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S.D.Ind.: Pursuant to FRCP 9(b), Generalized Allegations Of Willfulness Sufficient To Survive Motion To Dismiss Relating To Statute Of Limitations
Bockler v. R.J. McGough & Associates, Inc.
This cause is before the Court on the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend his Complaint. Specifically, Defendant sought to have the Complaint dismissed on statute of limitations grounds, averring that Plaintiff’s Complaint was insufficient to state of claim where the 3 year statute of limitations could be applicable, rather than the FLSA’s default 2 year statute of limitations. Denying Defendant’s Motion, the Court cited to the generalized allegations of willfulness, noting that the Complaint must be construed in favor of the Plaintiff on a Motion to Dismiss. Citing FRCP 9(b), the Court held Plaintiff’s allegations of willfulness sufficient to sustain Defendant’s Motion.
“[T]he statute of limitations for ordinary FLSA violations is two years. For willful violations of the FLSA, the statute of limitations is enlarged to three years. As the Supreme Court noted in McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 132 (1988), “[t]he fact that Congress did not simply extend the limitations period to three years, but instead adopted a two-tiered statute of limitations, makes it obvious that Congress intended to draw a significant distinction between ordinary violations and willful violations.”
In the instant case it is undisputed that Bockler missed the two-year deadline for filing an ordinary FLSA violation. However, Bockler’s Amended Complaint alleges that McGough willfully violated the FLSA, which adds one year to the statute of limitations and makes Bockler’s claim timely. McGough’s Motion to Dismiss alleges that Bockler “has failed to satisfy his burden for pleading a viable claim,” Def. Br. at 2, because he fails to provide “even inferential allegations as to how McGough’s conduct could be construed as ‘willful.’ “ Id. at 8.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) allows “[m]alice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind” to be alleged generally. Accordingly, to survive a motion to dismiss, Bockler’s Amended Complaint must give McGough “fair notice of what the … claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Pisciotta, 499 F.3d at 633 (7th Cir.2007). Furthermore, the “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. (citation omitted). Bockler has informed McGough what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. The Amended Complaint clearly alleges that “Defendant knowingly, willfully, or with reckless disregard, carried out its illegal pattern or practice of failing to pay at least one and one-half times the regular rate of pay for all overtime hours with respect to Plaintiff….” Amended Compl. ¶ 25. Although McGough may dispute these allegations, as this is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, all reasonable inferences are drawn in Bockler’s favor. Bockler has plead enough facts to satisfy Rule 9(b). Accordingly, McGough’s Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.”