Home » Arbitration (Page 2)
Category Archives: Arbitration
W.D.Wisc.: Loan Officers Compelled to Arbitrate FLSA Claims, But Class Waiver Stricken In Light of D.R. Horton
Herrington v. Waterstone Mortgage Corp.
In this proposed collective action, the plaintiff sought to pursue a collective action on behalf of defendant’s loan officers, seeking unpaid overtime wages under the FLSA. As discussed here, the defendant moved to to dismiss or stay the case on the ground that plaintiff’s claims were subject to an arbitration agreement. Significantly, while the court enforced the arbitration agreement and remanded the case to arbitration, it struck the purported class waiver portion of the arbitration agreement in light of the recent holding in In re D.R. Horton, Inc.
The specific language at issue was the following language from the parties’ agreement to arbitrate:
“[A]ny dispute between the parties concerning the wages, hours, working conditions, terms, rights, responsibilities or obligations between them or arising out of their employment relationship shall be resolved through binding arbitration in accordance with the rules of the American Arbitration Association applicable to employment claims. Such arbitration may not be joined with or join or include any claims by any persons not party to this Agreement. Except as otherwise set forth herein, the parties will share equally in the cost of arbitration.”
After discussing a litany of cases from the NLRB holding that claims for unpaid wages by workers represent concerted activity, the court discussed the ramifications of the recent D.R. Horton case and held that the class action waiver here was unenforceable. In so doing the court addressed and rejected defendant’s arguments as to why D.R. Horton should not be applied to the case. Specifically, the court rejected defendant’s arguments that: (1) D.R. Horton (and the NLRA) only protect “employees,” and not “former employees” such as plaintiff; (2) an employee can bring about the same changes in the workplace pursuing an individual claim as he or she can pursuing a claim collectively with other employees; and (3) D.R. Horton impermissibly conflicts with AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion.
However, because the court held that the class waiver provision was severable from the arbitration agreement, the court severed the waiver and remanded the case to arbitration, potentially as a collective action.
Click Herrington v. Waterstone Mortgage Corp. to read the entire Opinion and Order.
Thanks to Dan Getman for the heads up on this recent decision.
2 New Decisions Regarding Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements in Context of FLSA Claims Reach Opposite Results
Recent weeks have brought more opinions regarding the issue of whether specific arbitration agreements are enforceable. However, as two recent opinions show, these decisions continue to be fact-specific in virtually all instances, and judge and/or state-law specific in others. In the first case, Carey v. 24 Hour Fitness USA Inc., relying on Texas state law, the Fifth Circuit affirmed a lower court’s decision holding that an arbitration agreement allowing the employer to unilaterally change the terms lacked the necessary consideration to render the agreement enforceable. In a second case, LaVoice v. UBS Financial Services, Inc., a court within the Southern District of New York examined a different arbitration-related issue- the substantive unconscionability of a collective action waiver- concluding that compelling a potentially high value FLSA claim to arbitration on an individual basis does not conflict with the substantive law regarding the FLSA’s collective action provisions. Significantly, the court’s conclusion in this regard appears to conflict with another recent holding discussed here, in which another court within the same district held that collective action waivers are unenforceable per se, because they prevent employees from vindicating their substantive statutory rights under the FLSA.
Carey v. 24 Hour Fitness USA Inc.
Law360 aptly summarized this decision as follows:
“The Fifth Circuit on Wednesday allowed a proposed overtime class action against 24 Hour Fitness USA Inc. to go forward, finding an arbitration agreement at issue contained an ‘escape hatch’ for the fitness chain that made it unenforceable.
In a unanimous, published opinion, the appeals court upheld a Texas federal court’s ruling that the arbitration agreement in 24 Hour Fitness’ employee handbook was illusory because it allowed the company to retroactively modify or terminate the agreement.
Because 24 Hour Fitness reserved the right to unilaterally adjust the conditions of employment — including those which required employees to arbitrate claims on an individual basis — the appeals court found that the arbitration agreement was invalid from the outset.
‘If a 24 Hour Fitness employee sought to invoke arbitration with the company pursuant to the agreement, nothing would prevent 24 Hour Fitness from changing the agreement and making those changes applicable to that pending dispute if it determined that arbitration was no longer in its interest,’ the panel said.
Click Carey v. 24 Hour Fitness USA Inc. to read the entire Fifth Circuit Opinion.
LaVoice v. UBS Financial Services, Inc.
In LaVoice, the court held that an arbitration agreement, requiring individual arbitration was enforceable, despite plaintiff’s argument that such an scheme would deprive plaintiff of substantive statutory rights to proceed collectively under the FLSA. Discussing the issue, the court reasoned:
“…LaVoice also argues that the arbitration agreements between him and UBS are unenforceable because they would preclude him from exercising his statutory rights. To support this position, LaVoice likens the class waivers in the instant case with those that were found unenforceable in the Amex line of cases. LaVoice also draws comparison between his circumstances and those of the plaintiff in Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP, 768 F.Supp.2d 547 (S.D.N.Y.2011).
The enforceability of a class action waiver in an arbitration agreement must be considered on a case-by-case basis “on its own merits, governed with a healthy regard for the fact that the FAA is a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.” Amex II, 634 F.3d at 199. Turning to the class waiver at issue and LaVoice’s specific circumstances, this Court finds that the “practical effect of enforcement of the waiver” in the instant case would not “preclude” LaVoice from exercising his rights under the statutes. Id. at 196. The Court comes to its finding that LaVoice’s statutory rights will not be precluded by enforcement of the class waiver after reviewing his submissions regarding: his estimated damages claim, his estimated attorneys’ fees, his estimated expert fees, his disinclination to pursue his claims individually, his counsel’s disinclination to pursue the claims individually, and his likelihood of success at arbitration.
Although LaVoice and Defendants contest the value of LaVoice’s overtime claim, in reaching its decision, the Court accepts the figure cited in LaVoice’s own opposition papers of overtime claims between $127,000 to $132,000. Aff. Jeffrey G. Smith in Supp. of Opp’n. to Mot. to Compel Arbitration at ¶ 5. Assuming this self-reported value of claims, the Court finds that LaVoice’s circumstances differ drastically on their face from those of the plaintiffs in either the Amex line of cases or Sutherland. Plaintiffs in those cases could each only claim de minimus damages of less than $6000.
With respect to the estimated attorneys’ fees, the Court finds that, unlike the arbitration agreement at issue in Sutherland, the arbitration agreements at issue in the instant case would permit LaVoice to recover an award of attorneys’ fees. Since the agreements authorize the arbitrator(s) to “award whatever remedies would be available to the parties in a court of law” and awards of attorneys’ fees are mandatory for the prevailing party under the FLSA, the agreements themselves crate no impediment to LaVoice’s recovery of fees. See Ex. 6 to Decl. of Matthew Levitan at 20; Ex. 10 to Decl. of Matthew Levitan at 3; and 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (“The court in such action shall … allow a reasonable attorney’s fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the action.”) The instant case is therefore distinguishable from Sutherland and its consideration of attorneys’ fees in determining whether plaintiff’s claims were unarbitrable. See also Banus v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., No. 09–7128, 2010 WL 1643780, at *10 n. 61 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.23, 2010) (enforcing class action waiver in arbitration agreement where plaintiff’s estimated recovery was $45,675.36 and attorney’s fees would be “at least $100,000.”)
The court also evaluated and rejected plaintiff’s claim that expert costs to be incurred would be prohibitive in an individual claim, whereas spreading the cost over a collective group would be more palatable and rejected same, in the context of plaintiff’s proffered argument that his counsel would be disinclined to pursue his claims on an individual basis by themselves.
The court concluded, “[i]n light of the foregoing, the Court finds that LaVoice has not met his “burden of showing the likelihood of incurring” such “prohibitively expensive” costs such that the class waiver provisions in the instant action would preclude him from bringing his claims against Defendants in an individual or collective capacity. Amex II, 634 F.3d at 197 (citing Randolph, 531 U.S. at 92.)”
Click LaVoice v. UBS Financial Services, Inc. to read the entire Memorandum and Order compelling the case to arbitration on an individual basis.
