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LPNs, Commercial Cleaners and Cable Installers: Recent Decisions Continue to Clarify That So-Called “Independent Contractors” May Actually Be Employees Under the FLSA
As the workforce becomes more and more aware of the differences between true independent contractors and employees under the FLSA—the latter entitled to minimum wages and overtime premiums under the FLSA—courts continue to address this factually intensive issue in a variety of industries. However, as many FLSA practitioners are no doubt aware, certain industries seem to have more than their fair share of employers who misclassify their employees as independent contractors. In 3 recent cases, all from within the Eleventh Circuit, courts addressed the issue of independent contractor misclassification. Significantly, all of the cases held that—under the FLSA’s very wide definition of employment, each of the workers at issue were employees (or in one case reversed the lower court’s ruling otherwise). Because the decisions themselves are factually intensive inquiries, the facts of each case are discussed in detail below.
M.D.Fla.: LPNs Employees Not Independent Contractors
Solis v. A+ Nursetemps, Inc.
The first case discussed here concerned the defendant-employer’s misclassification of its LPN (licensed practical nurse) employees as independent contractors. Following a bench trial, the court held that the LPNs were employees and not independent contractors as the employer had maintained. Analyzing the issue, the court explained:
The Eleventh Circuit cases clearly establish that the “economic realities test” is the standard to be applied in determining whether a worker is an employee covered by the FLSA, or is an independent contractor who is not covered by the Act. Medrick v. Albert Enterprises, Inc., 508 F.2d 297 (5th Cir.1975); Villarreal v. Woodham, 113 F.3d 202 (11th Cir.1997); Freund v. Hi–Tech Satellite, Inc., 185 Fed. Appx. 782 (11th Cir.2006).9
See also Antenor, 88 F.3d 925 (applying the economic realities test in resolving a joint employer issue under the FLSA).
Each of those pertinent Eleventh Circuit decisions recite various factors to be considered in applying the economic realities test, and the lists are not identical. All of the cases agree, however, either implicitly or explicitly, that “[n]o one of these considerations can become the final determinant, nor can the collective answers to all of the inquiries produce a resolution which submerges consideration of the dominant factor—economic dependence.” Freund, supra, 185 Fed. Appx. at 783 (quoting Usery v. Pilgrim Equip. Co., 527 F.2d 1308, 1311 (5th Cir.1976)).
The factors listed in the cases include: (a) whether the alleged employer had the power to hire and fire the workers in question; (b) whether the alleged employer supervised and controlled the employee work schedules or conditions of employment; (c) whether the alleged employer determined the rate and method of payment; (d) whether the alleged employer maintained work time records; (e) whether the worker performed a specialty job requiring specialized training or skill; (f) whether the contractual terms of the employment varied in a material way as one worker succeeded another; (g) whether the workers had business organizations that could offer the worker’s services to others; (h) whether the alleged employer supplied the premises and/or the equipment necessary to perform the work; (i) whether the worker employed others to assist in performing the job; (j) the employee’s opportunity for profit or loss depending upon management skill; (k) the degree of permanency or duration of the working relationship; and (l) the extent to which the service rendered by the worker is an integral part of the employer’s business.
Applying each of the factors, the court reasoned:
(a) The right to hire and fire. The Court interprets this factor (taken from Villarreal, supra ) to require an examination of whether the employer has retained the usual common law right to hire and fire at will, or has placed limitations on those rights by contract as would often be the case in dealing with an independent contractor and a contractual clause imposing liability or a penalty for cancellation of the work. Here, of course, Nursetemps has sole control with respect to the selection of nurses to be assigned to shifts, and may withhold such assignments if it pleases. Just as the nurses are under no obligation to take assignments, Nursetemps is under no obligation to make them.
(b) Control of work schedules and supervision of the work. This factor (also taken from Villarreal, supra ) has two aspects as applied to this case. Control of the work schedules, in terms of assigning work to the nurses, is in the hands of Nursetemps. Supervision of the work, however, is not. That control is in the hands of the client facility, not Nursetemps. Thus, as stated earlier, if the common law test applied, Nursetemps would have a stronger case. In the context of an FLSA examination, however, this division of control does not help the nurses’ independent contractor argument because control of the work does not shift to the nurses, it shifts to another entity (which may thereby become a joint employer, Antenor v. D & S Farms, supra,) but it does not mean that the nurses thereby become independent contractors.
(c) Determining the rate and method of payment. In an independent contractor relationship, the independent contractor normally has at least an equal say in the rate to be charged for particular work by bidding on the job or by posting or advertising standard rates for the work to be performed. Here, by contrast, it is Nursetemps that fixes the hourly rate it will pay the nurses for each shift or each assignment. Individual nurses have the right to negotiate with respect to the rate they will earn, but Nursetemps retains the upper hand in deciding the rate it will pay; and it is Nursetemps that pays the nurses, not the facility where the work is performed.
(d) Maintenance of time records. While the nurses keep their own time records, they are paid by the hour, and such records are turned in to and maintained by Nursetemps (albeit not in full compliance with 29 C.F.R. § 516.2) for the purpose of calculating the nurses’ pay. Stated another way, the nurses are not paid a flat rate or piece rate per shift. They are hourly employees.
(e) Performance of a specialty job requiring specialized training or skill. While it cannot be denied that the work of a nurse requires highly specialized training and skill, such work in this society is not necessarily a specialty job in the sense that members of the public do not typically seek them out for private or individual engagements; rather, the nurses involved in this case work, instead, on an hourly basis in institutional settings like the hospices, hospitals and detention facilities.
(f) Variation in terms of employment. There is no evidence of any variation in the terms of employment as one worker succeeds another. Nurses are assigned to work shifts for rates established by Nursetemps and (subject to occasional negotiation of rates with an individual nurse) remain the same from nurse to nurse, shift to shift, week to week.
(g) Business organization for offering nurses services to others. While some of the nurses formed limited liability or corporate entities, the evidence is that those who did so were acting at the suggestion of Nursetemps, and the existence of such entities did not change the practical day-to-day relationship between Nursetemps and the nurses in any way. Also, the formation of such entities did not lead any of the nurses to use them as a vehicle to offer their services as entrepreneurs to other health care providers or to the public in general.
(h) Premises and equipment. Nursetemps does not supply the premises on which the work is accomplished, but neither do the nurses. The equipment necessary for the nurses to do their work—stethoscopes, blood pressure cuffs, thermometers and uniforms are provided by the nurses who also bear the cost of their continuing educational requirements.
(i) Employment of others. The nurses do not employ others to assist them in the performance of their work.
(j) Opportunity for profit. The nurses are paid by the hour for shift work. There is no opportunity for additional income or profit through the exercise of managerial skill or increased efficiency in the manner or means of accomplishing the work.
(k) Permanency of the relationship. A majority of Nursetemps nurses have accepted work assignments on a regular basis for a year or more.
(l) Whether the nurses work is an integral part of Nursetemps business. The work performed by the nurses is more than an integral part of Nursetemps’ business, it is the whole of Nursetemps’ business.
Per its analysis of each of the factors, the court concluded:
Consideration of the foregoing factors, both individually and collectively, leads inexorably to the conclusion that Nursetemps nurses are employees for purposes of the FLSA, not independent contractors. The same result is reached when one simply steps back to take a common sense look at the nature of the relationship between Nursetemps and the nurses. While it is certainly true that the nurses enjoy a degree of flexibility in their working lives, not shared by many in the work force, including an enhanced ability to “moonlight” by working for more than one agency at a time and by choosing when and where to make themselves available for work, the simple fact remains that when the nurses are available for work they are dependent upon Nursetemps to provide it, and when they are working on assignment for Nursetemps they are, during those workweeks, employees of Nursetemps.
Click Solis v. A+ Nursetemps, Inc. to read the entire Memorandum Opinion Including Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
S.D.Fla.: Commercial Contractors Were Employees Not Independent Contractors
Robles v. RFJD Holding Co., Inc.
In a second recent case, a court in the Southern District of Florida was asked to decide whether commercial cleaners were employees or independent contractors, as the employer-defendant claimed. Applying the same test as the court above, the court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and denied the defendant’s motion—holding that the defendant had misclassified the commercial cleaners as independent contractors. Discussing the factors regarding its determination on the issue the court explained, in part:
1. Control of the Manner of Performing Work
When an alleged employer provides “specific direction for how workers, particularly lowskilled workers, are to perform their jobs, courts have weighed the control factor in favor of employee status.” Montoya v. S.C. C.P. Painting Contractors, Inc., 589 F.Supp.2d 569, 579 (D.Md.2008) (finding factors such as the provision of supervision of painters, instruction in what paint to use and how many coats to apply, and on-the-job training to be indicative of employee status). Similarly, the provision of written instructions and procedures for how to complete the job also indicates employee status. See Schultz v. Capital Int’l Sec., Inc. ., 466 F.3d 298, 307 (4th Cir.2006) (finding an eight-page standard operating procedure document outlining job tasks indicative of employee status); Solis v. Int’l Detective & Protective Serv., Ltd., 819 F.Supp.2d 740, 750 (N.D.Ill.2011) (finding a policy and procedure handout coupled with close monitoring of workers’ compliance with the procedures indicative of control). The provision of training likewise indicates an employee-employer relationship. See Gate Guard Servs. L.P. v. Solis, 2013 WL 593418, at *4 (S.D.Tex. Feb.13, 2013) (noting the significance of training and observing that the non-provision of training indicates an independent-contractor relationship). Finally, supervision need not be constant to establish an employee-employer relationship. See Brock v. Superior Care, Inc., 840 F.2d 1054, 1060 (2d Cir.1988) (citing Donovan v. DialAmerica Mktg., Inc., 757 F.2d 1376, 1383–84 (3d Cir.1985)) (“An employer does not need to look over his workers’ shoulders every day in order to exercise control.”).
