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NLRB: Class Action Bans Unlawfully Restrict NLRA Protected Rights to Engage in Concerted Activity
D.R. Horton Inc. and Michael Cuda. Case 12-CA-25764
This case was before the NLRB on Michael Cuda’s challenge to D.R. Horton’s class/collective action waiver, which Cuda was required to sign as a condition of his employment. Specifically the certified question was “whether an employer violates Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act when it requires employees covered by the Act, as a condition of their employment, to sign an agreement that precludes them from filing joint, class, or collective claims addressing their wages, hours or other working conditions against the employer in any forum, arbitral or judicial.” The NLRB held that such an agreement unlawfully restricts employees’ Section 7 right to engage in concerted action for mutual aid or protection, notwithstanding the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), which generally makes employment-related arbitration agreements judicially enforceable.”
The NLRB stressed that arbitration agreements are not per se unenforeceable. However, whether the class/collective action mechanism is used in arbitration or in a court of law, the NLRB held that it must be available to employees.
Rejecting D.R. Horton’s contention that the NLRB’s holding was inconsistent with prior U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence, the NLRB explained:
“The Respondent and some amici further argue that holding that the MAA violates the NLRA would be inconsistent with two recent Supreme Court decisions stat-ing that a party cannot be required, without his consent, to submit to arbitration on a classwide basis. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S.Ct. 1758, 1775–1776 (2010) (arbitration panel exceeded its authority by permitting class antitrust claim when commercial shipping charter agreement’s arbitration clause was silent on class arbitration); AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1751–1753 (2011) (claim that class-action waiver in consumer arbitration agreement was unconscionable under state law was preempted by FAA). Neither case is controlling here. Neither involved the waiver of rights protected by the NLRA or even employment agreements. Furthermore, AT&T Mobility involved a conflict between the FAA and state law, which is governed by the Supremacy Clause, whereas the present case involves the argument that two federal statutes conflict. Finally, nothing in our holding here requires the Respondent or any other employer to permit, participate in, or be bound by a class-wide or collective arbitration proceeding. We need not and do not mandate class arbitration in order to protect employees’ rights under the NLRA. Rather, we hold only that employers may not compel employees to waive their NLRA right to collectively pursue litigation of employment claims in all forums, arbitral and judicial. So long as the employer leaves open a judicial forum for class and collective claims, employees’ NLRA rights are preserved without requiring the availability of classwide arbitration. Employers remain free to insist that arbitral proceedings be conducted on an individual basis.”
Click D.R. Horton Inc. and Michael Cuda. Case 12-CA-25764 to read the entire Decision and Order.
S.D.N.Y.: Collective Action Waiver Unenforceable Because It Would Prevent Employees From Vindicating Their Substantive Statutory Rights Under the FLSA
Raniere v. Citigroup Inc.
In an issue appearing more and more these days, this case was before the court on the defendant’s motion to compel arbitration on an individualized basis. Although the plaintiffs raised several issues regarding the enforceability of the arbitration agreement at issue, as discussed here, the case is significant because it held that- as a matter of law- purported waivers of the right to participate in an FLSA collective action are unenforceable, because they prevent employees from vindicating their substantive statutory rights (that are not waivable).
In so holding, the court reasoned:
“Plaintiffs make two arguments to the effect that the collective action waiver is unenforceable because it would prevent Plaintiffs from vindicating their substantive statutory rights. The first, and broader, of these arguments is that if the waiver is given effect, the FLSA will not serve both its remedial and deterrent functions. Plaintiffs’ second, narrower, contention is that to give effect to the collective action waiver and arbitration agreement here would have the practical effect of precluding Plaintiffs from pursuing the enforcement of their statutory rights due to the costs involved.