As more and more cases are decided following recent United States Supreme Court jurisprudence on arbitrability and class waiver issues, it’s becoming more and more clear that the results are very fact-specific to each case. Hopefully, higher courts will begin to weigh in on some of the broader issues and give some clarity in the near future.
D.Minn.: Where Agreement Silent As to Collective Action, Case May Proceed on Collective Basis in Arbitration
Mork v. Loram Maintenance of Way, Inc.
This case was before the court on the defendant’s motion to compel arbitration on an individual basis. While, the parties were in agreement that the case should be remanded to arbitration, the salient issue before the court was whether the arbitration agreement- silent on the issue of collective/class proceedings- allowed for collective treatment of the case. The court held that the parties had agreed to collective treatment of claims by the agreement’s silence. Thus, the case was remanded to arbitration, but to be treated as a collective action.
Initially the court held that, based on the absence of clear authority one way or another from the Supreme Court, the court had the authority to decide whether the case could proceed on a collective basis. Having made this decision, it proceeded into its analysis.
Discussing the standard it would apply, the court explained:
“The scope of an arbitration agreement is determined with reference to the agreement of the parties as evidenced by the terms of “the arbitration agreement itself or [based on] some background principle of contract law that would affect its interpretation.” See AT & T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1750 (2011). The Court must “give effect to the contractual rights and expectations of the parties.” Stolt–Nielsen, 130 S.Ct. at 1774 (citation omitted); see Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler–Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985) (“as with any other contract, the parties’ intentions control”). Imposition of a particular type of arbitration cannot be based solely “on policy judgments.” Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. at 1750. Like any contract dispute, however, ambiguities in the agreement must be construed against the drafter. See, e.g., Advantage Consulting Group, Ltd. v. ADT Sec. Sys., Inc., 306 F.3d 582, 588 (8th Cir.2002).
In facing the question of whether to compel collective versus individual arbitration, the Court must therefore determine what the parties agreed to in the Arbitration Clause. A mere agreement to arbitrate, without more, does not imply agreement to collective arbitration. Cf. Stolt–Nielsen, 130 S.Ct. at 1775. This approach is consistent with Eighth Circuit precedent in the context of class arbitrations, Dominium Austin Partners, L.L.C. v. Emerson, 248 F.3d 720, 728–29 (8th Cir.2001), and consolidation of individual arbitrations, Baesler v. Cont’l Grain Co., 900 F.2d 1193, 1195 (8th Cir.1990). In Emerson and Baesler, the Eighth Circuit held that an arbitration agreement must provide for the type of arbitration which is sought to be compelled by the Court.
Loram urges a restrictive reading of Baesler, Emerson, and Stolt–Nielsen which would require explicit reference to, and acceptance of, collective arbitration in order for Mork’s claim to proceed on a collective basis. Those cases do not stand for such a strict standard. In Stolt–Nielsen, the Supreme Court’s statement that an intention to authorize class arbitration cannot be “infer[red] solely from the fact of the parties’ agreement to arbitrate,” Stolt–Nielsen, 130 S.Ct. at 1775 (emphasis added), indicates that such an intention may be inferred and need not be explicitly stated. The majority in Stolt–Nielsen therefore “[did] not insist on express consent to class arbitration.” Id. at 1783 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Accordingly, “Stolt–Nielsen does not foreclose the possibility that parties may reach an ‘implicit’—rather than express—‘agreement to authorize class-action arbitration.’ “ Jock v. Sterling Jewelers Inc., 646 F.3d 113, 123 (2d Cir.2011); see Jones v. St. Paul Cos ., Inc., 495 F.3d 888, 893 (8th Cir.2007) (“[F]ederal courts are bound by the Supreme Court’s considered dicta almost as firmly as by the Court’s outright holdings, particularly when … [the dicta] is of recent vintage and not enfeebled by any [later] statement.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
In sum, the question before the Court is not whether the Arbitration Clause used the precise words “collective arbitration.” Rather, the Court must determine whether the Arbitration Clause evinces sufficient indicia of agreement between the parties that a claim within its scope may proceed on a collective basis. In doing so, the Court must keep in mind that Loram drafted the language of the Arbitration Clause and, therefore, that ambiguities must be construed against it. Advantage Consulting, 306 F.3d at 588.
The Court notes that the test from Stolt–Nielsen stated here may be more stringent that the appropriate test for contracts of adhesion. See Stolt–Nielsen, 130 S.Ct. at 1783 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court apparently spares from its affirmative-authorization requirement contracts of adhesion presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.”). Because the Court concludes that the Arbitration Clause does affirmatively authorize collective arbitration, there is no need to address whether the CAA was a contract of adhesion and therefore subject to a less stringent standard. The Court notes, however, that the parties here, unlike those in Stolt–Nielsen, are not both “sophisticated business entities” with comparable bargaining power, see id. at 1775, and the CAA appears to have been a “take-it-or-leave-it” boilerplate contract.”
The court then applied its standard and held that the silence of the parties on the collective issue demonstrated the indicia that the parties agreed to collective arbitration:
“While the parties distinguish between “express” and “implied” agreement to collective arbitration, as discussed above, the relevant question is whether there exists sufficient indicia that the parties agreed to undertake collective arbitration in the event of an employment dispute. While the Arbitration Clause does not refer explicitly to collective claims, the Court concludes that it does authorize such claims to proceed before an arbitrator.
To begin, the Arbitration Clause applies to “claims or disputes of any nature arising out of or relating to the employment relationship” and “statutory claims … arising out of or resulting from [Mork’s] employment with Loram.” (CAA ¶ 8 (emphasis added).) Mork’s claim that he and similarly situated coworkers were deprived of overtime pay is undisputedly related to “the employment relationship” and his FLSA claim is “statutory.” An action arising from FLSA violations “may be maintained against any employer … in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction by any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated.” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (emphasis added). Thus, Mork has a statutory right to bring a FLSA claim on behalf of himself and similarly situated Field Application Technicians, and such a claim arises out of his employment relationship with Loram.
Loram contends that Mork’s ability to bring a claim on behalf of similarly situated employees is foreclosed because the Arbitration Clause’s references to potential arbitral parties include only Loram and Mork. For example, the Arbitration Clause provides that the arbitrator will have “exclusive authority to resolve any dispute or claim relating to, arising out of, or resulting from my employment with Loram” and the “statutory claims” covered by the Arbitration Clause are those “arising out of or resulting from my employment with Loram or the formation or the termination of my employment with Loram.” (CAA ¶ 8 (emphasis added).) These statements, Loram argues, show that the Arbitration Clause does not authorize collective arbitrations.
The Court is not persuaded that the Arbitration Clause’s particular reference to disputes between Mork and Loram must be read to preclude a collective claim. Mork’s FLSA claim is no less a claim “arising out of [his] employment with Loram” because it implicates similarly situated employees. The FLSA claim remains “his.” Viewed in even the most charitable light, Loram’s argument only creates some amount of ambiguity in the Arbitration Clause—ambiguity that must be resolved in Mork’s favor. Advantage Consulting, 306 F.3d at 588.
The conclusion that the Arbitration Clause permits collective arbitration is also supported by the contrast between its broad delegation of “any claims and disputes” to arbitration and its exclusion of only “claims or disputes [arising out of the CAA], or the breach, termination or invalidity thereof.” (CAA ¶ 8.) By negative implication, collective arbitration—a type of arbitration not expressly excluded—can be presumed to be covered by the wide ranging terms of the Arbitration Clause, particularly in light of the factors already discussed.
The Court further notes that the Arbitration Clause provides that arbitration be conducted in accordance with model rules provided by the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) “in force at the time of the claim or dispute” and that the AAA “shall administer any such arbitration.” (CAA ¶ 8.) The AAA’s “Policy on Class Arbitrations” states that the AAA will “administer demands for class arbitration … if (1) the underlying agreement specifies that disputes arising out of the parties’ agreement shall be resolved by arbitration in accordance with any of the Association’s rules, and (2) the agreement is silent with respect to class claims, consolidation or joinder of claims.” See American Arbitration Association, Policy on Class Arbitrations, July 14, 2005, available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=25967. Even as interpreted by Loram, the Arbitration Clause in this case satisfies both criteria.
