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What Defines Commercial Motor Vehicles (CMVs) for Application of MCA Exemption Under Technical Corrections Act (TCA)? Courts Disagree
Two recent cases—one from the Eighth Circuit and one from a District court within the Ninth Circuit—continue to demonstrate that when it comes to application of the Motor Carrier Act’s exemption to the FLSA, for employees who drive commercial motor vehicles (CMVs) in interstate commerce, courts continue to be confused. Within days of the Eighth Circuit’s holding that it is the Gross Vehicle Weight Rating (GVWR) dictates whether a motor vehicle weighs 10,000 pounds or more, and thus reaches the threshold to be considered a CMV, a court in the District of Idaho held that the actual weight when loaded and not the GVWR dictates the weight for purposes of application of the MCA under the Technical Corrections Act (TCA). Both cases are discussed below.
8th Cir.: GVWR, Not Actual Weight, Is the Appropriate Criterion for Determining if the TCA Applies
McCall v. Disabled American Veterans
Initially, the Eighth Circuit discussed the historical background of the TCA, with respect to the MCA and SAFETEA-LU, the amendment that preceded the TCA:
Under the FLSA, “[e]mployees engaged in interstate commerce” are to be paid “one and one-half times” their regular salary rates for all work performed in excess of 40 hours per week. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). However, under the MCAE, the overtime-pay provision of § 207 does not apply to “any employee with respect to whom the Secretary of Transportation has power to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service pursuant to the provisions of section 31502 of Title 49.” 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(1). “The Secretary of Transportation may prescribe … maximum hours of service of employees of … motor carrier[s] and … motor private carrier[s].” 49 U.S.C. § 31502(b)(1) and (2). As relevant here, “motor private carrier” is a person “transporting property by motor vehicle when … the property is being transported for sale, lease, rent, or bailment or to further a commercial enterprise .” 49 U.S.C. § 13102(15)(C).
In 2005, the SAFETEA–LU amended the definition of “motor private carrier” to mean “a person, other than a motor carrier, transporting property by commercial motor vehicle (as defined in section 31132).” 49 U.S.C. § 13102(15) (2005) (emphasis added). Section 31132 defines a “commercial motor vehicle” as one which “has a gross vehicle weight rating or gross vehicle weight of at least 10,001 pounds, whichever is greater.” 49 U.S.C. § 31132(1). Therefore, following enactment of the SAFETEA–LU, the overtime-pay provision of § 207 began to apply to drivers of vehicles with a GVWR less than 10,001 pounds.
Reasoning that the TCA did not do away with SAFETEA-LU’s measure of 10,000 pounds by using the GVWR, the court explained:
In 2008, the TCA deleted the § 13102(15) reference to a “commercial motor vehicle (as defined in section 31132)” and inserted the more generic language “motor vehicle,” which is its current form. 49 U.S.C. § 13102(15) (2008). Section 306 of the TCA also extended FLSA overtime protections to “covered employees,” defined as individuals who are employed as motor private carriers, “who perform[ ] duties on motor vehicles weighing 10,000 pounds or less.” (Emphasis added). Pub.L. 110–244, Title III, § 306, 122 Stat. 1572, 1621 (2008). In the Bulletin, the Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division stated that it “will continue to use the gross vehicle weight rating2 (GVWR) or gross combined vehicle weight rating in the event that the vehicle is pulling a trailer” to determine if a vehicle is one “weighing 10,000 pounds” or less. Therefore, the overtime-pay provision of § 207 applies to vehicles with a GVWR of 10,000 pounds or less. We accord appropriate deference to this interpretation of the FLSA by the Secretary of Labor. See Donovan v. Bereuter’s, Inc., 704 F.2d 1034, 1036 (8th Cir.1983) ( “[T]he Secretary[ of Labor]’s interpretations are entitled to considerable weight.”).
McCall argues that he was a covered employee with overtime rights under the FLSA because the trucks that he operated actually weighed less than 10,000 pounds despite having GVWRs greater than 10,000 pounds. Upon review, we agree with the district court that GVWR, not actual weight, is the appropriate criterion for determining if the TCA applies to place a driver’s wage regulation under the FSLA rather than the Transportation Secretary. McCall operated trucks with GVWRs in excess of 10,000 pounds. He is not entitled to overtime under the FSLA.
Click McCall v. Disabled American Veterans to read the entire Opinion.
D.Idaho: Actual Weight, Not GVWR Determinative of Whether Vehicle Qualifies as CMV Under TCA
Garcia v. Western Waste Services, Inc.
In the second case, a court within the District of Idaho examined the identical issue and reached the opposite conclusion. That is the Idaho court held that the same regulation relied upon by the Eighth Circuit was not entitled to deference, because the statute at issue, the TCA, unambiguously eliminated SAFETEA-LU’s prior definition of a CMV (utilizing the GVWR) for vehicles not pulling a trailer. As such, the Garcia court held that the actual weight of the vehicle and not the GVWR dictates whether a vehicle is a CMV within the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Transportation (and whether the MCA applies).
