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9th Cir.: Employer’s Attorney Can Be Sued for Retaliation as a “Person Acting Directly or Indirectly” in Employer’s Interest
This case presented an issue of first impression: Can an employer’s attorney be held liable for retaliating against his client’s employee because the employee sued his client for violations of workplace laws? The district court held that he could not and dismissed the claim. On appeal the Ninth Circuit disagreed and reversed. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit held that as a “person acting directly or indirectly” in the employer’s interest, the employer’s attorney could be subject to liability under 29 U.S.C. § 215.
In the case, the defendant-employers had hired the plaintiff-employee, an undocumented immigrant without verifying his immigration status or his right to work in the United States. Although not explicitly stated, the Ninth Circuit’s opinion strongly implies that the defendants intentionally neglected to complete an I-9 form or verify plaintiff’s status because it knew he was not legally permitted to work in the United States.
After working for defendants for 11 years, in 2006, plaintiff filed suit in California state court against defendants, alleging that defendants violated a multitude of employment laws, and alleged among other things that defendants failed to provide him with legally mandated rest breaks and failed to pay him legally mandated overtime premiums.
The Ninth Circuit recited the following facts regarding the alleged retaliation, all taken from plaintiffs subsequent lawsuit alleging illegal retaliation that was the subject of the Ninth Circuit’s opinion:
On June 1, 2011, ten weeks before the state court trial, the Angelos’ attorney, Anthony Raimondo, set in motion an underhanded plan to derail Arias’s lawsuit. Raimondo’s plan involved enlisting the services of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) to take Arias into custody at a scheduled deposition and then to remove him from the United States. A second part of Raimondo’s plan was to block Arias’s California Rural Legal Assistance attorney from representing him. This double barrel plan was captured in email messages back and forth between Raimondo, Joe Angelo, and ICE’s forensic auditor Kulwinder Brar.
On May 8, 2013, Arias filed this lawsuit against Angelo Dairy, the Angelos, and Raimondo in the Eastern District of California. Arias alleged that the defendants violated section 215(a)(3) of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.
Arias’s theory of his case is that Raimondo, acting as the Angelos’ agent, retaliated against him in violation of section 215(a)(3) for filing his original case against Raimondo’s clients in state court . Raimondo’s sole legal defense is that because he was never Arias’s actual employer, he cannot be held liable under the FLSA for retaliation against someone who was never his employee.
As noted by the court, Angelo Dairy and its owners settled their part of this case at the early stages of its existence.
The district court dismissed plaintiff’s claims against the defendants’ attorney holding that he was not covered under the FLSA’s retaliation provisions because he was not plaintiff’s employer. Noting that the FLSA’s retaliation provision defines those subject to liability in a much broader way than the underlying definition of employer (which is broad to begin with) the Ninth Circuit reversed.
Discussing the issue before it the court explained:
Notwithstanding section 215(a)(3)’s reference to “any person,” section 203(a)’ s inclusion of a legal representative as a “person,” and section 203(d)’s plain language defining “employer,” the district court granted Raimondo’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The court did so without the benefit of oral argument, concluding that because Arias “ha[d] not alleged that [Raimondo] exercised any control over [his] employment relationship,” Raimondo as a matter of law could not be Arias’s employer.
The Ninth Circuit rejected this reasoning noting that the statutory definition of those who may be subject to liability under the FLSA’s retaliation provision include a broader spectrum of people:
Section 215(a)(3), an anti-retaliation provision, makes it unlawful “for any person … to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any employee because such employee has filed any complaint … under or related to this chapter.” The FLSA defines the term “person” to include a “legal representative.” Id. § 203(a). Section 216(b) in turn creates a private right of action against any “employer” who violates section 215(a)(3); and the FLSA defines “employer” to include “any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee.” Id. §§ 203(d), 216(b).
Controversies under FLSA sections 206 and 207 that require a determination of primary workplace liability for wage and hour responsibilities and violations, on one hand, and controversies arising from retaliation against employees for asserting their legal rights, on the other, are as different as chalk is from cheese. Each category has a different purpose. It stands to reason that the former relies in application on tests involving economic control and economic realities to determine who is an employer, because by definition it is the actual employer who controls substantive wage and hours issues.
Retaliation is a different animal altogether. Its purpose is to enable workers to avail themselves of their statutory rights in court by invoking the legal process designed by Congress to protect them. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997) (the “primary purpose of antiretaliation provisions” is to “[m]aintai[n] unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms”).