While this AAA policy was promulgated after the execution of the Arbitration Clause, the parties here agreed to be bound by the AAA rules in force “at the time of the claim or dispute.” (CAA ¶ 8.) The parties thus intended to be bound by future iterations of those rules. Loram’s decision to follow and abide by AAA rules therefore lends further support to the Court’s conclusion that the Arbitration Clause authorizes collective arbitration.
It is important to note that Mork has not moved the Court to consolidate otherwise independent actions into a single proceeding as was the case in Baesler, 900 F.3d at 1194–95. Rather, Mork seeks to proceed with a single, statutorily prescribed collective claim. Consolidation is a method by which a Court may efficiently resolve otherwise legally independent claims which happen to share a common question of law or fact. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 42(a). A FLSA collective action, in contrast, is a mechanism in which one claim can vindicate the rights of many. If Mork were seeking consolidated treatment of independent claims brought by employees, the Court would hesitate in considering those claims as “arising out of or resulting from [Mork’s] employment with Loram.” (See CAA ¶ 8.)
The Court also notes that some of the concerns raised by the Supreme Court about class arbitration are not present in the sort of collective arbitration sought by Mork. For one, a FLSA collective action is unlike a class action under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because similarly situated employees must always “opt-in” to a FLSA action. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Worries about an arbitrator “adjudicat[ing] the rights of absent parties” without affording them the full panoply of protections provided in court are therefore greatly diminished. See Stolt–Nielsen, 130 S.Ct. at 1776.
Finally, while fully cognizant that policy judgments may not be dispositive in this legal analysis, see Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. at 1750, the Court would be remiss if it did not briefly address the consequences of adopting a rule that an arbitration agreement cannot allow for collective or class arbitration except where the agreement explicitly uses and ratifies those precise terms. Such a rule would lead to great uncertainty, calling into question the countless arbitration agreements that have been executed in the shadow of a less stringent rule. Moreover, the adoption of such a rule would likely prevent the vindication of workers’ basic rights under the FLSA. See Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP, 768 F.Supp.2d 547, 553–54 (S.D.N.Y.2011).”
Click Mork v. Loram Maintenance of Way, Inc. to read the entire Memorandum of Law and Order.
M.D.Tenn.: Contractual Limitation of FLSA Claims to One Year SOL Unenforceable; Provision Severed and Arb Agreement Enforced
Pruiett v. West End Restaurants, LLC
Before the court in this putative collective action were the defendants’ motion to dismiss and remand the case to arbitration, as well as plaintiffs’ motion to conditionally certify the case as a collective action. As discussed here, the court held that the provision within the arbitration agreement purporting to reduce the applicable statute of limitations to one year (from either two or three years) was unenforceable. However, because the court further held that the unenforceable provision was severable, it severed the statute of limitations provision and otherwise held the arbitration agreement to be enforceable. Thus, it remanded the case to arbitration after striking the unenforceable provision.
After reviewing a history of applicable case law and determining that the enforceability of the provision in question was an issue of first impression, the court reasoned that allowing an employer to contractually shorten the statute of limitations applicable to FLSA claims would unduly abridge the statutory rights granted under the FLSA. The court explained:
“The FLSA requires employers to pay their employees a statutory minimum wage and to pay overtime compensation at a rate not less than one and one-half times the employees’ regular rate of pay. 29 U.S.C. §§ 206 and 207 (2011). An employer who fails to comply with these provisions is liable for the unlawfully withheld compensation, as well as an additional equal amount of liquidated damages. Id. at § 216(b). These damages, including liquidated damages, are compensatory. Elwell v. Univ. Hosp. Home Care Servs., 276 F.3d 832, 840 (6th Cir.2002).
A plaintiff seeking to recover under the FLSA must file the claim within two years of accrual of the cause of action, or within three years of accrual for a willful violation. 29 U.S.C. § 255(a) (2011). Each paycheck that fails to include required wages constitutes a separate statutory violation. See Archer v. Sullivan Cnty., Nos. 95–5214, 95–5215, 129 F.3d 1263, 1997 WL 720406, at *2 (6th Cir.1997). The plaintiff may recover compensatory damages under § 216(b) as far back as the statute of limitations will reach—that is, the plaintiff may recover up to two years of compensatory damages if the violation was not willful, and up to three years of compensatory damages if the violation was willful, dating back from the date of the complaint. See, e.g., Campbell v. Kelly, No. 3:09–cv–435, 2011 WL 3862019, at *10 (S.D.Ohio Aug.31, 2011) (finding that, where plaintiff filed FLSA claims on November 16, 2009, the plaintiff could seek relief dating back to November 17, 2007 for a non-willful violation, or back to November 17, 2006 for a willful violation); Sisk v. Sara Lee Corp., 590 F.Supp.2d 1001, 1004 (W.D.Tenn.2008) (finding that where plaintiff filed FLSA claims on May 7, 2007, the “relevant time period” for willful violations began on May 7, 2004); Herman v. Palo Grp. Foster Home, Inc., 976 F.Supp. 696, 700, 705–06 (W.D.Mich.1997) (finding that defendant willfully violated FLSA and awarding back wages and liquidated damages for period of three years prior to filing of complaint), aff’d, 183 F.3d 468 (6th Cir.1999) (upholding damages award). Thus, under the FLSA, a plaintiff’s substantive right to full compensation is determined by the statute of limitations. As a consequence, unlike the federal statutory claims at issue in Morrison, Daimler–Chrysler, and Ray, shortening the statute of limitations for an FLSA claim necessarily precludes a successful plaintiff from receiving full compensatory recovery under the statute.
Indeed, BrickTop’s does not dispute that enforcing the contractual limitations provision would limit the Plaintiffs to one year of compensatory damages recovery, even though the FLSA entitles Plaintiffs to more. Thus, Defendants concede that the provision prevents plaintiffs from recovering the “full panoply” of compensatory remedies to which the FLSA entitles them. That is not a permissible result. Plaintiffs’ substantive right to full compensation under the FLSA may not be bargained away. Accordingly, the contractual limitations provision is unenforceable as to FLSA claims.
In reaching this holding, the court has undertaken the necessary statute-specific analysis that neither the Boaz court nor the Wineman court conducted. In Wineman, which was issued before the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Penn Plaza limited Barrentine to its facts, the district court found that a six-month contractual limitations provision in an employment agreement was not enforceable as to FLSA claims. Wineman, 352 F.Supp.2d at 821–23. The defendant had argued, as BrickTop’s does here, that waiver of the FLSA statute of limitations constituted waiver of a procedural right, not a substantive right. Id. at 922. The court rejected this argument, reasoning that, “in light of the public policy implications, … that is a distinction without a difference.” Id. In support of this reasoning, the court relied on Barrentine for the proposition that even FLSA procedural rights, including the right to the judicial forum, could not be abridged, compromised, or waived by private agreement. Id. at 823. Thus, the court characterized the shortened limitations period as “a compromise of employees’ rights under the FLSA” in violation of public policy. Id. at 822–23. It did not analyze whether the shortened statute of limitations affected FLSA remedies, likely based on its assumption that Barrentine rendered that inquiry irrelevant.
In Boaz, the district court enforced a six-month contractual limitation on FLSA claims, but, like Wineman, did not analyze whether that limitation affected FLSA remedies. In Boaz, the plaintiff had asserted claims under Title VII for race and gender discrimination, as well as FLSA claims for pay discrimination and failure to pay overtime compensation. Id. at 932. At the summary judgment stage, the plaintiff, relying on Wineman, contended that her FLSA claims were not time-barred by a six-month limitations provision in her employment agreement. The court declined to follow Wineman, reasoning that the subsequent Penn Plaza decision limited Barrentine to its facts, and found that federal statutory procedural rights may be abridged. Id. The court observed that several courts had found that limitations provisions were enforceable as to other federal statutes, including discrimination claims under § 1981, ERISA claims, and FMLA claims. Id. at 933. It is also noted that, as a general matter, statutes of limitations are procedural, not substantive. Id. However, without any analysis specific to the FLSA, the court summarily concluded that the FLSA statute of limitations is procedural and, therefore, waivable.