It is well recognized that employees cannot release their substantive rights under the FLSA by private agreement. See Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 707, 65 S.Ct. 895, 89 L.Ed. 1296 (1945) (“No one can doubt but that to allow waiver of statutory wages by agreement would nullify the purposes of the Act.”); see also Bormann v. AT & T Commc’ns, Inc., 875 F.2d 399 (2d Cir.1989) (“[P]rivate waiver of claims under the [FLSA] has been precluded by such Supreme Court decisions as Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 65 S.Ct. 895, 89 L.Ed. 1296 (1945), and D.A. Shulte, Inc. v. Gangi, 328 U.S. 108, 66 S.Ct. 925, 90 L.Ed. 1114 (1946).” (citations omitted)).
It is likewise well established that “ ‘[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.’ “ Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 123 (quoting Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26); see also Desiderio, 191 F.3d at 205–06. Arbitration of a claim of statutory rights will only be compelled if that claim can be effectively vindicated through arbitration. See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637 n. 19 (noting that if arbitration clause and other contractual provisions “operated in tandem as a prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory remedies,” “we would have little hesitation in condemning the agreement as against public policy”); Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 90 (noting that “even claims arising under a statute designed to further important social policies may be arbitrated because so long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate his or her statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum the statute serves its functions.” (citations and internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)).
Federal substantive law of arbitrability requires federal courts to declare otherwise operative arbitration clauses unenforceable when enforcement would prevent plaintiffs from vindicating their statutory rights. American Express II, 634 F.3d at 199; see also Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 47–48 (1st Cir.2006); Hadnot v. Bay, Ltd., 344 F.3d 474, 478 n. 14 (5th Cir.2003); Paladino v. Avnet Computer Technologies, Inc., 134 F.3d 1054, 1062 (11th Cir.1998); Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP, 768 F.Supp.2d 547, 549 (S.D.N.Y.2011); Chen–Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 785 F.Supp.2d 394 (S.D.N.Y.2011); DeGaetano v. Smith Barney, Inc., 983 F.Supp. 459, 469 (S.D.N.Y.1997).
The Second Circuit addressed this issue in American Express I, 554 F.3d 300. The Court concluded that the class action waiver in that case was unenforceable because plaintiffs had demonstrated that they otherwise would not be able to vindicate their statutory rights “in either an individual or collective capacity,” id. at 314 (emphasis in original), due to the great expense of pursuing that antitrust litigation and the small individual recovery each plaintiff could expect. As such, the waiver would have the practical effect of ensuring no claims would be brought at all, granting the defendant “de facto immunity from … liability.” Id. at 320. The Supreme Court vacated American Express I and remanded for reconsideration in light of Stolt–Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., ––– U.S. ––––, 130 S.Ct. 1758, 176 L.Ed.2d 605 (2010). American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., ––– U.S. ––––, 130 S.Ct. 2401, 176 L.Ed.2d 920. On remand, the Circuit again found the arbitration provision unenforceable because “the class action waiver in this case precludes plaintiffs from enforcing their statutory rights” due to the prohibitive cost of litigating on an individual basis. American Express II, 634 F.3d at 197–99.
In Ragone, 595 F.3d 115, the Court of Appeals again confirmed the importance of the statutory rights analysis, indicating its willingness, if in dicta, to hold unenforceable an arbitration agreement containing a shortened statute of limitations and a fee-shifting provision that would “significantly diminish a litigant’s rights under Title VII.” 595 F.3d at 125–26. The Court of Appeals discussion in Ragone demonstrates “that the holdings of American Express apply not only to ‘negative value’ class action claims, that is, claims that are so small in value that it is not economically viable to pursue them as individual claims.” Chen–Oster, 785 F.Supp.2d at 408.