Here, the facts demonstrate that Defendants exercised substantial control over the manner of performing work. Defendants trained the cleaning crews in how to clean specific items, including what tools to use; they provided the crews with extensively detailed checklists of what to clean and how often to do so; they initially monitored the crews’ performance on-site and in person for an entire week; and, although there is some dispute as to how often any particular supervisor visited and inspected a specific restaurant,2 it is undisputed that Defendants’ supervisors regularly supervised the cleaning crews’ work. Viewed together, this all suggests that Defendants closely controlled the manner of Plaintiffs’ work as an employer would. While Defendants—as all businesses to some degree—may certainly have been concerned with “customer satisfaction,” Defendants manifested that concern through closely controlling and monitoring Plaintiffs’ work habits and methods. Accordingly, the first factor weighs in favor of finding that Plaintiffs were “employees” under the FLSA.
2. Opportunity for Profit or Loss Depending on Managerial Skill
Turning to the second half of the inquiry on this factor, the Court notes that Defendants do not point to any opportunity for loss that Plaintiffs risked. The opportunity for loss must extend beyond the mere threat of lost wages and must involve the risk of losing a capital investment. See Lauritzen, 835 F.2d at 1536;
Clincy v. Galardi S. Enters., Inc., 808 F.Supp.2d 1326, 1345–46 (N.D.Ga.2011). Beyond the occasional purchase of negligible cleaning supplies and tools, which is insufficient to present a risk of loss, Plaintiffs invested practically nothing but their labor in their cleaning work. See Lauritzen, 835 F.2d at 1536. To the extent that Defendants may contend that the back charges that they imposed on cleaning crews when customers were dissatisfied represent losses, see D.E. 56–1 at 9, the Court rejects this argument. Such back charges are not attributable to any discretionary managerial decision but, rather, are the result of poor cleaning performance.
When viewed as a whole, Plaintiffs’ opportunities to increase their profits support the idea that they were independent contractors, but the absence of any real risk of loss suggests Plaintiffs were “employees.” This factor is a wash.
3. Investment in Required Equipment or Materials and Employment of Workers
As discussed above, Plaintiffs were permitted to hire individuals on their own to accomplish their cleaning tasks but were not required to do so. D.E. 56–2, ¶ 5; D.E. 68–1, ¶ 5. During their fourteen-month tenure with Emmaculate, Plaintiffs Robles and Ulloa hired an individual only one time to help with their cleaning work. D.E. 56–2, ¶ 27; D.E. 68–1, ¶ 27. Plaintiffs’ investment in additional labor was minimal—even aberrant—and not indicative of independence. See Usery, 527 F.2d at 1312 (“Occasional exercise of the right to hire helpers also has not been found sufficiently indicative of independence to allow a finding of nonemployee status.”)…
Here, Plaintiffs made admittedly minimal purchases rather than large-scale investments in supplies and equipment. The lack of Plaintiffs’ substantial investment in equipment and materials tips in the direction of finding employee status.
4. Whether the Service Rendered Requires Special Skills
As other courts have found, cleaning services such as those provided by Plaintiffs require no special skills. See Quinteros v. Sparkle Cleaning, Inc., 532 F.Supp.2d 762, 770 (D.Md.2008); see also Usery, 527 F.2d at 1314 (“Routine work which requires industry and efficiency is not indicative of independence and nonemployee status.”). Defendants’ arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. To the extent that Defendants suggest experience is required to do Plaintiffs’ work, D.E. 67 at 7, the Court does not agree that experience is, or is equivalent to, a specialized skill, and Defendants point to no authority that suggests otherwise. See Lauritzen, 835 F.2d at 1537 (citing Brock v. Lauritzen, 624 F.Supp. 966, 969 (E.D.Wis.1985) (holding that the development of occupational skill through experience “is no different from what any good employee in any line of work must do”). Put another way, one can quickly and easily develop experience at routine, unspecialized tasks…
Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of finding employee status.
5. Permanency and Duration of the Working Relationship
The ability to readily reject jobs is not reflective of the permanency found in an employee-employer relationship and supports finding an independent-contractor relationship. On balance, the duration and permanency factor tips slightly in favor of Defendants.
6. The Extent to Which the Service Is an Integral Part of the Alleged Employer’s Business
Next, the Court considers the extent to which Plaintiffs’ cleaning services were an integral part of Defendants’ business. It is undisputed that Emmaculate is a “commercial cleaning business specializing in restaurant cleaning.” D.E. 56–2, ¶ 1; D.E. 68–1, ¶ 1. As Plaintiffs provide the cleaning services that Defendants’ offer, Plaintiffs’ services are indisputably integral, if not essential, to Defendants’ business. While Defendants attempt to cursorily dismiss this factor as “not determinative of one’s employee’s status,” D.E. 56–1 at 11, the reality is that this factor informs the inquiry as much as any other factor listed here. Freund, 185 F. App’x at 784;
Scruggs v. Skylink, Ltd., 2011 WL 6026152, at *8 (S.D.W.Va. Dec.2, 2011) (“Generally, the more integral the work, the more likely the worker is an employee, not an independent contractor.” (citation omitted)). Consequently, this factor weighs strongly in favor of finding an employee relationship.
Having weighed each of the factors, the court concluded that the commercial cleaner workers were defendant’s employees, as a matter of law:
Upon consideration of the six factors above and the circumstances as a whole, the Court finds that Plaintiffs were dependent on Defendants in their economic relationship and are considered employees under the FLSA. The fact that Robles and Ulloa worked exclusively for Emmaculate during their fourteen-month association highlights Plaintiffs’ economic dependency on Defendants. Further, Defendants’ significant control and supervision of Plaintiffs’ work habits and methods, Plaintiffs’ minimal capital investments and nonexistent risk of loss, Plaintiffs’ dependence on Emmaculate to find and engage restaurants to be cleaned, the lack of a need for specialized skills, and the integral and essential nature of Plaintiffs’ services to Defendants’ business all describe a relationship with the character of one between an employee and an employer, notwithstanding the few indicia of independent-contractor status found on the record. Taken together, these facts demonstrate that Plaintiffs were not in business for themselves but were, instead, dependent on Defendants for their continued employment in the restaurant-cleaning business. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is granted on this point, and Defendants’ motion is denied.
Click Robles v. RFJD Holding Co., Inc. to read the entire Order on Motions for Summary Judgment.
11th Cir.: Cable Installers May Be Employees; Summary Judgment For Employer Reversed
Scantland v. Jeffrey Knight, Inc.
The final case was before the Eleventh Circuit on the appeal of cable installer employees, following the district court’s order in which it held that the installers were independent contractors rather than employees, notwithstanding many cases holding to the contrary on similar facts. Applying the economic realities test discussed above, and taking the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs (as the non-movants), the Eleventh Circuit held that a reasonable jury could find that the cable installers were employees under the FLSA. As such, the court reversed the decision below and remanded the case for trial on the issue.
Weighing the various factors, the court explained:
The first factor considers the nature and degree of the alleged employer’s control as to the manner in which the work is to be performed. Control is only significant when it shows an individual exerts such a control over a meaningful part of the business that she stands as a separate economic entity. Usery, 527 F.2d at 1312–13. The facts, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, indicate that Knight exercised significant control over plaintiffs such that they did not stand as separate economic entities who were in business for themselves.
