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N.D.Ala.: GM’s Salary Based on Forecast Sales of Store Did Not Qualify As a “Bona Fide Commission Plan;” Retail Exemption Inapplicable
Kuntsmann v. Aaron Rents, Inc.
This case was before the court on the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The defendant asserted that plaintiff was exempt under either the executive exemption, administrative exemption or the so-called combination exemption of the two. As discussed here, the defendant further argued that even if the plaintiff was not properly deemed exempt under any of the 3 exemptions, he was paid in accordance with 207(i), the “retail exemption” and thus not entitled to overtime compensation. After holding that issues of fact regarding the plaintiff’s primary duties precluded summary judgment, the court addressed the defendant’s final contention regarding the retail exemption and held that it was inapplicable because the plaintiff had not been paid “commissions” as required for application of the retail exemption.
Describing the compensation plan at issue, the court explained:
During his time as GM of that store, Kuntsmann was the highest ranking and only employee in the store whom Aaron classified as exempt from the FLSA’s minimum wage and overtime requirements. Aaron’s compensation scheme for GMs is based on the revenue and operating profits of each individual store. The GM of each store receives a monthly income that approximates the expected financial performance of the store in a month. This approximation, called the “draw,” is compared with the actual earnings of the store on a monthly basis. Then, Aaron adjusts salary upwards when the store performance exceeds the draw and sometimes downward when the store performance does not meet the draw. GMs are also eligible for monthly bonuses based on set financial goals. Aaron reviews each store’s performance twice a year and can increase or decrease the draw according to performance. Aaron also looks at the financial performance of the store at the end of each quarter and provides the GM a bonus if his total monthly commission is greater than the GM’s quarterly draw.
After disposing of the plaintiff’s argument that the retail exemption argument was waived by the defendant’s failure to assert it in its answer (the court reasoned that it wasn’t really an exemption despite referring to it as same, but rather an “exception”), and discussing the elements necessary for the retail exemption, the court explained that it was not applicable, because the plaintiff had not been paid under a “bona fide commission plan.” After noting a lack of authority on the issue, the court distinguished two prior cases from within the Eleventh Circuit.
First, the court noted that time did not play any role in the compensation system at bar, which the court reasoned supported its finding that the plaintiff had not been paid a commission as defendant claimed:
The compensation scheme examined in Klinedinst is distinguishable from the one at issue in the present case. The Eleventh Circuit emphasized the importance of time as a factor in the Klinedinst compensation scheme; time does not play a role in the compensation of an Aaron’s GM. In addition, inherent differences appear between how the auto mechanics in Klinedinst and the GMs at Aaron earn their compensation. The auto mechanics’ compensation derived from each individual job that they performed that was assigned a particular number of “flag hours.” The connection between individual sales and the compensation of an Aaron GM is much more attenuated, however. At Aaron, GMs are neither paid on a “per job basis,” nor an hourly basis but a monthly compensation based on previous quarters’ revenue that could possibly be increased or decreased based on the store’s profits. The payment system in Klinedinst is different enough from the Aaron compensation scheme so that the opinion does not guide this court’s analysis as to whether Aaron’s payment scheme meets the final requirements of § 207(i) at the summary judgment stage—whether its compensation scheme qualifies as a bona fide commission plan.
The court also reasoned that plaintiff’s salary at issue was not a “commission,” because he was not being paid based on total sales attributed to him, but rather based on his store’s overall profits and whether they exceeded the company’s expectations:
A great difference exists between simply adding up total sales attributed to a salesperson each month and then giving the salesperson a certain percentage of those sales in compensation, and awarding a store manager a “bonus” if his store’s profits exceeded the company’s predictions. As Kuntsmann argued, his monthly salary was based on a published rate and did not change based solely on his sales or the store’s sales alone. The payment system in Ethan Allen diverges enough from the Aaron compensation scheme so that the opinion does not direct this court’s analysis as to whether Aaron’s scheme qualifies as a bona fide commission plan under § 207(i).
