 minutes of unpaid time per week was legally insignificant or that recording the time would be too difficult.
The Court’s Decision
The Second Circuit vacated the dismissal of Santos’s FLSA and NYLL time-shaving claims and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings.
The court assumed, without deciding, that the NYLL and FLSA claims rose or fell together on the time-shaving issue because both parties treated them that way in their appellate briefing.
One judge dissented, reasoning that Santos’s pre-shift wait was not part of her principal work and should not be compensable under the Portal-to-Portal Act.
What the Decision May Mean for Employees and Employers
For Employees
Santos shows that being required to arrive early does not automatically make every minute before a shift compensable. But when an employer requires an employee to report ready to work and the employee cannot start because of an employer-related obstacle, the waiting time may support a wage claim.
If you believe you were required to wait before clocking in, keep records of your scheduled and actual arrival times, when you were able to enter and clock in, and any instructions about arriving early. Santos’s claim centered on the alleged early-reporting requirement and the time employees could not enter the store.
For Employers
Employers should review opening procedures, timekeeping practices, and instructions given to employees about when to report. If employees are required to arrive before their shifts but cannot begin work because the workplace is inaccessible, the timekeeping process may create a wage-and-hour risk under the reasoning in Santos.
The decision also makes clear that whether short waiting periods are too small to count cannot necessarily be resolved from a complaint alone; the circumstances and evidence may matter.
Bottom Line
Santos v. Lidl is a reminder that unpaid time before a shift may be legally significant when an employee is required to report ready to work but cannot begin because of circumstances beyond their control. The appeal ruling allowed Santos’s claims to proceed; it did not decide whether Lidl ultimately owes her or other workers compensation.
If you are an employee in a similar situation, document the reporting requirement and the time you are unable to work, and consider speaking with an employment attorney about your specific circumstances.
Click Santos v. Lidl to read the entire decision.
N.D.Ga.: Private Release Did Not Bar Employee’s FLSA Overtime Claim, Absent Court or DOL Approval
Adams v. Enplas USA, Inc., No. 1:25-CV-03882-SDG, 2026 WL 2908745 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 28, 2026)
Employees sometimes sign broad release agreements when resolving workplace disputes, including workers’ compensation matters. But a recent federal decision from Georgia highlights an important limitation: an employer generally cannot use a private release agreement to waive an employee’s claim for unpaid overtime under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).
In Adams v. Enplas USA, Inc., the court held that a broad release barred the former employee’s discrimination and retaliation claims, but it did not eliminate his claim that the employer failed to pay overtime. The decision is a practical reminder that FLSA wage rights receive special protection—even where an employee has signed an agreement releasing other employment-related claims.
The Case Background
Deleslie Adams sued his former employer, Enplas USA, Inc., alleging discrimination and retaliation under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, along with violations of the FLSA.
Adams alleged that he worked at least one instance of overtime for which he was not paid and that Enplas engaged in a pattern of coercing him to work overtime without proper compensation.
Before Adams filed suit, the parties had entered into a release agreement in connection with a workers’ compensation matter.
Enplas argued that the release barred every claim in the lawsuit and sought summary judgment—a ruling without a trial.
A magistrate judge recommended dismissing all of Adams’s claims based on the release, but Adams objected.
This distinction was critical because, although parties can often settle and release many employment claims by contract, FLSA wage-and-hour claims are governed by different rules.
The Legal Issues Before the Court
The federal district court addressed two separate questions:
- Whether the release covered Adams’s discrimination and retaliation claims; and
- Whether the same private release could legally eliminate his FLSA unpaid-overtime claim.
What Did the Release Say?
The agreement stated that Adams released Enplas from “any and all” actions, causes of action, damages, and claims of every kind arising from an alleged accident or injury during his employment.
Adams argued that, because the agreement was connected to a workers’ compensation settlement, “accident or injury” should be understood as referring only to physical injuries.
The court disagreed as to the discrimination and retaliation claims, finding that the release’s language was broad, clear, and not limited to workers’ compensation claims or physical injuries.
In other words, the agreement’s broad wording was enough to release those non-FLSA claims.
Why the Overtime Claim Was Different
The court reached the opposite result on Adams’s unpaid-overtime claim.
