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D.Utah: FLSA Collective Action Rights Cannot Be Waived Outside Arbitration Agreement
Roig v. Alder Holdings, LLC
In Roig v. Alder Holdings, LLC, the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah held that an employee’s contractual waiver of the right to proceed through a collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) was unenforceable where the agreement did not contain an arbitration provision. The court denied the employer’s motion to dismiss or strike the collective allegations, granted conditional certification of a nationwide FLSA collective, and authorized notice to similarly situated workers.
The ruling addresses an issue on which federal courts have disagreed: whether an employer may require a worker, as a condition of employment, to waive the FLSA’s collective-action mechanism while still permitting the worker to pursue an individual case in court. The court concluded that, absent the competing federal policy favoring enforcement of an arbitration agreement, the collective-action right provided by 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) is not subject to waiver by private contract.
Case Background
Jason Roig brought suit against Alder Holdings, a home-security door-to-door sales company, alleging that Alder employed him as a Field Service Technician (“FST”), misclassified him as an independent contractor, and failed to pay overtime wages required by 29 U.S.C. § 207.
Roig sought to pursue the action on behalf of a proposed nationwide collective of similarly situated FSTs under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). He alleged that Alder paid FSTs by completed project rather than by the time required to complete the work, required overtime work, and did not compensate overtime hours.
Alder relied on a provision in a document titled the “Sales Finishing Representative Agreement.” The provision stated that the worker waived, to the fullest extent permitted by law, the right to participate in or be a member of any class or collective action against Alder or its affiliates.
The Threshold Issue: Was the Agreement Binding?
Roig argued that the agreement was unenforceable because Alder had not signed it, because he worked as an FST rather than a sales representative, and because a later offer letter governed the employment relationship.
The court rejected those challenges and held that the agreement was binding under Utah law. The court found that Roig signed the agreement, understood that signing was required to obtain work from Alder, and that Alder manifested its assent by drafting and sending the agreement, requiring its execution before work, hiring Roig, and seeking to enforce its terms.
That finding did not end the analysis. The court then addressed the separate legal question of whether the agreement’s collective-action waiver could be enforced under the FLSA.
The FLSA Collective-Action Provision
Section 216(b) provides that an employee may bring an action for unpaid minimum wages or overtime compensation “for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated.” It also requires each worker who wishes to participate to file written consent with the court.
Unlike a Rule 23 class action, an FLSA collective action is an opt-in procedure. Employees do not become parties merely because they fall within a proposed group; they must affirmatively consent in writing to join. The court emphasized that § 216(b) identifies when the right to bring or join such an action ends—when the Secretary of Labor files an enforcement action—but does not provide that employers may eliminate the right through a stand-alone employment agreement.
The Court’s Holding: The Right Could Not Be Waived Here
The court concluded that the FLSA collective-action right was nonwaivable in the circumstances presented. It relied on the text of § 216(b), the Supreme Court’s treatment of FLSA rights as generally nonwaivable, the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Killion v. KeHE Distributors, LLC, and the Tenth Circuit’s discussion of the history behind Congress’s adoption of the FLSA’s opt-in collective-action procedure.
The court’s analysis was expressly limited by the absence of an arbitration agreement. It recognized that the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) may require enforcement of agreements calling for bilateral arbitration, even where a federal statute otherwise permits collective procedures. But because Alder did not have an arbitration agreement with Roig, the court found that there was no countervailing federal policy requiring enforcement of the waiver.
The Court Relied on Brooklyn Savings Bank
The court relied heavily on Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697 (1945), in which the Supreme Court held that employees could not privately waive their right to liquidated damages under the FLSA.
Although Brooklyn Savings Bank did not decide the specific question of collective-action waivers, the Utah court reasoned that its broader discussion of the FLSA’s mandatory protections and unequal bargaining power supported the conclusion that the collective mechanism could not be prospectively waived by contract.
The Court Found Killion Persuasive
The court also followed the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning in Killion v. KeHE Distributors, LLC, 761 F.3d 574 (6th Cir. 2014). Killion held that the FLSA collective-action right could not be waived where no arbitration agreement was involved.
The Roig court agreed with Killion that requiring workers with relatively small individual overtime claims to proceed one-by-one could discourage enforcement of the FLSA.
