N.D.Ill.: Tailors Scope Of Representative Discovery In Stage 1 Class Of 522 FLSA Plaintiffs; Plaintiffs Entitled To Protective Order Re: RFAs Served On Entire Class
Russell v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co.
The case was before the Court on Illinois Bell’s motion to compel the depositions of thirty-eight individual plaintiffs and to dismiss three individual plaintiffs. Additionally, plaintiffs moved for a protective order, pertaining to RFAs and RFPs served on every individual Plaintiff, in this 522 person class. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants the motions in part and denies them in part.At the time of the Motions, Defendant had deposed twenty-four plaintiffs. Each side selected twelve of the deponents.
Significantly, Plaintiffs requested a protective order excusing them from responding to requests for admission (RTA) and requests for the production of documents (RFP) propounded by Illinois Bell.
The RTAs were sent to opt-in plaintiffs that had not been deposed. Each set of RTAs is identical containing ten requests. The ten requests essentially ask the plaintiff to admit that Illinois Bell did not violate her FLSA rights (e.g., “Admit that you did not perform any work on behalf of Defendant without compensation after the end of your scheduled shift.”). Pls.’ Mot for a Protective Order at 4-5. Each of the ten requests is a variation pertaining to a different alleged violation of the FLSA. In granting Plaintiffs a protective order pertaining to the RFAs and requiring them to answer the RFPs, the Court reasoned:
“District courts have broad discretion over matters relating to discovery. E.g., Patterson v. Avery Dennison Corp., 281 F.3d 676, 681 (7th Cir.2002); Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(2). The Court agrees with plaintiffs that the responding to the RTAs would be unduly burdensome based on the circumstances of this case. As noted above, Illinois Bell is entitled to depose a reasonable and sufficient number of opt-in plaintiffs. Requiring the plaintiffs to respond to hundreds of RTAs, however, is unreasonable and will not advance the ball in this litigation. It is fair to assume that each plaintiff will deny the RTAs that pertain to her FLSA claim, leaving Illinois Bell without any additional information regarding similarities or dissimilarities among the class members. Conversely, requiring plaintiffs to respond to the RTAs would impose a significant burden on them and an enormous burden on their counsel, and it would defeat the purpose of utilizing representative discovery in FLSA class actions. E.g., Adkins, 143 F.R.D. at 174.
The RFPs were sent to opt-in plaintiffs who had not been previously been served with written discovery. They consist of four narrowly drawn requests for documents that would support or refute the particular plaintiff’s FLSA claims. The RFPs are more likely to yield relevant evidence than the RTAs. For example, disclosure regarding whether a plaintiff kept notes of when she allegedly worked overtime without appropriate compensation might be probative of whether such conduct actually occurred or the extent of it. Additionally, disclosure regarding whether a plaintiff possesses documents she contends required her to work overtime without compensation might be probative whether such a policy actually existed regarding or the whether plaintiff misinterpreted some policy of directive of Illinois Bell.
Moreover, certain actions by plaintiffs’ counsel have elevated the importance of the RFPs. During the deposition of one opt-in plaintiff, that deponent made reference to a document she contended Illinois Bell provided that informed her she would not be paid if she logged off of her phone. Plaintiffs’ counsel had not produced this document before the deposition, contending it was not responsive to a document request. Plaintiffs respond that the disclosures they made pursuant to Rule 26(a)(1) obviate the need for individual RFPs. The actions of plaintiffs’ counsel, however, undermine that contention.”
The Court concluded, “Illinois Bell’s RFPs are narrowly tailored, seek relevant information, and will not impose an undue burden on plaintiffs. Accordingly, the Court denies plaintiffs’ motion for a protective order regarding the RFPs.”
9th Cir. Seeks Clarification From California Supreme Court Re: Proper Classification Of Pharmaceutical Sales Reps
On May 5, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals certified the question of exempt status (under California state law) of pharmaceutical sales representatives to the California Supreme Court.
The 9th Circuit asked for guidance from the California Supreme Court to determine two issues, pertaining to the oft-litigated issues of whether Pharmaceutical Sales Reps are outside sales exempt and/or administrative exempt under those so-called exemptions in the California Wage and Hour law, which is similar to the FLSA. The first question focuses on whether or not pharmaceutical representatives fall within the “outside sales exemption.” The other question focuses on the administrative exemption and whether or not application is applicable to the pharmaceutical sales reps at issue as well.
Pharmaceutical sales reps across the country will be watching this and other key cases in the months to come. If you worked as a pharmaceutical sales rep within the last 3 years, you may may entitled to overtime pay which was incorrectly denied to you, if you worked more than 40 hours per week.
Call 1-888-OVERTIME or visit http://www.overtimeadvocate.com to learn more about your overtime rights today.
Class Conditionally Certified In Centex Unpaid Overtime Case
Odem v. Centex Homes
A federal judge has granted conditional certification to a nationwide class of “Field Managers” in an overtime wage suit against Centex Homes Inc. that could include as many as 3,500 opt-in plaintiffs. Centex “Field Managers” can find out more about the case by contacting class attorneys Morgan & Morgan at 1-866-344-9243.