Under controlling Eleventh Circuit law, employees and employers generally cannot privately settle or waive FLSA overtime claims through an ordinary release agreement.
The court explained that there are only two recognized paths for resolving an FLSA overtime claim:
- The U.S. Department of Labor supervises the payment of unpaid wages; or
- In an employee-filed lawsuit, the parties present a proposed settlement to a court, and the court approves it as a fair resolution of a genuine dispute.
There was no evidence that the Department of Labor supervised payment of Adams’s claimed overtime wages or that a court reviewed and approved the release as an FLSA settlement.
For that reason, the court concluded that the private release could not waive Adams’s FLSA overtime rights.
The Court’s Decision
The court granted Enplas summary judgment on Adams’s discrimination and retaliation claims because those claims were covered by the release.
Those claims were dismissed with prejudice, meaning Adams cannot bring them again.
However, the court denied Enplas’s request for summary judgment on the FLSA overtime claim, allowing that claim to proceed.
The ruling did not determine whether Adams is ultimately entitled to unpaid overtime; it decided only that the release agreement did not end his right to pursue that claim.
What This Decision Means for Employees
For workers, Adams reinforces that signing a broad release does not necessarily end every wage-and-hour claim.
Employees should keep the following points in mind:
- A severance, settlement, workers’ compensation, or general release agreement may waive many claims, including discrimination and retaliation claims, depending on its language.
- An unpaid-overtime claim under the FLSA is different because it ordinarily cannot be privately waived or settled without Department of Labor supervision or court approval.
- A release agreement should be reviewed carefully before signing, particularly when the employee believes they worked off the clock, worked more than 40 hours in a workweek, or were not paid overtime properly. The case materials reflect an allegation that Adams was required to work overtime without proper payment.
What Employers Should Take Away
For employers, the decision serves as a warning against relying on generic release language to eliminate potential FLSA overtime liability.
Even a release written in sweeping terms—covering “any and all” claims—may not be enforceable as to unpaid overtime under the FLSA.
Employers addressing potential overtime disputes should consider whether the proposed resolution follows one of the legally recognized methods identified by the court: Department of Labor-supervised payment or a court-reviewed settlement in an employee-filed case.
Bottom Line
The Adams decision draws a clear line between general employment claims and FLSA overtime claims. A carefully drafted private release may bar discrimination and retaliation claims, as it did here, but it cannot by itself erase an employee’s right to seek unpaid overtime under the FLSA.
If you believe you were denied overtime pay, required to work off the clock, or asked to sign a release involving wage claims, preserve your pay records, schedules, timekeeping communications, and the agreement itself. The materials in Adams show why the specific type of claim—and the process used to resolve it—can be just as important as the wording of the release.
Click Adams v. Enplas USA, Inc. to read the entire Order.
W.D.Okla.: When a Franchise Model Looks Like Employment… Court Finds Jani-King Franchise Owners Are FLSA Employees
DOL v. Jani-King of Oklahoma, Inc.
A business may call someone a “franchise owner” or an “independent contractor,” but those labels do not control whether the person is an employee under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). In a recent decision involving Jani-King of Oklahoma, Inc., a federal court applied the FLSA’s “economic realities” test and concluded that the company’s janitorial franchise owners were employees—not independent contractors—for purposes of the Act’s recordkeeping requirements.
The ruling is an important reminder for employers using franchise, contractor, or other nontraditional work arrangements: the actual working relationship matters more than the contract title. It also offers employees a useful framework for evaluating whether they may have been misclassified.
Case Background
The U.S. Department of Labor sued Jani-King of Oklahoma (JKO), a regional franchisor that sells janitorial franchises and provides commercial cleaning services. The Department alleged that JKO improperly treated certain franchise owners as nonemployees and failed to meet the FLSA’s recordkeeping obligations.
JKO marketed cleaning services, entered into customer contracts in its own name, and retained ownership of customer accounts. It then offered franchise owners the opportunity to perform cleaning work for those accounts.
The franchise owners could sometimes perform the cleaning themselves, with family help, or through workers they hired.
Both sides sought summary judgment, meaning they asked the court to decide the case without a trial based on undisputed facts.
The Key Legal Question: Employee or Independent Contractor?