Thus, the court concluded:
Therefore, this court finds that Aaron has not demonstrated that its compensation scheme qualifies as a “bona fide commission plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 207(i). Although some circuits have doubted the validity of the “clear and affirmative evidence” standard, the Eleventh Circuit has not retreated from this standard, and Aaron has not met it regarding the applicability of the § 207(i) exception. Moreover, regardless of how exacting Aaron’s burden should be when proving the applicability of an FLSA exception, the Eleventh Circuit has also instructed this court to construe FLSA exceptions “narrowly and sensibly.” Klinedinst, 260 F.3d at 1254. After narrowly construing § 207(i), the court has serious doubts as to whether Aaron’ compensation scheme qualifies under the statutory section. While recognizing that determining whether a compensation system qualifies as a bona fide commission plan is a question of law for the court, Aaron has not met its burden of proof at this stage.
Click Kuntsmann v. Aaron Rents, Inc. to read the entire Memorandum Opinion.
3d Cir.: Flat-rate Payment Scheme Constituted Commissions; Nutrisystem Sales Associates 7(i) Exempt
Parker v. Nutrisystem, Inc.
This case was before the Third Circuit on Plaintiffs appeal of summary judgment in favor of Defendant. Plaintiffs were sales associates, employed in Defendant’s call center, who completed sales orders on behalf of Defendant. It was undisputed that Defendant’s business was “retail” in nature. Thus, the only issue before the court was whether the District Court correctly concluded that NutriSystem’s method of compensating its call-center employees constituted a commission under the FLSA so that Nutrisystem was exempt from paying Appellants overtime. The court concluded that the compensation constituted a commission and affirmed the ruling below.
Describing the pay methodology at issue, the Court said:
“In March 2005, NutriSystem implemented the compensation scheme for sales associates at issue in this case. Under the plan, sales associates receive the greater of either their hourly pay or their flat-rate payments per sale for each pay period. The hourly rate is $10 per hour for the first forty hours per week, and $15 per hour for overtime. The flat rates per sale are $18 for each 28-day program sold via an incoming call during daytime hours, $25 for each 28-day program sold on an incoming call during evening or weekend hours, and $40 for each 28-day program sold on an outbound call or during the overnight shift. These flat rates do not vary based on the cost of the meal plan to the consumer.
The majority of the sales associates are compensated based on these flat rates, not their hourly earnings. Under the compensation plan, sales associates do not receive overtime compensation when they are paid the flat rates for the sales made. There is no change to the flat rates when a sales associate works more than forty hours in one week.”
In affirming the decision that this pay constituted commissions under the FLSA, for the purposes of the 7(i) exemption, the Court reviewed the legislative history of the applicable regulations, the limited case law and the DOL’s opinions and reference materials.
Dissenting, Judge Cowen took issue with the majority’s holding that commissions were proportional to the sales prices of the good sold here. First, Judge Cowen noted:
“Unlike the majority, I would afford Skidmore deference to the Department’s view that in order to constitute a commission for purposes of § 7(I), the amount of compensation paid to the employee must be proportionally related to the amount charged to the customer. Because NutriSystem failed to demonstrate the requisite proportionality, its compensation plan cannot be considered a bona fide commission plan under § 7(I).”
Applying this definition to commissions, Judge Cowen reasoned that here, because the flat rates were not proportional to the products sold, the flat rates did not constitute commissions:
“The majority then concludes that NutriSystem’s compensation plan meets this definition because the payments made to its sales associates are “sufficiently proportional” to the cost to the consumer. Id . While I do not object to the majority’s contention that § 7(I) requires a proportional relationship between employee compensation and customer costs, I cannot agree that NutriSystem has demonstrated such a proportional relationship here.