Technicians were required to report to a Knight facility by 7:00 to 7:15 each morning. Technicians would turn in equipment from the previous day and submit their work orders, which included the billing codes that determined their pay for particular jobs. These billing codes were set by Knight, and managers could unilaterally change the codes that technicians reported, thereby reducing a technician’s pay.4 Plaintiffs would also receive a route detailing the current day’s work orders, which were generally assigned in two-hour timeslots. Though plaintiffs’ Independent Contractor Service Agreements provided that they could decline any work assignments, plaintiffs testified that they could not reject a route or a work order within their route without threat of termination or being refused work in the following days. Thus, while a technician might consider a specific route or work order unprofitable, because, for example, it was low-paying or far away, plaintiffs had no power to decline the assignment. Technicians also might be required to attend quality control meetings and classes on new equipment or participate in a monthly equipment inventory conducted by BHN, which required technicians to unload their trucks and account for all BHN equipment. This morning routine could last up to two hours. Plaintiff Sperry testified that he had to arrive by 5:30 a.m. in order to make it to his first job assignment on time. During occasional downtime, technicians could request additional jobs; they could also be required to assist other technicians or be assigned additional jobs that they could not refuse. Technicians might be required to stay on the job until all the technicians in their area had completed their work; they could also be called back to jobs long after completing them to address problems. Plaintiffs could upsell by convincing customers to add additional BHN services, but those orders had to be approved by Knight. Plaintiffs could not sell non-BHN services to customers and could not work for other companies, either because they were told they could not do so or because the schedule Knight imposed prevented them from doing so. Plaintiffs could, according to their contract, employ others to help them, but any such employees had to be technicians already engaged by Knight, and were therefore bound by Knight’s policies. Plaintiffs were subject to meaningful supervision and monitoring by Knight. Technicians routinely communicated with dispatch during the day and were required to log in and out of Work Force Management—a service on their cellular phones that they paid for via payroll deductions—to indicate when they arrived on a job, when they completed a job, and what their estimated time of arrival was for their next job. Knight or BHN also conducted site checks of technicians’ work, and Knight tracked technicians’ quality control discrepancy rate. Technicians with consistent quality control issues could be given remedial training at a mock house or they could be terminated. An installation manager also might counsel a technician regarding his physical appearance or the appearance of his vehicle. Knight levied uncontestable fines called chargebacks for not meeting specifications, not using Work Force correctly, misplacing inventory, or being late to a job. Typically, $100 would be deducted from the technician’s pay for chargebacks on residential jobs and $150 for commercial jobs. Plaintiff Downs testified that chargebacks could mount up to the point where they surpassed the amount of money a technician could earn on a job. Technicians could also be downloaded, i.e., fired, for consistently misbilling, fraudulently billing, stealing, having a bad attitude, having consistently low quality control ratings, and being rude to customers, other technicians, or Knight employees. Knight’s Jill Williams testified that she and another installation manager had downloaded more than one hundred technicians. Plaintiff technicians worked five to seven days a week; some were required to work six days a week and sometimes seven days a week because of a requirement that they work rotating Sundays. Plaintiffs regularly worked more than forty hours a week.7 Technicians either had to inform their supervisors that they would be taking time off or request time off in advance, sometimes in writing.
In sum, Knight controlled what jobs plaintiffs did, how much they were paid, how many hours they worked, how many days they worked, their daily work schedule, whether they could work for others, whether they could earn additional income from customers, and closely monitored the quality of their work. Plaintiffs could not bid for jobs or negotiate the prices for jobs. Their ability to hire and manage others was illusory. This alleged control strongly suggests that the plaintiffs were economically dependent upon Knight…
B. Opportunity for Profit or Loss
The second factor considers the alleged employee’s opportunity for profit or loss depending upon his managerial skill. The facts, taken in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, indicate that plaintiffs’ opportunity for profit or loss depended more upon Knight’s provision of work orders and technicians’ own technical skill and efficiency than their managerial skill.
Plaintiffs’ opportunity for profit was largely limited to their ability to complete more jobs than assigned, which is analogous to an employee’s ability to take on overtime work or an efficient piece-rate worker’s ability to produce more pieces. An individual’s ability to earn more by being more technically proficient is unrelated to an individual’s ability to earn or lose profit via his managerial skill, and it does not indicate that he operates his own business. As the Supreme Court has explained, a job whose profits are based on efficiency is more like piecework than an enterprise that actually depend[s] for success upon the initiative, judgment or foresight of the typical independent contractor. Rutherford Food, 331 U.S. at 730, 67 S.Ct. at 1477. Technicians could not negotiate or otherwise determine the rates they were paid for jobs. In fact, the billing codes they submitted were subject to unilateral change by Knight. They were also subjected to uncontestable chargebacks that could wipe out their earnings from a single job.12 Knight’s argument that plaintiffs could control losses by avoiding chargebacks is unpersuasive. Chargebacks relate to the quality of a technician’s skill, not his managerial or entrepreneurial prowess. Plaintiffs’ ability to earn additional income through their own initiative was limited. Though plaintiffs could upsell, any jobs added to a work order by a technician had to be approved by Knight, and plaintiffs testified that the extra income was minimal and often not worth the additional effort. Plaintiffs could not sell non-BHN services to customers, nor work for other companies because of either a flat prohibition or because the schedules demanded by Knight prevented them from pursuing other work. Plaintiffs were able to exert some control over their opportunity for profits by pairing up to complete jobs and trading jobs among each other, but this ability was ultimately limited by the number and types of jobs Knight assigned them and whether Knight’s assigned schedule permitted them time to do so. Furthermore, as previously discussed, though the parties’ contract provided that technicians could hire helpers, this authority was illusory. Any helpers were required to be contracted with Knight as technicians, thus precluding the exercise of any real managerial skill over such helpers.
Assuming factual inferences in favor of plaintiffs, and in light of the minimal opportunity for profit (and that being little different from the usual path of an employee), this factor suggests economic dependence, and points strongly toward employee status.
C. Investment in Equipment or Materials
The third factor considers the alleged employee’s investment in equipment or materials required for his task, or his employment of workers. This factor favors independent contractor status, although it does so only weakly.
As previously discussed, technicians’ ability to employ workers was illusory. As regards investment in equipment and materials, Knight provides, via BHN, the hardware that is actually installed in customers’ homes and businesses, such as cable boxes, DVRs, and cable modems. Technicians are required to have vehicles, auto insurance, tools and safety equipment, and commercial general liability insurance. However, in light of the fact that most technicians will already own a vehicle suitable for the work and that many technicians purchased specialty tools from Knight directly via payroll withholdings, there seems to be little need for significant independent capital and very little difference from an employee’s wages being increased in order to pay for tools and equipment. Furthermore, even though a technician who initially bought his tools from Knight and paid for them via withholdings has some economic independence when the tools are paid for, it is analogous to the independence any employee has who has gained experience and the ability to market himself to competing employers.
In sum, these expenditures seem to detract little from the worker’s economic dependence on Knight, which is the lens through which we evaluate each of the several factors. Thus, to the extent that this factor weighs in favor of independent contractor status, the weight in that direction is minimal.
D. Special Skill
The fourth factor considers whether the service rendered requires a special skill. This factor favors independent contractor status, but it does so only weakly.
Plaintiffs were clearly skilled workers. The meaningfulness of this skill as indicating that plaintiffs were in business for themselves or economically independent, however, is undermined by the fact that Knight provided most technicians with their skills. Technicians could come to Knight from other installation outfits or be completely inexperienced. Most technicians, however, were inexperienced and underwent some length of unpaid training by Knight, which was followed by some period of unpaid ride-alongs with experienced technicians, before performing work on their own. Robert Collins, a former Knight installation manager, testified that Knight generally provided about two weeks of training and technicians did about a week of ride-alongs, and he estimated that only 10 to 15 percent of technicians did not require training.
Plaintiffs were, therefore, dependent upon Knight to equip them with the skills necessary to do their jobs. The skills attained by technicians point toward a degree of economic independence insofar as a highly trained technician could gain economic independence by the ability to market his skills to a competing employer. This does not, however, significantly distinguish such a worker from the usual path of an employee. To the extent that this factor favors independent contractor status, it does so weakly.
E. Permanency and Duration
The fifth factor considers the degree of permanency and duration of the working relationship. This factor points strongly toward employee status.
Named plaintiffs worked for Knight for an average of more than five years. Their contracts were for year terms, were automatically renewed, and were terminable only with thirty days’ notice. These facts suggest substantial permanence of relationship…
Assuming factual inferences in favor of plaintiffs, and looking through the lens of economic dependence vel non, long tenure, along with control, and lack of opportunity for profit, point strongly toward economic dependence. Thus, this factor strongly indicates employee status.
F. Integral Part of Alleged Employer’s Business
The sixth and final factor considers the extent to which the service rendered is an integral part of the alleged employer’s business. This factor weighs clearly and strongly toward employee status.
Approximately two-thirds of Knight’s business consists of the telecommunications installation and repair services it performs for BHN. Knight relies on approximately five hundred technicians to perform installations and repairs in BHN customers’ homes and businesses. Knight’s website described its Installation Services department as the backbone of its business.
The integral role played by technicians in Knight’s business shows that the arrangement follows more closely that of an employer-employee relationship than an independent contractor dynamic. If Knight had truly outsourced such a large portion of its business, as would be true if plaintiffs were independent contractors, then the company would retain far less control over the business. However, because of Knight’s concern with the quality of the services it provides through this arrangement, it does, as one might expect, control the relationship in much the same way a company would control its employees. The technicians’ integral part in Knight’s business follows the usual path of an employee.
Assuming factual inferences in favor of plaintiffs, this factor points strongly toward employee status.
Given these factual circumstances, the Eleventh Circuit concluded:
When all the facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs and all reasonable inferences are drawn in their favor, four of the six factors weigh strongly in favor of employee status. The two factors that do not—investment and special skill—weigh only very slightly toward independent contractor status. Neither contributes in any significant manner to the workers’ economic independence or to distinguishing the workers from the usual path of an employee. Thus, we conclude that, viewing the facts most favorably toward plaintiffs and with all justifiable inferences drawn in their favor, plaintiffs were employees—not independent contractors—under the FLSA. Because there are genuine issues of material fact, and because plaintiffs were employees if all reasonable factual inferences are found in plaintiffs’ favor, the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Knight.