Defendants are incorrect that the Supreme Court’s decision in AT & T, –––U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 179 L.Ed.2d 742, overrules American Express and Ragone. AT & T addressed only whether a state law rule holding class action waivers unconscionable was preempted by the FAA. ––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 179 L.Ed.2d 742. The holdings of both the American Express cases and Ragone were based, in contrast and as this decision must be, on federal arbitral law, and AT & T in no way alters the relevance of those binding circuit holdings. See Chen–Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 2011 WL 2671813 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2011) (holding that AT & T does not abrogate American Express or Ragone and noting that “it remains the law of the Second Circuit that an arbitration provision which precludes plaintiffs from enforcing their statutory rights is unenforceable.” Id. at *4). Moreover, while the dissent in AT & T noted with concern that “agreements that forbid the consolidation of claims can lead small-dollar claimants to abandon their claims rather than to litigate,” 131 S.Ct. at 1760, AT & T involved the vindication of state, not federal, rights. Thus, even if AT & T is read broadly to acquiesce to the enforcement of an arbitral agreement that as a practical matter would prevent the vindication of state rights in the name of furthering the strong federal policy favoring arbitration, that would not alter the validity of the federal statutory rights analysis articulated in Mitsubishi, Green Tree, American Express and Ragone. The Court accordingly analyses the present issues under the reasoning articulated in those cases.
i. The Right to Proceed Collectively Under the FLSA Cannot be Waived
The Second Circuit has not determined whether the collective action provisions of the FLSA are integral to its structure and function, and, as such, whether an agreement waiving that right can be enforced.
The First Circuit has expressly reserved decision on this question. Skirchak v. Dynamics Research Corp., 508 F.3d 49, 62 (1st Cir.2007) (“We do not need to decide if class actions under the FLSA may ever be waived by agreement…. We also do not reach the question of whether such waivers of FLSA class actions are per se against public policy under either the FLSA or the Massachusetts Fair Wage Law”). And while a number of other Circuits have accepted that, at least in principle, arbitration agreements containing waivers of the right to proceed collectively under the FLSA are enforceable, those decisions were either based upon a premise rejected by the Second Circuit or did not reach the question here. See Horenstein v. Mortgage. Mkt., Inc., 9 F. App’x 618, 619 (9th Cir.2001); Carter v. Countrywide Credit Indus. ., Inc., 362 F.3d 294, 297–98 (5th Cir.2004); Vilches v. Travelers Co., Inc., 413 Fed. App’x 487, 494 n. 4 (3d Cir.2011); Caley v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 428 F.3d 1359, 1378 (11th Cir.2005); Adkins v. Labor Ready, Inc., 303 F.3d 496, 503 (4th Cir.2002).
Specifically, the court in Caley did not address whether the right to proceed collectively under the FLSA may be waived as a matter of federal law. Instead, it addressed whether such waivers were unconscionable under Georgia state law principles. See Caley, 428 F.3d at 1377–79.
The Second Circuit has rejected the reasoning relied on in Horenstein, Adkins, Carter, and Vilches. In American Express, the Second Circuit noted that the issue of whether statutorily granted collective action rights under the ADEA, which incorporates by reference the collective action rights granted in the FLSA, could be waived was not decided by Gilmer, 500 U.S. 20, 111 S.Ct. 1647, 114 L.Ed.2d 26, because “because a collective and perhaps a class action remedy was, in fact, available in that case.” American Express II, 634 F.3d at 195–96; American Express I, 554 F.3d at 314 (same). Countrywide, Adkins, Horenstein, and Vilches, the latter three relying on Johnson v. West Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366, 377 (3d Cir.2000), assumed that Gilmer resolved whether collective enforcement rights were waivable. See Vilches, at 494 n. 4 (citing Adkins, 303 F.3d at 503 (citing Johnson, 225 F.3d at 377)); Adkins, 303 F.3d at 503 (citing Johnson, 225 F.3d at 377); Countrywide, 362 F.3d at 298 (citing Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32). Under the Second Circuit’s precedents, Gilmer does not. See American Express II, 634 F.3d at 195–96. Accordingly, the issue presented by Plaintiffs here, namely whether the right to proceed collectively under the FLSA is unwaivable—beyond such a clause being unenforceable were Plaintiffs to demonstrate that to do so would have the practical effect of denying them their substantive rights—is an open question in this Circuit.
