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S.D.N.Y.: SOL Equitably Tolled, Where Decision on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Conditional Certification Delayed, Notwithstanding Plaintiffs’ Diligence In Pursuing Same
Yahraes v. Restaurant Associates Events Corp.
This case was before the court on plaintiffs’ motion seeking equitable tolling of their FLSA claims. During oral argument on plaintiffs’ motion to certify that this case may proceed as a collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), the court had questioned whether the 2007 FLSA claims, even assuming that defendants’ violation was willful, were still viable or were now time-barred. Plaintiffs conceded that, absent an order equitably tolling the statute of limitations, their claims were indeed outside of the statute of limitations. However, Plaintiffs argued that, since they had moved for conditional certification very early on in the case and only through events outside of their control had a decision on same been delayed, the court was due to toll the statute of limitations. The court agreed and tolled the statute of limitations.
The court reasoned:
“The FLSA provides for a two-year statute of limitations generally, with an additional one-year extension for willful violations. 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). In a FLSA collective action, the statute of limitations runs for each plaintiff until he files written consent with the court to join the lawsuit. Id. § 256(b). Thus, unlike the statute of limitations in a Rule 23 class action which is tolled for all putative class members upon the filing of the complaint, the limitations periods in a FLSA action continues to run until an individual affirmatively opts into the action. Moreover, “[s]igned consents do not relate back to the original filing date of the complaint.” Lee v. ABC Carpet & Home, 236 F.R.D. 193, 199 (S.D.N.Y.2006). Nonetheless, the court has the discretion to equitably toll the limitations period.
Federal courts should grant equitable tolling “sparingly,” Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96, 111 S.Ct. 453, 112 L.Ed.2d 435 (1990), and “only … in [ ] rare and exceptional circumstance[s],” Zerilli-Edelglass v. New York City Transit Auth., 333 F.3d 74, 80 (2d Cir.2003) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Equitable tolling is generally reserved for situations “where the claimant has actively pursued his judicial remedies by filing a defective pleading during the statutory period, or where the complainant has been induced or tricked by his adversary’s misconduct into allowing the filing deadline to pass.” Irwin, 498 U.S. at 96. Nevertheless, “[a] statute of limitations may be tolled as necessary to avoid inequitable circumstances.” Iavorski v. U.S. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 232 F.3d 124, 129 (2d Cir.2000). In determining whether equitable tolling is warranted, the Second Circuit has stated that a court “must consider whether the person seeking application of the equitable tolling doctrine (1) has acted with reasonable diligence during the time period she seeks to have tolled, and (2) has proved that the circumstances are so extraordinary that the doctrine should apply.” Zerilli-Edelglass, 333 F.3d at 80-81 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The delay caused by the time required for a court to rule on a motion, such as one for certification of a collective action in a FLSA case, may be deemed an “extraordinary circumstance[ ]” justifying application of the equitable tolling doctrine. See Abadeer v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 2010 WL 5158873, at *2-4 (M.D.Tenn. Dec.14, 2010); Israel Antonio-Morales v. Bimbo’s Best Produce, Inc., 2009 WL 1591172, at *1 (E.D.La. Apr.20, 2009) (collecting cases for the proposition that “[c]ourts routinely grant equitable tolling in the FLSA collective action context to avoid prejudice to actual or potential opt-in plaintiffs that can arise from the unique procedural posture of collective actions”); Stickle v. Sciwestern Mkt. Support Ctr., 2008 WL 4446539, at *22 (D.Ariz. Sept.30, 2008) (collecting cases); Owens v. Bethlehem Mines Corp., 630 F.Supp. 309, 312 (S.D.W.V.1986). But see Hintergerger v. Catholic Health Sys., 2009 WL 3464134, at *14-15 (W.D.N.Y. Oct.21, 2009) (denying tolling for the time period while certification motion was pending).
Plaintiffs argue for equitable tolling primarily on the ground that they have diligently pursued their claims and, through no fault of their own, have been frustrated in their attempts to send notice any sooner to potential 216(b) opt-in plaintiffs. Docket Entry 96. I find that the circumstances of this case, and in particular plaintiffs’ diligence in pursuing the FLSA claims on behalf of putative opt-ins, warrant equitable tolling to avoid an inequitable result. A discussion of the procedural history of this case will explain the “extraordinary circumstances” present here that justify tolling.
In addition, plaintiffs contend that Judge Townes’ tolling is still ongoing. Docket Entries 96, 102. For the reasons just stated, I do not reach this question either.
Less than one month after filing an amended complaint, plaintiffs filed a fully-briefed motion to certify the collective action.FN4 Docket Entries 33-39. In their opposition to plaintiffs’ certification motion, defendants noted that one of the defendants, Amerivents, had recently entered into an agreement with the New York State Department of Labor (“NYSDOL”) to pay unpaid wages. Docket Entry 41 at 14. During a conference in June, 2010, Judge Townes issued a stay of the proceedings until November 19, 2010, to await the result of the NYSDOL investigation. The parties agree that plaintiffs’ claims were tolled for approximately 160 days while the stay was in place. See Docket Entry 102 n. 3 (stating that 160 days is “the minimum undisputed number of days the statute of limitations was tolled”); see also Tr. 5.
After the stay was lifted, defendants requested leave to re-brief their opposition to the certification motion, and sought to defer the certification motion until Judge Townes decided their motion to dismiss, which had not yet even been filed. Docket Entry 81. During a telephone conference held in December, 2010, I set a short briefing schedule for the certification motion, with the fully-briefed motion due at the end of January, 2011. At the oral argument held on February 9, 2011, I granted plaintiffs’ motion for certification of the collective action.
This procedural history demonstrates that plaintiffs have vigorously pursued their claims and, through no fault of their own, have been delayed in prosecuting their action and distributing 216(b) notice to potential opt-in plaintiffs. Moreover, defendants’ actions-re-briefing the certification motion, seeking to defer certification in anticipation of dispositive motions, and failing to produce documents in connection with the NYSDOL investigation have frustrated plaintiffs’ diligent attempts to ensure that claims did not expire. I attribute no trickery or wrongdoing on the part of defendants. I do, however, conclude that defendants will not be prejudiced by any tolling because they have been on notice since the complaint was served in March, 2010, that they were potentially liable for 2007 FLSA claims. Accordingly, in the interest of fairness, I find equitable tolling is warranted from the date plaintiffs served their original certification motion, May 3, 2010, to June 8, 2010, the date Judge Townes issued the stay (a period of 37 days), and from the date plaintiffs re-filed their certification motion, December 17, 2010, to February 9, 2011, the date I granted it (a period of 55 days). The additional 92 days will permit any collective member who timely opts in to maintain a FLSA claim based on wages allegedly due for labor performed in September, 2007, assuming plaintiffs establish defendants’ willful violation of the statute.
