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4th Cir.: Statute of Limitations Equitably Tolled Where Employer Fails to Post Required FLSA Notice
This case involved a former domestic servant who sued her former employers alleging claims for forced labor and involuntary servitude under the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act (TVPA), willful violation of Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), and state law claims for breach of contract, fraudulent misrepresentation, and false imprisonment. After the court below dismissed the case on statute of limitations grounds, plaintiff appealed. As discussed here, the Fourth Circuit joined other courts who have similarly held, and held that where an employer fails to post the required FLSA Notice, the statute of limitations for an employees claims under the FLSA are tolled until he or she either obtains an attorney, or obtains actual knowledge of his or her rights.
Initially, the Fourth Circuit identified two circumstances under which equitable tolling may generally be applicable:
[E]quitable tolling is available when 1) “the plaintiffs were prevented from asserting their claims by some kind of wrongful conduct on the part of the defendant,” or 2) “extraordinary circumstances beyond plaintiffs’ control made it impossible to file the claims on time.” Harris, 209 F.3d at 330 (internal quotation marks omitted). Cruz asks us to evaluate this rule in light of Vance v. Whirlpool Corp., 716 F.2d 1010 (4th Cir.1983), in which this Court found that the district court properly held that the 180–day filing requirement of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) was tolled by reason of the plaintiff’s employer’s failure to post statutory notice of workers’ rights under the Act. Id. at 1013.
Extending its reasoning from Vance, an ADEA claim to claims under the FLSA, the court explained:
It makes good sense to extend our reasoning in Vance to the FLSA. The notice requirements in the ADEA and the FLSA are almost identical. Compare 29 C.F.R. § 1627.10 (requiring employers to “post and keep posted in conspicuous places … the notice pertaining to the applicability of the [ADEA]”), with id. § 516 .4 (requiring employers “post and keep posted a notice explaining the [FLSA] … in conspicuous places”). The purpose of these requirements is to ensure that those protected under the Acts are aware of and able to assert their rights. Although Vance tolled an administrative filing deadline rather than a statute of limitations, the FLSA lacks an equivalent administrative filing requirement; thus, the FLSA’s deadline to sue is, like the ADEA’s administrative filing deadline, the critical juncture at which a claimant’s rights are preserved or lost. Neither the ADEA nor the FLSA inflicts statutory penalties for failure to comply with the notice requirements. See Cortez v. Medina’s Landscaping, Inc., No. 00 C 6320, 2002 WL 31175471, at *5 (N.D.Ill. Sept.30, 2002) (extending an actual notice tolling rule similar to Vance from the ADEA to the FLSA). Therefore, absent a tolling rule, employers would have no incentive to post notice since they could hide the fact of their violations from employees until any relevant claims expired. For all of these reasons, this Court’s analysis in Vance applies with equal force to the notice requirement of the FLSA. Under Vance, tolling based on lack of notice continues until the claimant retains an attorney or obtains actual knowledge of her rights. 716 F.2d at 1013. The current factual record, which is limited to the amended complaint, does not identify when Cruz first retained a lawyer or learned of her rights under the FLSA. Therefore, the district court should allow discovery on remand to determine in the first instance whether Cruz’s FLSA claim was time-barred despite being equitably tolled.
Click Cruz v. Maypa to read the entire Opinion.
D.Colo.: Statute of Limitations Tolled During Time Motion for Conditional Certification Pending
Stransky v. HealthONE of Denver, Inc.
This case was before the court on the plaintiffs’ Motion to Toll the Statute of Limitations, which was filed simultaneously with the plaintiffs’ motion for conditional certification of the case as a collective action. In granting the plaintiffs motion (in part) and tolling the statute of limitations as of the date on which the plaintiffs sought conditional certification, the court looked to the both the procedural realities of the opt-in provisions of 216(b) and the remedial purpose behind the FLSA. Significantly, the court noted that there would be no prejudice to the defendant in granting such tolling while the potential plaintiffs would be significantly prejudiced by the continued expiration of their respective statutes of limitations if the tolling were not granted.