This distctive purpose is not served by importing an “economic control” or an “economic realities” test as a line of demarcation into the issue of who may be held liable for retaliation. To the contrary, the FLSA itself recognizes this sensible distinction in section 215(a)(3) by prohibiting “any person” –not just an actual employer – from engaging in retaliatory conduct. By contrast, the FLSA’s primary wage and hour obligations are unambiguously imposed only on an employee’s de facto “employer,” as that term is defined in the statute. Treating “any person” who was not a worker’s actual employer as primarily responsible for wage and hour violations would be nonsensical…
Congress made it illegal for any person, not just an “employer” as defined under the statute, to retaliate against any employee for reporting conduct “under” or “related to” violations of the federal minimum wage or maximum hour laws, whether or not the employer’s conduct does in fact violate those laws. … Moreover, “the remedial nature of the statute further warrants an expansive interpretation of its provisions. …” Id. at 857 (second omission in original) (quoting Herman v. RSR Sec. Servs., 172 F.3d 132, 139 (2d Cir. 1999)).
In line with this reasoning, the court concluded:
The FLSA is “remedial and humanitarian in purpose. We are not here dealing with mere chattels or articles of trade but with the rights of those who toil, of those who sacrifice a full measure of their freedom and talents to the use and profit of others …. Such a statute must not be interpreted or applied in a narrow, grudging manner.” Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 597 (1944).
Accordingly, we conclude that Arias may proceed with this retaliation action against Raimondo under FLSA sections 215(a)(3) and 216(b). Raimondo’s behavior as alleged in Arias’s complaint manifestly falls within the purview, the purpose, and the plain language of FLSA sections 203(a), 203(d), and 215(a)(3).
Our interpretation of these provisions is limited to retaliation claims. It does not make non-actual employers like Raimondo liable in the first instance for any of the substantive wage and hour economic provisions listed in the FLSA. As illustrated by the Court’s opinion in Burlington, the substantive provisions of statutes like Title VII and the FLSA, and their respective anti-retaliation provisions, stand on distinctive grounds and shall be treated differently in interpretation and application. Ultimately a retaliator like Raimondo may become secondarily liable pursuant to section 216(b) for economic reparations, but only as a measure of penalties for his transgressions.
Click Arias v. Raimondo to read the entire opinion.
5th Cir.: Department Head Who Notified Employer of Potential FLSA Violations Did Not Engage in Protected Activity, Because She Did Not “Step Outside Her Normal Job Role”
Lasater v. Texas A & M University-Commerce
This case was before the Fifth Circuit on appeal of an order awarding the defendant summary judgment on plaintiff’s FLSA retaliation claim. Specifically, the plaintiff, a former department head for the defendant asserted that she was terminated for raising concerns regarding the defendant’s payroll policies (and failure to comply with the FLSA) to an independent auditor and later her supervisors. The court below held that plaintiff failed to allege that she had engaged in protected activity, because she was merely performing her duties for defendant when she reported her concerns regarding non-compliance. The Fifth Circuit agreed and affirmed the award of summary judgment for the defendant.
The Fifth Circuit recited the following factual history:
This case arises from TAMUC’s termination of Lasater’s employment in December 2009. From March 2006 to December 2009, Lasater was employed as the Director of the Office of Financial Aid and Scholarships at TAMUC. Prior to that, Lasater worked in the Financial Aid Department at Texas A & M University–Corpus Christi for 17 years.
In November 2008, Lasater met with Lori Ellison, an outside auditor from The Texas A & M University System who was conducting a regularly scheduled audit. During the meeting, Lasater alleges that Ellison asked her if she had any “concerns” and Lasater told her that “there were some things that were of concern to me and I felt like I needed to, in good faith, report some things that I thought were violations, including comp time.” Lasater alleges that in the course of the conversation with Ellison she discussed a number of problems related to the university’s employee compensatory time (“comp time”) policy. First, she was concerned that comp time had to be used before vacation time; because vacation time would be lost if not taken before the end of the year, this could in turn cause employees to lose accrued comp time. She also voiced her concerns that employees in her department had accrued large balances of comp time and were too busy for Lasater to allow them to timely use their comp time and still meet the demands of her office. Third, she specifically expressed her concerns about one of her employees, Diane Lewis, who had been promoted to a position within the department exempt from the overtime requirements of the FLSA and TAMUC had declined Lasater’s request that Lewis be paid for her accrued comp time after her promotion. Finally, Lasater alleges that she reported to Ellison her concerns about the operation of TAMUC’s Financial Services division, including its failure to “draw down” its allotted federal funds and the fact that it was not performing monthly reconciliations related to federal funds for financial aid. At the time of the meeting Lasater did not suggest to Ellison that TAMUC policies regarding comp time violated the FLSA or refer to any applicable law she believed had been violated.