Click independent contractor misclassification for more information on industries where employees are frequently misclassified as independent contractors.
11th Cir.: Student Externs, Required to Complete Externship in Order to Graduate, Were Not “Employees”
Kaplan v.Code Blue Billing & Coding, Inc.
This case was before the court on the consolidated appeal of three student externs who sued the administrators of their respective externships asserting that they had not been paid proper minimum wages. The courts below had all granted the respective defendants summary judgment, holding that the plaintiffs could not satisfy the “economic reality” test, and therefore they were not “employees” subject to the FLSA’s coverage. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, applying the DOL’s six-factor test applicable to trainees. In so doing, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ contentions that the defendants benefitted from their work, while they essentially received no academic or monetary benefit.
The court reasoned:
Although Kaplan and O’Neill argue that their externship experiences were of little educational benefit, they did in fact engage in hands-on work for their formal degree program. Kaplan and O’Neill also received academic credit for their work and, by completing an externship, were eligible to earn their degrees.
Kaplan and O’Neill argue that, because they were performing tasks for Defendants’ businesses, Defendants benefitted economically from their work. The undisputed evidence, however, demonstrates that Defendants’ staff spent time—time away from their own regular duties—training Plaintiffs and supervising and reviewing Plaintiffs’ work. Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs caused Defendants’ businesses to run less efficiently and caused at least some duplication of effort. Defendants received little if any economic benefit from Plaintiffs’ work. Thus, under the “economic realities” test, Plaintiffs were not “employees” within the meaning of the FLSA. See New Floridian Hotel, Inc., 676 F.2d at 470.
The Eleventh Circuit applied the DOL’s six factor test, derived from the Supreme Court’s decision in Portland Terminal—pertinent to determining whether a trainee qualifies as an employee under the FLSA, to reach its holding.
As explained in footnote 2, under the Administrator’s test, a trainee is not an “employee” if these six factors apply:
(1) the training, even though it includes actual operation of the facilities of the employer, is similar to that which would be given in a vocational school; (2) the training is for the benefit of the trainees; (3) the trainees do not displace regular employees, but work under close supervision; (4) the employer that provides the training derives no immediate advantage from the activities of the trainees and on occasion his operations may actually be impeded; (5) the trainees are not necessarily entitled to a job at the completion of the training period; and, (6) the employer and the trainees understand that the trainees are not entitled to wages for the time spent in training. Wage & Hour Manual (BNA) 91:416 (1975); see also Donovan v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 686 F.2d 267, 273 n. 7 (5th Cir.1982).
Reasoning that the externs at issue were not “employees” the court concluded:
The externship programs at Code Blue and EFEI satisfy all six of the Administrator’s criteria. The training provided was similar to that which would be given in school and was related to Plaintiffs’ course of study. The training benefitted Plaintiffs, who received academic credit for their work and who satisfied a precondition of graduation. Both Kaplan and O’Neill were supervised closely and did not displace Defendants’ regular employees. Defendants received no immediate advantage from Plaintiffs’ work and, at times, were impeded by their efforts to help train and supervise Plaintiffs. And both Kaplan and O’Neill admit that they were unentitled to a job after their externships and that they understood that the externship would be unpaid.
Click Kaplan v.Code Blue Billing & Coding, Inc. to read the entire decision.
10th Cir.: Employee Who Performed Work Afterhours for Employer Through His Separate Company Held to be Independent Contractor for Afterhours Work
Barlow v. C.R. England, Inc.
Following an order granting the defendant summary judgment, the plaintiff appealed. As discussed here, the issue before the Tenth Circuit regarding the plaintiff’s FLSA claim, was whether he was properly deemed to be an independent contractor for janitorial work her performed for his employer afterhours, while the same employer deemed him to be an employee for security work he performed during the day. In a decision lacking much by way of reasoning, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the court below and held that the defendant’s dual classification for the two different types of duties performed was valid.
The Tenth Circuit laid out the pertinent facts as follows:
In February 2005, Barlow began working as a part-time security guard at a Denver maintenance yard operated by England, a large trucking company. Barlow patrolled England’s grounds for about thirty hours a week, from 6:30 P.M. to 5:00 or 6:00 A.M. Friday through Sunday nights. Most of the yard was fenced in, accessible through an automatic overhead gate. Barlow also performed maintenance and ground work to try to reach 40 hours of work per week.
After Barlow had been at England for about a year and a half, he asked the facility’s site manager, John Smith, for extra work. Smith, who had initially hired Barlow, was not satisfied with England’s janitorial contractor at that time, so he asked England’s personnel department about having Barlow take over. Smith was told he could not allow Barlow to work any more hours because the company would have to pay overtime.
To get around this, Smith suggested Barlow create a company England could contract with. Barlow formed E & W Janitorial & Maintenance Services, LLC. Beginning in February 2007, Barlow cleaned for England on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Saturdays, pursuant to an oral agreement with Smith. On a few occasions, his girlfriend, a co-owner of E & W, filled in. England provided his cleaning supplies, but did not require Barlow clean in any particular order. England, the only company for which E & W worked, paid $400 a month for E & W’s services.
Without much reasoning regarding this portion of the plaintiff’s claim, the court held:
We also agree with the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment against Barlow regarding his FLSA claims. Barlow argues that he performed his janitorial work as an employee under the FLSA, and that he was therefore entitled to overtime pay. But applying the “economic realities” test of employee status, we conclude that Barlow was not a statutory employee for purposes of the FLSA.
The “economic realities” test seeks to look past technical, common-law concepts of the master and servant relationship to determine whether, as a matter of economic reality, a worker is dependent on a given employer. Baker v. Flint Engineering & Const . Co., 137 F.3d 1436, 1440 (10th Cir.1998). “The focal point in deciding whether an individual is an employee is whether the individual is economically dependent on the business to which he renders service, or is, as a matter of economic fact, in business for himself.” Doty v. Elias, 733 F.2d 720, 722–23 (10th Cir.1984) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). “In applying the economic reality test, courts generally look at (1) the degree of control exerted by the alleged employer over the worker; (2) the worker’s opportunity for profit or loss; (3) the worker’s investment in the business; (4) the permanence of the working relationship; (5) the degree of skill required to perform the work; and (6) the extent to which the work is an integral part of the alleged employer’s business.” Baker, 137 F.3d at 1440. It also “includes inquiries into whether the alleged employer has the power to hire and fire employees, supervises and controls employee work schedules or conditions of employment, determines the rate and method of payment, and maintains employment records.” Id. “None of the factors alone is dispositive; instead, the court must employ a totality-of-the-circumstances approach.” Id.
Some factors favor Barlow, while other factors favor C.R. England, but, ultimately, we agree with the district court that Barlow was an independent contractor. Barlow and his partner created a licensed, limited liability company in order to provide janitorial services. Cf. Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U .S. 722, 730 (1947) (classifying as employees speciality group of production line workers in part because “[t]he group had no business organization that could or did shift as a unit from one slaughter-house to another”). Barlow kept records for the company, opened a separate bank account, and filed a corporate tax return. The district court also noted Barlow had the “freedom to decide how to accomplish” his tasks, even if the company reviewed the ultimate work product. 816 F.Supp.2d at 1107. Indeed, little in the case indicates the relationship between Barlow and C.R. England materially differed from one the company would have with any other cleaning service except for the fact Barlow also happened to otherwise be an employee. This suggests Barlow was in business for himself as a janitor, and we therefore affirm the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment.
Click Barlow v. C.R. England, Inc. to read the entire decision.
E.D.Mo.: Where Common Tip Pool Violations Alleged, Employees of Franchise Stores as Well as Those at Company-Owned Stores Similarly Situated at Stage 1
White v. 14051 Manchester, Inc.
This case was before the court on the plaintiffs’ motion for conditional certification. As discussed here, the plaintiffs sought to facilitate class notice to employees who worked at the franchise locations of the franchisee who employed them, as well as those who worked for “Hotshots” franchisor or company-owned locations. In support of their motion, plaintiffs argued that all tipped employees at all Hotshots locations, regardless of the owner, were required to participate in illegal tip pools whereby they were required to tip out back-of-the-house employees not eligible to participate in a valid tip pool. Rejecting the defendants’ argument that the court should limit the putative class to those tipped employees employed by the franchisee who employed plaintiffs the court explained, that it would be inappropriate to resolve the merits issue regarding which entities employed each putative class member at Stage 1.
Discussing this issue the court opined:
The Supreme Court has noted that whether a relationship is covered by the FLSA turns on the economic realities of the working relationship rather than technical definitions relating to employment. Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coop., Inc., 366 U.S. 28, 33, 81 S.Ct. 933, 6 L.Ed.2d 100 (1961). The FLSA defines “employee” broadly to include “any individual employed by an employer.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1)(2006). In turn, “employ” is defined as “to suffer or permit to work” 29 U.S.C. § 203(g), and an “employer” is any person “acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(d). “Thus, based on the language of the statute, an employee is any individual who is permitted to work by one acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer.” Helmert v. Butterball, LLC, No. 4:08CV00342, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28964, at *6 (E.D.Ark. Mar. 5, 2010); see also Nicholson v. UTi Worldwide, Inc., No. 3:09–cv–722, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41886, at *3 (S.D.Ill. Apr. 18, 2011)(conditionally certifying class of “forklift operators employed” by defendant that included workers hired through temporary staffing agencies).