Thus, although Boaz and Wineman reached differing conclusions about the enforceability of a contractual limitation on FLSA claims, neither reached the crucial inquiry presented here. In particular, the reasoning in Boaz is flawed for two reasons. First, the Boaz court misinterpreted Penn Plaza, which merely held that statutory claims may be arbitrated, but did not address whether the statute of limitations for any federal statute—let alone the FLSA—constituted a waivable right. Second, the court should not have concluded that the FLSA statute of limitations was purely “procedural” without assessing whether enforcing a shortened limitation on FLSA claims prevented successful plaintiffs from vindicating their substantive right to full compensation.”
Click Pruiett v. West End Restaurants, LLC to read the entire Memorandum and Order.
S.D.Cal.: Although Arbitration Agreement With Class Waiver Enforceable, Confidentiality Provision Stricken as Unconscionable Because Overbroad
Grabowski v. Robinson
This case was before the court on defendant’s motion to compel arbitration on an individual (rather than class) basis. Although the court noted that plaintiffs were required to sign the arbitration agreement contained in their compensation agreements, under threat of forfeiture of commissions, the court held that did not make the agreement unenforceable as entered into under duress. The court also, in large part, dismissed other arguments regarding the substantive and procedural unconscionability of the agreement. However, as discussed here, the court held that the confidentiality provision which barred any discussion of the litigation without the other party’s consent to be far too broad.
Discussing the confidentiality provision the court stated:
“Plaintiff contends: ‘[T]he Defendant’s rules impose confidentiality which unfairly favors Defendant. While arbitration normally is not open to the public, the Defendant’s rules go much further. Defendant’s rules require that the record of the proceedings be confidential under threat of a sanction order by the arbitrator.’
The Employment Dispute Mediation/Arbitration Procedure contains a provision entitled, “Confidentiality,” which states:
All aspects of the arbitration, including without limitation, the record of the proceeding, are confidential and shall not be open to the public, except (a) to the extent both Parties agree otherwise in writing, (b) as may be appropriate in any subsequent proceedings by the Parties, or (c) as may otherwise be appropriate in response to a governmental agency or legal process, provided that the Party upon whom such process is served shall give immediate notice of such process to the other Party and afford the other Party an appropriate opportunity to object to such process.
At the request of a Party or upon his or her initiative, the Arbitrator shall issue protective orders appropriate to the circumstances and shall enforce the confidentiality of the arbitration as set forth in this article.
In Davis, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated that, under California law, “[c]onfidentiality by itself is not substantively unconscionable,” but the employer’s “confidentiality clause … is written too broadly” and “unconscionably favors [the employer],” when the clause at issue “would prevent an employee from contacting other employees to assist in litigating (or arbitrating) an employee’s case.” Davis, 485 F.3d at 1078–79 (“The clause precludes even mention to anyone ‘not directly involved in the mediation or arbitration’ of ‘the content of the pleadings, papers, orders, hearings, trials, or awards in the arbitration’ or even ‘the existence of a controversy and the fact that there is a mediation or an arbitration proceeding.’ ”). In this case, the confidentiality provision in the Employment Dispute Mediation/Arbitration Procedure is broader than what the court in Davis indicated would be conscionable. Cf. id. at 1079 (noting that “[t]he parties to any particular arbitration, especially in an employment dispute, can always agree to limit availability of sensitive employee information (e.g., social security numbers or other personal identifier information) or other issue-specific matters, if necessary”).
The Court finds that the confidentiality provision in the arbitration agreement is substantively unconscionable under California law.”
While courts- seemingly bound by a recent slew of employer/arbitration-friendly decisions from the Supreme Court- continue to compel arbitration and enforce class and collective action provisions contained in arbitration agreements, this decision seems somewhat in line with the remedial nature of the FLSA and related state wage and hour laws. One way employees and their counsel can try to even the playing field might be to seek court-approved notice of pending litigation, notwithstanding the inability to proceed as a class/collective action. Notifying other employees of existing litigation (and their rights to be paid in accordance with wage and hour laws) would certainly be in line with the remedial purposes of the FLSA and related state wage and hour laws. In any event, the court’s holding that an employer cannot hide its alleged violations for other employees certainly seems to be a step in the right direction.
Click Grabowski v. Robinson to read the entire Opinion.
E.D.N.Y.: Where Agreement to Arbitrate Is Silent As To Class Arbitration, Arbitrator Not Court to Decide Class Arbitrability Issue
Guida v. Home Savings of America, Inc.
Plaintiffs brought this putative class action on behalf of themselves, and on behalf of individuals similarly situated, against Defendants, asserting claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et. seq., and related New York state wage and labor laws. Defendants moved to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint, and compel arbitration on an individual basis pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et. seq. While Plaintiffs agreed to arbitrate the dispute, they argued that the arbitrator should decide whether the arbitration can proceed on a class basis, because the arbitration agreement was silent on the issue of class arbitration. The court agreed and held that while the parties were required to arbitrate the dispute, the determination of whether or not the arbitration should proceed on a class basis is for the arbitrator to make in the first instance.
Discussing the relevant provisions of the agreement(s) to arbitrate, the court explained:
“The terms of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Agreement are identical for all of the plaintiffs. The following are relevant portions from the Alternative Dispute Resolution Agreements:
I understand that Home Savings of America makes available arbitration for resolution of employment disputes that are not otherwise resolved by internal policies or procedures.
I agree that if I am unable to resolve any dispute through the internal policies and procedures of Home Savings … I will arbitrate … any legal claim that I might have against Home Savings … or its employees, in connection with my employment or termination of employment … whether arising out of issues or matters occurring before the date of this Agreement or after such date.
I agree to abide by and accept the final decisions of the arbitration panel as ultimate resolution of any disputes or issues for any and all events that arise out of employment or termination of employment.
I agree that the Employee Dispute Resolution Rules of the American Arbitration Association will apply to any resolution of any such matters. In exchange for the benefits of arbitration, I agree that the arbitrator will only have the power to grant those remedies available in court, under applicable law.”
In light of the silence as to class arbitration, the court held that the issue was one for the arbitrator, not the court to decide. The court reasoned that Supreme Court jurisprudence supported this holding, because the issue was one of substantive interpretation of the contract language and not merely a procedural issue:
“This Court concludes, in light of StoltNielsen and Bazzle, that the ability of a class to arbitrate a dispute where the parties contest whether the agreement to arbitrate is silent or ambiguous on the issue is a procedural question that is for the arbitrator to decide. Even though Bazzle does not have the full weight of Supreme Court precedent, it is nevertheless instructive. See, e.g., Barbour v. Haley, 471 F.3d 1222, 1229 (11 th Cir.2006) (“Plurality opinions are not binding on this court; however, they are persuasive authority.”); Galli v. N.J. Meadowlands Comm’n, 490 F.3d 265, 274 (3d Cir.2007) (concluding that dicta in Supreme Court opinions has persuasive value). The Second Circuit found Bazzle persuasive, as have other courts prior to Stolt–Nielsen. See Vaughn v. Leeds, Morelli & Brown, P.C., 315 F. App’x 327, 329 (2d Cir.2009) (concluding that the district court “properly compelled arbitration on the question of the arbitrability of class claims under the Settlement Agreement[,]” citing Bazzle and Howsam); JSC Surgutneftegaz v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 04 Civ. 6069(RMB), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79161, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2007) (citing Bazzle for the proposition that “arbitrators are well situated to answer the question whether contracts forbid[ ] class arbitration” (quotation marks omitted)); Scout. com, LLC v. Bucknuts, LLC, No. C07–1444 RSM, 2007 WL 4143229, at *5 (W.D.Wa. Nov.16, 2007) (concluding that, in light of Bazzle, it was for the arbitrator to decide the procedural question of whether the plaintiffs can arbitrate as a class (collecting cases)). Furthermore, many courts since Stolt–Nielsen have continued to follow Bazzle’s conclusion that the ability to arbitrate on a class basis is a procedural question left for the arbitrator to decide. This Court finds the Third Circuit’s opinion in Vilches v. The Travelers Companies, Incorporated, No. 10–2888, 2011 U.S.App. LEXIS 2551 (3d Cir. Feb. 9, 2011), particularly instructive. In Vilches, the Third Circuit reconciled Bazzle and StoltNielsen as follows:
Although contractual silence [on the issue of arbitration on a class basis] has often been treated by arbitrators as authorizing class arbitration, Stolt–Nielsen suggests a return to the pre-Bazzle line of reasoning on contractual silence, albeit decided by an arbitrator, because it focuses on what the parties agreed to—expressly or by implication.