Relevant TAMUC policy provides that employees who are not exempt under the FLSA may earn comp time for working more than forty hours per week; the policy requires component universities to compensate employees by giving them time off rather than paying them overtime. TAMUC policy also provided that administrators who supervise staff were to ensure that no employee accrue a comp time balance in excess of 240 hours and that, if necessary, employees were to use comp time before taking vacation time. Lasater, as a supervisor, had the responsibility for approving, and the authority to deny, employee leave requests. The policy also states that an employee who transfers between departments may, upon the department managers’ agreement, be paid for accumulated comp time but no policy required payment for comp time to an employee promoted within a department. TAMUC policy additionally provides that inquiries or interpretations of FLSA legal issues should be directed to the System Human Resources Office or the Office of General Counsel.
In December 2008, Ellison reported Lasater’s concerns up the chain of command to Lasater’s supervisor, Stephanie Holley; Mary Hendrix, Vice President for Student Access and Success; and Dan Jones, President of TAMUC. Lasater alleges that shortly after her conversation with the auditor Holley and Hendrix demanded to know why she had reported the comp time issue and began to act colder toward her, harassed her, increased their scrutiny of her, and forced her to take unqualified employees.
In May 2009, Holley gave Lasater a favorable evaluation, and in August, Lasatar received a merit raise. In September 2009, Holley and Hendrix met with Lasater and discussed their concerns about the need for a training manual, the role of Lewis, and how Lasater was not “allowing other people into [her] inner circle.” In early December 2009, Rose Giles, one of Lasater’s subordinates, approached Holley to discuss her frustration with the fact that she did not feel Lasater’s staff was properly trained. Holley then spoke with Susan Grove, the Assistant Director of Scholarships, who alleged that Lasater did not adequately train her staff, spent most of her time with co-employee Lewis to the exclusion of all others, repeatedly arrived late, and had a tendency to “lash out.” Grove stated that she was so distressed by Lasater’s management style that she was planning to leave the university. On December 15, 2009, Holley and Hendrix informed Lasater that her employment was terminated.
Discussing the type of behavior a management-level employee must engage in, for such behavior/activity to constitute “protected activity,” the court explained:
[T]his circuit has recognized that an employee’s communication does not constitute a complaint unless that employee “somehow steps outside of his normal job role” so as to make clear to the employer that the employee is “taking a position adverse to the employer.” Id. at 627–28. Such a requirement is “eminently sensible for management employees” because a managerial position “necessarily involves being mindful of the needs and concerns of both sides and appropriately expressing them.” Id. at 628. Thus, voicing “concerns is not only not adverse to the company’s interests, it is exactly what the company expects of a manger.” Id. (emphasis in original). Without such a requirement, “nearly every activity in the normal course of a manager’s job would be protected activity.” Id.
Illustratively, a personnel director responsible for monitoring compliance with workplace laws did not engage in protected activity when she discussed her “concerns about the company’s possible FLSA violations” with the president of the company. McKenzie v. Renberg’s Inc., 94 F.3d 1478, 1481 (10th Cir.1996). The Tenth Circuit found her “job responsibilities” included discussing wage issues and that assisting the company with FLSA compliance was “completely consistent with her duties.” Hagan, 529 F.3d at 627 (quoting McKenzie, 94 F.3d at 1487). It held that it is “the assertion of statutory rights (i.e., the advocacy of rights) by taking some action adverse to the company … that is the hallmark of protected activity.” Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting McKenzie, 94 F.3d at 1486). Thus because McKenzie “never crossed the line from being an employee merely performing her job as personnel director to an employee lodging a personal complaint about the wage and hour practices of her employer and asserting a right adverse to the company,” her discussion of her FLSA violation concerns with the president could not reasonably “be perceived as directed towards the assertion of rights protected by the FLSA.” Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting McKenzie, 94 F.3d at 1486–87).
Applying this standard to the facts at bar, the court held that the plaintiff failed to show she stepped outside of her normal job role in reporting her concerns regarding the defendant’s comp time system to the auditor and to her supervisors. Further, the court noted that even if she had, her actions could not reasonably be construed to have asserted FLSA rights on behalf of herself or the employees who were the subject of her conversations. Thus, the court affirmed summary judgment for the defendant.