After discussing cases from around the country that have granted equitable tolling under similar circumstances, largely based upon the amount of time that it took for the court to rule upon a plaintiff’s pending motion for conditional certification, because same is in the interests of justice, the court honed in on the policy supporting such decisions:
In the case of a collective FLSA action, a least one district court in the Tenth Circuit has explained that the unique circumstances of a collective action “is not only significant but justifies tolling the limitations period [ ] for the FLSA putative class until the court authorizes the provision of notice to putative class members or issues an order denying the provision of notice.” In re Bank of America Wage and Hour Emp’t Litig., No. 10–MDL–2138, 2010 WL 4180530 (D.Kan. Oct.20, 2010). In making that equitable tolling determination, the court in In re Bank of America utilized a flexible standard, where a court considers five factors in determining whether to equitably toll a statute of limitations: (1) lack of notice of the filing requirement; (2) lack of constructive knowledge of the filing requirement; (3) diligence in pursuing one’s rights; (4) absence of prejudice to the defendant; and (5) the plaintiff’s reasonableness in remaining ignorant of the particular legal requirement. Id. (citing Graham–Humphreys, 209 F.3d at 561).
Plaintiffs argue that the statue of limitations should be equitably tolled here in the interest of justice in order to protect the Opt-in Plaintiffs’ diminishing claims. The Court agrees. Although early notice to Opt-in Plaintiffs in a collective action such as this is favored, such notice was not possible here as Defendant is in sole possession of the names and last known physical addresses of all potential Opt-in Plaintiffs. As such, allowing Opt-in Plaintiffs’ claims to diminish or expire due to circumstances beyond their direct control would be particularly unjust. The Tenth Circuit has also recognized the possible need for equitable tolling under such conditions. See Gray v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 858 F.2d 610, 616 (10th Cir.1988) (tolling statute of limitations where plaintiffs were lulled into inaction and defendant did not show that any “significant prejudice” would result from allowing plaintiffs to proceed; defendant was “fully apprised” of the plaintiffs’ claims). Moreover, Defendant will not be prejudiced by such equitable tolling. See Baden–Winterwood, 484 F.Supp.2d at 828–29 (defendant not prejudiced because it “had full knowledge that the named Plaintiff brought the suit as a collective action on the date of the filing” and “was fully aware of its scope of potential liability.”). Indeed, Defendant fails to claim it would be prejudiced in any manner, let alone prejudiced unduly, were this Court to toll the applicable limitations period. Thus, having considered the particular facts of this case, the Court finds that the interests of justice are best served by tolling the statute of limitations for the Opt-in Plaintiffs in this case.
However, while the court granted the plaintiffs motion, it declined to toll the statute of limitations back to the date of the filing of the original complaint. Instead, the court held the appropriate date to begin tolling was the date on which the plaintiffs filed their motion for conditional certification.
Click Stransky v. HealthONE of Denver, Inc. to read the entire Corrected Order Granting in Part Plaintiffs’ Motion to Toll the Statute of Limitations.
S.D.N.Y.: Delay Caused By the Time Required for Court to Rule on Motion for Conditional Certification Is ‘Extraordinary Circumstance’ Justifying Equitable Tolling
McGlone v. Contract Callers, Inc.
This case was before the court on plaintiff’s motion for conditional certification of a collective action, seeking to permit court approved notice. The court noted that another court, presented with a similar motion for conditional certification had previously denied same due to very significant differences in the factual circumstances in the employees’ work, depending on location. Nonetheless the court granted plaintiff’s motion and conditionally certified the case with respect to the district in which the plaintiff was employed. As discussed here, the court also granted plaintiff’s motion to equitably toll the statute of limitations for putative class members, as of the date the plaintiff filed his motion for conditional certification. In so doing, the court joined other courts who have held that court delay in issuing a decision on a motion for conditional certification is of itself an “extraordinary circumstance” warranting the tolling of the statute of limitations.