This issue is fundamentally distinct, and more nuanced, than that presented in Gilmer, which addressed whether ADEA claims are arbitrable at all. Here, Plaintiffs do not contest that individually filed FLSA claims are generally arbitrable or that were the agreement to permit proceeding as a collective in arbitration, as the parties could in Gilmer, see American Express II, 634 F.3d at 195–96, that such a provision would be enforceable. Accordingly, this case does not oppose the strong federal policy favoring arbitration with the rights granted in the FLSA, but instead only questions whether the right to proceed collectively may be waived.
There are good reasons to hold that a waiver of the right to proceed collectively under the FLSA is per se unenforceable—and different in kind from waivers of the right to proceed as a class under Rule 23. Collective actions under the FLSA are a unique animal. Unlike employment-discrimination class suits under Title VII or the Americans with Disabilities Act that are governed by Rule 23, Congress created a unique form of collective actions for minimum-wage and overtime pay claims brought under the FLSA.
The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, and its original collective action provision, was a product of the forces that gave rise to what has been termed the constitutional revolution of 1937, marking a high point in the clash of the federal courts with President Roosevelt and New Deal legislators. The original FLSA collective action provision, passed in the wake of the “switch in time that saved nine,” provided that
[a]ny employer who violates the provisions of section 6 or section 7 of this Act shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be, and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages. Action to recover such liability may be maintained in any court of competent jurisdiction by any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated, or such employee or employees may designate an agent or representative to maintain such action for and in behalf of all employees similarly situated. The court in such action shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney’s fee to be paid by the defendant and costs of the action.
Fair Labor Standards Act, 75 Cong. Ch. 676, § 16(b), 52 Stat. 1060, 1069 (1938). As the Supreme Court has noted, this provision appeared for the first time in the bill reported by a Conference Committee of both Houses. See Brooklyn Sav. Bank, 324 U.S. at 705 n. 15 (citing H. Rep. No. 2738, 75th Cong.3d Sess., at 33). The bill that later became the FLSA took over thirteen months to become law and went through a variety of iterations, creating a veritable raft of legislative history. Within this, however, “[t]he only reference to Section 16(b) was by Representative Keller….” Id. at 705 n. 16. Representative Keller stated in relevant part:
Among the provisions for the enforcement of the act an old principle has been adopted and will be applied to new uses. If there shall occur violations of either the wages or hours, the employees can themselves, or by designated agent or representatives, maintain an action in any court to recover the wages due them and in such a case the court shall allow liquidated damages in addition to the wages due equal to such deficient payment and shall also allow a reasonable attorney’s fees and assess the court costs against the violator of the law so that employees will not suffer the burden of an expensive lawsuit. The provision has the further virtue of minimizing the cost of enforcement by the Government. It is both a common-sense and economical method of regulation. The bill has other penalties for violations and other judicial remedies, but the provision which I have mentioned puts directly into the hands of the employees who are affected by violation the means and ability to assert and enforce their own rights, thus avoiding the assumption by Government of the sole responsibility to enforce the act. Id. (citing 83 Cong. Rec. 9264).
This collective action provision was amended by the Portal–to–Portal Act of 1947, the history of which has been described by the courts in the following manner:
In 1947, in response to a “national emergency” created by a flood of suits under the FLSA aimed at collecting portal-to-portal pay allegedly due employees, Congress enacted the Portal–to–Portal amendments to the FLSA. 61 Stat. 87 (1947). The original, stated purpose of the bill containing these amendments was: “To define and limit the jurisdiction of the courts, to regulate actions arising under certain laws of the United States, and for other purposes.” 93 Cong. Rec. 156 (H.R.2157). To this end, the amendments, among other things, barred unions from bringing representative actions under the FLSA. Arrington v. Nat. Broadcasting Co., Inc., 531 F.Supp. 498, 500 (D.D.C.1982) (citations omitted); see also United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 1564 of N.M. v. Albertson’s, Inc., 207 F.3d 1193, 1200–01 (11th Cir.2000) (noting the Arrington court’s “exhaustive survey of the legislative history of the 1947 amendments”). As amended, FLSA collective actions allow “plaintiffs the advantage of lower individual costs to vindicate rights by the pooling of resources. The judicial system benefits by efficient resolution in one proceeding of common issues of law and fact arising from the same alleged” unlawful activity. Hoffman–La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 170, 110 S.Ct. 482, 107 L.Ed.2d 480 (1989) (describing the collective action provisions under the ADEA, which are by reference those of the FLSA).