Id. at *12–13 n. 3. The Third Circuit concluded that the ability of the plaintiffs to proceed on a class basis in arbitration was essentially a question of “what kind of arbitration proceeding the parties agreed to [,]” id. at *10 (emphasis in original) (citing Bazzle), and went on to conclude that “[w]here contractual silence is implicated, the arbitrator and not a court should decide whether a contract was indeed silent on the issue of class arbitration, and whether a contract with an arbitration clause forbids class arbitration.” Id. at *11 (quotation marks omitted) (citing StoltNielsen, 130 S.Ct. at 1771–72, describing the plurality opinion in Bazzle). In Vilches, the agreement in question “did not expressly reference class or collective arbitration or any waiver of the same.” Id. at *3. The parties debated whether a revised arbitration policy including a class arbitration waiver applied to plaintiffs but agreed that plaintiffs’ causes of action alleged in the complaint otherwise fell under the purview of the arbitration agreement. Id. at *3–6, *9–10. The court in Vilches referred the “questions of whether class arbitration was agreed upon to the arbitrator.” Id. This Court similarly concludes that Stolt–Nielsen and Bazzle are reconcilable and that arbitrating on a class basis is a procedural question that is for the arbitrators to decide in accordance with the Supreme Court’s analysis in Stolt–Nielsen, which provides a framework for the arbitrator’s analysis of the issue.
Nor is Vilches alone in its conclusion. There are a number of cases in addition to Vilches in which courts have concluded, subsequent to Stolt–Nielsen, that the ability of plaintiffs to arbitrate on a class basis is an issue to be determined by the arbitrator. See, e.g., Aracri v. Dillard’s Inc., No. 1:10cv253, 2011 WL 1388613, at * 4 (S.D.Ohio Mar.29, 2011) (concluding that “it is not for this Court, but for an arbitrator to decide whether class arbitration is forbidden under the Arbitration Agreement and Dillard’s Rules of Arbitration” where the arbitration agreement did not explicitly mention class arbitration but the parties contested whether Dillard’s Rules, to which all arbitration claims were subject, provided for class arbitration); Smith v. The Cheesecake Factory Restaurants, Inc., No. 3:06–00829, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121930, at *7 (M.D.Tenn. Nov. 16, 2010) (concluding that “whether the parties agreed to class arbitration is to be resolved by the arbitrator[,]” citing Stolt–Nielsen and Bazzle); Fisher v. General Steel Domestic Sales, LLC, No. 10–cv–1509–WYD–BNB, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108223, at *6–7 (D.Col. Sept. 22, 2010) (where parties agreed that plaintiffs’ claims were subject to arbitration but were contesting whether the agreement in question permitted class arbitration, “based on the plain language of Stolt–Nielsen, it is clear that an arbitrator may, as a threshold matter, appropriately determine whether the applicable arbitration clause permits the arbitration to proceed on behalf of or against a class” (quotation marks omitted)). See also Clark v. Goldline Int’l, Inc., No. 6:10–cv–01884 (JMC), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126192, at *21–22 (D.S.C. Nov. 30, 2010) (“[T]he court notes that whether a class is appropriately certified in this case or otherwise is yet to be determined. Second, whether the Account Agreement precludes any putative classmember from bringing a claim has no bearing on the validity or enforceability of the arbitration provisions. Such issues raised by Plaintiffs must be determined by an arbitrator, not this court.” (citing Bazzle)). But see Chen–Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., No. 10 Civ. 6950(LBS)(JCF), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46994, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2011) (concluding that the ability to arbitrate on a class basis requires a “determination of the scope and enforceability of the arbitration clause, and therefore the issue is appropriately characterized as a dispute over arbitrability[,]” further noting that this question “fits into the narrow circumstances where contracting parties would likely have expected a court to have decided the gateway matter[,]” relying on Stolt–Nielsen’s emphasis that Bazzle was solely a plurality opinion).”
Interestingly, the court also addressed and rejected Defendants’ argument that the Supreme Court’s recent holding in AT & T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion stood for the proposition that the issue of whether or not to arbitrate on a class basis is not a procedural issue, which would have allowed the court to decide the issue.
Click Guida v. Home Savings of America, Inc. to read the entire Memorandum and Order.
U.S.S.C.: State Law Regarding Unconscionability of Class Waivers in Arbitration Agreements Preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion
There has long been talk of the pr0-business conservative majority that currently comprises the United State’s Supreme Court. However, many pundits have commented that while the Court has ruled as might be expected, largely based on their political leanings, on social issues, there has been wide agreement that other cases have not necessarily gone as some might have expected. Last term with its decision that corporations could contribute unlimited amounts of money to political campaigns (while individuals were subject to the caps put in place by campaign finance laws), it appeared that the Court was getting more comfortable in trading in a lot of the basic individual freedoms that have always been a foundation for the United States, in exchange for satiating the demands of big business who are forever seeking to tilt the playing field in its favor. Wednesday the Court handed down perhaps its biggest blow to average Americans ever, when it reversed the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Concepcion v. AT&T Mobility, a decision that had sought to balance individual consumer rights, against those of a behemoth corporation.
As the Court stated in its Syllabus opinion, “[t]he cellular telephone contract between respondents (Concepcions) and petitioner (AT&T) provided for arbitration of all disputes, but did not permit classwide arbitration. After the Concepcions were charged sales tax on the retail value of phones provided free under their service contract, they sued AT&T in a California Federal District Court.Their suit was consolidated with a class action alleging, inter alia, that AT&T had engaged in false advertising and fraud by chargingsales tax on “free” phones. The District Court denied AT&T’s motion to compel arbitration under the Concepcions’ contract. Relying onthe California Supreme Court’s Discover Bank decision, it found the arbitration provision unconscionable because it disallowed classwide proceedings. The Ninth Circuit agreed that the provision was unconscionable under California law and held that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), which makes arbitration agreements “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract,” 9 U. S. C. §2, did not preempt its ruling.”
However, the Supreme’s disagreed. Instead they held that “[b]ecause it ‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress,’ Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 67, California’s Discover Bank rule is preempted by the FAA. Pp. 4–18.”
Of course big business cheered the opinion as a necessary step towards giving parties the rights they had contracted for. In reality however, the Ninth Circuit’s decision was much more in line with the realities of today’s business environment. As anyone who has a cell phone can attest, the contracts we all enter into with a cell phone provider are anything but a fairly negotiated one. In order to get your phone and/or start your service, you must sign away any rights you would normally have, in a take it or leave it contract.
Although aimed at eliminating consumer class actions, those in which the size of the claims is typically a few dollars to a few thousand dollars at most, the effects of the decision will be felt throughout all types of litigation, including employment and wage and hour litigation, where individual claims are often small by themselves, by collectively worthwhile for an attorney to pursue, in order to vindicate the rights of an entire class. Given what could be a death nell for class and collective litigation for employees, pro-consumer legislators have been shaken to action.
As noted by blog thePopTort, Senator Al Franken, who actually has a great track record persuading Congress to outlaw unfair arbitration agreements, is taking the lead on this one. Responding to yesterday’s decision, “U.S. Sens. Al Franken (D-Minn.) and Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn.) and Rep. Hank Johnson (D-Ga.) said today they plan to introduce legislation next week that would restore consumers’ rights to seek justice in the courts. Their bill, called the Arbitration Fairness Act, would eliminate forced arbitration clauses in employment, consumer, and civil rights cases, and would allow consumers and workers to choose arbitration after a dispute occurred.”