It is undisputed that NutriSystem’s meal plans vary in price depending on the type of meal plan the customer chooses and the length of the customer’s commitment. It is likewise undisputed that the flat-rate fee paid to a sales associate does not vary depending on the type of plan the customer chooses or the length of the customer’s commitment. NutriSystem clearly has not demonstrated that the flat-rate fees are proportionally related to the cost to the customer. While neither the plaintiffs nor the Department suggests that a commission must be based on a strict percentage of the end cost to the consumer, the flat-rate payments in this case do not correspond at all with the end cost to the consumer. Rather, the flat-rate payments are based on the time the sale is made and whether it results from an incoming or outgoing call. The fact that NutriSystem can perform math to portray its flat-rate fees as percentages of customer costs does not transform the fees into commissions.
Therefore I am unable to agree with the majority and would reverse and remand for further proceedings.”
To read the entire decision and dissent click here.
S.D.Ohio: Hybrid Salary Plus Commissions Plan Violated FLSA, Because Commissions Did Not Comprise More Than 50% Of Wages; 7(i) Exemption Not Applicable
Keyes v. Car-X Auto Services
This case was before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, relative to his FLSA claims. Defendants contended that they were entitled to the exemption from the overtime wage requirement under 7(i) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 207(i), the so-called “Retail Exemption,” because Plaintiff’s regular rate of pay exceeded one and one-half times the minimum wage rate and over half of Plaintiff’s compensation came from commissions earned on the sale of goods and services. The Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion, explaining that Defendants were not entitled to the benefit of 7(i), because they were unable to show that 50% or more of Plaintiff’s income was derived from commissions, as differentiated from salary.
Discussing the elements of the Retail Exemption and applying the exemption to the pay policy at issue, the Court explained, “The parties do not dispute that Defendant Car-X is a retail establishment or that Plaintiff’s regular rate of pay exceeded one and one-half times the minimum wage rate. Thus, the issue before the Court is whether more than one-half of Plaintiff’s compensation consisted of commissions on goods or services.
Federal regulations recognize that employees of retail or service establishments are usually compensated in any one of five ways:
(1) Straight salary or hourly rate: Under this method of compensation the employee receives a stipulated sum paid weekly, biweekly, semimonthly, or monthly or a fixed amount for each hour of work.
(2) Salary plus commission: Under this method of compensation the employee receives a commission on all sales in addition to a base salary (see paragraph (a)(1) of this section).
(3) Quota bonus: This method of compensation is similar to paragraph (a)(2) of this section except that the commission payment is paid on sales over and above a predetermined sales quota.
(4) Straight commission without advances: Under this method of compensation the employee is paid a flat percentage on each dollar of sales he makes.
(5) Straight commission with “advances,” “guarantees,” or “draws.” This method of compensation is similar to paragraph (a) (4) of this section except that the employee is paid a fixed weekly, biweekly, semimonthly, or monthly “advance,” “guarantee,” or “draw.” At periodic intervals a settlement is made at which time the payments already made are supplemented by any additional amount by which his commission earnings exceed the amounts previously paid.29 C.F.R. § 779.413(a).
By definition, each of these compensation plans, except for the “straight salary or hourly rate,” qualify as “bona fide commission plans” under § 207(i). Viciedo v. New Horizons Computer Learning Center of Columbus, LTD, 246 F.Supp.2d 886 (S.D.Ohio 2003).