More specifically, the revised collective action provision that resulted from these amendments limited representative suits to those workers who submit written opt-in notices. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (“No employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such action unless he gives his consent in writing to become such a party and such consent is filed in the court in which such action is brought”). FLSA actions are, consequently, not true representative actions as under Rule 23, but instead those actions brought about by individual employees who affirmatively join a single suit. These collective action provisions were crafted by not one but over the course of several Congresses to balance the need to incentivize the bringing of often small claims by way of collectivization in order to ensure the statute’s function, while barring actions “brought on behalf of employees who had no real involvement in, or real knowledge of, the lawsuit.” Arrington, 531 F.Supp. at 501. The Act’s, and more specifically this provision’s, lengthy legislative history evidences Congress’ precise determination of how this balance should be struck in order to ensure the statute’s remedial and deterrent functions.
In addition, as the Supreme Court has described,
[t]he legislative history of the Fair Labor Standards Act shows an intent on the part of Congress to protect certain groups of the population from substandard wages and excessive hours which endangered the national health and well-being and the free flow of goods in interstate commerce. The statute was a recognition of the fact that due to the unequal bargaining power as between employer and employee, certain segments of the population required federal compulsory legislation to prevent private contracts on their part which endangered national health and efficiency as a result of the free movement of goods in interstate commerce. Brooklyn Sav. Bank, 324 U.S. at 706–07. Although the right to sue under the FLSA is compensatory, “it is nevertheless an enforcement provision.” Id. at 709. Not the least integral aspect of this remedy is the ability of employees to pool resources in order to pursue a collective action, in accordance with the specific balance struck by Congress. The particular FLSA collective action mechanism was additionally a Congressional determination regarding the allocation of enforcement costs, as the ability of employees to bring actions collectively reduces the burden borne by the public fisc, as Representative Keller noted. See 83 Cong. Rec. 9264. Moreover, prohibition of the waiver of the right to proceed collectively accords with the Congressional policy of uniformity with regard to the application of FLSA standards, see H. Rep. No. 2182, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. at 6–7, because an employer is not permitted to gain a competitive advantage because his employees are more willing to assent to, or his human resources department more able to ascertain, collective action waivers than those of his competitors. As the Supreme Court has noted, “the purposes of the Act require that it be applied even to those who would decline its protections.” Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 105 S.Ct. 1953, 85 L.Ed.2d 278 (1985). It is not enough to respond that such a waiver should be upheld in the name of the broad federal policy favoring arbitration, simply because the waiver was included in an arbitration agreement. An otherwise enforceable arbitration agreement should not become the vehicle to invalidate the particular Congressional purposes of the collective action provision and the policies on which that provision is based.
In sum, a waiver of the right to proceed collectively under the FLSA is unenforceable as a matter of law in accordance with the Gilmer Court’s recognition that “[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute.” Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26. See also Chen–Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 785 F.Supp.2d 394 (S.D.N.Y.2011) (holding arbitral provision waiving right to proceed as a class unenforceable as to Title VII pattern and practice claims).”
Further, because the arbitration agreement at issue said that if the collective action waiver were found to be unenforceable, the case(s) must be litigated in court, the court held that the case should not be remanded to arbitration, having held the collective action waiver unenforceable.
Click Raniere v. Citigroup Inc. to read the entire Opinion.
3d Cir.: Enforceability Of Class/Collective Action Waiver In Agreement To Arbitrate Is Issue For Arbitrator Not The Court
Vilches v. Travelers Companies, Inc.