Click Lasater v. Texas A & M University-Commerce to read the entire per curiam decision.
4th Cir.: Job Applicant Lacked Standing Under § 215 for Retaliation Against Prospective Employer; Protections Extend Only to “Employees”
Dellinger v. Science Applications International Corp.
Plaintiff commenced this action under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (“FLSA”) against Science Applications International Corporation which, she alleges, retaliated against her, in violation of the FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3), by refusing to hire her after learning that she had sued her former employer under the FLSA. As discussed here, the district court granted Science Applications’ motion to dismiss, concluding that Plaintiff was not an “employee” of Science Applications, as defined in the FLSA, and that the FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision does not cover prospective employees. On appeal, Dellinger contended that the district court’s reading of the statute was too narrow and that the FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision protects any employee that has been the victim of FLSA retaliation by “any person,” including future employers. Affirming the dismissal, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the FLSA gives an employee the right to sue only his or her current or former employer and that a prospective employee cannot sue a prospective employer for retaliation.
Rejecting the common sense approach proffered by the Plaintiff (and supported by the DOL, who filed an Amicus Brief in support of the Plaintiff), the Fourth Circuit reasoned:
“While § 215(a)(3) does prohibit all “persons” from engaging in certain acts, including retaliation against employees, it does not authorize employees to sue “any person.” An employee may only sue employers for retaliation, as explicitly provided in § 216(b). The use of the term “person” in § 215(a) is attributable to the structure of the provision, which prohibits a number of separate acts in addition to retaliation, not all of which are acts performed by employers. For instance, § 215(a)(1) prohibits any person from transporting “any goods in the production of which any employee was employed in violation of section 206 [minimum wages] or section 207 [maximum hours] of this title.” Thus, Congress prohibited the shipment of goods produced by employees who are paid in violation of the Act, and for enforcement, it authorized the criminal prosecution of any “person” violating the prohibition. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(a). Just as there is no remedy for an employee to sue such a shipper, there is also no remedy for an employee to sue anyone but his employer for violations of the anti-retaliation provision. Accordingly, if the person retaliating against an employee is not an employer, the person is not subject to a private civil action by an employee under § 216(b).
Considering the Act more broadly, we cannot overlook the fact that the FLSA was intended at its core to provide minimum wages and maximum hours of work to ensure employees a minimum standard of living necessary for “health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers.” 29 U.S.C. § 202(a). The anti-retaliation provision is included, not as a free-standing protection against any societal retaliation, but rather as an effort “to foster a climate in which compliance with the substantive provisions of the [FLSA] would be enhanced.” Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 293 (1960). Thus, the anti-retaliation provision was meant to ensure that employees could sue to obtain minimum wages and maximum hours from their employers without the employers taking adverse action against them for the exercise of those rights. This purpose is inherent in the employment relationship, which is the context in which the substantive provisions operate.
We have been unable to find any case that extends FLSA protections to applicants or prospective employees. Indeed, prior cases have reached the conclusion that we have, applying the anti-retaliation provision only within the employer-employee relationship. See, e.g., Glover v. City of North Charleston, S.C., 942 F.Supp. 243, 245 (D.S.C.1996) (noting that the “any employee” language in the anti-retaliation provision mandates that the plaintiff have an employment relationship with the defendant); Harper v. San Luis Valley Reg’l Med. Ctr., 848 F.Supp. 911 (D.Col.1994) (same); cf. Darveau v. Detecon, Inc., 515 F.3d 334, 340 (4th Cir.2008) (requiring, as part of a prima facie FLSA retaliation case, a showing of “adverse action by the employer”); Dunlop v. Carriage Carpet Co., 548 F.2d 139 (6th Cir.1977) (holding that an employee could sue his former employer when the former employer retaliated against the employee by advising a prospective employer that the employee had previously filed an FLSA suit).
We are sympathetic to Dellinger’s argument that it could be problematic to permit future employers effectively to discriminate against prospective employees for having exercised their rights under the FLSA in the past. The notion, however, that any person who once in the past sued an employer could then sue any prospective employer claiming that she was denied employment because of her past litigation would clearly broaden the scope of the FLSA beyond its explicit purpose of fixing minimum wages and maximum hours between employees and employers. We are, of course, not free to broaden the scope of a statute whose scope is defined in plain terms, even when “morally unacceptable retaliatory conduct” may be involved. Ball v. Memphis Bar–B–Q Co., 228 F.3d 360, 364 (4th Cir.2000).