Under Defendant’s compensation plan, employees were paid the greater of either the commission rate on the total gross sale of services and products attributable to the employee during a given pay period or a “default” guaranteed wage rate, which was calculated by multiplying the employee’s regular hourly rate by the number of hours actually worked in a given pay period. (Deposition of Robert Keyes at 14, 15-16, 101-02, 213-17; Govind Aff. at ¶¶ 10-14, Govind Dep., Ex. 3, Employee Sales/Commission Reports). Car-X did not calculate a setoff or overpayment in weeks in which Plaintiff earned extra for commissions. (Keyes Dep. at 101-102; Govind Dep. at 104-105). While Defendants avoid designating which of the above examples under 29 C.F.R. § 779.413(a) best fits the characteristics of Car-X’s compensation plan, Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ compensation plan is based on a hybrid system and is not a bona fide commission plan under the FLSA. As in Viciedo, we find the present facts remarkably similar to those in Donovan v. Highway Oil Inc., Case No. 81-4245, 1986 WL 11266 at *4 (D.Kan. July 18, 1986), in which that court found the defendant’s compensation plan possessed the characteristics of both a salary plus commission plan and a quota bonus plan. In Donovan, managers of a gas station bringing suit to recover overtime wages allegedly due under the FLSA were paid a set commission for selling a threshold amount of gasoline, and then a small commission for each additional gallon of gasoline sold in excess of the threshold amount. The court found that “the only true commission portion of the salaries appears to be those amounts over the threshold level” and that the amount of said commissions did not meet the requirements of 29 C.F.R. § 207(i) as they did not comprise more than half of the managers’ compensation. Donovan, 1986 WL 11266 at *4. While Defendants argue that all Car-X technicians were paid based on commissions from services and products sold, we find, as did the court in Donovan, that the plan’s operation, as explained by Defendants’ witness and Plaintiff himself, belies such an argument. (See Govind Dep. at 60-62, 65-66, 72; Ex. 3, Employee Sales/Commission Reports; Keyes Dep. at 14, 101-102, 213-17). For this reason, we find that the default guaranteed wage represents a salary and only that amount in excess of such constitutes the true commission portion. Defendant has failed to demonstrate that more than fifty percent of Plaintiff’s compensation for any representative period consists of commissions.”
Accordingly, the Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to his FLSA claim.
N.D.Ga.: “Design Consultant” For Furniture Store, Paid Strictly Commissions, Retail Exempt Under 7(i)
Lee v. Ethan Allen Retail, Inc.
Plaintiff brought this case based on 200-250 hours she claimed to have worked in overtime for Defendant, which she was not paid for. Defendant maintained the Plaintiff was subject to the so-called retail exemption of 7(i). Before the Court was Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the retail exemption issue. The Court granted Defendant’s Motion, holding that Plaintiff was paid under a bona fide commission plan throughout her employment with Defendant, despite the fact that she never received anything other than her bi-weekly draw.
The Court relied on the following facts:
“Defendant Ethan Allen owns and operates Ethan Allen Design Centers (“Design Centers”) throughout the United States. These Design Centers are retail establishments, which sell Ethan Allen home furnishing products. Plaintiff began working as a Design Consultant on August 6, 2006, at Ethan Allen’s Peachtree City, Georgia Design Center. Plaintiff worked as a Design Consultant throughout her employment with Ethan Allen. As a Design Consultant, Plaintiff’s primary job responsibility is selling Ethan Allen home furnishing products. Design Consultants, including Plaintiff, are paid on a commission basis. They are never paid a salary. After an initial two week training period, Plaintiff began making sales and earning commissions. Ethan Allen paid Plaintiff according to its written Design Consultant Compensation Plan (“Compensation Plan”). Pursuant to this Compensation Plan, Design Consultants earn a minimum of 7% commission on net written sales per fiscal month. The commission increases to 8% if the Design Consultant has sales of at least $45,000, 8.5% at $55,000, and 9% at $70,000. Design Consultants earn a commission on every dollar of their sales; there are no caps on the amount of commissions a Design Consultant can earn.
During the first four months of employment, Ethan Allen pays its Design Consultants through a non-recoverable, bi-weekly draw. Every month Ethan Allen reduces the Design Consultant’s commissions by the amount of the draw. The Design Consultant earns commissions on sales that exceed her draw. Because the draw is non-recoverable, Design Consultants do not have to repay Ethan Allen if the amount of their draw exceeds their commissions during the month. After the initial four month period, however, Ethan Allen pays its Design Consultants through a bi-weekly, recoverable draw. Accordingly, if a Design Consultant does not earn enough in commissions to cover the draw, the Design Consultant carries forward a deficit, which she owes to Ethan Allen. Ethan Allen then reduces any deficit from prior months by the amount that her commissions exceeded the draw.