The central question was whether the franchise owners were economically dependent on JKO or were genuinely operating businesses of their own. The FLSA uses an expansive definition of employment, and courts look beyond contractual labels to the real-world relationship between the company and the worker.
The court used the familiar six-factor economic realities test:
• How much control the company has over the work;
• The worker’s opportunity for profit or loss through business decisions;
• The worker’s investment compared with the company’s investment;
• The permanence of the relationship;
• Whether the job requires specialized skill; and
• Whether the work is integral to the company’s business.
No one factor automatically decides employee status. Instead, the court must consider the total circumstances of the working arrangement.
Why the Court Found an Employment Relationship
- JKO Exercised Substantial Control
The court found that JKO exercised significant control over franchise owners’ access to work and the manner in which that work was performed. JKO controlled admission to and termination from the franchise system, chose which franchise owners would be offered customer accounts, and could remove them from accounts.
JKO also established cleaning schedules and performance standards, conducted quality-control inspections, and could remove a franchise owner when work did not meet its standards or a customer complained.
The court also emphasized that franchise owners were barred from performing commercial cleaning work for non-JKO customers during the franchise agreement and for two years afterward.
- Franchise Owners Had Limited Control Over Profit and Loss
Although franchise owners could control some expenses and occasionally seek additional work, JKO controlled the most important economic terms. It handled customer contracts, bidding, pricing, billing, and the payment process.
Customers paid JKO, which deducted fees and costs before paying the franchise owner the remaining amount.
As the court saw it, the franchise owners’ ability to increase profits through independent business initiative was restricted because they could not independently negotiate the price or scope of work with customers.
- Investment Did Not Outweigh the Other Evidence
The franchise owners did make investments, including franchise fees, equipment, supplies, payroll, taxes, and insurance.
But the court found that their investments were modest in comparison with JKO’s overall investment and noted that some costs could be deducted from the franchise owners’ compensation.
That economic structure resembled payment for labor more than an independently operated business, according to the court.
- The Relationship Was Long-Term and Exclusive
The franchise agreements lasted ten or twenty years, and franchise owners were effectively restricted from taking commercial cleaning work outside the JKO system.
The court concluded that this continuous and exclusive relationship supported employee status.
- Commercial Cleaning Did Not Require Specialized Skills
The court found that commercial cleaning can be demanding, but it did not require the type of specialized skill that typically points toward independent-contractor status.
JKO’s required training did not change that conclusion because the training developed basic job skills rather than a specialized professional trade.
- Cleaning Work Was Central to JKO’s Business
Finally, the court found that cleaning services were an integral part of JKO’s business. JKO marketed commercial cleaning, secured the customer accounts, negotiated and signed the cleaning contracts, and sometimes performed cleaning services directly when a franchise owner was unavailable.
That factor strongly supported treating the franchise owners as employees.
The Court’s Decision
The court granted summary judgment to the Secretary of Labor and denied JKO’s competing request for summary judgment.
Looking at the full relationship, the court held that the franchise owners depended on JKO for the opportunity to perform cleaning services and therefore were employees under the FLSA.
Because JKO was an employer under the FLSA, the court ruled that it had to comply with the statute’s recordkeeping requirements.
The court permanently barred JKO from failing to keep accurate records concerning employees’ wages, hours, and working conditions.
What This FLSA Misclassification Decision Means
This case does not mean that every franchise owner is automatically an employee. The analysis remains fact-specific, and the court acknowledged that JKO’s franchise owners had some features commonly associated with independent contractors, including the ability to reject contracts, own franchise entities, buy supplies, make an initial investment, and hire others.
But the decision reinforces several practical points:
For Employees and Workers
• A contract calling you a franchisee or independent contractor does not necessarily decide your legal status under the FLSA.
• Your degree of economic dependence matters, including who controls customer relationships, pricing, payment, schedules, and the ability to work for others.
• Employee status may affect rights to minimum wage, overtime compensation, and accurate payroll and hour records. The court noted that required FLSA records include payroll and records concerning minimum wage and overtime pay.
Bottom Line
The Jani-King decision illustrates a foundational principle of wage and hour law: an arrangement can be labeled a franchise opportunity, but still be treated as employment under the FLSA when workers are economically dependent on the company that provides and controls the work.