Dellinger urges us to extend the FLSA’s definition of “employee” to protect job applicants, pointing to other statutes under which applicants are protected. In particular, she refers to the Energy Reorganization Act, the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), the Occupational Safety and Health Act (“OSHA”), and the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act. Reference to these statutes, however, does not advance her cause. The case cited by Dellinger with respect to the Energy Reorganization Act merely assumed, without deciding, that an applicant was covered under that Act. See Doyle v. Secretary of Labor, 285 F.3d 243, 251 n. 13 (3d Cir.2002). While the NLRA does protect prospective employees from retaliation, the Act itself defines “employee” more broadly than does the FLSA, providing that the term “employee” “shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer” unless explicitly stated. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3). With respect to OSHA and the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act, regulations implementing those statutes have been promulgated to extend protections to prospective employees. See 29 C.F.R. § 1977.5(b) (OSHA); 29 C.F.R. § 1981.101 (Pipeline Safety Improvement Act). The Secretary of Labor has not, however, promulgated a similar regulation for the FLSA.
Because we conclude that the text and purpose of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 link the Act’s application closely to the employment relationship and because the text of the applicable remedy allows for private civil actions only by employees against their employers, we hold that the FLSA anti-retaliation provision, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3), does not authorize prospective employees to bring retaliation claims against prospective employers. The judgment of the district court is accordingly affirmed.”
In a must-read strong dissent, authored by Judge King, he indicated that he would have reversed the dismissal at the district court below. Following a lengthy discussion of the parallels in this case to the Robinson case- in which the Supreme Court reversed an en banc decision of the Fourth Circuit and concluded that similar statutory text in Title VII should be read expansively to protect former employees- Judge King explained that he would have held that job applicants are protected by § 215. Judge King challenges the majority who he asserts ignored binding opinions from both the Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit in favor of what he calls their “textualist” approach:
“It is unlawful under the FLSA ‘for any person,’ not just employers, ‘to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any employee because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted … any proceeding under or related to this chapter[.]’ 29 U.S.C. § 215(a), –(a)(3). The Act criminalizes willful violations of § 215, and it also provides civil recourse to ’employees affected’ by the retaliatory acts described in subsection (a)(3). See § 216(a), –(b). Affected employees are entitled to “legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of” the antiretaliation provision, ‘including without limitation employment, reinstatement, promotion, and the payment of wages lost and an additional equal amount as liquidated damages.’ § 216(b). Liability attaches to ‘[a]ny employer,’ id., which ‘includes any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee .’ § 203(d).
A plain reading of these several sections of the Act, taken together, indicates that Congress was concerned enough with retaliatory conduct to impose criminal penalties on actual decisionmakers (“any person”), regardless of whether that person could also be considered the employing entity or was acting at the entity’s behest. Civil liability for retaliation, on the other hand, is reserved for employers and their agents who are sued by an “employee,” which generally means “any individual employed by an employer.” § 203(e)(1). Science Applications is undoubtedly an employer subject to the Act, and Ms. Dellinger broadly qualifies as an employee, having once sued her former employer for allegedly violating the FLSA. It does not follow perforce, however, that “Dellinger could only sue Science Applications if she could show … that Science Applications was her employer.” Ante at 7 (emphasis added).
It would hardly be a stretch to interpret the FLSA to permit Ms. Dellinger’s action, particularly considering that other, similar remedial statutes already apply to employees in her situation…
…I am therefore left to wonder why, in the face of a statute’s relative silence as to a material enforcement term, we must presume that a particular avenue is foreclosed because it is not explicitly mentioned, rather than permitted because it is not specifically prohibited. See Healy Tibbitts Builders, Inc. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 444 F.3d 1095, 1100 (9th Cir.2006) (“[F]aced with two reasonable and conflicting interpretations, [an act] should be interpreted to further its remedial purpose.”). The majority’s decision today bucks the trend begun by Robinson, which is indisputably toward an expansive interpretation of protective statutes like Title VII and the FLSA to thwart employer retaliation. See, e.g., Gomez–Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474, 491 (2008) (concluding that, under applicable provision of ADEA, federal employee may state claim for retaliation as form of discrimination); CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 457 (2008) (ruling that anti-discrimination provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 encompass action for retaliation); Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 178 (2005) (same with respect to Title IX).