For the reasons stated above, I find equitable tolling of plaintiffs’ FLSA claims warranted in light of the procedural history of this case.”
Click Yahraes v. Restaurant Associates Events Corp. to read the entire decision.
E.D.Mo.: First-Filed Rule Inapplicable to FLSA Case For A Variety of Reasons
Arnold v. DirecTV, Inc.
This FLSA putative collective action was before the court on defendants’ motion to dismiss. The opinion is of interest, because it discusses an issue raised more and more frequently in recent years, given the proliferation of FLSA cases around the country- the so-called first-filed rule. Here, the defendants were sued in state court in the first action. Nine (9) days later, the plaintiffs in this case filed a second case, alleging similar claims. The defendants moved to dismiss this second-filed case, in favor of the first-filed case, in part based on the first-filed rule. The court rejected the applicability of the first-filed rule in this context and suggested that given the opt-in procedures applicable in FLSA cases, the first-filed rule may not be applicable to FLSA cases in general.
The court reasoned:
“To conserve judicial resources and avoid conflicting rulings, the first-filed rule gives priority, for purposes of choosing among possible venues when parallel litigation has been instituted in separate courts, to the party who first establishes jurisdiction.” Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 989 F.2d 1002, 1006 (8th Cir.1993). The rule “is not intended to be rigid, mechanical, or inflexible, but is to be applied in a manner best serving the interests of justice.” Id. at 1005 (citation omitted). The prevailing standard is that “in the absence of compelling circumstances the first-filed rule should apply.” Id. at 1005 (citation omitted). However, district courts enjoy wide discretion in applying the first-filed rule. Id. at 1004.
Upon review of the record, the relevant case law, and the arguments of the parties, this Court declines to apply the first-filed rule to dismiss or stay the present case, for several reasons. Although several district courts have applied the first-filed rule to FLSA collective actions, see, e.g., Abushalieh v. Am. Eagle Exp., Inc., No. 10-211, 2010 WL 2301150 (D.N.J. Jun. 7, 2010), this Court is not convinced that the rule is a good fit for such actions. Generally, the rule is applied when the two cases are between the same parties litigating essentially the same issue, with one party being the plaintiff in one case and the defendant in the other, and vice versa. The decision of whether to apply the first-filed often turns on whether one party unfairly “raced to the courthouse.” See, e.g., Innovation Ventures, L.L.C. v. Custom Nutrition Labs., 534 F.Supp.2d 754 (E.D.Mich.2008). This is not the case here.
Application of the rule in the FLSA opt-in collective action context would, in theory, limit all potential members of a nation-wide class to opt into just one and the same collective action in all the federal district courts. Defendants have not pointed to anything in the FLSA itself that indicates that such a situation was intended. The Court notes that the prejudice claimed by Defendants resulting from having to defend against two (or more) contemporaneous lawsuits raising the same FLSA claims could be mitigated by Defendants availing themselves of multidistrict litigation options. See, e.g., In re Wells Fargo Home Mortg. Overtime Pay Litig., 571 F.3d 953 (9th Cir.2009) (multidistrict litigation arising from three putative collective actions and one putative class action against home mortgage company on behalf of current and former home mortgage consultants seeking overtime pay).
In addition, the Court is not convinced that in this context, the date that Lang was filed in state court should be the operative date for determining which case, i.e., Lang or the present case, was filed first for purpose of the first-filed rule. Clearly, had Lang remained in state court, this Court would not dismiss or stay the present action in deference to Lang. In light of the fact that the first-filed rule is one of comity as between the federal district courts, it seems to this Court that the question is which federal court first obtained jurisdiction over the issues and parties. At least one federal district court has so held. See N. Am. Commc’ns, Inc. v. Homeowners Loan Corp., No. CIVA 3:2006-147, 2007 WL 184776, at *3 n. 1 (W.D.Pa. Jan. 22, 2007) (“In applying the first-filed rule, the first-filed case is the federal civil action which is first in time, whether by removal or the actual filing of a civil action in federal court. Since the rule the Court follows today is limited to federal district courts, the plaintiff in a state civil action can avoid being the second-filed matter by simply filing a complaint in a federal district court, not a state trial court at the outset.”).
Lastly, but not of least significance, the present case has a defendant, DTV Home Services II, LLC, that is not a defendant in Lang and Lang has two defendants that are not defendants here. Although DTV Home Services II, LLC, is a wholly-owned subsidiary of DIRECTV, it is a separate party. See Martin v. Citizens Fin. Group, Inc., No. 10-260, 2010 WL 3239187, at *2 (E.D .Pa. Aug. 13, 2010) (declining to apply first-filed rule to a FLSA case where one of the defendants was not a defendant in an earlier case raising the same issues); Gardner v. GC Servs., LP, No. 10-CV-997-IEG, 2010 WL 2721271, at *5-6 (S.D.Cal. July 6, 2010).
Although not determinative, the Court also notes that with the filing of the amended complaint in Lang, the nature of that suit has changed. In addition, the class action aspects of the two suits are different-one brought under Missouri law and one brought under Louisiana law. See Gardner, 2010 WL 2721271, at *5-6. In sum, the Court declines to dismiss or stay this action under the first-filed rule, and turns to consider the merits of Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and on other grounds.”
Click Arnold v. DirecTV, Inc. to read the entire opinion.
S.D.N.Y.: Class Action Waiver Unenforceable in FLSA Case, Because Cost of Individual Litigation vs. Potential Recovery Prohibitive
Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP
This case was before the court on Defendant’s motion to stay the proceedings and compel arbitration on an individual (rather than class/collective) basis. There was no dispute as to whether the Plaintiff had executed the arbitration agreement, containing the class waiver, however the court held that the class waiver was unenforceable, after a lengthy discussion of Second Circuit law and the impact of the recent United States Supreme Court case, Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S.Ct. 1758 (2010).