Workers who have been classified as independent contractors, franchisees, or business owners—but whose work is closely controlled by another company—should carefully review the actual terms and day-to-day reality of the relationship. Employers using these models should likewise assess their practices, classification decisions, and recordkeeping before a dispute or government investigation arises.
Click DOL v. Jani-King of Oklahoma, Inc. to read the full Order.
N.D.Miss.: Court Rejects Retaliatory Counterclaims in FLSA Case
Hale v. KTG USA, Inc.
A recent decision out of the Northern District of Mississippi underscores that courts do not look favorably upon what appear to be retaliatory counterclaims, asserted by defendant-employers in the context of FLSA claims. In Hale v. KTG USA, Inc., the individual defendant filed a counterclaim in response to the plaintiff’s FLSA claims, asserting that the FLSA claims had negligently inflicted emotional distress on him and/or interfered with his business relations. On the plaintiff’s motion, the court dismissed counterclaims relying on well-settled Fifth Circuit authority which typically does not allow such counterclaims.
Background
Plaintiff Dameon Hale alleged he worked as many as 60 to 80 hours per week in KTG’s shipping yard from April 2023 to November 2024 without receiving overtime pay as required under the FLSA. He named both KTG and Robert L. Ruth, Jr., doing business as RBT Transportation, as his employers and defendants in the action. In response, Ruth filed a counterclaim accusing Hale of negligent infliction of emotional distress and interference with business relations, alleging the filing of the FLSA suit against KTG caused him personal harm and risked his business ties with the company. Hale moved to dismiss.
The Court’s Analysis
The court characterized Hale’s motion as a facial Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack and found Ruth’s claims squarely barred under Fifth Circuit precedent. The Fifth Circuit has long prohibited employer counterclaims in FLSA cases where those claims function as set-offs or seek damages against employees, citing Brennan v. Heard and subsequent reaffirmations such as Martin v. PepsiAmericas. The rationale is policy-driven: FLSA proceedings should focus narrowly on employer compliance with minimum wage and overtime rules, not devolve into collateral disputes about employer-employee grievances.
Although Ruth argued his claims were “compulsory” because they arose from the same transaction, the court disagreed. Even if jurisdiction could theoretically exist, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(c)(4), pointing to Fifth Circuit precedent rejecting such counterclaims as fundamentally inconsistent with the purpose of the Act.
Takeaways for Practitioners
This decision reinforces what most of us practicing in this space already know: employer counterclaims in FLSA cases are typically not well-received by courts, absent the extremely narrow “set-off” exception where the employer is acknowledging and crediting previously paid wages. This ruling is useful when opposing retaliatory counterclaims designed to intimidate plaintiffs. It’s also a strong reminder to defense counsel—pursuing unrelated tort claims against an FLSA plaintiff in federal court is typically a losing strategy.
Click Hale v. KTG USA, Inc. to read the entire decision.
D.Ct.: Approval of FLSA Settlement Denied Based on Non-Reemployment Clause
Shorter v. Greenwich Homecare LLC
Each year federal courts are asked review and approve FLSA settlements in thousands of cases. In some Circuits like the Second and the Eleventh, settlements must be approved for fairness under almost all circumstances. Certain clauses, like general releases and non-disparagement often raise red flags and result in denial of approval. Although many employer-defendants and their counsel often seek to include non-reemployment clauses in such settlement agreements, a recent case from the District of Connecticut holds that such clauses may be taboo as well.
In that case, the court held that inclusion of a non-reemployment clause in the settlement agreement in an individual FLSA/wage and hour case was impermissible and thus, denied the motion for approval. Addressing the issue, the court explained:
ORDER denying 63 Motion for Settlement Approval. The Court finds that approval of the proposed settlement is precluded by an impermissible provision of the agreement itself. The settlement agreement here contains a total ban on Plaintiff’s ability to seek future employment with Defendant. See ECF No. 63 -2 Paragraph 4.3. The FLSA “was not created as a vehicle for employers to fire their employees,” and thus courts in this circuit generally do not approve any agreement by the parties containing a “no re-employment clause.” Vega v. Brown Roofing Co., Inc., No. 3:21-cv-64 (CSH), 2021 WL 6048926, at *5 (D. Conn. Nov. 19, 2021) (collecting cases). The parties have included no caselaw as to why the inclusion of this provision should be permitted.
