Clarke v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.

Before the Court in this FLSA/Overtime Law case was an application by defendant, J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. for an order compelling plaintiffs to return or destroy all copies of an e-mail message, dated December 3, 2007, allegedly sent from Defendant’s Global Technology Infrastructure Management Team (the “GTI Management Team”) to “all those in GTI who manage employees impacted by upcoming FLSA changes.” Defendants contended that the e-mail is protected by the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine and that the email, intended solely for senior management, was errantly forwarded to Plaintiffs, who it was not intended for. After considering arguments from both parties, the Court denied Defendant’s application, finding that the email lacked confidentiality and was not an attorney-client communication either.

First the Court addressed whether the email was in fact an “attorney-client communication”:

“Here, when distributed to management employees, the e-mail in question did not state that it was prepared by or was being sent from Gutfleisch; rather, the “sender” of the e-mail was identified only as the GTI Management Team. (Defendant’s 3/3/09 Letter, at Ex. A2.) Nor did the e-mail state that it contained privileged information. (Id.) Nor did it state that any of the information incorporated therein had been obtained from counsel, or was based on communications from counsel, or even that counsel had been consulted.(Id.) Nor did it state that the policy change reflected in the e-mail was intended to implement a recommendation of counsel. (Id.)

Defendant has the burden of establishing that the e-mail is privileged, see Mercator Corp. v. United States, 318 F.3d 379, 384 (2d Cir.2002), and, as a threshold matter, this includes showing that the recipients of the e-mail would have understood that it contained or referenced a communication from counsel. On this point, Defendant essentially asks the Court to assume that the recipients of the e-mail would have understood that the e-mail incorporated the advice of counsel because (1) the e-mail addressed the issue of FLSA compliance, (2) it noted facts regarding the IT employees’ job duties on which, according to Defendant, “no non-lawyer manager could ever have been expected to focus” (Defendant’s 3/3/09 Letter, at 4), and (3) it referenced litigation against other companies. Yet none of these aspects of the e-mail necessarily signaled to the recipients that the e-mail contained legal advice. Cf. Baptiste, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2579, at *7 (finding that it was “of no moment that the e-mail was not authored by an attorney or addressed to an attorney” where the e-mail at issue “was clearly conveying information and advice given to [its author] by … outside counsel”); see also id. at *2 (noting that the e-mail at issue specifically referenced the author’s having spoken with counsel).)

Indeed, all of the information in the e-mail could easily have been understood to have come from senior management, working in conjunction with Defendant’s human resources (“HR”) department, as can be seen from the follow-up memorandum that was apparently sent out by the HR department on or about December 11, 2007. (See Letter to the Court from Sam S. Shaulson, Esq., dated April 1, 2009 (“Defendant’s 4/1/09 Letter”) (enclosing the follow-up memorandum), and attachment thereto; Defendant’s 3/3/09 Letter, at Ex. A2 (noting that follow-up would be sent on December 11 from “Corporate Sector HR”).).  Not only does that second communication also fail to mention any involvement of counsel, but it suggests that the recipients tell the reclassified employees that “Human Resources and technology management partnered to conduct a review of Technology jobs to ensure they are classified consistently from an overtime eligibility standpoint.”(Defendant’s 4/1/09 Letter, attached exhibit, at TG00003.).  Further, this follow-up memorandum explains that the reclassification was being made because, “[a]s a normal practice, we periodically review our jobs to ensure we have them classified consistently.” (Id. at TG00006). There is no implication that this particular compliance review was actually conducted by counsel and that the upshot of the review was a recommendation by counsel to implement a reclassification. On the contrary, the plain implication of the communications, especially when read together, was that the determination to reclassify certain employees was made by HR and “management,” as part of their “normal practice.” (Id. at TG00003, TG00006).”

The Court then addressed the separate issue of confidentiality:

Even if the Court were to find that an attorney-client relationship existed between Gutfleisch and the recipients of the e-mail, the way in which the e-mail was written in any event undermines any argument that a privileged communication was made with the expectation that it be kept confidential. Although the e-mail did request that the recipients “not begin any communication to employees prior to receiving specific details on December 11” (see Defendant’s 3/3/09 Letter, at Ex. A2), the e-mail did not flag that any of its contents, in particular, were privileged and should not be communicated. Further, the December 11 follow-up memorandum (which, as stated above, was sent out by corporate HR) was plainly intended to provide guidance as to how to communicate with the employees whose positions had been reclassified; nothing therein identified any particular information that was supposed to be held back and not conveyed. (Defendant’s 4/1/09 Letter, at attached exhibit).  Thus, nothing about the original e-mail or its follow-up gave the recipients any indication that portions of the e-mail contained legal reasoning or legal advice that should be held in confidence.

Moreover, the fact that one or more of the affected employees actually obtained the e-mail in the course of their employment (see Declaration of Tapas Sarkar Regarding Letter Sent to Potential Class Members, dated Feb. 24, 2009 (“Sarkar Decl.”), at ¶¶ 2, 4-5, attached to Plaintiffs’ 2/24/09 Letter) bolsters the Court’s view that the recipients of the e-mail would not have been aware that it contained confidential legal advice.

At bottom, Defendant has not satisfied its burden of demonstrating that the recipients of the e-mail would have reasonably understood that its contents, or any specific portion of those contents, contained legal advice that was being communicated in confidence.”