The court reasoned:
“Because the Amex decision retains its persuasive force, the Court applies the test adopted in Amex to determine the enforceability of the class waiver provision here at issue. In the totality of the circumstances, the Court finds that the class waiver provision is invalid because it prevents Sutherland from vindicating her statutory rights.
1. Cost to Individual Plaintiff Versus Potential Recovery
The record supports Sutherland’s argument that her maximum potential recovery would be too meager to justify the expenses required for the individual prosecution of her claim. Sutherland alleges “an actual overtime loss of approximately $1,867.02, with potentially liquidated damages of an equal amount under the FLSA.” (Folkenflik Decl. ¶ 8; see also Sutherland Deck. ¶ 4.) If her only option were to prosecute her claim on an individual basis, Sutherland would be required to pay expenses that would dwarf her potential recovery.
Sutherland’s uncontested submission estimates that her attorney’s fees during arbitration will exceed $160,000, and that costs will exceed $6,000. (Folkenflik Decl. ¶ 20, 24.) Sutherland will utilize expert assistance in support of her claims.(Id. ¶ 22.) Her expert, a professor of accountancy, has submitted an affidavit stating that his fees may exceed $33,500, and that he requires a retainer payment of $25,000. (Carmichael Decl. ¶ 5.) In sum, Sutherland would be required to spend approximately $200,000 in order to recover double her overtime loss of approximately $1,867 .02. Only a “lunatic or a fanatic” would undertake such an endeavor. Carnegie v. Household Intern., Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir.2004). Indeed, rather than prosecuting her low-value, high-cost claim on an individual basis, Sutherland “would give up any rights” she might have to recover overtime payments allegedly owed to her. (Sutherland Decl.¶ 2.)
Pursuant to the E & Y Agreement, Sutherland is responsible for the Court Equivalent Fee, or a fee specified by the arbitration provider, whichever is less; arbitration fees and costs are to be shared equally between the parties. (Reece Decl. Exh. D¶ IV.P.) Sutherland has submitted an uncontested affidavit stating that arbitration fees would amount to $24,000, and that the applicable Court Equivalent Fee is $350. (Folkenflik Decl.¶ 24.) E & Y’s offer to pay such costs, which the Court has factored into Sutherland’s expenses as detailed above, thus lessens her burden by $12,350. Although this amount is not insignificant, it is hardly enough to allow Sutherland to bring her claims on an individual basis: she would still be required to spend approximately $200,000 on attorney’s fees and costs, as well as expert fees, in order to recover double her overtime loss of approximately $1,867.02.
E & Y’s attempt to distinguish the cost-recovery differential in Amex from the differential present here is unavailing. The “median plaintiff” in Amex would have recovered damages of $1,751, and the expert’s services would have cost at least several hundred thousand dollars. Amex, 554 F.3d at 317. According to E & Y, a “median plaintiff” in the instant matter could recover “substantially more,” and expert fees here amount to “a small fraction” of those at issue in Amex. (Def. Reply at 6-7.) The Amex decision did not, however, set a cost-to-recovery ratio below which claims are deemed “prosecutable.” The court instead embraced a functional approach, which “depends upon a showing that the size of the recovery received by any individual plaintiff will be too small to justify the expenditure of bringing an individual action.” Amex, 554 F.3d at 320. Sutherland has satisfied her burden on that score.
E & Y also cites to authorities in which the cost-recovery differential was held not to preclude the prosecution of claims on an individual basis. Such decisions are either inapposite or unpersuasive. In Pomposi v. GameStop, Inc., for instance, a class waiver was enforced where the amount in controversy was $11,000, and plaintiff’s total fees and costs ranged from $46,000 to $62,000.09 Civ. 0340, 2010 WL 147196, at *7 (D.Conn. Jan. 11, 2010). The court in Pomposi did not, however, meaningfully discuss plaintiff’s ability to retain counsel notwithstanding the differential between potential costs and recovery. E & Y cites Ornelas v. Sonic-Denver T, Inc., No. 06 Civ. 253, 2007 WL 274738 (D.Colo. Jan. 29, 2007), as standing for the proposition that “compelling arbitration would not preclude plaintiff from pursuing his claims where damages were at least $3500.” (Def. Mem. at 12.) But the plaintiff in Ornelas was allegedly entitled to (i) a trebling of the approximately $3500 in actual damages, and (ii) unspecified punitive damages and interest. Id. at *6. Moreover, the plaintiff in Ornelas apparently would not incur any expert witness fees. Id. at *7. Finally, E & Y offers Anglin v. Tower Loan of Miss., Inc., 635 F.Supp.2d 523 (S.D.Miss.2009) as precedent for “compelling arbitration where damages, attorney’s fees and punitive damages would result in [a] recovery of over $5,000.” (Def. Reply at 12.) The nub of Anglin, however, was that the plaintiff “made no effort” to demonstrate the prohibitive costs of individual arbitration. Anglin, 635 F.Supp.2d at 529. By contrast, Sutherland has “substantial[ly] demonstrat[ed]” that an inability to prosecute her claims on a class basis “would be tantamount to an inability to assert [her] claims at all.” Amex, 554 F.3d at 302-03 n.1.
2. Ability to Obtain Legal Representation
Even if Sutherland were willing to incur approximately $200,000 to recover a few thousand dollars, she would be unable to retain an attorney to prosecute her individual claim. This is due largely to the E & Y Agreement’s obstacles to reimbursement of fees and expenses. Whether attorney’s fees and expenses incurred during arbitration are compensable is subject to the discretion of the arbitrators. (Reece Decl. Exh. D ¶ IV.P.3.) The amount of such reimbursement is also left to the arbitrators’ discretion. (See id. (arbitrators may award attorney’s fees, “in whole or part, in accordance with applicable law or in the interest of justice”); 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (providing for the reimbursement of “reasonable” attorney’s fees).)
In light of the foregoing, Sutherland cannot reasonably be expected to retain an attorney to pursue her individual claim, and E & Y has not submitted an affidavit stating otherwise. Sutherland cannot afford to advance the fees and costs in order to hire an attorney on an hourly basis: she has remained unemployed since her termination from E & Y in December 2009; she has no savings, and owes $35,000 in student loans. (Sutherland Decl. ¶ 5.) Counsel for Sutherland will not prosecute her individual claim without charge, and will not advance the required costs where the E & Y Agreement’s fee-shifting provisions present little possibility of being made whole. (Folkenflik Decl. ¶ 25.) As the uncontested affidavit of Sutherland’s counsel reflects, Sutherland would find no attorney willing to represent her under the circumstances. (Id. ¶ 27.) Cf. Kristian, 446 F.3d at 60 (“[I]t would not make economic sense for an individual to retain an attorney to handle one of these cases on an hourly basis and it is hard to see how any lawyer could advise a client to do so.”) (internal quotations omitted).