The Court finds that, for purposes of this Motion, Defendants “permitted or suffered to work” all Hotshots employees, even those at the franchise locations. Given the FLSA’s broad definition of the “employee” and its remedial purpose, Defendants’ franchise arrangement demonstrates sufficient “control” for conditional class certification. Moreover, the employment relationship for franchise employees is disputed by the Plaintiffs, and the Court cannot make credibility determinations at this juncture. See Arnold v. DirecTv, Inc., No. 4:10–CV–352–JAR, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140777, at *8 (E.D.Mo. Sept. 28, 2012)(“The Court will not make any credibility determinations or findings of fact with respect to contradictory evidence presented by the parties at this initial stage.”).
The Court also finds that the proper class definition is all Hotshots employees who shared in any tip pool. Employees who participated in the tip pool were allegedly victims of the same policy or plan and denied compensation as a result of the tip-pooling arrangement. While the Court acknowledges that distinctions exist among the Hotshot’s teams and locations, Plaintiffs’ affidavits provide enough evidence at this stage to demonstrate employees were similarly situated and subject to a common practice. McCauley, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91375, at *12–13 (citing Busler v. Enersys Energy Products, Inc., No. 09–00159, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84500, at *9–10, 2009 WL 2998970 at *3 (W.D.Mo. Sep. 16, 2009)); see also Fast v. Applebee’s Intern., Inc., 243 F.R.D. 360, 363–64 (W.D.Mo.2007) (citations omitted) (“To be similarly situated, however, class members need not be identically situated. The ‘similarly situated’ threshold requires only a modest factual showing.”); Schleipfer v. Mitek Corp., No. 1:06CV109, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64042, at *9 (E.D.Mo. Aug. 29, 2007)(class members need not be identically situated). “[A]rguments concerning the individualized inquiries required and the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims are inappropriate at this stage of the proceeding and can be raised before the Court at the second, or decertification, stage.” Dominquez v. Minn. Beef Indus., No. 06–1002, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61298, at *10 (D.Minn. Aug. 21, 2007)(internal quotation omitted).
Click White v. 14051 Manchester, Inc. to read the entire Memorandum and Order.
With the uptick in FLSA case filings in recent years, a previously rarely litigated issue- whether certain types of workers are volunteers or “employees” subject to FLSA coverage- has increasingly come under judicial scrutiny. And, while case law has long interpreted the FLSA in a liberal manner, with the stated purpose of erring on the side of coverage for workers, two recent cases demonstrate that definition is not without its limits. In the first case, the domestic partner/girlfriend of a Domino’s Pizza store manager helped the manager with his management duties, in the hopes that eventually such efforts would lead to the partner’s advancement within the company. In the second case, an alumni for a public high school served as a mentor to students following his graduation from school. As discussed below, in both cases, the courts employed the “economic reality” test, and held that the workers were volunteers as opposed to employees.
Emanuel v. Rolling in the Dough, Inc.
In the first case, the plaintiff- apparently the girlfriend of the general manager of a Domino’s franchise store- assisted her boyfriend in his duties as the general manager. After the boyfriend’s employment with the defendant ceased, the plaintiff sought renumeration for all of the work she had previously performed on behalf of defendants, while he boyfriend had been employed. Interestingly, it appears from the style of the case that the defendants- who denied that the plaintiff was ever their employee- sought to bring a claim for indemnification/contribution against the boyfriend by impleading him as a third-party defendant. Looking at the totality of the circumstances, the court concluded that she was a volunteer and not an employee under the FLSA. Thus, the court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
Elucidating the relevant facts, the court explained that at some point in 2007, the plaintiff (Emanuel) told her boyfriend that she wanted to work at the store he managed on behalf of the defendants. Apparently, the plaintiff wanted to help with her boyfriend’s effort to become a Domino’s Pizza franchise owner.In response the boyfriend said he’d have to speak to the defendants about Emanuel working at the Elmhurst store. Thereafter, the boyfriend conveyed to Emanuel that defendants “believed your talents can be better utilized somewhere else.” Nonetheless, sometime later, the boyfriend (Shafer) communicated to Emanuel that she could begin working at the Elmhurst store. Significantly, the plaintiff acknowledged that she could not have worked in the store pursuant to the defendants anti-nepotism policy and that defendants would have told her to “get the hell out of my store,” had they known she was performing work in the store.
It was undisputed that neither the defendants, nor plaintiff’s boyfriend or anyone for that matter, ever promised plaintiff any compensation for the work she performed.
Ultimately, the plaintiff’s boyfriend and defendants got into a dispute regarding their agreement about his [plaintiff’s boyfriend’s] compensation, and as a result both plaintiff and her boyfriend ceased working for defendants. Subsequently, she filed the lawsuit, seeking compensation for the approximately 3 years of work she performed on behalf of defendants (and her boyfriend).
Laying out the elements of the “economic reality” test, the court explained:
Courts look to the totality of the circumstances when determining whether an individual is an “employee” under the FLSA and examine the “economic reality” of the working relationship. See, e.g., Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806, 808 (7th Cir.1992). Courts have considered a variety of factors when examining the “economic reality” of a purported employment relationship, though none are dispositive or controlling. Secretary of Lab. v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1534 (7th Cir.1987). Six commonly applied factors are: (1) the nature and degree of the alleged employer’s control as to the manner in which the work is to be performed; (2) the alleged employee’s opportunity for profit or loss depending upon his managerial skill; (3) the alleged employee’s investment in equipment or materials required for his task, or his employment of workers; (4) whether the service rendered requires a special skill; (5) the degree of permanency and duration of the working relationship; and (6) the extent to which the service rendered is an integral part of the alleged employer’s business. Id. at 1534–35.
Rejecting the plaintiff’s contention that she was defendants’ “employee,” the court reasoned:
“Here, plaintiff Emanuel advances an absurd position. Emanuel argues that defendant Lindeman’s repeated statement that he would not pay her to work at the Elmhurst store was not a refusal to hire her as an employee, but an offer for her to work for free. Since Emanuel claims to have worked at the Elmhurst store without compensation and without [defendants] forcibly ejecting her from the store or otherwise preventing her from working, it is her position that an employment relationship impliedly exists.” However, noting the no one ever promised plaintiff compensation and that her work likely violated one or more of defendants corporate policies, the court held it was unreasonable for plaintiff to believe she was actually their employee, rather than a volunteer. Thus, the court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
Click Emanuel v. Rolling in the Dough, Inc. to read the entire Memorandum Opinion and Order.
Brown v. New York City Dept. of Educ.
In the second case, the plaintiff, Brown, graduated from the New School for Arts and Sciences, a high school that shared space with Banana Kelly. After graduation, Brown maintained ties with Banana Kelly and occasionally came in to visit former teachers. In October 2007, when Plaintiff expressed an interest in mentoring students, the school offered Plaintiff the opportunity to do so at Banana Kelly. Neither Brown nor the school raised the issue of compensation at this time, and neither discussed Brown’s employee status. No one interviewed Brown about his background or qualifications. Thereafter, the plaintiff went to Banana Kelly and continued at the school for more than three years, finally leaving in December 23, 2010, apparently because he was being investigated for inappropriate conduct related to his comments to a freshman student. During his time at the school, with minor exceptions, the plaintiff reported five days a week throughout the academic year, working 7-8 hours per day on a regular basis.
Citing the fact that the plaintiff never submitted to the normal, legal requirements for employment by the Department of Education: application, interview, background check, job classification, and assignment, the court rejected plaintiff’s assertion that he was an employee, because he expected compensation for his services. Although it was undisputed that the defendant told plaintiff that there was not enough money in the budget to pay him, according to the plaintiff, defendant promised that he would attempt to search the budget for the funding.
Again, looking at the “economic realities” and the totality of the facts of the situation, the court held that plaintiff was a volunteer and not an employee, subject to FLSA coverage. Thus, the court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
The court gave the following overview of the analysis applicable to the issue:
Whether one is a volunteer is to be determined “in a common-sense manner, which takes into account the totality of the circumstances surrounding the relationship between the individual providing services and the entity for which the services are provided.” Purdham, 637 F.3d at 428;City of Elmendorf, 388 F.3d at 528; Todaro, 40 F.Supp.2d at 230. Accordingly, courts should review “the objective facts surrounding the services performed to determine whether the totality of the circumstances establish volunteer status, or whether, instead, the facts and circumstances, objectively viewed, are rationally indicative of employee status.” Purdham, 637 F.3d at 428. The court then examined 2 factors to determine whether the plaintiff was an employee or a volunteer. First, the court considered whether Brown performed the tasks at Banana Kelly for “civic, charitable, or humanitarian reasons,” pursuant to 553.101(a).