Consumer and employee groups have been quick to respond as well, calling for legislation, that has been raised but stalled in prior legislative sessions in Washington, D.C. For example the National Employment Lawyers Association (NELA), who had filed an Amicus Brief in support of the Concepcions, released this press release calling for immediate action by Congress to rectify the situation. It remains to be seen how this will all end in both the short and long terms, but for now the decision is unquestionably a boon for big business, who has essentially been given the green light to ignore laws big and small to the detriment of average Americans, with the knowledge that there will be little or no repercussions for same.
S.D.N.Y.: Class Action Waiver Unenforceable in FLSA Case, Because Cost of Individual Litigation vs. Potential Recovery Prohibitive
Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP
This case was before the court on Defendant’s motion to stay the proceedings and compel arbitration on an individual (rather than class/collective) basis. There was no dispute as to whether the Plaintiff had executed the arbitration agreement, containing the class waiver, however the court held that the class waiver was unenforceable, after a lengthy discussion of Second Circuit law and the impact of the recent United States Supreme Court case, Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S.Ct. 1758 (2010).
The court reasoned:
“Because the Amex decision retains its persuasive force, the Court applies the test adopted in Amex to determine the enforceability of the class waiver provision here at issue. In the totality of the circumstances, the Court finds that the class waiver provision is invalid because it prevents Sutherland from vindicating her statutory rights.
1. Cost to Individual Plaintiff Versus Potential Recovery
The record supports Sutherland’s argument that her maximum potential recovery would be too meager to justify the expenses required for the individual prosecution of her claim. Sutherland alleges “an actual overtime loss of approximately $1,867.02, with potentially liquidated damages of an equal amount under the FLSA.” (Folkenflik Decl. ¶ 8; see also Sutherland Deck. ¶ 4.) If her only option were to prosecute her claim on an individual basis, Sutherland would be required to pay expenses that would dwarf her potential recovery.
Sutherland’s uncontested submission estimates that her attorney’s fees during arbitration will exceed $160,000, and that costs will exceed $6,000. (Folkenflik Decl. ¶ 20, 24.) Sutherland will utilize expert assistance in support of her claims.(Id. ¶ 22.) Her expert, a professor of accountancy, has submitted an affidavit stating that his fees may exceed $33,500, and that he requires a retainer payment of $25,000. (Carmichael Decl. ¶ 5.) In sum, Sutherland would be required to spend approximately $200,000 in order to recover double her overtime loss of approximately $1,867 .02. Only a “lunatic or a fanatic” would undertake such an endeavor. Carnegie v. Household Intern., Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir.2004). Indeed, rather than prosecuting her low-value, high-cost claim on an individual basis, Sutherland “would give up any rights” she might have to recover overtime payments allegedly owed to her. (Sutherland Decl.¶ 2.)
Pursuant to the E & Y Agreement, Sutherland is responsible for the Court Equivalent Fee, or a fee specified by the arbitration provider, whichever is less; arbitration fees and costs are to be shared equally between the parties. (Reece Decl. Exh. D¶ IV.P.) Sutherland has submitted an uncontested affidavit stating that arbitration fees would amount to $24,000, and that the applicable Court Equivalent Fee is $350. (Folkenflik Decl.¶ 24.) E & Y’s offer to pay such costs, which the Court has factored into Sutherland’s expenses as detailed above, thus lessens her burden by $12,350. Although this amount is not insignificant, it is hardly enough to allow Sutherland to bring her claims on an individual basis: she would still be required to spend approximately $200,000 on attorney’s fees and costs, as well as expert fees, in order to recover double her overtime loss of approximately $1,867.02.
E & Y’s attempt to distinguish the cost-recovery differential in Amex from the differential present here is unavailing. The “median plaintiff” in Amex would have recovered damages of $1,751, and the expert’s services would have cost at least several hundred thousand dollars. Amex, 554 F.3d at 317. According to E & Y, a “median plaintiff” in the instant matter could recover “substantially more,” and expert fees here amount to “a small fraction” of those at issue in Amex. (Def. Reply at 6-7.) The Amex decision did not, however, set a cost-to-recovery ratio below which claims are deemed “prosecutable.” The court instead embraced a functional approach, which “depends upon a showing that the size of the recovery received by any individual plaintiff will be too small to justify the expenditure of bringing an individual action.” Amex, 554 F.3d at 320. Sutherland has satisfied her burden on that score.
E & Y also cites to authorities in which the cost-recovery differential was held not to preclude the prosecution of claims on an individual basis. Such decisions are either inapposite or unpersuasive. In Pomposi v. GameStop, Inc., for instance, a class waiver was enforced where the amount in controversy was $11,000, and plaintiff’s total fees and costs ranged from $46,000 to $62,000.09 Civ. 0340, 2010 WL 147196, at *7 (D.Conn. Jan. 11, 2010). The court in Pomposi did not, however, meaningfully discuss plaintiff’s ability to retain counsel notwithstanding the differential between potential costs and recovery. E & Y cites Ornelas v. Sonic-Denver T, Inc., No. 06 Civ. 253, 2007 WL 274738 (D.Colo. Jan. 29, 2007), as standing for the proposition that “compelling arbitration would not preclude plaintiff from pursuing his claims where damages were at least $3500.” (Def. Mem. at 12.) But the plaintiff in Ornelas was allegedly entitled to (i) a trebling of the approximately $3500 in actual damages, and (ii) unspecified punitive damages and interest. Id. at *6. Moreover, the plaintiff in Ornelas apparently would not incur any expert witness fees. Id. at *7. Finally, E & Y offers Anglin v. Tower Loan of Miss., Inc., 635 F.Supp.2d 523 (S.D.Miss.2009) as precedent for “compelling arbitration where damages, attorney’s fees and punitive damages would result in [a] recovery of over $5,000.” (Def. Reply at 12.) The nub of Anglin, however, was that the plaintiff “made no effort” to demonstrate the prohibitive costs of individual arbitration. Anglin, 635 F.Supp.2d at 529. By contrast, Sutherland has “substantial[ly] demonstrat[ed]” that an inability to prosecute her claims on a class basis “would be tantamount to an inability to assert [her] claims at all.” Amex, 554 F.3d at 302-03 n.1.
2. Ability to Obtain Legal Representation
Even if Sutherland were willing to incur approximately $200,000 to recover a few thousand dollars, she would be unable to retain an attorney to prosecute her individual claim. This is due largely to the E & Y Agreement’s obstacles to reimbursement of fees and expenses. Whether attorney’s fees and expenses incurred during arbitration are compensable is subject to the discretion of the arbitrators. (Reece Decl. Exh. D ¶ IV.P.3.) The amount of such reimbursement is also left to the arbitrators’ discretion. (See id. (arbitrators may award attorney’s fees, “in whole or part, in accordance with applicable law or in the interest of justice”); 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (providing for the reimbursement of “reasonable” attorney’s fees).)
In light of the foregoing, Sutherland cannot reasonably be expected to retain an attorney to pursue her individual claim, and E & Y has not submitted an affidavit stating otherwise. Sutherland cannot afford to advance the fees and costs in order to hire an attorney on an hourly basis: she has remained unemployed since her termination from E & Y in December 2009; she has no savings, and owes $35,000 in student loans. (Sutherland Decl. ¶ 5.) Counsel for Sutherland will not prosecute her individual claim without charge, and will not advance the required costs where the E & Y Agreement’s fee-shifting provisions present little possibility of being made whole. (Folkenflik Decl. ¶ 25.) As the uncontested affidavit of Sutherland’s counsel reflects, Sutherland would find no attorney willing to represent her under the circumstances. (Id. ¶ 27.) Cf. Kristian, 446 F.3d at 60 (“[I]t would not make economic sense for an individual to retain an attorney to handle one of these cases on an hourly basis and it is hard to see how any lawyer could advise a client to do so.”) (internal quotations omitted).
Sutherland’s only option in pursuing her individual claim is thus to retain an attorney on a contingent fee basis. But just as no rational person would expend hundreds of thousands of dollars to recover a few thousand dollars in damages, “no attorney (regardless of competence) would ever take such a case on a contingent fee basis .” Caban v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 606 F.Supp.2d 1361, 1371 (S.D.Fla.2009); see also Folkenflik Decl.¶ 27. Cf. Kristian, 446 F.3d at 59 (“[I]t would not make economic sense for an attorney to agree to represent any of the plaintiffs in these cases in exchange for 33 1/3% or even a greater percentage of the individual’s recovery.”) (internal quotations omitted). E & Y has submitted no evidence that an attorney would expend approximately $200,000 in time and costs in return for a mere chance to earn potentially one-third of Sutherland’s less than $4,000 recovery.