Sutherland’s only option in pursuing her individual claim is thus to retain an attorney on a contingent fee basis. But just as no rational person would expend hundreds of thousands of dollars to recover a few thousand dollars in damages, “no attorney (regardless of competence) would ever take such a case on a contingent fee basis .” Caban v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 606 F.Supp.2d 1361, 1371 (S.D.Fla.2009); see also Folkenflik Decl.¶ 27. Cf. Kristian, 446 F.3d at 59 (“[I]t would not make economic sense for an attorney to agree to represent any of the plaintiffs in these cases in exchange for 33 1/3% or even a greater percentage of the individual’s recovery.”) (internal quotations omitted). E & Y has submitted no evidence that an attorney would expend approximately $200,000 in time and costs in return for a mere chance to earn potentially one-third of Sutherland’s less than $4,000 recovery.
If Sutherland could aggregate her claim with the claims of others similarly situated, however, she would have no difficulty in obtaining legal representation. (See Folkenflik Decl.¶ 25; see also Pl. Reply at 3.) This is because class proceedings “achieve economies of time, effort, and expense….” Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 616 (1997) (internal quotations omitted).
3. The Practical Effect of Waiver
Enforcement of the class waiver provision in this case would effectively ban all proceedings by Sutherland against E & Y. She will be unable to pursue her claims, even if they are meritorious. As a result, E & Y would enjoy de facto immunity from liability for alleged violations of the labor laws. The legislative purposes in enacting such laws-including, for example, combating “labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living” FLSA § 2(a), 29 U.S.C. § 202(a), and assuring workers “additional pay to compensate them for the burden of a workweek beyond” 40 hours per week, In re Novartis Wage and Hour Litig. Litig. 611 F.3d 141, 150 (2d Cir.2010)-would go unfulfilled. “Corporations should not be permitted to use class action waivers as a means to exculpate themselves from liability for small-value claims.” Dale v. Comcast Corp., 498 F.3d 1216, 1224 (11th Cir.2007).
4. Summary
Having examined the totality of the facts and circumstances, the Court finds that the class waiver provision here at issue is unenforceable because it prevents Sutherland from vindicating her statutory rights. See Amex, 554 F.3d at 302-03 n.1.
V. Future Proceedings
Although the class waiver provision is unenforceable, the Court cannot order E & Y to submit to class arbitration. After the offending provision is severed from the E & Y Agreement, (see Reece Decl. Exh. D ¶ V.F.), the Agreement is rendered silent as to whether class arbitration is permissible. In accordance with Stolt-Nielsen, class arbitration may not be imposed on parties whose arbitration agreements are silent on the permissibility of class proceedings. 130 S.Ct. at 1764, 1775. See also Fensterstock v. Educ. Fin. Partners, 611 F.3d 124, 140 (2d Cir.2010). The Court must accordingly deny E & Y’s motion to compel arbitration.”
It will be interesting to see whether courts in other circuits will follow this well-reasoned opinion. This is an area of FLSA jurisprudence where there is a wide divergence of opinions. The Eleventh Circuit for example has long-held that FLSA Collective Action rights can be waived by agreement.
Click Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP to read the entire opinion.
S.D.Tex.: Defendant Who Prevailed at Trial Following OJ, Not Entitled to Award of Attorney’s Fees Under FLSA
Tran v. Thai
While not a novel concept, this case demonstrates a commonly misunderstood concept in FLSA jurisprudence, an FLSA defendant who prevails at trial, following the tender of an offer of judgment (OJ), is not entitled to an award of its attorneys fees.
In this case the defendant had served an OJ on the plaintiff in the amount of $500.00, which the plaintiff did not accept. The case then proceeded to trial and resulted in a defense verdict. Following the defense verdict, the defendant moved for an award of its fees and costs, citing Rule 68, the OJ statute. Denying the defendant’s motion, the court explained that OJ’s do not shift attorney’s fees in FLSA cases, because: (1) OJ’s only shift fees where a plaintiff prevails at trial, but for less than the amount of the OJ; and (2) the FLSA does not permit fee shifting to a defendant.
Reasoning that an award of the defendant’s attorney’s fees was impermissible here, the court explained:
“There are two flaws in the defendants’ request for the fees they incurred after the plaintiff failed to accept the $500 offer. First, Rule 68 “applies only to offers made by the defendant and only to judgments obtained by the plaintiff. It therefore is simply inapplicable to this case because it was the defendant that obtained the judgment.” Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August, 450 U.S. 346, 352, 101 S.Ct. 1146, 67 L.Ed.2d 287 (1981); MRO Communications, Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 197 F.3d 1276, 1280 (9th Cir.1999); see also CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, et al., 12 FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV. § 3006 (2d ed.) (“[Rule 68] is entirely inapplicable … if the defendant, rather than the plaintiff, obtain judgment.”). In Delta Airlines, Justice Powell, concurring in the result noted that the Court’s holding implies that “a defendant may obtain costs under Rule 68 against a plaintiff who prevails in part but not against a plaintiff who loses entirely.” 450 U.S. at 362 (Powell, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). In other words, if the jury in this case had awarded Nguyen $300 against the defendants, they could seek attorney fees under Rule 68(d). But because the jury awarded nothing, and judgment is entered in favor of the defendants, there is no basis to award attorney’s fees. See Farley v. Country Coach, Inc., No. 05-71623, 2008 WL 795788, at *1 (E.D.Mich. Mar.26, 2008); Drewery v. Mervyns Dept. Store, No. C 07-5017 RJB, 2008 WL 222627, at *1-2 (W.D.Wash. Jan.25, 2008).
In support of their argument that Rule 68 is relevant to an award of costs in this case, the defendants have cited Haworth v. Nevada, 56 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir.1995). In that case, however, the plaintiffs prevailed on one of their claims. The Ninth Circuit held that the defendant was entitled to costs under Rule 68 because the defendant’s offer of judgment exceeded the final judgment obtained by the plaintiffs. Id. at 1052. In this case, the defendants prevailed and the plaintiff lost entirely. Rule 68 is not applicable.