Plaintiff received a bi-weekly draw of approximately $1,100. Although Plaintiff earned commissions that exceeded her draw in four of the fourteen months she was employed at Ethan Allen, she never received an additional commission payment beyond her draw because throughout her employment at Ethan Allen she maintained a cumulative deficit as a result of her failure to earn enough commissions to cover her draw in prior months. When Ethan Allen terminated, Plaintiff she had an accumulated deficit of $4,610.14.”
Discussing the retail exemption, and granting Defendant’s Motion the Court stated, “The retail or service establishment exemption applies where: (1) the employee was employed by a retail or service establishment; (2) the employee’s regular rate of pay was more than one and one-half times the minimum hourly rate; and (3) more than half of the employee’s compensation comes from commissions. 29 U.S.C. § 207(i); 29 C.F.R. § 779.412; see also Schwind v. EW & Assocs. Inc., 371 F. Supp 2d 560, 563 (S.D.N.Y.2005). As the employer, Defendant bears the burden of proving the applicability of this exemption by ” ‘clear and affirmative evidence.’ ” Klinedinst, 260 F.3d at 1254 (quoting Birdwell v. City of Gadsden, 970 F.2d 802, 805 (11th Cir.1992)). Moreover, the Court construes exemptions from the overtime provisions of the FLSA narrowly against the employer. Birdwell, 970 F.2d at 905.
Plaintiff concedes that Defendant is a retail establishment and that her regular rate of pay was in excess of one and one-half times the minimum hourly rate applicable to her, thus satisfying the first two prongs of the test. (Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 5; Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 5.) The dispute in this case centers around the final requirement.
To rely on the retail or service establishment exemption, Defendant must demonstrate that more than half of Plaintiff’s compensation for a representative period of at least one month represents commissions on goods or services. See29 U.S.C. § 207(i).Section 207(i) provides that:
In determining the proportion of compensation representing commissions, all earnings resulting from the application of a bona fide commission rate shall be deemed commissions on goods and services without regard to whether the computed commissions exceed the draw or guarantee.
29 U.S.C. § 207(i) (emphasis added). Accordingly, in determining whether more than half of Plaintiff’s compensation came from commissions, the Court must also determine whether the commissions paid to Plaintiff were the result of “the application of a bona fide commission rate.”Id. Provided that the employer’s compensation plan is a bona fide plan, any compensation calculated as commissions according to the plan will count as commissions, even if the amount of commissions may not equal or exceed the guarantee or draw in some weeks. 29 C.F.R. § 779.416(b); Erichs v. Venator Group, Inc., 128 F. Supp 2d 1255, 1259 (N.D.Cal.2001). Conversely, even where an employer characterizes the entirety of an employee’s earnings as commissions, the employer may not rely on the retail and service establishment exemption unless the commissions are calculated pursuant to a bona fide commission plan. See generally Erichs, 128 F. Supp 2d at 1260 (explaining that “some payment plans that apparently are commission plans on their face may reveal themselves to be something different upon closer inspection.”). Although Ethan Allen categorized 100% of Plaintiff’s earnings as commissions, Plaintiff contends that Ethan Allen cannot demonstrate that more than half of her compensation came from commissions because her earnings did not result from the application of a bona fide commission rate.