Addressing the equitable tolling issue, the court said:
Normally in a FLSA collective action, the statute of limitations for each plaintiff runs when he or she files written consent with the court electing to join the lawsuit, not when the named plaintiff files the complaint. See 29 U.S.C. § 256(b). However, courts have discretion to equitably toll the limitations period in appropriate cases in order “to avoid inequitable circumstances.” Yahraes v. Restaurant Assocs. Events Corp., 2011 WL 844963, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Mar.8, 2011). The Honorable Steven M. Gold stated that “the delay caused by the time required for a court to rule on a motion, such as one for certification of a collective action in a FLSA case, may be deemed an ‘extraordinary circumstance’ justifying application of the equitable tolling doctrine.” Id. at *2 (collecting cases). While plaintiffs wishing to pursue their rights cannot sit on them indefinitely, those whose putative class representatives and their counsel are diligently and timely pursuing the claims should also not be penalized due to the courts’ heavy dockets and understandable delays in rulings. Accordingly, the statute of limitations will be tolled as of the date of the filing of this motion.
While courts remain split on this issue, this is a good example of a court ruling on equitable tolling with the remedial purposes of the FLSA in mind.
Click McGlone v. Contract Callers, Inc. to read the entire Opinion.
S.D.N.Y.: Delay in Asserting Equitable Tolling Not a Bar to Its Application
Chen v. Grand Harmony Restaurant, Inc.
This case was before the court in an unusual procedural posture on defendants’ proactive motion requesting that the court deny tolling of the statute of limitations on plaintiffs’ FLSA and NYLL claims arguing that (1) it is too late for Plaintiffs to make a request for equitable tolling; (2) the equitable tolling doctrine cannot be applied to the remaining individual defendants, as they were not obligated by federal or state law to post the notices at issue; and (3) there is no justification to toll the statute of limitations. The Magistrate Judge held that plaintiffs had not waived their right to assert a right to equitable tolling based on the passage of time. The defendants then objected to the Magistrate’s R&R on this ground. Adopting the Magistrate’s reasoning the court reasoned:
“In his Report, Magistrate Judge Katz properly concluded that Plaintiffs are not barred from invoking the doctrine of equitable tolling because of a delay in raising the issue. Equitable tolling is a matter within the sound discretion of the Court. Defendants do not cite any relevant statutory or case law authority to support their claim that Plaintiffs have waived their right to request that the Court equitably toll the statute of limitations by waiting until this stage in the litigation. Further, Defendants had prior notice that Plaintiffs intended to seek damages back to the beginning of their employment. Plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that Defendants’ actions occurred throughout Plaintiffs’ employment and Defendants acknowledged that the entire period of Plaintiffs’ employment was at issue both in their answer and throughout discovery. The issue of equitable tolling was therefore present, at least implicitly, from the beginning of the action.”
Click Chen v. Grand Harmony Restaurant, Inc. to read the entire Memorandum Decision and Order.
S.D.N.Y.: SOL Equitably Tolled, Where Decision on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Conditional Certification Delayed, Notwithstanding Plaintiffs’ Diligence In Pursuing Same
Yahraes v. Restaurant Associates Events Corp.
This case was before the court on plaintiffs’ motion seeking equitable tolling of their FLSA claims. During oral argument on plaintiffs’ motion to certify that this case may proceed as a collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), the court had questioned whether the 2007 FLSA claims, even assuming that defendants’ violation was willful, were still viable or were now time-barred. Plaintiffs conceded that, absent an order equitably tolling the statute of limitations, their claims were indeed outside of the statute of limitations. However, Plaintiffs argued that, since they had moved for conditional certification very early on in the case and only through events outside of their control had a decision on same been delayed, the court was due to toll the statute of limitations. The court agreed and tolled the statute of limitations.
The court reasoned:
“The FLSA provides for a two-year statute of limitations generally, with an additional one-year extension for willful violations. 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). In a FLSA collective action, the statute of limitations runs for each plaintiff until he files written consent with the court to join the lawsuit. Id. § 256(b). Thus, unlike the statute of limitations in a Rule 23 class action which is tolled for all putative class members upon the filing of the complaint, the limitations periods in a FLSA action continues to run until an individual affirmatively opts into the action. Moreover, “[s]igned consents do not relate back to the original filing date of the complaint.” Lee v. ABC Carpet & Home, 236 F.R.D. 193, 199 (S.D.N.Y.2006). Nonetheless, the court has the discretion to equitably toll the limitations period.