The second flaw is that the FLSA does not appear to be in the category of statutes on which Rule 68 operates to include fees. The Supreme Court considered the applicability of Rule 68 to statutory fee-shifting provisions in Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 105 S.Ct. 3012, 87 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985). The Court upheld the application of Rule 68 to the fee-shifting provision of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court reasoned that in an action under § 1983, “all costs properly awardable in an action are to be considered within the scope of Rule 68 ‘costs.’ Thus, absent congressional expressions to the contrary, where the underlying statute defines ‘costs’ to include attorney’s fees, we are satisfied such fees are to be included as costs for purposes of Rule 68.” Id. at 9, 105 S.Ct. at 3016. Because § 1983 defined costs to include attorney’s fees, Rule 68 applied to bar recovery for any attorney’s fees incurred after a Rule 68 offer was made when the plaintiff recovered less by judgment than the settlement offer. Id. The FLSA is different. The FLSA defines attorney’s fees separately from costs. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Unlike attorney’s fees in a § 1983 action, attorney’s fees in an FLSA action are not automatically shifted by Rule 68. Accord Fegley v. Higgins, 19 F.3d 1126, 1135 (6th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 875, 115 S.Ct. 203, 130 L.Ed.2d 134 (1994); Cox v. Brookshire Grocery Co., 919 F.2d 354, 358 (5th Cir.1990) (dicta); Haworth v. State of Nev., 56 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir.1995).
The motion for judgment is denied to the extent it seeks to include $22,057.90 in attorney’s fees after the offer of judgment.”
U.S.S.C.: Court Denies Certiorari to Novartis and Schering on Appeals of Decisions Finding Pharma Reps Non-Exempt Under the FLSA
Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. v. Lopes, Simona M. and Schering Corporation v. Kuzinski, Eugene, et al.
In a case with far sweeping ramifications for the pharmaceutical industry and its employees, following the Second Circuit’s decision that found pharmaceutical representatives (pharma reps) to be non-exempt and therefore, entitled to overtime, the Supreme Court has denied Plaintiff’s Petition for Cert, and therefore the issue remains largely unresolved. In a decision discussed here, the Second Circuit had previously held that the pharma reps were non-exempt, notwithstanding the pharmaceutical companies’ arguments that they were outside sales and/or administrative exempt. However, the Third Circuit, on facts it acknowledged were limited to the case before it, recently reached the opposite conclusion, holding Johnson & Johnson pharma reps to be exempt under the administrative exemption. Most recently, the Ninth Circuit held that, notwithstanding the fact that pharma reps cannot and do not consummate sales, their promotional activities are close enough to render them exempt under the outside sales exemption.
The Department of Labor had submitted an Amicus Brief in support of the employees in both the Second and Ninth Circuit cases. While the Second Circuit relied on the DOL’s Brief in large part, reaching its conclusion that the pharma reps are non-exempt, the Ninth Circuit rejected the arguments in the Brief.
It will be interesting to see if the large pharmaceutical companies, most of whom are in the midst of FLSA collective actions and/or state wage and hour class actions, will reclassify their pharma reps based on the Novartis decision. The stakes are huge, and the risk- if they chose not to- could be an imposition of liquidated damages, in addition to unpaid wage awards in any case(s) the employees win.
10th Cir.: FLSA Defendant Who Simultaneously Relied Upon and Rejected Advice of Counsel Committed Willful Violation of FLSA; 3 Year SOL Applied
Mumby v. Pure Energy Services (USA), Inc.
Following an award of summary judgment to the plaintiffs, which held that defendant’s violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) was willful, for both liquidated damages and statute of limitations purposes, the defendant appealed. The crux of defendant’s argument on appeal was that, due to partial reliance on attorney advice, it was entitled to reject portions of the attorney’s advice that were not relevant to its inquiry of the attorney, without a finding that its FLSA violations were willful. The lower court disagreed and granted plaintiffs summary judgment, holding that a three (3), rather than two (2) year statute of limitations was applicable, due to defendant’s willful violation of the FLSA. The Tenth Circuit agreed and affirmed.
Explaining the issue the Tenth Circuit stated: “[t]he thrust of Pure Energy’s argument is that it should be allowed to both rely on and disregard advice of counsel in order to avoid a three-year statute of limitations and liquidated damages.”
Laying out the general law regarding attorney consults as a defense to willfulness in cases brought under the FLSA, the court stated:
“Although consultation with an attorney may help prove that an employer lacked willfulness, such a consultation is, by itself, insufficient to require a finding in favor of the employer. The court’s operative inquiry focuses on the employer’s diligence in the face of a statutory obligation, not on the employer’s mere knowledge of relevant law. See McGlaughlin, 486 U.S. at 134-35; see also Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 129-30 (1985) (airline did not recklessly disregard the Age Discrimination in Employment Act where it sought legal advice, negotiated with union representatives, and then finally implemented a new retirement policy). We have also stated the inverse in our unpublished decisions: that failure to consult with a lawyer is equally insufficient to prove recklessness. See Fowler v. Incor, 279 F. App’x 590, 602 (10th Cir.2008). These principles are consistent with similar “advice-of-counsel” rules in other contexts. See, e.g., United States v. Wenger, 427 F.3d 840, 853 (10th Cir.2005) (in the securities fraud context, “[g]ood faith reliance on counsel … is merely one factor a jury may consider when determining whether a defendant acted willfully”); Takecare Corp. v. Takecare of Oklahoma, Inc., 889 F.2d 955, 957 (10th Cir.1989) (in a trademark infringement action, absent a showing of other factors, “counsel’s advice alone will not shield the actor from the consequences of his act”) (internal quotation marks omitted).”
Rejecting the defendant’s argument, the court explained:
“In 2005, after one year of U.S. operations, Pure Energy began transferring management of its U.S. operations from Canada to the United States. When it transferred payroll functions to its new domestic management team, it hired a new manager, Cindy Rucker, to run payroll operations in compliance with U.S. labor standards. At the time of her hiring, Ms. Rucker was aware of the FLSA, but she was unfamiliar with day rates. When she expressed concerns about the company’s compensation policy, Pure Energy’s management referred Ms. Rucker to a Colorado attorney, Paul Hurcomb.