Thus, the court denied the motion for settlement approval without prejudice, and directed the parties to address what it referred to as “the problematic agreement provision” in a renewed motion, “either by removing it or explaining why its inclusion is permissible under relevant authorities.”
Because the clause often provides little relief to the defendant-employers who seek its inclusion, it might be wise to forego such clauses going forward when settling FLSA cases in jurisdictions that require judicial approval of such settlements.
E.D.Tex.: Texas Court Strikes Down DOL Overtime Rule
Texas v. United States Department of Labor
Last week, in a long-awaited decision, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas struck down the 2024 Rule issued by the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL), which aimed to increase the salary threshold for the executive, administrative, and professional (EAP) exemptions under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The rule which would have provided overtime for approximately 4,000,000 workers who do not currently receive it.
The case continued a back and forth in which Democrat administrations have sought to expand workers’ rights by increasing the salary thresholds required to maintain overtime exemptions, and Republican appointed judges have invalidated the rules, stripping workers of enhanced rights provided by DOL promulgated regulations.
Background of the Case
The FLSA mandates that most employees must receive at least the federal minimum wage and overtime pay for hours worked beyond 40 in a workweek. However, certain employees are exempt from these requirements, particularly those classified under the EAP exemptions. Historically, the DOL has set a minimum salary level to qualify for these exemptions.
In April 2024, the DOL announced the 2024 Rule, which significantly raised the minimum salary threshold for EAP employees—from $684 to $844 per week starting July 1, 2024, and further to $1,128 per week by January 1, 2025. Additionally, the rule included an automatic indexing mechanism for future salary increases based on contemporary earnings data every three years.
The Legal Challenge
Texas, along with a coalition of business organizations, argued that the DOL overstepped its statutory authority by effectively prioritizing salary over the actual duties performed by employees. They contended that the changes would displace the duties-based test required by the FLSA and improperly classify millions of employees as nonexempt from overtime pay, despite no changes to their job responsibilities.
The court’s analysis began with the text of the FLSA, which does not explicitly specify a minimum salary for the EAP exemption. The DOL has historically exercised its authority to define and delimit this exemption, but the court emphasized that such authority has limits—primarily that the focus should remain on the duties performed by employees rather than solely their salary.
The Court’s Ruling
Judge Sean D. Jordan ruled in favor of Texas and the business organizations, stating that the DOL’s 2024 Rule was an unlawful exercise of agency power. The court held that the rule’s changes effectively eliminated the consideration of job duties in favor of a predominately salary-based exemption test, contravening the FLSA’s intent.
The ruling detailed that the DOL’s increase in salary thresholds and the implementation of automatic indexing would improperly classify millions of employees as nonexempt, thereby violating the fundamental purpose of the EAP exemption, which is to protect workers who perform executive, administrative, or professional duties.
Implications of the Decision
This ruling has far-reaching implications for employers and employees alike. By vacating the 2024 Rule, the court has reinstated the previous salary thresholds and reaffirmed the importance of the duties test in determining exemption status.
This order effectively reverts the minimum weekly salary requirement back to the 2019 number, $684 per week (except in jurisdictions, such as California and New York, which have higher minimum requirements under state law). In the months leading up to the July 1 increase, many employers reclassified workers as nonexempt. In theory, employees who were converted to nonexempt due to the July 1 increase may now be reclassified to exempt, if desired.
It is anticipated that the DOL will appeal this decision to the Fifth Circuit. However, any appeal most certainly will not be resolved by the Jan. 1 effective date of the next planned increase, and the new administration may ultimately abandon the appeal at a later date if it is still pending. The 2019 rule, which is now once again in effect, was issued under the previous Trump administration.
Key takeaways at this time are:
- The minimum salary for exempt status under federal law is once again $684 per week, with limited exceptions.
- Employees who earned between $684 and $844 per week and were reclassified as nonexempt as a result may be reclassified as exempt, provided they continue to meet one of the applicable job duties tests.
- The anticipated increase to $1,128 per week on Jan. 1, 2025, will not occur.
- Any future revisions to the minimum salary will not face an uphill battle, ostensibly freezing wages for millions of Americans paid relatively moderate salaries.
Click Texas v. United States Department of Labor to read the entire decision.