Congress did not define the meaning of “bona fide commission rate.” Herman v. Suwannee Sifty Stores, Inc., 19 F. Supp 2d 1365, 1369 (M.D.Ga.1998) (Sands, J.); Erichs, 128 F. Supp 2d at 1259. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “bona fide” as “made in good faith.” BLACKS’S LAW DICTIONARY 186 (8th ed.2004). Courts have applied this definition to the term bona fide commission rate in Section 207(i).See Herman, 19 F. Supp 2d at 1370 (“Congress … provided that to use this commission-based exception, the commission rate must be set in good faith.”). Therefore, “[t]he inquiry is whether the employer set the commission rate in good faith.” Enrichs, 128 F. Supp 2d at 1259.
The Code of Federal Regulations provides two examples of commission rates that are not bona fide. See29 C.F.R. § 779.416(c). First, a commission rate is not bona fide where “the employee, in fact, always or almost always earns the same fixed amount of compensation for each workweek (as would be the case where the computed commissions seldom or never equal or exceed the amount of the draw or guarantee).”Id.Second, an employer’s commission plan is not bona fide where “the employee receives a regular payment constituting nearly his entire earnings which is expressed in terms of a percentage of the sales which the establishment … can always be expected to make with only a slight addition to his wages based upon a greatly reduced percentage applied to the sales above the expected quota.”Id.
These two examples are not exhaustive. See Erichs, 128 F. Supp 2d at 1260. The Court must examine Defendant’s particular commission rate and determine whether the plan is bona fide or set in good faith. As the Court explained in Herman:
Congress did not state that any commission rate was fine … Instead, it limited the exception to ensure employers would create a commission rate in good faith. Since Congress did not specify a definition of ‘bona fide [,]’ … the DOL did so through section 779.416(c). The DOL’s interpretation is consistent with the purpose of passing an exception to overtime by paying commissions. The whole premise behind earning a commission is that the amount of sales would increase the rate of pay. Thus, employees may elect to work more hours so they can increase their sales, and in turn, their earnings. When a commission plan never affects the rate of pay, the purpose behind using a commission rate also fails.
Herman, 19 F. Supp 2d at 1370;
Erichs, 128 F. Supp 2d at 1260. By requiring that a commission rate is bona fide, “Congress apparently envisions a smell test, one that reaches beyond the formal structure of the commission rate and into its actual effects and the purpose behind it.” Erichs, 128 F. Supp 2d at 1260.
The commission rate in this case passes this “smell test.” Defendant set the commission rate in good faith; the commission rate was not a superficial attempt to categorize Plaintiff’s earnings as commissions in order to avoid having to pay her overtime compensation. Cf. Id. at 1260-61 (finding that the defendant’s commission rate plan was not made in good faith because it was an attempt to replicate the prior, “legally nebulous” plan and would not increase sales); Herman, 19 F. Supp 2d at 1372 (holding that store managers who never received more than the guaranteed rate or received more than the guaranteed rate only once a year were not exempt under the retail and service exemption). Plaintiff’s compensation was entirely commission based. She received a commission ranging from 7% to 9% depending on the volume of her sales. Every two weeks, Plaintiff received a recoverable draw. After the initial four months of employment, if Plaintiff did not have enough sales to cover the draw, she went into deficit. Ethan Allen then deducted any earnings from commissions exceeding the draw from this deficit.
Ethan Allen’s compensation plan provided Plaintiff with a meaningful opportunity to elect to work more hours to increase her sales and earnings. Plaintiff’s monthly commissions exceeded her draw four times. Although Defendant used these funds to reduce Plaintiff’s accumulated deficit from prior months, the fact that Plaintiff could exceed her draw by increasing sales demonstrates her ability to impact her compensation by increasing sales. Unlike the example in the Code of Federal Regulations, Plaintiff did not always or almost always earn the same fixed amount each week; Plaintiff’s earnings fluctuated based on the amount of her sales. Because all of Plaintiff’s earnings resulted from the application of a bona fide commission rate, and are commissions within the meaning of Section 207(i), Defendant met its burden of demonstrating that one of the exemptions to the FLSA’s general overtime requirements applies to Plaintiff. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion for Summary Judgment [# 91].”