In January 2006, after speaking with Ms. Rucker and reviewing some of Pure Energy’s employment offer letters, Mr. Hurcomb advised Ms. Rucker that Pure Energy’s day rate policy complied with the FLSA so long as the company itemized regular and overtime rates and did not have its field employees work more than twelve hours per day. Mr. Hurcomb also discussed with Ms. Rucker that any weekly hours over forty had to be paid as overtime, regardless of the day rate. Mr. Hurcomb did not perform any legal research regarding day rates or the FLSA. Although he essentially stated the forty-hour overtime requirement correctly, his other advice was incorrect.
After receiving Mr. Hurcomb’s advice, Ms. Rucker confirmed with management that Pure Energy was paying its employees correctly so long as it broke down the day rate into regular and overtime hourly rates and did not exceed twelve-hour shifts. However, until it changed its compensation policies in late 2007 to finally comply with the FLSA, Pure Energy continued to underpay its field employees for overtime. Field employees also continued to occasionally work more than twelve hours per day without additional compensation, in violation of Mr. Hurcomb’s advice…
In sum, Mr. Hurcomb and Ms. Rucker discussed day rates, but they also discussed the weekly overtime requirement for employees working more than forty hours per week. Mr. Hurcomb further advised-and Ms. Rucker communicated to her counterparts within the company-that employees must not work more than twelve hours per day. Yet, Pure Energy made no real changes to its compensation policy, nor did it investigate whether its employees were working shifts longer than twelve hours. Indeed, without tracking the number of hours worked by each field employee, it was virtually impossible for Pure Energy to determine whether it was complying with Mr. Hurcomb’s advice, let alone the requirements imposed under the FLSA. It is of no consequence that Mr. Hurcomb’s advice proved incorrect. Pure Energy did not rely in good faith on its counsel’s advice, and thus cannot raise an advice-of-counsel defense.
Pure Energy argues that its purpose in seeking Mr. Hurcomb’s advice was to determine the legality of its day rate policy, and with respect to this narrow issue it acted in good faith on Mr. Hurcomb’s advice. However, an employer may not selectively listen to and then, in good faith, rely upon only one of many issues discussed simply because it sought discrete legal advice on one potential FLSA violation and viewed all other advice as irrelevant to its original, limited inquiry.
In this case, it does not matter if Ms. Rucker’s intent was only to narrowly inquire about Pure Energy’s compliance with the FLSA’s day rate requirements and not to inquire about the FLSA’s weekly overtime requirement. The discussion between Mr. Hurcomb and Ms. Rucker essentially put Pure Energy on notice that it must pay weekly overtime for each hour over forty.
Pure Energy failed to compensate Plaintiffs for weekly overtime despite being put on notice. It applied its compensation policy in reckless disregard of FLSA requirements, and is therefore subject to the three-year statute of limitations for damages.”
USSC: Plaintiff’s Petition for Certiorari Denied Regarding Calculation of Damages for “Salaried Misclassified” Workers
Urnikis-Negro v. American Family Property
In a case where the United States Supreme Court could have decided the oft-raised issue of how to calculate an employee’s damages, following a finding that they were “salaried misclassified,” the Supreme Court has denied Plaintiff’s Petition for Cert, and therefore the issue remains largely unresolved. In a decision discussed here, the Seventh Circuit held that the proper calculation of damages in such a situation was the the “fluctuating workweek” methodology, rather than time and a half. The Fourth Circuit held that only “half-time” damages are due when an employee is salaried misclassified recently too. This decision was widely watched by Wage and Hour practitioners, because of the impact the calculation issue has on damages for such employees who are misclassified. Under the fluctuating workweek calculation, an employee who was salaried and misclassified receives less than one third the damages he or she would receive if the award were made at time and a half.
9th Cir.: Notwithstanding DOL’s Position Otherwise, Pharmaceutical Reps (PSRs) Are “Outside Sales” Exempt
Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.
This case was before the Ninth Circuit on the plaintiffs’ appeal from an order granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment, finding plaintiffs’, pharmaceutical reps (“PSRs”), to be exempt from the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) under the “outside sales” exemption. Although the DOL, filed an Amicus Brief, explaining that the type of work performed by the PSRs did not come within the “outside sales” exemption, because the PSR’s did not perform any sales, the Ninth Circuit disagreed.
Reasoning that the PSR employees came within the outside sales exemption, notwithstanding the fact that they did not complete sales, the court essentially held that their work was close enough to sales, that it should be deemed sales:
“Absent an agency-determined result, it is the province of the court to construe the relevant statutes and regulations. N. Cal. River Watch, 620 F.3d at 1088-89. As noted supra, Plaintiffs argue that by not transferring any product to physicians, they are not selling pharmaceuticals, but only “promoting” them. Plaintiffs say this distinction is warranted in light of the rule that the FLSA be “narrowly construed against … employers.” Webster, 247 F.3d at 914. For its part, Glaxo urges us to view “sale” in Section 3(k) in a commonsensical fashion, while contending that the meaning of “sale” is permissive. Glaxo urges us to adopt the rationale that the phrase “other disposition” in Section 3(k)’s definition of “sale” is a broad catch-all category. This view was cited with approval by the district court here, and is supported by the Secretary’s usage, dating back to 1940, of the language that an employee must “in some sense make a sale.” 69 Fed.Reg. at 22,162 (quoting “Executive, Administrative, Professional Outside Salesman” Redefined, Wage and Hour Division, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Report & Recommendations of the Presiding Officer (Harold Stein) at Hearings Preliminary to Redefinition, at 46 (Oct. 10, 1940)) (emphasis added).
Plaintiffs’ contention that they do not “sell” to doctors ignores the structure and realities of the heavily regulated pharmaceutical industry. It is undisputed that federal law prohibits pharmaceutical manufacturers from directly selling prescription medications to patients. Plaintiffs suggest that despite being hired for their sales experience, being trained in sales methods, encouraging physicians to prescribe their products, and receiving commission-based compensation tied to sales, their job cannot “in some sense” be called selling. This view ignores the reality of the nature of the work of detailers, as it has been carried out for decades. Plaintiffs’ argument also fails to account for the fact that the relevant “purchasers” in the pharmaceutical industry, and the appropriate foci of our inquiry, are not the end-users of the drug but, rather, the prescribing physicians whom they importune frequently. See, e.g., Baum v. AstraZeneca LP, 605 F.Supp.2d 669, 678-79 (W.D.Pa.2009) (discussing why the “professional paradigm” places the physician as the relevant decision maker in the health services industry), aff’d on other grounds, 372 Fed. App’x 246 (3d Cir.2010). Unlike conventional retail sales, the patient is not at liberty to choose personally which prescription pharmaceutical he desires. As such, he cannot be fairly characterized as the “buyer.” Instead, it is patient’s physician, who is vested with both a moral and legal duty to prescribe medication appropriately, who selects the medication and is the appropriate focus of our “sell/buy” inquiry. In this industry, the “sale” is the exchange of non-binding commitments between the PSR and physician at the end of a successful call. Through such commitments, the manufacturer will provide an effective product and the doctor will appropriately prescribe; for all practical purposes, this is a sale. Because pharmaceutical manufacturers appreciate who the “real” buyer is, they have structured their 90,000-person sales force and their marketing tactics to accommodate this unique environment.