Federal courts should grant equitable tolling “sparingly,” Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96, 111 S.Ct. 453, 112 L.Ed.2d 435 (1990), and “only … in [ ] rare and exceptional circumstance[s],” Zerilli-Edelglass v. New York City Transit Auth., 333 F.3d 74, 80 (2d Cir.2003) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Equitable tolling is generally reserved for situations “where the claimant has actively pursued his judicial remedies by filing a defective pleading during the statutory period, or where the complainant has been induced or tricked by his adversary’s misconduct into allowing the filing deadline to pass.” Irwin, 498 U.S. at 96. Nevertheless, “[a] statute of limitations may be tolled as necessary to avoid inequitable circumstances.” Iavorski v. U.S. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 232 F.3d 124, 129 (2d Cir.2000). In determining whether equitable tolling is warranted, the Second Circuit has stated that a court “must consider whether the person seeking application of the equitable tolling doctrine (1) has acted with reasonable diligence during the time period she seeks to have tolled, and (2) has proved that the circumstances are so extraordinary that the doctrine should apply.” Zerilli-Edelglass, 333 F.3d at 80-81 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The delay caused by the time required for a court to rule on a motion, such as one for certification of a collective action in a FLSA case, may be deemed an “extraordinary circumstance[ ]” justifying application of the equitable tolling doctrine. See Abadeer v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 2010 WL 5158873, at *2-4 (M.D.Tenn. Dec.14, 2010); Israel Antonio-Morales v. Bimbo’s Best Produce, Inc., 2009 WL 1591172, at *1 (E.D.La. Apr.20, 2009) (collecting cases for the proposition that “[c]ourts routinely grant equitable tolling in the FLSA collective action context to avoid prejudice to actual or potential opt-in plaintiffs that can arise from the unique procedural posture of collective actions”); Stickle v. Sciwestern Mkt. Support Ctr., 2008 WL 4446539, at *22 (D.Ariz. Sept.30, 2008) (collecting cases); Owens v. Bethlehem Mines Corp., 630 F.Supp. 309, 312 (S.D.W.V.1986). But see Hintergerger v. Catholic Health Sys., 2009 WL 3464134, at *14-15 (W.D.N.Y. Oct.21, 2009) (denying tolling for the time period while certification motion was pending).
Plaintiffs argue for equitable tolling primarily on the ground that they have diligently pursued their claims and, through no fault of their own, have been frustrated in their attempts to send notice any sooner to potential 216(b) opt-in plaintiffs. Docket Entry 96. I find that the circumstances of this case, and in particular plaintiffs’ diligence in pursuing the FLSA claims on behalf of putative opt-ins, warrant equitable tolling to avoid an inequitable result. A discussion of the procedural history of this case will explain the “extraordinary circumstances” present here that justify tolling.
In addition, plaintiffs contend that Judge Townes’ tolling is still ongoing. Docket Entries 96, 102. For the reasons just stated, I do not reach this question either.
Less than one month after filing an amended complaint, plaintiffs filed a fully-briefed motion to certify the collective action.FN4 Docket Entries 33-39. In their opposition to plaintiffs’ certification motion, defendants noted that one of the defendants, Amerivents, had recently entered into an agreement with the New York State Department of Labor (“NYSDOL”) to pay unpaid wages. Docket Entry 41 at 14. During a conference in June, 2010, Judge Townes issued a stay of the proceedings until November 19, 2010, to await the result of the NYSDOL investigation. The parties agree that plaintiffs’ claims were tolled for approximately 160 days while the stay was in place. See Docket Entry 102 n. 3 (stating that 160 days is “the minimum undisputed number of days the statute of limitations was tolled”); see also Tr. 5.
After the stay was lifted, defendants requested leave to re-brief their opposition to the certification motion, and sought to defer the certification motion until Judge Townes decided their motion to dismiss, which had not yet even been filed. Docket Entry 81. During a telephone conference held in December, 2010, I set a short briefing schedule for the certification motion, with the fully-briefed motion due at the end of January, 2011. At the oral argument held on February 9, 2011, I granted plaintiffs’ motion for certification of the collective action.