Behind this impressive array of authority is the Supreme Court’s acknowledgment of the vital role that antiretaliation provisions play in regulating a vast range of undesirable behaviors on the part of employers. See, e.g., Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., Tenn., 129 S.Ct. 846, 852 (2009) (observing that fear of retaliation is primary motivation behind employees’ failure to voice concerns about bias and discrimination and reversing Sixth Circuit’s judgment in employer’s favor as inconsistent with primary objective of Title VII to avoid harm to employees) (citations omitted); Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57 (2006) (explaining that liability for Title VII retaliation extends well beyond those actions affecting terms and conditions of employment to include employer’s acts outside workplace that are “materially adverse to a reasonable employee or job applicant”). There is no reason to doubt that similar concerns obtain in the FLSA context, as expressed in Reyes–Fuentes v. Shannon Produce Farm, 671 F.Supp.2d 1365, 1368 (S.D.Ga.2009) (“Congress chose to rely upon information and complaints from employees seeking to vindicate their rights. Plainly, effective enforcement could thus only be expected if employees felt free to approach officials with their grievances”) (citations omitted).”
Given the strong dissent of Judge King, it is possible if not likely that this case might be headed to the Supreme Court. This is certainly one to keep an eye on.
Click Dellinger v. Science Applications International Corp. to read the entire Opinion and Dissent.
8th Cir.: Recording Overtime Over Defendant-Employer’s Objections Not Protected Activity Under 29 U.S.C. § 215
Ritchie v. St. Louis Jewish Light
Plaintiff brought this case under 29 U.S.C. § 215. Holding that informal complaints are not protected activity under the FLSA’s anti-retaliation provisions, the lower court dismissed and Plaintiff appealed, arguing that such informal complaints are protected activity. The Eight Circuit did not reach that issue however, because it held that Plaintiff had not even made such informal complaints, because it held continuing to record overtime worked, despite Defendants’ instructions not to does not constitute a “complaint.” As such, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision.
Reasoning that Plaintiff had not engaged in activity that would be protected under § 215, even if § 215 protected informal complaints, the court explained:
“We need not decide today whether informal complaints are protected activity under the FLSA because there is nothing in Ritchie’s verified federal court complaint that alleged that Ritchie made any sort of complaint to either Levin or St. Louis Jewish Light. The verified complaint alleged that:
7. Starting on or about May or June 2009, Levin asked Ritchie to perform work (“Work”) [formerly] performed by two employees by herself which Ritchie commenced to do.
8. Levin asked Ritchie to perform the Work without recording overtime.
9. The Work required that Ritchie perform overtime hours (more than 40 hours in a week) (“Overtime”) which Ritchie recorded.
10. Levin complained to Ritchie about her recording the Overtime and again requested that she perform the Work without recording overtime.
11. When Ritchie continued to record the Overtime, she was terminated by Levin and [St. Louis Jewish Light].
(Appellant’s App. at 1-2.)
Even assuming that informal complaints are sufficient to trigger the anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA, a legal conclusion we do not make, Ritchie failed to allege sufficient facts to indicate that she made even an informal complaint to either Levin or St. Louis Jewish Light. The only complaining asserted in her pleading goes the other way-Levin complaining to Ritchie. Ritchie asserts that she complained pursuant to the FLSA when she gave “Levin notice that she believed Levin’s instructions were a violation of the law because she, in fact, recorded the overtime hours in writing despite his orders not to record them.” (Appellant’s Reply Br. at 4.) In fact, rather than constituting an affirmative complaint that would trigger the anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA, her recording of her overtime could be nothing more than mere insubordination, she having been instructed to the contrary. Insubordination is not protected under the FLSA, and insubordination is not sufficient to trigger the anti-retaliation provision in 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3). As appellees’ counsel noted at oral argument, if merely recording one’s overtime is a “complaint” that triggers the anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA, an employer would not be able to discipline an employee for working unauthorized overtime so long as the employee recorded the overtime.
As the Supreme Court has recently said, the plausibility standard, which requires a federal court complaint “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face, … asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (internal quotation marks omitted). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]-‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ “ Id. at 1950 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)).
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the FLSA, Ritchie would have to show that she participated in statutorily protected activity, that the appellees took an adverse employment action against her, and that there was a causal connection between Ritchie’s statutorily protected activity and the adverse employment action. See Grey v. City of Oak Grove, 396 F.3d 1031, 1034-35 (8th Cir.2005). The facts pleaded in Ritchie’s complaint do not permit us to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct. Thus, Ritchie’s complaint merely alleged, but did not show, that Ritchie is entitled to relief.
Click Ritchie v. St. Louis Jewish Light to read the entire decision.