This appeal raised the issue of whether the District Court properly determined that the Plaintiff-Appellant (employee) assented to the insertion of a class arbitration waiver into an existing arbitration policy, and that the waiver was not unconscionable. The District Court ordered the parties into arbitration to individually resolve the claims brought by Plaintiff under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. (“FLSA”), and New Jersey Wage and Hour Law, N.J.S.A. § 34:11-4.1, et seq. (“NJWHL”). While it held that the class arbitration waiver was not unconscionable, the Third Circuit vacated the District Court’s order and referred the matter to arbitration to determine whether Vilches can proceed as a class based upon the parties’ agreements.
Discussing the relevant procedural and factual background the court stated:
“We briefly summarize the allegations pertinent to our decision. Appellants Vilches filed a class and collective action in the Superior Court of New Jersey to recover unpaid wages and overtime allegedly withheld in violation of the FLSA and the NJWHL, contending that Travelers consistently required its insurance appraisers to work beyond 40 hours per week but failed to properly compensate the appraisers for the additional labor. Travelers removed the matter to the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, and filed a Motion for Summary Judgment seeking the dismissal of the complaint and an order compelling Vilches to arbitrate their individual wage and hour claims.
Upon commencing employment with Travelers, Vilches agreed to an employment provision making arbitration “the required, and exclusive, forum for the resolution of all employment disputes that may arise” pursuant to an enumerated list of federal statutes, and under “any other federal, state or local statute, regulation or common law doctrine, regarding employment discrimination, conditions of employment or termination of employment.” (App’x at 79.) The agreement did not expressly reference class or collective arbitration or any waiver of the same. The agreement reserved to Travelers the right to alter or amend the arbitration policy at its discretion with appropriate notice to employees.
In April 2005, Travelers electronically published a revised Arbitration Policy. In addition to restating the expansive scope of the Policy, the update also included an express statement prohibiting arbitration through class or collective action:
The Policy makes arbitration the required and exclusive forum for the resolution of all employment-related and compensation-related disputes based on legally protected rights (i.e ., statutory, contractual or common law rights) that may arise between an employee or former employee and the Company…. [T]here will be no right or authority for any dispute to be brought, heard or arbitrated under this Policy as a class or collective action, private attorney general, or in a representative capacity on behalf of any person. (App’x at 88) (emphasis added). Travelers communicated the revised Policy to Vilches in several electronic communications.
Before the District Court, Vilches initially alleged that they never agreed to arbitrate any claims against Travelers; their position changed, however, during the course of proceedings and they ultimately conceded that all employment disputes with Travelers must be arbitrated pursuant to the arbitration agreement they signed at commencement of employment. They nevertheless insisted that the revised Arbitration Policy introduced by Travelers in April 2005 prohibiting class arbitration, which Travelers attempted to enforce, did not bind them because they never assented to its terms. Vilches further argued that, even assuming that the updated Policy did bind them, the revision was unconscionable and unenforceable.
Notwithstanding the fact that the parties agreed to arbitrate all employment disputes, as we discuss below, the District Court addressed the question of whether Vilches agreed to waive the right to proceed by way of class arbitration. In an oral decision, the District Court granted Travelers’ motion for summary judgment, finding that the various forms of correspondence from Travelers provided sufficient notice to Vilches of the revised Policy, and that their electronic assent and continued employment constituted agreement to the update. As such, the Court held that Vilches waived the ability to proceed in a representative capacity through class arbitration. The Court’s opinion only briefly touched upon the unconscionability claims, stating that “there was no adhesion that was part of that process.” (App’x at 23.) The Court ordered the parties to individually arbitrate the employment disputes, and this appeal followed.”
Holding that the Arbitrator and not the Court should decide the issue of enforceability of the class/collective action waiver, the Third Circuit reasoned:
“The parties agree that any and all disputes arising out of the employment relationship-including the claims asserted here-are to be resolved in binding arbitration. Accordingly, the role of the Court is limited to deciding whether the revised Arbitration Policy introduced in April 2005-and the class arbitration waiver included within that revision-governed this dispute. We conclude that the District Court should not have decided the issue presented as to the class action waiver, and, as we explain below, we will refer the resolution of this question to arbitration in accordance with governing jurisprudence. The District Court should have, however, ruled on the issue of unconscionability and we will address it.