Looking at this factor, the court reasoned:
One is a volunteer, if motivated by an altruistic sense of civic duty, see Krause, 969 F.Supp. at 276, as opposed to the expectation of compensation, see Rodriguez, 866 F.Supp. at 1019. When the situation is one of mixed motives, “the regulatory definition does not require that the individual be exclusively, or even predominantly, motivated by ‘civic, charitable or humanitarian reasons. Rather, what is required is that the individual must be motivated by civic, charitable or humanitarian reasons, at least in part.” Purdham, 637 F.3d at 429 (citing Todaro, 40 F.Supp. at 230); see also Benshoff v. City of Virginia Beach, 9 F.Supp.2d 610, 623 (E.D.Va.1998) (finding that firefighters were volunteers when motivated primarily, but not exclusively, by civic, charitable and humanitarian concerns). Here, Brown accepted Jerome’s offer to mentor, in part, because he wanted “[s]omeone … to stand up, and make a change, and show the kids that we do care.” (Welikson Dec. Ex. C, Brown Dep. at 35:21–22.) He felt that the school needed the change because in his experience as a student, “nobody cared” (id. 35:14–17). This motivation remained unchanged as Brown started performing non-mentorship tasks. Brown testified that he helped with lunch duty, dismissals and escorting students despite his displeasure with being asked because he wanted to be a “team player” and that he “want[ed] to help and [he] care[d].” (38:14–39:5.) He felt obligated because he did not want to “let[ ] the school down.” (id. at 150:20–22.) These statements show a continued civic and charitable intent to improve the environment at Banana Kelly. At the same time, Brown testified that he worked because he believed (“hoped”) that money was forthcoming. (Okoronkwo Dec. Ex. 13 Brown Dep. 231:18–19). Accepting Brown’s acknowledgements, the Court turns to whether, in this mixed motive case, Brown acted at least in part, by the proper humanitarian concerns. See Purdham, 637 F.3d at 429. Plaintiff’s testimony shows that his actions at Banana Kelly, had their source, at least in part, in his concern for what would become of students if he did not show up, and was thus properly motivated.
Next the court looked at whether there was a “promise, expectation or receipt of compensation for services rendered.” 29 C.F.R. § 553.101(a). Noting that plaintiff was not compensated, was not offered “under-the-table” compensation, and was not promised compensation, the court concluded that the plaintiff had no reasonable expectation of compensation. Looking at all the circumstances the court concluded that:
There is ample evidence that Brown knew and understood, despite his hopes to the contrary, that he would not be compensated. Brown admitted that he understood that he would not get paid for mentoring. No one led Plaintiff to believe that he would get paid for non-mentoring tasks. Laub testified that he had conversations with Plaintiff in which he relayed to Brown that he was volunteer and intern. Banana Kelly gave him certificates of appreciation that acknowledged his services as an intern and volunteer which Brown accepted without objection. While labels used by the parties do not control the outcome (P. Opp. at 11), the parties’ understanding of their arrangement is a relevant factor in the totality-of-circumstances analysis. See Rodriguez v. Township, 866 F.Supp. 1012, 1020 (S.D.Tex.1994) (declining to hold that the plaintiff was a volunteer in part because both parties understood their relationship as an employment, rather than volunteer, relationship).
Taking all of the circumstances into consideration, the court concluded that the plaintiff was a volunteer.
Click Brown v. New York City Dept. of Educ. to read the entire Opinion and Order.
11th Cir.: Joint Enterprises’ Cumulative Gross Revenues Properly Considered For Enterprise Coverage Analysis Where All Corporate Defendants Working For Common Purpose and Plaintiffs’ Work Furthered Purpose
Cornell v. CF Center, LLC
This was an appeal from a jury verdict in favor of the Appellees for Appellants’ alleged failure to pay overtime in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). The issue on appeal was whether the trial court property added together the gross revenues of the various Defendants, in order to determine that the “joint enterprises” met the $500,000.00 requirement for enterprise coverage.
The Court framed the issue as follows:
“While [Plaintiffs] worked primarily for CF Center, LLC, they contend that the corporate entities were, as a matter of economic reality, jointly engaged in the floor covering business and acted as their joint employers. The corporate Appellants-owned by Jay Meltzer before he sold his interest to Nicholas Elliot-contend that the district court improperly allowed Cornell and Harp to conflate and combine separate corporate entities in order to meet the annual gross sales requirement of the FLSA and establish joint liability. Appellants argue that Cornell and Harp failed to meet their burden at trial to establish that they were improperly denied overtime pay. Appellants now appeal the district court’s denial of their motion for judgment as a matter of law on these points. Appellants further appeal the district court’s denial of their motion for a new trial based on their claim that the jury’s verdict was against the great weight of the evidence.”
Reasoning that the trial court properly considered the cumulative gross earnings of all Defendants, the Eleventh Circuit explained:
“This court has broadly construed the coverage requirements under the FLSA. The FLSA allows for coverage under a joint enterprise theory. Donovan v. Easton Land & Dev., Inc., 723 F.2d 1549, 1551 (11th Cir.1984). The FLSA states, “ ‘Enterprise’ means the related activities performed (either through unified operation or common control) by any person or persons for a common business purpose, and includes all such activities whether performed in one or more establishments or by one or more corporate or other organizational units including departments of an establishment operated through leasing arrangements, but shall not include the related activities performed by such enterprise by an independent contractor….” 29 U.S.C. § 203(r). In Patel v. Wargo, we explained that “the legislative history of the FLSA and the case law demonstrate that the enterprise analysis was included in the FLSA solely for the purpose of expanding the scope of coverage of the statute. The legislative history clearly states the congressional purpose to expand the coverage of the Act, i.e., to lump related activities together so that the annual dollar volume test for coverage would be satisfied.” 803 F.2d 632, 636 (11th Cir .1986). The enterprise and liability analyses are distinct. “The finding of an enterprise is relevant only to the issue of coverage. Liability is based on the existence of an employer-employee relationship.” Id. at 637.
Appellants claim that their separate tax identifications, banking accounts, and tax returns establish that they are not engaged in a joint enterprise. Questions such as these, however, require courts to “look beyond formalistic corporate separation to the actual pragmatic operation and control, whether unified or, instead, separate as to each unit.” Donovan v. Grim Hotel Co., 747 F.2d 966, 970 (5th Cir.1984). Cornell and Harp have provided a wealth of evidence to show that, practically speaking, the corporate defendants functioned as a single unit for the purpose of selling and installing flooring. Business cards issued by the Appellants identify the business simply as “Coastal Floors” without identifying a particular corporate entity. Furthermore, these cards refer to locations in Port St. Lucie, Vero Beach, and Stuart. CF Center is located in Vero Beach, whereas Granite by Coastal is in Port St. Lucie. Granite by Coastal banners were hung in CF Center’s showroom. Moreover, the corporations share a website which, like their business cards, treats the corporations interchangeably, listing four business locations without indicating which corporation is located in which city. A liability release signed by Harp includes a number of the corporate defendants, contradicting their claim that there is no relationship between them. Harp, upon beginning his employment with CF Centers, was required to sign a safety policy that listed his employer as Coastal Floors I, Inc. Meltzer summed up the business reality best when he testified regarding the companies’ health plan, stating, “Contractors Flooring was an existing company for tax purposes. Coastal Floors-see, Contractors Flooring was probably the initiator of the plan early, early on. Coastal Floors I, II or III were established-I don’t know if my bookkeeper had made a name change to the policy as required or not. I own them all, so I don’t think it mattered.” (R.117 110:13-18.) This evidence was more than sufficient to allow coverage under the FLSA subject to an enterprise analysis.
While the question of liability is different than coverage under the FLSA, many of the same factors support both the district court and the jury’s finding that, effectively, Cornell and Harp were employed by all of the entities. As with the joint enterprise analysis, whether a party qualifies as a joint employer for liability purposes depends on whether “as a matter of economic reality, the individual is dependent on the entity.” Antenor v. D & S Farms, 88 F.3d 925, 929 (11th Cir.1996). Under the FLSA “[a] determination of whether the employment by the employers is to be considered joint employment or separate and distinct employment for purposes of the act depends upon all the facts in the particular case.” 29 CFR 791.2. This case-by-case inquiry turns on no formula, but the court will consider factors such as control, supervision, right to hire and fire, ownership of work facilities, investment, and pay-roll decisions. Antenor, 88 F.3d at 932-37.
It is clear from the evidence discussed above that the multiple corporate defendants were acting in one purpose, a purpose that the employment of Cornell and Harp furthered. Appellants often conflated what corporation conducted what activity. This confusion included matters of employment, as evidenced by the Coastal Floors I safety plan and Contractors Flooring health plan applying to CF Centers’s employees. Appellants’ argument that these companies are completely separate ignores the economic reality analysis required by the FLSA. Thus, the district court’s refusal to grant Appellants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law was proper.