This procedural history demonstrates that plaintiffs have vigorously pursued their claims and, through no fault of their own, have been delayed in prosecuting their action and distributing 216(b) notice to potential opt-in plaintiffs. Moreover, defendants’ actions-re-briefing the certification motion, seeking to defer certification in anticipation of dispositive motions, and failing to produce documents in connection with the NYSDOL investigation have frustrated plaintiffs’ diligent attempts to ensure that claims did not expire. I attribute no trickery or wrongdoing on the part of defendants. I do, however, conclude that defendants will not be prejudiced by any tolling because they have been on notice since the complaint was served in March, 2010, that they were potentially liable for 2007 FLSA claims. Accordingly, in the interest of fairness, I find equitable tolling is warranted from the date plaintiffs served their original certification motion, May 3, 2010, to June 8, 2010, the date Judge Townes issued the stay (a period of 37 days), and from the date plaintiffs re-filed their certification motion, December 17, 2010, to February 9, 2011, the date I granted it (a period of 55 days). The additional 92 days will permit any collective member who timely opts in to maintain a FLSA claim based on wages allegedly due for labor performed in September, 2007, assuming plaintiffs establish defendants’ willful violation of the statute.
For the reasons stated above, I find equitable tolling of plaintiffs’ FLSA claims warranted in light of the procedural history of this case.”
Click Yahraes v. Restaurant Associates Events Corp. to read the entire decision.
N.D.Ga.: FLSA Plaintiffs’ Motion For Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Preliminary Injunction Granted; Plaintiffs Reinstated To Jobs And Statute Of Limitations Tolled Due To Retaliatory Discharge
Clincy v. Galardi South Enterprises, Inc.
This matter comes was before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. Plaintiffs were employed as entertainers at Club Onyx (“Onyx”), an adult entertainment night club allegedly owned and operated by Defendants.
On July 31, 2009, Plaintiffs filed a putative collective action against their employer for violating the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). The alleged violations of the FLSA include misclassifying the Plaintiffs as independent contractors instead of employees, failing to pay minimum wage and overtime, and retaliation for filing suit under the statute. On August 11, 2009, some Plaintiffs appear to have been terminated, from their employment with Onyx as a result of filing this action. Plaintiffs Jordan, on August 12, and Clincy, on August 13, were also informed that they could no longer work at Onyx due to their involvement in this suit. On August 20, 2009, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction [14]. Among the relief sought in the motion, Plaintiffs requested that they be reinstated to their positions at Onyx and that they and other similarly situated individuals not be adversely affected by participation in this suit. Plaintiffs also requested the tolling of the statute of limitations for the FLSA claims of similarly situated individuals.
The Court first defined the applicable legal standard. “It is settled law in this Circuit that a preliminary injunction is an “extraordinary and drastic remedy[.]” Zardui-Quintana v. Richard, 768 F.2d 1213, 1216 (11th Cir.1985). To obtain such relief, a movant must demonstrate: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of the underlying case, (2) the movant will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction, (3) the harm suffered by the movant in the absence of an injunction would exceed the harm suffered by the opposing party if the injunction issued, and (4) an injunction would not disserve the public interest. Johnson & Johnson Vision Care, Inc. v. 1-800 Contacts, Inc., 299 F.3d 1242, 1246-47 (11th Cir.2002). Based on the arguments made at the hearing, a review of the record, and the parties’ briefs, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have succeeded in making such a showing here, and a preliminary injunction will accordingly be issued.”
Finding that Plaintiffs met their burden, the Court stated, “Plaintiffs have demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of the underlying case. While the FLSA establishes requirements for minimum wage and overtime pay, it also makes it illegal to “discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any employee because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to” the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3). While the Plaintiffs may well succeed on the claim that they are employees of Onyx and not independent contractors and thus entitled to a minimum wage and overtime pay, they are substantially likely to prevail on the claim of retaliation. All of the Plaintiffs, with the exception of Hammond, were fired after instituting this suit. At the August 11 meeting at which Parker, Pough, Wells, Leaphart, Sales, and Appling were ostensibly terminated, it was made clear that the reason for their termination was the filing of this suit. Plaintiffs Jordan and Clincy were similarly told that they would not be able to work at Onyx as a result of their participation in the FLSA action. (See Complaint, at 17). This type of action represents a flagrant violation of the FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision and therefore Plaintiffs have satisfied the first requirement by demonstrating a substantial likelihood of success.