If Sutherland could aggregate her claim with the claims of others similarly situated, however, she would have no difficulty in obtaining legal representation. (See Folkenflik Decl.¶ 25; see also Pl. Reply at 3.) This is because class proceedings “achieve economies of time, effort, and expense….” Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 616 (1997) (internal quotations omitted).
3. The Practical Effect of Waiver
Enforcement of the class waiver provision in this case would effectively ban all proceedings by Sutherland against E & Y. She will be unable to pursue her claims, even if they are meritorious. As a result, E & Y would enjoy de facto immunity from liability for alleged violations of the labor laws. The legislative purposes in enacting such laws-including, for example, combating “labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living” FLSA § 2(a), 29 U.S.C. § 202(a), and assuring workers “additional pay to compensate them for the burden of a workweek beyond” 40 hours per week, In re Novartis Wage and Hour Litig. Litig. 611 F.3d 141, 150 (2d Cir.2010)-would go unfulfilled. “Corporations should not be permitted to use class action waivers as a means to exculpate themselves from liability for small-value claims.” Dale v. Comcast Corp., 498 F.3d 1216, 1224 (11th Cir.2007).
Having examined the totality of the facts and circumstances, the Court finds that the class waiver provision here at issue is unenforceable because it prevents Sutherland from vindicating her statutory rights. See Amex, 554 F.3d at 302-03 n.1.
V. Future Proceedings
Although the class waiver provision is unenforceable, the Court cannot order E & Y to submit to class arbitration. After the offending provision is severed from the E & Y Agreement, (see Reece Decl. Exh. D ¶ V.F.), the Agreement is rendered silent as to whether class arbitration is permissible. In accordance with Stolt-Nielsen, class arbitration may not be imposed on parties whose arbitration agreements are silent on the permissibility of class proceedings. 130 S.Ct. at 1764, 1775. See also Fensterstock v. Educ. Fin. Partners, 611 F.3d 124, 140 (2d Cir.2010). The Court must accordingly deny E & Y’s motion to compel arbitration.”
It will be interesting to see whether courts in other circuits will follow this well-reasoned opinion. This is an area of FLSA jurisprudence where there is a wide divergence of opinions. The Eleventh Circuit for example has long-held that FLSA Collective Action rights can be waived by agreement.
Click Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP to read the entire opinion.
S.D.N.Y.: Because FLSA Collective Action Is Not A Class Action, FLSA Collective Action Subject To Arbitration Despite FINRA Rule Prohibiting Class Actions
Velez v. Perrin Holden & Davenport Capital Corp.
Plaintiff brought this action alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and the New York Labor Law (“NYLL”) on behalf of himself and other similarly situated stock brokers employed or formerly employed by defendant Perrin Holden & Davenport Capital Corp. (“PHD Capital”) and its officers and owners. Plaintiff sought designation of the case as as a collective action pursuant to FLSA section 216 for his FLSA claims and as a class action pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23 for his state law claims.
Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) or, in the alternative, to compel arbitration pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S .C. §§ 3, 4, on the ground that Plaintiff had agreed to arbitrate his FLSA claims at the time he was hired. In line with other courts that have decided the issue, the court held that a “collective action” is not encompassed within the term “class action” as that term is used in FINRA’s rules, and thus compelled arbitration of Velez’s FLSA claims, allowing for a collective action in FINRA arbitration.
After finding that the Plaintiff’s claims were subject to arbitration, the court then discussed whether, under FINRA rules banning class actions, Plaintiff could proceed with an FLSA collective action. Reasoning he could the court explained:
“FINRA Rule 13200 mandates arbitration of disputes between the parties “except as otherwise provided.” (FINRA Rule 13200, Ex. B to Declaration of Matthew D. Kadushin dated Aug. 27, 2010 (“Kadushin Decl.”).) Notably, FINRA Rule 13204 prohibits arbitration of “class action claims.” (FINRA Rule 13204, Ex. A to Kadushin Decl.) It is thus uncontested that Velez’s state law claims-which plaintiff has asserted as a class action pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23-are ineligible for arbitration. The parties dispute, however, whether that exemption of class action claims from arbitration also applies to plaintiff’s FLSA collective action claims. While defendants contend that collective actions are distinct from class actions and therefore subject to FINRA arbitration, Velez argues that the phrase “class action” in FINRA Rule 13204 encompasses a collective action and therefore collective action claims are not arbitrable. Velez looks to the interpretation by FINRA staff members of FINRA’s rules to support his position.
Every court to address whether an FLSA collective action is arbitrable pursuant to FINRA’s rules has found in favor of arbitrability. See Gomez v. Brill Securities, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 3503, 2010 WL 4455827 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2010); Suschil v. Ameriprise Financial Servs., Inc., No. 07 Civ. 2655, 2008 WL 974045, at *5 (N.D.Ohio Apr. 7, 2008); Chapman v. Lehman Bros., Inc., 279 F.Supp.2d 1286, 1290 (S.D.Fla.2003). This Court agrees with its sister district courts.
FINRA Rule 13204 clearly states that “[c]lass action claims may not be arbitrated” under FINRA’s Code of Arbitration Procedure. However, that rule says nothing about collective action claims. Although collective and class actions have much in common, there is a critically important difference: collective actions are opt-in actions, i.e., each member of the class must take steps to opt in to the action in order to participate in it, whereas class actions are opt-out actions, i.e., class members automatically participate in a class action unless they take affirmative steps to opt out of the class action. Collective actions bind only similarly situated plaintiffs who have affirmatively consented to join the action.
Velez urges the Court to defer to the opinions of FINRA staff who have issued letters construing collective actions to come within the ambit of class actions for the purposes of FINRA arbitration. (See, e.g., Letter from Jean I. Feeney, NASD Assistant General Counsel, dated Sept. 21, 1999, Ex. C. to Kadushin Decl.; Letter from George H. Friedman, NASD Executive Vice President, Dispute Resolution, Director of Arbitration, dated Oct. 10, 2003, Ex. D to Kadushin Decl.) However, those letters do not contain any substantial analysis, and the Feeney letter itself includes the disclaimer that “the opinions expressed herein are staff opinions only and have not been reviewed or endorsed by the Board of Directors of [the] NASD.” Moreover, FINRA’s website specifically states that “[s]taff-issued interpretive letters express staff views and opinions only and are not binding on FINRA and its Board.” (FINRA-Interpretive Letters, Ex. 1 to Affirmation of Emily A. Hayes dated Sept. 9, 2010). Such “staff opinion letters are not the sort of agency interpretation that is entitled to deference by this Court.” Gomez, 2010 WL 4455827 at *1; see also Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). If FINRA wanted to prohibit arbitration of collective action claims, FINRA is certainly able to amend its rules to do so. See FINRA Rulemaking Process, available at http://www.finra.org/In dustry/Regulation/FINRARules/RulemakingProcess (Feb. 2, 2010); see also Gomez, 2010 WL 4455827 at *2.
As noted above, the parties here have agreed in writing to arbitrate certain disputes as required by FINRA. In light of other district court opinions, this Court’s own interpretation of FINRA rules, and the federal policy favoring arbitration as an alternative forum in which to resolve disputes, this Court finds that FLSA collective actions are within the scope of the parties’ agreement to arbitrate. In addition, no congressional intent precludes arbitration of the federal FLSA claims. See, e.g., Gomez, 2010 WL 4455827 at *2; Coheleach v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 440 F.Supp.2d 338, 240 (S.D.N.Y.2006).”
Accordingly, defendants’ motion was granted to the extent that the court compelled arbitration of Plaintiff’s FLSA claims.
3d Cir.: Enforceability Of Class/Collective Action Waiver In Agreement To Arbitrate Is Issue For Arbitrator Not The Court
Vilches v. Travelers Companies, Inc.