Nor did the district court abuse its discretion in denying Appellants’ motion for a new trial. Appellants’ claim that the jury verdict was against the great weight of the evidence appears to be based almost entirely on their contention that the jury gave too much weight to the testimony of Cornell and Harp and should have found them not credible. But as this court has said before, “we do not assume the jury’s role of weighing conflicting evidence or inferences, or of assessing the credibility of witnesses.” Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 421 F.3d 1169, 1177 (11th Cir.2005). Cornell and Harp testified in detail regarding their claims that they were not permitted to take lunch breaks and were not compensated for this extra hour of work. While Appellants were able to solicit testimony from Cornell and Harp that possibly contradicts some of their claims, it was for the jury to assess their credibility. While Appellants may believe that the jury came to the wrong conclusion, they have failed to show that the great weight of the evidence so undermines the jury’s decision as to warrant a new trial, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying one.
Accordingly, for the aforementioned reasons, we affirm the district court’s order denying Appellants’ motion for a judgment as a matter of law and the order denying Appellants’ motion for a new trial.”
Click Cornell v. CF Center, LLC to read the entire opinion.
9th Cir.: Complaint That Failed To Allege Entity Exercised Control Over Nature And Structure Of The Employment Relationship Did Not Properly Allege Defendant Was “Employer”
Dianda v. PDEI, Inc.
Plaintiff-appellant Joseph Dianda worked for two days as a “best boy” in the production of a television commercial, but was allegedly paid three days late. Dianda sued the production company and PDEI, Inc. (“PDEI”) for various violations under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and California law. In the case below, all defendants moved to dismiss the action. The district court denied the motion as to the production company, but granted the motion as to PDEI after determining that PDEI was not Dianda’s “employer” under the FLSA or California law. Dianda appealed and the 9th Circuit affirmed, discussing the requirements for an “employer” under both the FLSA and California law. Here, because the Complaint failed to adequately allege that PDEI exercised control over the nature and structure of the Plaintiff’s employment, the Court affirmed the dismissal as to PDEI.
“I. ‘Employer’ Status Under California’s Labor Code and FLSA
The essence of the test for “employer” status under the California Labor Code is “whether the principal has the right to control the manner and means by which the worker accomplishes the work.” Estrada v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 327, 335 (Cal.Ct.App.2007). FLSA’s test is broader, asking whether the “individual [here, PDEI] exercises control over the nature and structure of the employment relationship.” Boucher v. Shaw, 572 F.3d 1087, 1090-91 (9th Cir.2009) (quotation marks omitted).
Dianda has not shown that PDEI had the right to control the details of his work or that PDEI exercised control over his employment relationship. In his deposition, Dianda admitted that PDEI did not tell him how to do his job, PDEI did not hire him, PDEI did not terminate him, PDEI never communicated with him in any way, and Dianda never took instructions or directions from PDEI concerning the commercial. Nonetheless, Dianda argues that his pay stub and W-2 form identify PDEI as the “employer.” However, “[t]he parties’ label is not dispositive and will be ignored if their actual conduct establishes a different relationship.” Estrada, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d at 335-36. See also Real v. Driscoll Strawberry Assocs., Inc., 603 F.2d 748, 755 (9th Cir.1979) (“Economic realities, not contractual labels, determine employment status for the remedial purposes of the FLSA.”). Furthermore, PDEI’s alleged use of its own account to pay wages and PDEI’s maintenance of payroll records are explainable as part of the service it provides as a payroll company. See, e.g., Moreau v. Air France, 356 F.3d 942, 950-52 (9th Cir.2004) (determining that Air France was not a joint employer of contracted service workers where Air France’s involvement was to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements).”
M.D.Fla.: Cable Installer Is An Employee Not An Independent Contractor Of Contractor To Cable Company
Parrilla v. Allcom Const. & Installation Services, LLC
This matter came before the Court after a one-day bench trial on the issue of whether Plaintiff, was an independent contractor, and thus exempt from the overtime compensation requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act (the “FLSA”). In its decision, on this highly litigated issue, the Court held that Plaintiff was an employee, notwithstanding Defendant’s argument otherwise, after reviewing the six factor “economic reality” test.
Initially the Court laid out the oft-used test:
“In determining whether an individual is an employee or independent contractor, the United States Supreme Court has explained that lower courts must consider the “economic realities” of the parties’ relationship-not the labels or formalities by which the parties characterize their relationship. See generally Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 67 S.Ct. 1473, 91 L.Ed. 1772 (1947); see also Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126, 130, 67 S.Ct. 1547, 91 L.Ed. 1947 (1947). The Eleventh Circuit has noted that the following factors guide this inquiry:
(1) the nature and degree of the alleged employer’s control as to the manner in which the work is to be performed;
(2) the alleged employee’s opportunity for profit or loss depending upon his managerial skill;
(3) the alleged employee’s investment in equipment or materials required for his task, or his employment of workers;
(4) whether the service rendered requires a special skill;
(5) the degree of permanency and duration of the working relationship; and
(6) the extent to which the service rendered is an integral part of the alleged employer’s business.
Freund v. Hi-Tech Satellite, Inc., 185 F. App’x 782, 783 (11th Cir.2006) (unpublished) [hereinafter “Freund”] (quoting Sec’y of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1535 (7th Cir.1987)); see also 29 C.F.R. § 500.20(h)(4).”
The Court then discussed its factual findings as applied to the six factor test:
“A. Nature and Degree of Control Exerted by Defendant Over Plaintiff
The testimony and record evidence in this case establishes that Defendant exerted significant control over Plaintiff. Specifically, Defendant controlled Plaintiff’s daily work schedule, the type of work Plaintiff performed, the amount of time Plaintiff could take off from work, and the manner in which Plaintiff carried out his work.
Defendant determined Plaintiff’s daily work schedule, the resulting number of hours that Plaintiff worked, and the type of jobs that Plaintiff performed. Defendant required Plaintiff to arrive at its place of work at approximately 7:30 a.m. each day; Defendant would then hand Plaintiff a list of work orders to perform for the day. Plaintiff had no control over the work orders that he received, the types of jobs that he could perform or the order in which he carried out the work orders. Plaintiff could not, for instance, perform work orders relating only to Internet service. He had to carry out the work orders that Defendant gave him and in the order that Defendant specified. Furthermore, if a customer requested additional work, or work that differed from what was printed on an existing work order, Plaintiff could not accept the new work unless Bright House and Defendant’s supervisors first approved the new work and Plaintiff received a new work order. Finally, Defendant did not permit Plaintiff to perform cable installation work for any other cable installation provider.
Plaintiff also had little control over when to perform the work orders or the order in which he choose to carry out the work orders. When Bright House customers schedule an appointment with a technician, they are given a two-hour window in which they must wait for the technician to arrive and start performing the work. To ensure that its technicians would be able to meet these windows, Defendant assigned its work orders based largely on geographical proximity. Plaintiff had no control over this assignment process and was required to meet Bright House customers’ time windows. He could not re-schedule customer appointments. Furthermore, Defendant would sometimes instruct Plaintiff to leave a particular job (even if the job were not complete) and go to another job; Plaintiff did not have any meaningful discretion to refuse those instructions.
Defendant also controlled the amount of time, and the manner in which, Plaintiff could take time off. While there was conflicting evidence on this issue, the Court finds that the more credible evidence revealed that Defendant would penalize, or at least threatened to penalize, technicians who frequently requested time off, failed to show up each morning at Defendant’s office, or failed to attend Defendant’s mandatory weekly meetings. Although Defendant appears to have made some allowances for doctors’ appointments, family emergencies and vacations that were planned in advance, it would penalize or terminate technicians who simply decided that, for whatever reason, they did not want to work on a particular day. Indeed, Defendant’s manager testified that its technicians needed to “request” time off.
Defendant also supervised, to a significant extent, the manner in which Plaintiff carried out his work. Defendant provided Plaintiff with specifications (that came mostly from Bright House) on how his work was to be performed. If Bright House informed Defendant that it was not satisfied with the manner in which Plaintiff performed an installation, Defendant would assess Plaintiff with fixed monetary penalties (or “charge-backs”) based on the type of job performed (e.g., the penalty for an unsatisfactory modem installation might be $50, while the penalty on an unsatisfactory television installation might be $25). Defendant automatically deducted these charge-backs from the weekly payments it made to Plaintiff’s company. In some instances, these penalties actually exceeded the total amount Plaintiff was supposed to be paid on a job. Plaintiff had no way of disputing or negotiating the amount of a particular charge-back. Finally, Defendant and Bright House sometimes sent supervisors to “spot-check” or monitor Plaintiff and other technicians after they completed a job or even during a job.
B. Plaintiff’s Opportunity for Profit or Loss Depending on His Managerial Skill
The testimony and record evidence in this case establishes that Plaintiff’s opportunity for profit or loss did not depend upon his managerial skill. Instead, Plaintiff’s compensation was based simply on the number and type of jobs that Defendant gave him and the quality and pace of Plaintiff’s work.
Because Plaintiff was paid on a piece work basis, Plaintiff’s opportunity for profit or loss was, in a simplistic sense, a function of the number of jobs he could complete in a finite time frame. Excluding charge-backs, the more jobs Plaintiff could quickly complete, the more Plaintiff stood to profit.