Plaintiffs have also satisfied the second requirement by demonstrating that irreparable harm will be suffered absent the injunction. In Gresham v. Windrush Partners, LTD, the Court found that “irreparable injury may be presumed from the fact of discrimination and violation of fair housing statutes.” 730 F.2d 1417, 1423 (11th Cir.1984). The Court went on to state that, “when a plaintiff who has standing to bring suit shows a substantial likelihood that a defendant has violated specific fair housing statutes and regulations, that alone, if unrebutted, is sufficient to support an injunction remedying these violations.” Id. In the case at hand, Plaintiffs have demonstrated that a substantial likelihood exists that Defendants have violated the FLSA, specifically its anti-retaliation provision. The FLSA provides that actions may be brought by any employee on behalf of himself and others similarly situated and specifically contemplates “equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of section 215(a)(3) of this title, including without limitation … reinstatement.” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
The anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA is intended to allow employees to seek vindication of their statutory rights without the fear of reprisal. Retaliatory termination also carries with it the risk that other similarly situated employees will be deterred from protecting their own rights. See Holt v. Continental Group, Inc., 708 F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir.1983) (stating retaliatory discharge carries risk of deterring employees from protecting statutory rights). Furthermore, in order to be a party to an FLSA action, an employee must actively join the suit by providing consent in writing. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Irreparable injury may not occur every time a retaliatory discharge takes place, but under the present facts it appears likely that other similarly situated employees of Onyx will be deterred from joining the action as a result of the action taken against Plaintiffs by Onyx. Defendants not only fired Plaintiffs for their participation in this suit, but also informed other entertainers at Onyx that Plaintiffs had been fired because of their participation. (See Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, at 9 [14-2] ). Forcing individuals with claims under the FLSA to choose between pursuing their claims or maintaining employment results in irreparable harm. See Allen v. Suntrust Banks, Inc., 549 F.Supp.2d 1379 (N.D.Ga.2008) (finding irreparable harm where employees were put in a position of either obtaining a severance package or pursuing their FLSA claims).”
Thus, the Court found that “the harm to Plaintiffs in the absence of an injunction will exceed any harm suffered by Defendants as a result of granting a preliminary injunction. The Court also finds that an injunction in this case will not disserve the public interest. Such equitable relief is specifically contemplated by the FLSA in order to protect the rights of employees. Plaintiffs have therefore satisfied the requirements necessary for the granting of a preliminary injunction. Because Plaintiffs seek the tolling of the statute of limitations as part of the preliminary injunction, this Court will also examine the propriety of this request.”
Granting Plaintiffs’ request to equitably toll the statute of limitations, the Court said, ‘Time requirements in lawsuits between private litigants are customarily subject to ‘equitable tolling.’ ‘ Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95, 111 S.Ct. 453, 112 L.Ed.2d 435 (1990). However, it is a remedy which should be used sparingly. Justice v. United States, 6 F.3d 1474, 1479 (11th Cir.1993). Equitable tolling is permitted ‘upon finding an inequitable event that prevented plaintiff’s timely action.’ Id. It is permitted where the plaintiff ‘has been induced … by his adversary’s misconduct into allowing the filing deadline to pass.’ Irwin, 498 U.S. at 96.
In the underlying case, individuals similarly situated to Plaintiffs have likely been induced to refrain from pursuing claims under the FLSA as a result of the discharge of Plaintiffs and by being informed by management of Onyx that the discharge resulted from participation in this suit. Therefore, proper grounds exist to toll the statute of limitations for a limited period until similarly situated individuals may be made aware that they may pursue FLSA claims without the fear of retaliation or reprisal.
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction [14] is hereby GRANTED and the following relief is ORDERED:
1. Defendants are to immediately reinstate Plaintiffs Parker, Pough, Wells, Leaphart, Sales, Jordan, Clincy, and Appling;
2. Defendants are prohibited from retaliating or discriminating in any way against Plaintiffs or similarly situated individuals for involvement with or participation in this action or any other pursuit of claims under the FLSA; and
3. the statute of limitations for potential opt-in plaintiffs is tolled until this Court has ruled on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Conditional Class Certification [12].”
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