A copy of the Order certifying the class can be found at Odem v. Centex Homes
M.D.Ga.: Settlement Agreements Entered Into Without Benefit Of Counsel Not Binding; Defendant’s Motion To Dismiss Denied
Dowling v. Athens Ahmed Family Restaurant, Inc.
Plaintiffs April Dowling, William Smith, and Debra Scott initiated this action against Defendants, seeking to recover minimum wage and overtime compensation allegedly withheld from them by Defendants in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. After filing the lawsuit, all three Plaintiffs terminated their relationship with legal counsel, received money from Defendants in an attempt to satisfy their FLSA claims, and expressed disinterest in continuing the litigation. Therefore, Defendants contended that all three Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendants should be dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, opposed the dismissal of any FLSA claims and request that the Court not approve any alleged settlements. Before the Court were: (1) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice April Dowling’s Claims against Defendants and Approve Settlement Agreement between Dowling and Defendants (Doc. 37, hereinafter Mot. to Dismiss Dowling) and (2) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Debra Scott’s and William Smith’s Claims against Defendants (Doc. 38, hereinafter Mot. to Dismiss Scott & Smith). For the following reasons, Defendants’ motions are denied.
The Court denied Defendant’s Motion to dismiss applying the framework from Lynn’s Foods, requiring the Plaintiffs to return any money received under the “settlements.” Interestingly, the Court did note, that if the Plaintiffs failed to return the money paid to them, it would revisit the Motion to Dismiss:
“Since these claims remain pending for adjudication or proper settlement, the Court orders Plaintiffs Dowling, Smith and Scott to return any money paid to them by Defendants in the attempted settlement of their claims if they have not already done so. That money shall be returned to Defendants within 21 days of the date of this Order. If that money is not returned as ordered, the Court will reconsider its decision not to dismiss these Plaintiffs’ claims.”
E.D.Pa.: Time Spent Going Through Security And Walking From Security To Perform Production Work Not Compensable; Excluded By Portal-to-Portal Act
Sleiman v. DHL Express
This case was before the Court on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, based on its claims that certain activities that were the subject of Plaintiff’s “off-the-clock” claims were not compensable as a matter of law. In granting Defendant’s Motion, the Court addressed each of the the three types of activity in turn and found all three excluded by the Portal-to-Portal Act as pre- and/or postliminary in nature and not compensable “work” activity.
Defendant DHL Express operates a mail sorting facility in Breinigsville, Pennsylvania, and employs about 400 sorters, yard jockeys, and others. Plaintiff is a mail worker and seeks to represent Mail Workers who have been employed by Defendant during the past three years. It was undisputed that Defendant has paid Plaintiff and prospective class members for the time that they engage in actual production activities. Pursuant to Defendant’s internal policy, Class Members are randomly selected on a daily basis to proceed through a security screening before clocking in and after clocking out. Class Members are not compensated for time spent waiting for the security screening process or for time spent clearing the security process. Class Members are also not compensated for the time it takes for them to walk from the entrance to the time clock at Defendant’s facility and the time it takes to walk from the time clock to the exit.
Plaintiff brought a two-count complaint, alleging violations of the FLSA and WPCL. Plaintiff alleged that failure to compensate Class Members for the following three activities was a violation of these statutes: (1) waiting in line to go through security screening before entering and exiting Defendant’s facility; (2) participating in the security screening itself; and (3) walking between the security screening area and time clocks where Mail Workers clock in and out. Plaintiff seeks an award of damages in the form of reimbursement for unpaid wages, costs and attorneys fees, and other equitable relief.
Citing to several cases, as well as the Portal-to-Portal Act itself, the Court granted Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.
S.D.N.Y.: Despite Evidence Of Good Faith, Court Constrained By Jury’s Finding Of Willfulness As To Defendants’ FLSA Violation; Liquidated Damages Due
Scott v. City of New York
Over fifteen thousand current and former New York City police officers and detectives (Plaintiffs) asserted that the City of New York and the New York City Police Department (“Defendants”) systematically violated plaintiffs’ overtime rights under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). This lawsuit addressed the policies and practices of the nation’s largest police department, and plaintiffs claim hundreds of millions of dollars in damages based on defendants’ alleged failures concerning the accrual, use, and payment of overtime. Before the Court was the issue of whether defendants may be relieved from the FLSA’s liquidated damages provision on account of a good faith attempt to comply with the statute. Although evaluating the evidence presented by the Defendants of good faith, the Court noted that it was bound to find a willful violation, based on the juries prior finding of willfulness:
“If this Court were free to determine independently whether defendants acted in good faith, I would address evidence presented at trial concerning defendants’ consultation of in-house lawyers and outside counsel, along with other compliance efforts. However, the Second Circuit has squarely held-along with the majority of other Circuit that a district court may not find good faith after a jury has concluded that the employer willfully violated the FLSA. Therefore, I decline to find that defendants acted in good faith and hold that plaintiffs are entitled to liquidated damages in equal amount to compensatory damages resulting from the chart claim and the regular rate claim.”
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