We have repeatedly stated that courts play a limited role when a litigant moves to compel arbitration. Specifically, “whether the parties have submitted a particular dispute to arbitration, i.e., the question of arbitrability, is an issue for judicial determination unless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise.’ “ Puleo, 605 F.3d at 178 (quoting Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002)). “[A] question of arbitrability arises only in two circumstances-first, when there is a threshold dispute over whether the parties have a valid arbitration agreement at all,’ and, second, when the parties are in dispute as to whether a concededly binding arbitration clause applies to a certain type of controversy.’ “ Id. (quoting Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 452 (2003)). In contrast, the Supreme Court has distinguished “questions of arbitrability with disputes over arbitration procedure, which do not bear upon the validity of an agreement to arbitrate.” Id. at 179. We noted in Puleo that “procedural questions”-such as waiver or delay-“which grow out of the dispute and bear on its final disposition are presumptively not for the judge.” Id.
This matter satisfies neither of the Puleo arbitrability circumstances. As stated, neither party questions “whether the parties have a valid arbitration agreement at all.” Id.; (see also Appellants’ Br. at 15 (“Plaintiffs do not challenge the validity of the arbitration agreements they entered into when they first began their employment”); Appellees’ Br. at 6 (“At the outset of employment, Appellants agreed to the Travelers Employment Arbitration Policy”).) The original arbitration provision to which Vilches admittedly agreed provided that “the required, and exclusive, forum for the resolution of all employment disputes ” would be arbitration. (App’x at 79 (emphasis added).) Here, the issue of whether an employee is bound by a disputed amendment to existing employment provisions falls within the scope of this expansive agreement to arbitrate. Indeed, the language makes clear that the “concededly binding arbitration clause applies” to the particular employment claims at stake here, and the parties do not advance a cognizable argument to suggest otherwise. Puleo, 605 F.3d at 178. Accordingly, the second Puleo arbitrability element is also unfulfilled.
While the parties framed their arguments so as to invite the Court’s attention to the class action waiver issue-namely, whether the revised Arbitration Policy expressly prohibiting class arbitration governs the relationship between Travelers and Vilches-we conclude that “the relevant question here is what kind of arbitration proceeding the parties agreed to.” Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 452 (emphasis in original). As stated, the addition of the disputed class arbitration waiver did not disturb the parties’ agreement to refer “all employment disputes” to arbitration, and, thus, “does not bear upon the validity of an agreement to arbitrate.” Puleo, 605 F.3d at 179. Assuming binding arbitration of all employment disputes, the contested waiver provision solely affects the type of procedural arbitration mechanism applicable to this dispute. “[T]he Supreme Court has made clear that questions of contract interpretation’ aimed at discerning whether a particular procedural mechanism is authorized by a given arbitration agreement are matters for the arbitrator to decide .” Id. (emphasis in original). Where contractual silence is implicated, “the arbitrator and not a court should decide whether a contract [ was] indeed silent’ on the issue of class arbitration,” and “whether a contract with an arbitration clause forbids class arbitration.” Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animalfeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S.Ct. 1758, 1771-72 (2010).
The Policy originally in force made no mention of class action or class arbitration, and was entirely silent on whether the parties had a right to proceed through class or collective arbitration. In contrast, the amended Policy explicitly precludes class arbitration. Accordingly, we must “give effect to the contractual rights and expectations of the parties,” and refer the questions of whether class arbitration was agreed upon to the arbitrator. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S.Ct. at 1774.
Although we offer no forecast as to the arbitrator’s potential resolution of these questions, assuming arguendo that the arbitrator finds the class action waiver binding, we will address Vilches’ alternative argument that the addition of the class action waiver was unconscionable for the sake of judicial efficiency, and because it does concern “arbitrabillity.” See Puleo, 605 F.3d at 179.”
The Third Circuit went on to hold that, in the event the class action waiver language was binding, it was not unconscionable.
Click Vilches v. Travelers Companies, Inc., to read the entire opinion.