When a PSR visits a doctor, he or she attempts to obtain the absolute maximum commitment from his or her “buyer”-a non-binding commitment from the physician to prescribe the PSR’s assigned product when medically appropriate. In most industries, there are no firm legal barriers that prohibit the actual physical exchange of the goods offered for sale. Because such barriers do exist in this industry, the fact that commitments are non-binding is irrelevant; the record reveals that binding or non-binding, a physician’s commitment to a PSR is nevertheless a meaningful exchange because pharmaceutical manufacturers value these commitments enough to reward a PSR with increased commissions when a physician increases his or her use of a drug in the PSR’s bag. See, e.g., Baum, 605 F.Supp.2d at 681 (“This Court believes that other courts, and perhaps regulatory agencies, underestimate the significance of this oral commitment from physicians. In part, this error emerges from a misunderstanding of the ways in which human beings are socially and informally motivated. Sometimes lawyers and judges forget that a person’s word means something; remarkably, many people do not actually need a 400-page contract to bind themselves to their word.”).
Moreover, the industry has agreed upon and abides by the PhRMA Code to regulate the marketing of medicine to healthcare professionals-just as any consumer-products maker might develop rules to limit the express warranties its sales force might offer to a customer. Such industry practice and prevailing customs should inform our disposition. Cf. Reiseck v. Universal Commc’ns of Miami, Inc., 591 F.3d 101, 106 (2d Cir.2010) (in resolving whether advertising sales director was an administrative or sales worker in the publishing industry “a careful consideration of [employer’s] business model provides some clarity”).
Under Plaintiffs’ view, PSRs are not salespeople, despite the fact that more than 90,000 pharmaceutical representatives make daily calls on physicians for the purpose of driving greater sales. See IMS Health, 616 F.3d at 14. We cannot square this view with Section 3(k)’s open-ended use of the word “sale,” which includes “other disposition[s].” While we recognize that the FLSA is to be narrowly construed in light of its remedial nature, that general principle does not mean that every word must be given a rigid, formalistic interpretation. For example, for over seventy years, the Secretary has emphasized a sensible application of the exemptions; in the Preamble to the 2004 Rule, the Secretary employs the openended concept that a salesman is someone who “in some sense” sells. 69 Fed.Reg. at 22,162-63 (emphasis added). In other words, while the Secretary asks us to narrowly interpret this exemption, she herself acknowledges that technical considerations alone and changes in the way sales are made should not be grounds for denying the exemption. See 69 Fed.Reg. at 22,162.
To further explain our common sense understanding of why PSRs make sales, we find the paradigm “outside salesman” case Jewel Tea Co. v. Williams-instructive. 118 F.2d 202 (10th Cir.1941). The importance of Jewel Tea is illustrated by the fact that both parties and the amicus offer it as favorable precedent for their conflicting positions.
Jewel Tea involved a FLSA overtime-wage suit brought by three employees of a tea, coffee, and sundry goods manufacturer and distributor. 118 F.2d at 203. The plaintiffs held the position of “route salesmen” to “sell and distribute” products to customers in their homes. Id. The area in which the company sold its goods was divided and “[e]ach salesman [was] assigned an exclusive territory which he cover[ed].” Id. The employees made no immediate deliveries but instead took orders for future delivery, although they might advance an item to a customer. Id. The company provided sales training and sent a supervisor with a new hire on early sales calls before permitting the employee to “go out on a route by himself.” Id. at 204. Further, employees were taught a “five-point sale” method to employ when speaking with customers. Id. A certain degree of knowledge about the products and potential customers was also required-“[t]he salesman must know recipes for the preparation of the Company’s products … [and] must learn the general requirements of each family, in order to avoid over-stocking his customer and in order to anticipate the family’s needs.” Id. After working in the field during the day, employees completed some clerical tasks at night. Id. at 205. Finally, employees were paid a base salary plus a commission if their collections were in excess of a sum certain. Id.
The Jewel Tea plaintiffs brought suit to collect unpaid overtime, asserting they did not fall within the “outside sales” exemption, primarily employing the argument that they were “delivery men.” Id. at 208. In its decision denying plaintiffs overtime pay, the Tenth Circuit penned the oft-quoted justification for the outside sales exemption:
The reasons for excluding an outside salesman are fairly apparent. Such salesman, to a great extent, works individually. There are no restrictions respecting the time he shall work and he can earn as much or as little, within the range of his ability, as his ambition dictates. In lieu of overtime, he ordinarily receives commissions as extra compensation. He works away from his employer’s place of business, is not subject to the personal supervision of his employer, and his employer has no way of knowing the number of hours he works per day. To apply hourly standards primarily devised for an employee on a fixed hourly wage is incompatible with the individual character of the work of an outside salesman. Id. at 207-08.
Reviewing the undisputed facts here, we consider the rationale for applying the outside sales exemption to PSRs to be as “apparent” as it was in Jewel Tea. Of course, this case does not involve door-to-door consumer-product sales. But, the FLSA is not an industry-specific statute. As the Second Circuit recognized in Reiseck, not all FLSA claims will involve the “archetypal businesses envisaged by the FLSA,” 591 F.3d at 106. Even though there are differences, it is notable that the salesmen in Jewel Tea and Plaintiffs here each (1) worked in assigned territories, (2) did not make immediate deliveries, (3) were required to analyze client backgrounds, (4) received product training, (5) employed a pre-planned routine for client interaction, (6) were accompanied by supervisors for training, (7) were later subject to minimal supervisor oversight, (8) completed clerical activities at the end of the day, and (9) had a dual salary and commission-based compensation plan tied to their performance. Even though PSRs lack some hallmarks of the classic salesman, the great bulk of their activities are the same, as is the overarching purpose of obtaining a commitment to purchase (prescribe) something.