As noted, supra, however, Plaintiff’s profit was also a function of the type of work orders that Defendant assigned him (and the amount of charge-backs Plaintiff received). Because the types of jobs that Plaintiff performed each paid differently, notwithstanding the amount of time it took to complete those jobs, Plaintiff would experience days that were more profitable than others simply as a result of the type of work orders that Defendant assigned to him. For example, assuming cable modem installations paid more than television installations, if all the work orders Plaintiff received on a given day were for cable modem installations, Plaintiff would make more on that day, ceteris paribus, than if he had been assigned all television installations. Of course, if cable modem installations took twice as long as television installations, it might be the case that Plaintiff could earn the same amount (or more) by just doing television installations throughout the day. Importantly, though, Plaintiff had no control over the types of work orders that he was given and, in at least some instances, Defendant instructed him to leave particular jobs to perform other potentially less profitable jobs.
Furthermore, Plaintiff was not permitted to install cable services for other cable installation companies. Nor was he permitted to provide additional services for Bright House customers without first obtaining a new work order authorized by both Bright House and Defendant.
No matter how quickly or efficiently Plaintiff worked, Defendant’s charge-backs, the manner in which it assigned jobs, and the directives it gave to sometimes leave jobs prior to their completion obviated Plaintiff’s ability to rely upon his own managerial skill.
C. Plaintiff’s Investment in Equipment or His Employment of Others
The testimony and record evidence in this case establishes that Plaintiff did not make any significant investment in capital or employ others.
Although Plaintiff provided most of the equipment necessary for performing installations on behalf of Defendant, Plaintiff’s relative investment in that equipment was small. In total, the cost of the hand tools, cable fishing stick, crimper, hammer drill, cable meter, and ladder that Defendant required Plaintiff to purchase amounted to perhaps no more than $1,000 (the cable meter and hammer drill, for instance, cost $500 and $150, respectively). Bright House provided the actual cable, cable modems, digital video recorders and other material inputs required for the installations. While Plaintiff used his own vehicle (a mini-van) to drive to customer’s houses, that vehicle was also for personal use.
*5 Defendant ostensibly gave Plaintiff the option to hire others through his own company. But that option was illusory. With the exception of just one husband and wife team, none of Defendant’s technicians, including Plaintiff, ever utilized or substituted others to carry out the work orders that Defendant assigned.
D. Special Skills Required for Plaintiff’s Services
The testimony and record evidence in this case establishes that Plaintiff’s work did not require the application of particularly special, or difficult to acquire, skills.
Although Plaintiff’s work involved proper cable wiring, connecting and configuring Internet cable modems, the use of a cable meter, and answering customer’s questions, Defendant’s manager testified that those skills could be acquired in as little as two weeks of on-the-job training. In fact, Defendant often assigned experienced technicians to work with new technicians for a one or two week period in order to get new technicians up to speed. After this short training period, Defendant would start sending the new technicians out into the field.
E. The Degree of Permanence and Duration of Plaintiff’s Working Relationship With Defendant
The testimony and record evidence in this case establishes that there was a high degree of permanence in Plaintiff’s relationship with Defendant. As noted, supra, Plaintiff was not permitted to provide cable installation services for any other cable installation company while we worked for Defendant. Plaintiff was expected to show up at Defendant’s office each morning, six days a week, and was given work orders that typically amounted to a full day’s worth of work. This relationship continued for nearly one and a half years.
F. The Extent to Which Plaintiff’s Work Was Integral to Defendant
The testimony and record evidence in this case establishes that Plaintiff’s work was clearly integral to Defendant’s business. In the absence of Plaintiff’s work, and the work of Defendant’s other installation technicians, Defendant would not succeed as an ongoing enterprise. Defendant conceded as much in its trial brief (Doc. 52 at 5) and later at trial.
Based on the totality of the circumstances, it is clear that Plaintiff was an employee-and not an exempt independent contractor-for purposes of the FLSA. Taken together, all six of the factors comprising the “economic reality” test overwhelmingly support the conclusion that Plaintiff was an employee who was economically dependent on Defendant.”
The following was excerpted from NPR.org. To read the full article go to NPR.org.
“This Friday, the federal minimum wage will rise to $7.25 an hour, up from $6.55.
Conservative economists are worried that the government-mandated raise will force small businesses to lay off workers. They note that the job market has deteriorated since Congress approved the 10.7 percent pay raise two years ago. In the summer of 2007, the U.S. unemployment rate was running at about 4.7 percent. Today, it is 9.5 percent. Mandating higher wages could force some employers to cut jobs, the argument goes.
But liberal economists say this summer is the perfect time for a wage hike: It will put more money into the pockets of people who need it most. Fatter paychecks will stimulate spending and help the economy, they say. Kai Filion, a policy analyst for the Economic Policy Institute, a left-leaning research group, says this wage hike will generate $5.5 billion in consumer spending over the next 12 months.”
To read the full article go to NPR.org.
Godoy v. Restaurant Opportunity Center of New York, Inc.
Plaintiffs, brought suit against Defendants Restaurant Opportunity Center of New York, Inc. (“ROC-NY”), 417 Restaurant LLC a/k/a ROC N.Y. Restaurant LLC d/b/a Colors, ROC-NY Worker Owner Restaurant, LLC a/k/a RWOR, Saru Jayaraman, and Grace Gilbert, as President of ROC-NY (“Defendants”), alleging breach of contract, fraud, and violations of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 28 U.S.C. § 216(b), and New York State Labor Law. Plaintiffs, former restaurant workers and members of Defendant not-for-profit corporation ROC-NY, alleged that Defendants broke their agreement with Plaintiffs that Plaintiffs would gain equity in and employment at the “worker-owned” restaurant they helped ROC-NY to create in exchange for the hundreds of hours that Plaintiffs contributed to that effort. Plaintiffs sought through this action damages and injunctive relief in the form of their promised shareholder status in and employment at the restaurant, now known as “Colors,” back pay for the work they performed on behalf of ROC-NY during the period of 2002-2005 and the wages they did not earn because they were not employed at the restaurant once it opened, and costs and attorneys’ fees in prosecuting this action. Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint in its entirety, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In granting Defendants’ Motion, the Court discussed the unique situation under which the Plaintiffs worked for and with the co-op, applying the various economic reality tests to determine that they were not “employed” by Defendants, and therefore dismissing the Complaint.
Several Plaintiffs became members of Defendant ROC-NY in August 2002. Several months later, ROC-NY began seeking grants to launch what was described as a “cooperatively owned restaurant” which would be run by-workers displaced after the September 11 terrorist attacks, and a “Cooperative Committee” of ROC-NY was created to direct that effort. Several Plaintiffs were initial members of the Cooperative Committee. Other Plaintiffs joined ROC-NY and the Cooperative Committee in around 2003, and one Plaintiff joined in around 2004. All of the Plaintiffs joined the Cooperative Committee when they joined ROC-NY, and many served on the Committee’s Board of Directors at various times.
Significantly, the Court noted, “[ha]ving surveyed the various economic reality tests and factors applied by the courts, this Court finds lacking any standard applicable to the question presented by the particular facts of this case-that is, whether workers laboring for and together with a not-for-profit corporation to develop a business that they would co-own are employees of that corporation for purposes of the FLSA. Instead, the Court finds company with the Tenth Circuit in its decision in Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257 (10th Cir.1987). In that case, the Circuit considered whether a general partner of an accounting firm was an “employee” of that firm for purposes of a FLSA action. After reviewing the traditional “economic reality” factors employed by the courts, the Court noted the “absence … of any coherent standard of ‘economic reality’ for supposed application to partners” in a business, and concluded that “the specific independent contractor/employee factors … are largely useless in a general partnership context.” Id. at 271-72. The Court explained that while “[t]he focal point in deciding whether an individual is an employee” under the “economic realities” jurisprudence, “is whether the individual is economically dependent on the business to which he renders service … or is, as a matter of economic fact, in business for himself,”
Consideration of the factors used by the Tenth Circuit in Wheeler to assess the economic reality presented by a partnership supports the absence of an employer-employee relationship in this instance. See Wheeler, 825 F.2d at 274-75. Like partners at a firm. Plaintiffs, as putative co-owners of the business they were working to create, “assume[d] the risks of loss and liabilities” of the venture, and had a real opportunity to share in its profits upon success. Plaintiffs’ hours of “sweat-equity” represented their “capital” contribution to the business, and one that “would earn [Plaintiffs] equity in the RWOR” as “sweat equity converted to cash equivalent in stock.” While Plaintiffs’ “right to share in management” once the restaurant opened is not specifically alleged in the Complaint, the Court notes that Plaintiffs were members of the Board of Directors of the Cooperative Committee tasked with the management of the restaurant’s planning and development phase. Taken together, the balance of these “economic realities” weighs against the existence of an employment relationship in this case. As Plaintiffs and Defendants were at all relevant times putative co-owners of the restaurant they were working to create, the Court finds that Plaintiffs were not, as a matter of economic reality, the employees of Defendants. As such. Plaintiffs have no claims under the FLSA, see Alamo, 471 U.S. at 296-97, and Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss these claims is GRANTED.”
This unfortunate result, seems unavoidable given the fact that the Plaintiffs were technically “owners” of the business for which they worked, and it is likely that the decision will have limited application in future cases.