Framing the issue, the court explained:
Garcia asserts that he is a “covered employee” under the TCA small vehicle exception due to his work as a mechanic and/or driver. To qualify for overtime pay as a mechanic, Garcia must show that: (1) he was a mechanic for a DOT-regulated motor carrier, (2) his work affected, in part, the safety of vehicles weighing 10,000 pounds or less, and (3) that the vehicles were in transportation in interstate commerce. Pub.L. No. 110–244, § 306(c). It is undisputed that Garcia worked as a mechanic for Western Waste, and that Western Waste is a DOT-regulated motor carrier. It is also clear that Garcia’s work affected the safety of all of Western Waste’s vehicles, which all travel in interstate commerce. Molitor Aff., ¶¶ 13–16, Dkt. 33–4. The main questions at issue are whether any of Western Waste’s vehicles weigh 10,000 pounds or less, and whether Garcia’s work on any such vehicles is sufficient to qualify him for the TCA exception.
Reasoning that the actual weight of the vehicle and not the hypothetical GVWR governs whether a vehicle meets the definition of a CMV under the TCA, the court explained:
(1) Vehicle Weight
The issue is how do you weigh a truck? Garcia asserts that Western Waste’s fleet has a number of service vehicles that weigh less than 10,000 pounds. Western Waste has 5 service vehicles that are used to transport portable toilets, run errands, and do service on other trucks and equipment. When the parties weighed three of Western Waste’s service vehicles on June 13, 2012, the actual weight of each vehicle, without a trailer, was less than 10,000 pounds. Thorne Aff., Dkt. 37–2. However, Western Waste argues that actual weight is not the appropriate measure of vehicle weight under the TCA. Instead, the GVWR or GCWR should be used. Western Waste points out that all of its service vehicles are equipped to pull, and regularly pull, a 5,740 pound trailer. Additionally, Western Waste states that there are several other trailers of unknown weight that the service vehicles regularly pull. Accordingly, Western Waste argues that all of its service vehicles have GCWRs that exceed 10,000 pounds.
The TCA does not specify how vehicle weight is to be determined. As mentioned above, SAFETEA–LU specifically provided that the GVWR or GCWR was used to determine vehicle weight. 49 C.F.R. § 390.5. The TCA dropped any reference to GVWR or GCWR, and simply refers to “motor vehicles weighing 10,000 pounds or less.” Thus, Congress appears to have abandoned the GVWR and GCWR standard for determining availability of the exemption.
After Congress passed the TCA, the Department of Labor (“DOL”) issued Field Assistance Bulletin No.2010–2 (“the Bulletin”) to explain its interpretation of the TCA. Specifically, the Bulletin announced that the Wage and Hour Division “will continue to use the [GVWR] or [GCWR] in the event that the vehicle is pulling a trailer” to determine vehicle weight. Id. This raises the question of whether the Bulletin’s interpretation of the TCA is entitled to deference.
After a discussion of the types of deference that a court owes to administrative regulations of that administrations own regulations, the court rejected DOL’s interpretation of the TCA, and held that the regulation at issue (defining the weight of a CMV) was unambiguous:
Under these standards, the Court concludes’ that the DOL’s interpretation of the TCA is not entitled to deference. It is not an attempt to interpret its own ambiguous regulation, and therefore is not entitled to deference under Auer. Additionally, it is not entitled to Chevron deference. When Congress enacted the TCA, it had the language of the SAFETEA–LU before it, and chose not to rely upon GVWR or GCWR to measure a vehicle’s weight for purposes of the TCA exception. In the Court’s view, the language in the TCA is not ambiguous. Therefore, the DOL’s interpretation, which is contrary to the plain language of the statute, is not warranted.
Moreover, the DOL Bulletin is not persuasive and runs afoul of the charge that the TCA exception be construed broadly. The DOL offers no explanation as to why it will continue to use GVWR or GCWR, despite the clear language of the statute not adopting that standard. Furthermore, using GVWR or GCWR narrows the number of employees covered by the TCA exception. Such a reading does not allow the Court to construe the TCA exception “to apply to the furthest reaches consistent with Congressional direction.” Klem, 208 F.3d at 1089. Therefore, in absence of any guidance from Congress and “a specific definition in the TCA, the ordinary meaning of ‘weight’ controls.” Glanville v. Dupar, Inc., CIV.A. H–08–2537, 2009 WL 3255292, *8 (S.D.Tex. Sept. 25, 2009).
Even under the ordinary meaning of weight, however, the weights of a truck and trailer which are commonly used together should be combined. Id. (holding that because the plaintiffs “operated vehicles, truck and trailer combined, with an actual weight of greater than 10,000 pounds,” the TCA was inapplicable). When Western Waste’s service vehicles are combined with the trailer, they exceed 10,000 pounds. However, there are unresolved factual questions as to whether all of the service trucks actually pull the trailer. Garcia contends that only one of the service trucks pulled the trailer during his employment. Garcia Decl., ¶ 4, Dkt. 37–1. Garcia’s allegations raise doubt as to whether all of the trucks should have a weight rating combined with the trailer. If vehicles # 25 and # 27 do not pull the trailer, as Garcia asserts, then they will have an actual weight and GVWR under 10,000 pounds. Thus disputed issues of fact remain.
Click Garcia v. Western Waste Services, Inc. to read the entire Memorandum Decision and Order.
Although not discussed here, the courts also fell on opposite sides of the “mixed fleet” question. For anyone facing this issue—whether an employee who drives both CMVs and non-CMVs for his or her employer within the same week—you would be well-advised to read these opinions on that issue as well.