The primary duty of a PSR is not promoting Glaxo’s products in general or schooling physicians in drug development. These are but preliminary steps toward the end goal of causing a particular doctor to commit to prescribing more of the particular drugs in the PSR’s drug bag. Without this commitment and the concomitant increase in prescriptions, or drug volume, or market share-i.e. without more sales-the PSR would not receive his or her commission salary and could soon find himself or herself unemployed. While not all steps in the PSR’s daily activities constitute “selling,” that fact does not render the totality of those activities non-exempt promotion; “work performed incidental to and in conjunction with the employee’s own outside sales or solicitations … shall be regarded as exempt outside sales work … [and] … other work that furthers the employee’s sales efforts also shall be regarded as exempt work.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.500(b).
The Secretary’s distinction between selling and promoting is only meaningful if the employee does not engage in any activities that constitute “selling” under the Act. This much is seen from the plain language of the regulations, which gives the example of promotional work as “a company representative who visits chain stores, arranges the merchandise on shelves, replenishes stock by replacing old with new merchandise, sets up displays and consults with the store manager when inventory runs low, but does not obtain a commitment for additional purchases.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.503(c) (emphasis added). PSRs do far more than collect general data or provide consultations; indeed they ask for, and sometimes obtain, a commitment by the doctor to prescribe Glaxo drugs, and whether the doctor keeps that commitment is verified and traced using aggregated pharmacy data Glaxo collects. See IMS Health, 550 F.3d at 44-47 (“A valuable tool in this endeavor, available through the omnipresence of computerized technology, is knowledge of each individual physician’s prescribing history.”).
In Reisick, the Second Circuit highlighted an important distinction between selling and promoting, noting that the latter is directed to the public at large, as opposed to a particular client:
Consider a clothing store. The individual who assists customers in finding their size of clothing or who completes the transaction at the cash register is a salesperson under the FLSA, while the individual who designs advertisements for the store or decides when to reduce prices to attract customers is an administrative employee for the purposes of the FLSA. Reiseck, 591 F.3d at 107. At Glaxo, Plaintiffs had no interest in “generally” promoting sales by the company or improving sales across the board. Rather, Plaintiffs directed their sales efforts only towards certain products, only to a discrete group of physicians, and only within a defined geographic area. Targeting physicians is not based on mass appeals or general advertisements, but is the result of a personalized review of each physician’s prescribing habits and history. The process, like any sales process, is tailored to the customer’s preferences.
We also find that the Secretary’s acquiescence in the sales practices of the drug industry for over seventy years further buttresses our decision. The outside sales exemption has existed since 1938. Detail men have practiced their craft over that same period. Generally, they have been considered salespeople. Until the Secretary’s appearance in Novartis, the DOL did not challenge the conventional wisdom that detailing is the functional equivalent of selling pharmaceutical products. Indeed, the DOL has recognized as much in its Dictionary of Occupation Titles, which provides the following definition for pharmaceutical detailers:
Promotes use of and sells ethical drugs and other pharmaceutical products to physicians, [dentists], hospitals, and retail and wholesale drug establishments, utilizing knowledge of medical practices, drugs, and medicines: Calls on customers, informs customer of new drugs, and explains characteristics and clinical studies conducted with drug. Discusses dosage, use, and effect of new drugs and medicinal preparations. Gives samples of new drugs to customer. Promotes and sells other drugs and medicines manufactured by company. May sell and take orders for pharmaceutical supply items from persons contacted.
D.O.L. Dictionary of Occupational Titles § 262.157-010 (4th ed.1991) (emphases added). Likewise, although it emerged in a different context, we find Judge Posner’s observation in Yi v. Sterling Collison Centers, Inc., 480 F.3d 505, 510-11 (7th Cir.2007), informative-while it is “possible for an entire industry to be in violation of the [FSLA] for a long time without the Labor Department noticing[, the] more plausible hypothesis is that the … industry has been left alone” because DOL believed its practices were lawful.
In view of many similarities between PSRs and salespeople in other fields, pharmaceutical industry norms, and the acquiescence of the Secretary over the last seventy-plus years, we cannot accord even minimal Skidmore deference to the position expressed in the amicus brief. Under Skidmore, “[t]he fair measure of deference to an agency administering its own statute has been understood to vary with circumstances, and courts have looked to the degree of the agency’s care, its consistency, formality, and relative expertness, and to the persuasiveness of the agency’s position.” United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001) (internal citations omitted); see also League of Wilderness Defenders v. Forsgren, 309 F.3d 1181, 1189 (9th Cir.2002) (quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140) (internal quotation marks omitted). Many, if not all, of these hallmarks of “respectful” deference are absent here. The about-face regulation, expressed only in ad hoc amicus filings, is not enough to overcome decades of DOL nonfeasance and the consistent message to employers that a salesman is someone who “in some sense” sells. Moreover, we are unable to accept an argument that fails to account for industry customs and emphasizes formalism over practicality, in particular the argument that “obtaining a commitment to buy” is the sine qua non of the exemption. Under the Secretary’s view, “sale” means unequivocally the final execution of a legally binding contract for the exchange of a discrete good. In addition to the point that such stringent wording is not found in Section 3(k), or plausibly implied from phrases like “other disposition,” the Secretary’s approach transforms what since the time of Jewel Tea has been recognized as a multi-factor review of an employee’s functions into a single, stagnant inquiry.
Telephones, television, shopping malls, the Internet and general societal progress have largely relegated the professional pitchman embodied in Jewel Tea to the history books. But selling continues, and, as in prior eras, a salesperson learns the nuances of a product and those of his or her potential clientele, tailors a scripted message based on intuition about the customer, asks for the customer to consider her need for the product, and then receives a commission when the customer’s positive impression ultimately results in a purchase.
For the past seventy-plus years, selling in the pharmaceutical industry has followed this process. PSRs are driven by their own ambition and rewarded with commissions when their efforts generate new sales. They receive their commissions in lieu of overtime and enjoy a largely autonomous work-life outside of an office. The pharmaceutical industry’s representatives-detail men and women-share many more similarities than differences with their colleagues in other sales fields, and we hold that they are exempt from the FLSA overtime-pay requirement.
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s summary judgment for Defendant-Appellee SmithKline Beecham Corporation.”
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Overtime Law Blog 