The Conflicting Appellate Authority
The court acknowledged that this issue is unresolved in the Tenth Circuit and that other circuits have enforced collective-action waivers, generally in cases involving arbitration agreements.
For example, the court identified decisions from the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits concluding that collective-action rights may be waived.
But the court found those decisions less persuasive in a case lacking an agreement to arbitrate. It reasoned that the cited appellate decisions were shaped by the FAA’s mandate to enforce arbitration contracts according to their terms—a consideration absent from Roig’s employment agreement.
The court also declined to treat the collective-action mechanism as merely “procedural” and therefore freely waivable. It concluded that the procedural-versus-substantive distinction did not provide a clear or persuasive basis to allow an employer to eliminate a statutory enforcement mechanism by contract.
Congress’s Opt-In Compromise
The court further relied on Dolan v. Project Construction Corp., 725 F.2d 1263 (10th Cir. 1984), which discusses Congress’s adoption of the FLSA’s opt-in collective procedure through the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947.
According to the court, this history showed that Congress had already balanced employee enforcement interests against employers’ concerns about representative litigation. Congress restricted the original FLSA procedure by requiring affirmative written consent, but preserved the ability of similarly situated employees to proceed collectively.
The court declined to create an additional, judge-made exception allowing employers to eliminate that statutory mechanism through stand-alone waivers.
Conditional Certification Granted
Having rejected the waiver defense, the court granted Roig’s motion for conditional certification of a nationwide collective action. Roig alleged that at least 35 other FSTs were similarly misclassified as independent contractors and denied overtime wages.
Applying the Tenth Circuit’s two-step framework from Thiessen v. General Electric Capital Corp., 267 F.3d 1095 (10th Cir. 2001), the court found that Roig had made the showing necessary at the initial notice stage: substantial allegations that proposed collective members were victims of a common decision, policy, or plan.
The court approved the proposed notice and ordered Alder to provide a list of current and former employees who fit the collective description within 21 days.
Interlocutory Appeal and Equitable Tolling
The court recognized that the enforceability of a stand-alone FLSA collective-action waiver presents a controlling question of law on which there is substantial disagreement among courts. It therefore certified the issue for a possible interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
The court nevertheless declined to stay the proceedings pending any appeal.
It also equitably tolled the limitations period for potential opt-in plaintiffs from February 9, 2024—the date Roig first moved for conditional certification—through the date of the order. The court explained that prospective opt-in plaintiffs should not lose claims because of delays in resolving the certification and waiver issues.
What Roig Means for FLSA Overtime Litigation
The decision is a district-court ruling, not binding Tenth Circuit precedent. Its importance lies in its direct treatment of a stand-alone FLSA collective-action waiver—that is, a waiver not paired with an arbitration agreement.
For Employees
- A signed agreement waiving participation in collective litigation may not necessarily prevent an employee from seeking collective treatment of an FLSA overtime claim. In Roig, the court found the agreement valid but declined to enforce its collective-action waiver.
- The ruling is particularly relevant where an employer requires workers to waive collective actions but does not require arbitration.
- The merits of the underlying overtime claim remained unresolved. The court did not decide whether Alder actually misclassified FSTs or failed to pay them overtime; it held only that Roig could pursue the case collectively at the notice stage.
For Employers
- An employer cannot assume that a stand-alone class or collective-action waiver will be enforceable in every jurisdiction or in every statutory context.
- The presence or absence of an arbitration agreement may be outcome-determinative. The court distinguished decisions enforcing waivers because those cases involved the FAA and agreements to arbitrate.
- Employers defending FLSA collective cases should separately evaluate the enforceability of any arbitration clause, any collective-action waiver, the governing circuit’s precedent, and the particular language of the employment documents. The court found that an otherwise valid contract did not make the waiver enforceable under the FLSA.
The Bottom Line
Roig v. Alder Holdings holds that, in the absence of an arbitration agreement, an employer may not require an employee to waive the right to pursue an FLSA collective action under § 216(b).
The ruling adopts the reasoning of Killion and treats the FLSA’s opt-in collective procedure as part of Congress’s chosen enforcement framework, rather than a contractual term an employer may eliminate through a condition of work.
Because the court certified the issue for interlocutory appeal, further appellate review may clarify whether the Tenth Circuit will adopt, reject, or modify this approach.