This appeal raised the issue of whether the District Court properly determined that the Plaintiff-Appellant (employee) assented to the insertion of a class arbitration waiver into an existing arbitration policy, and that the waiver was not unconscionable. The District Court ordered the parties into arbitration to individually resolve the claims brought by Plaintiff under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. (“FLSA”), and New Jersey Wage and Hour Law, N.J.S.A. § 34:11-4.1, et seq. (“NJWHL”). While it held that the class arbitration waiver was not unconscionable, the Third Circuit vacated the District Court’s order and referred the matter to arbitration to determine whether Vilches can proceed as a class based upon the parties’ agreements.
Discussing the relevant procedural and factual background the court stated:
“We briefly summarize the allegations pertinent to our decision. Appellants Vilches filed a class and collective action in the Superior Court of New Jersey to recover unpaid wages and overtime allegedly withheld in violation of the FLSA and the NJWHL, contending that Travelers consistently required its insurance appraisers to work beyond 40 hours per week but failed to properly compensate the appraisers for the additional labor. Travelers removed the matter to the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, and filed a Motion for Summary Judgment seeking the dismissal of the complaint and an order compelling Vilches to arbitrate their individual wage and hour claims.
Upon commencing employment with Travelers, Vilches agreed to an employment provision making arbitration “the required, and exclusive, forum for the resolution of all employment disputes that may arise” pursuant to an enumerated list of federal statutes, and under “any other federal, state or local statute, regulation or common law doctrine, regarding employment discrimination, conditions of employment or termination of employment.” (App’x at 79.) The agreement did not expressly reference class or collective arbitration or any waiver of the same. The agreement reserved to Travelers the right to alter or amend the arbitration policy at its discretion with appropriate notice to employees.
In April 2005, Travelers electronically published a revised Arbitration Policy. In addition to restating the expansive scope of the Policy, the update also included an express statement prohibiting arbitration through class or collective action:
The Policy makes arbitration the required and exclusive forum for the resolution of all employment-related and compensation-related disputes based on legally protected rights (i.e ., statutory, contractual or common law rights) that may arise between an employee or former employee and the Company…. [T]here will be no right or authority for any dispute to be brought, heard or arbitrated under this Policy as a class or collective action, private attorney general, or in a representative capacity on behalf of any person. (App’x at 88) (emphasis added). Travelers communicated the revised Policy to Vilches in several electronic communications.
Before the District Court, Vilches initially alleged that they never agreed to arbitrate any claims against Travelers; their position changed, however, during the course of proceedings and they ultimately conceded that all employment disputes with Travelers must be arbitrated pursuant to the arbitration agreement they signed at commencement of employment. They nevertheless insisted that the revised Arbitration Policy introduced by Travelers in April 2005 prohibiting class arbitration, which Travelers attempted to enforce, did not bind them because they never assented to its terms. Vilches further argued that, even assuming that the updated Policy did bind them, the revision was unconscionable and unenforceable.
Notwithstanding the fact that the parties agreed to arbitrate all employment disputes, as we discuss below, the District Court addressed the question of whether Vilches agreed to waive the right to proceed by way of class arbitration. In an oral decision, the District Court granted Travelers’ motion for summary judgment, finding that the various forms of correspondence from Travelers provided sufficient notice to Vilches of the revised Policy, and that their electronic assent and continued employment constituted agreement to the update. As such, the Court held that Vilches waived the ability to proceed in a representative capacity through class arbitration. The Court’s opinion only briefly touched upon the unconscionability claims, stating that “there was no adhesion that was part of that process.” (App’x at 23.) The Court ordered the parties to individually arbitrate the employment disputes, and this appeal followed.”
Holding that the Arbitrator and not the Court should decide the issue of enforceability of the class/collective action waiver, the Third Circuit reasoned:
“The parties agree that any and all disputes arising out of the employment relationship-including the claims asserted here-are to be resolved in binding arbitration. Accordingly, the role of the Court is limited to deciding whether the revised Arbitration Policy introduced in April 2005-and the class arbitration waiver included within that revision-governed this dispute. We conclude that the District Court should not have decided the issue presented as to the class action waiver, and, as we explain below, we will refer the resolution of this question to arbitration in accordance with governing jurisprudence. The District Court should have, however, ruled on the issue of unconscionability and we will address it.
We have repeatedly stated that courts play a limited role when a litigant moves to compel arbitration. Specifically, “whether the parties have submitted a particular dispute to arbitration, i.e., the question of arbitrability, is an issue for judicial determination unless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise.’ “ Puleo, 605 F.3d at 178 (quoting Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002)). “[A] question of arbitrability arises only in two circumstances-first, when there is a threshold dispute over whether the parties have a valid arbitration agreement at all,’ and, second, when the parties are in dispute as to whether a concededly binding arbitration clause applies to a certain type of controversy.’ “ Id. (quoting Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 452 (2003)). In contrast, the Supreme Court has distinguished “questions of arbitrability with disputes over arbitration procedure, which do not bear upon the validity of an agreement to arbitrate.” Id. at 179. We noted in Puleo that “procedural questions”-such as waiver or delay-“which grow out of the dispute and bear on its final disposition are presumptively not for the judge.” Id.
This matter satisfies neither of the Puleo arbitrability circumstances. As stated, neither party questions “whether the parties have a valid arbitration agreement at all.” Id.; (see also Appellants’ Br. at 15 (“Plaintiffs do not challenge the validity of the arbitration agreements they entered into when they first began their employment”); Appellees’ Br. at 6 (“At the outset of employment, Appellants agreed to the Travelers Employment Arbitration Policy”).) The original arbitration provision to which Vilches admittedly agreed provided that “the required, and exclusive, forum for the resolution of all employment disputes ” would be arbitration. (App’x at 79 (emphasis added).) Here, the issue of whether an employee is bound by a disputed amendment to existing employment provisions falls within the scope of this expansive agreement to arbitrate. Indeed, the language makes clear that the “concededly binding arbitration clause applies” to the particular employment claims at stake here, and the parties do not advance a cognizable argument to suggest otherwise. Puleo, 605 F.3d at 178. Accordingly, the second Puleo arbitrability element is also unfulfilled.
While the parties framed their arguments so as to invite the Court’s attention to the class action waiver issue-namely, whether the revised Arbitration Policy expressly prohibiting class arbitration governs the relationship between Travelers and Vilches-we conclude that “the relevant question here is what kind of arbitration proceeding the parties agreed to.” Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 452 (emphasis in original). As stated, the addition of the disputed class arbitration waiver did not disturb the parties’ agreement to refer “all employment disputes” to arbitration, and, thus, “does not bear upon the validity of an agreement to arbitrate.” Puleo, 605 F.3d at 179. Assuming binding arbitration of all employment disputes, the contested waiver provision solely affects the type of procedural arbitration mechanism applicable to this dispute. “[T]he Supreme Court has made clear that questions of contract interpretation’ aimed at discerning whether a particular procedural mechanism is authorized by a given arbitration agreement are matters for the arbitrator to decide .” Id. (emphasis in original). Where contractual silence is implicated, “the arbitrator and not a court should decide whether a contract [ was] indeed silent’ on the issue of class arbitration,” and “whether a contract with an arbitration clause forbids class arbitration.” Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animalfeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S.Ct. 1758, 1771-72 (2010).
The Policy originally in force made no mention of class action or class arbitration, and was entirely silent on whether the parties had a right to proceed through class or collective arbitration. In contrast, the amended Policy explicitly precludes class arbitration. Accordingly, we must “give effect to the contractual rights and expectations of the parties,” and refer the questions of whether class arbitration was agreed upon to the arbitrator. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S.Ct. at 1774.
Although we offer no forecast as to the arbitrator’s potential resolution of these questions, assuming arguendo that the arbitrator finds the class action waiver binding, we will address Vilches’ alternative argument that the addition of the class action waiver was unconscionable for the sake of judicial efficiency, and because it does concern “arbitrabillity.” See Puleo, 605 F.3d at 179.”
The Third Circuit went on to hold that, in the event the class action waiver language was binding, it was not unconscionable.
Click Vilches v. Travelers Companies, Inc., to read the entire opinion.