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3rd. Cir.: “Senior Professional Sales Representative” For Pharmaceutical Company Exempt From Overtime Provisions Of FLSA Under Administrative Exemption
Smith v. Johnson and Johnson
The Court below determined that Plaintiff was exempt under the Administrative Exemption, based on her duties and salary while employed as a “Senior Professional Sales Representative.” On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed.
Discussing the relevant facts, the Court stated:
“From April 2006 to October 2006, McNeill Pediatrics, a J & J wholly-owned subsidiary, employed Smith in the position of Senior Professional Sales Representative. In essence, Smith’s position required her to travel to various doctors’ offices and hospitals where she extolled the benefit of J & J’s pharmaceutical drug Concerta to the prescribing doctors. J & J hoped that the doctors, having learned about the benefits of Concerta, would choose to prescribe this drug for their patients. Smith, however, did not sell Concerta (a controlled substance) directly to the doctors, as such sales are prohibited by law.
J & J gave Smith a list of target doctors that it created and told her to complete an average of ten visits per day, visiting every doctor on her target list at least once each quarter. To schedule visits with reluctant doctors, Smith had to be inventive and cultivate relationships with the doctor’s staff, an endeavor in which she found that coffee and donuts were useful tools. J & J left the itinerary and order of Smith’s visits to the target doctors to her discretion. The J & J target list identified “high-priority” doctors that issued a large number of prescriptions for Concerta or a competing product, and Smith could choose to visit high-priority doctors more than once each quarter. J & J gave her a budget for these visits and she could use the money in the budget to take the doctors to lunch or to sponsor seminars.
At the meetings, Smith worked off of a prepared “message” that J & J provided her, although she had some discretion when deciding how to approach the conversation. J & J gave her pre-approved visual aids and did not permit her to use other aids. J & J trained its representatives to gauge a doctor’s interest and knowledge about the product, eventually building to a “commitment” to prescribe the drug.
In Smith’s deposition she made it clear that she appreciated the freedom and responsibility that her position provided. Though a supervisor accompanied Smith during the doctor visits on a few days each quarter, by her own calculation Smith was unsupervised 95% of the time. As Smith explained during her deposition, “[i]t was really up to me to run the territory the way I wanted to. And it was not a micromanaged type of job. I had pretty much the ability to work it the way I wanted to work it.” App. at 54. According to Smith’s job description, she was required to plan and prioritize her responsibilities in a manner that maximized business results. J & J witnesses testified (and J & J documents confirmed) that Smith was the “expert” on her own territory and was supposed to develop a strategic plan to achieve higher sales.
Before her visits, Smith completed pre-visit reports to help her select the correct strategy for that day’s visits. At the end of her day, Smith completed post-visit reports summarizing the events of the visits. Smith would refer back to this information before her next visit to the same doctors. After adding up the time she spent writing pre-visit reports, driving, conducting the visits, writing post-visit reports, and completing other tasks, Smith worked more than eight hours per day.
Smith earned a base salary of $66,000 but was not paid overtime, though J & J, at its discretion, could award her a bonus. J & J considered the number of Concerta prescriptions issued in Smith’s territory in determining her bonus. The collection of this data and its direct relationship to Smith’s efforts was, however, subject to error as purchasers might fill their prescriptions in another territory or with a pharmacy that would not release the pertinent information to J & J.”
Applying the Administrative Exemption to the facts of this case, the Court held, that the Administrative Exemption was applicable to Smith. The Court reasoned, “[w]hile testifying at her deposition Smith elaborated on the independent and managerial qualities that her position required. Her non-manual position required her to form a strategic plan designed to maximize sales in her territory. We think that this requirement satisfied the “directly related to the management or general business operations of the employer” provision of the administrative employee exemption because it involved a high level of planning and foresight, and the strategic plan that Smith developed guided the execution of her remaining duties. See29 C.F.R. § 541.203(e) (“Human resources managers who formulate, interpret or implement employment policies and management consultants who study the operations of a business and propose changes in organization generally meet the duties requirements for the administrative exemption.”); Reich v. John Alden Life Ins. Co. ., 126 F.3d 1, 3-5, 12 (1st Cir.1997) (applying administrative employee exemption to marketing representatives who dealt with licensed independent insurance agents who, in turn, dealt with purchasers of insurance products).
When we turn to the “exercise of discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of significance” requirement, we note that Smith executed nearly all of her duties without direct oversight. In fact, she described herself as the manager of her own business who could run her own territory as she saw fit. Given these descriptions, we conclude that Smith was subject to the administrative employee exemption. Cf. Cote v. Burroughs Wellcome Co., 558 F.Supp. 883, 886-87 (E.D.Pa.1982) (applying administrative employee exemption to medical “detailer” even though description of employee’s duties was more parsimonious than Smith’s description of her duties here).
Smith nevertheless has asked us to limit the significance of her testimony and find that she lacked discretion with respect to matters of significance. Indeed, her attorney contended at oral argument on this appeal that Smith overinflated her importance during the deposition, and that we should consider her statements mere puffery. We are unwilling to ignore Smith’s testimony to hold that there is an issue of material fact merely because of Smith’s request that we do so. In this regard, we point out that when Smith testified she surely understood the significance of her testimony in the context of this case. In the circumstances before us, we accept Smith’s deposition testimony as an accurate description of her position and thus we will affirm the order granting J & J summary judgment.FN3
In reaching our result we have not overlooked our opinion in Martin v. Cooper Elec. Supply Co., 940 F.2d 896 (3d Cir.1991), on which Smith heavily relies. Rather, we find that Cooper is distinguishable on the facts. Moreover, we agree with the District Court that changes in the Secretary’s regulations since Cooper make that case inapplicable here. See Smith, 2008 WL 5427802, at *8-9.”
Interestingly, neither the Court below, nor the Third Circuit, reached the hot button issue of whether Smith was subject to the Outside Sales Exemption, despite the fact that the issue was briefed both on Defendant’s Motion below, and on cross-appeal.
D.Idaho: “Sales Representative” Who Educated Retailers, But Did Not “Sell” To Customers, Not Subject To Outside Sales Exemption Under FLSA
Burling v. Real Stone Source, LLC
The case was before the Court on the parties’ respective motions for summary judgment on exemption issues. The Court agreed with Plaintiff that he was not subject to the outside sales exemption, and further held that issues of fact precluded a finding regarding the applicability of the administrative exemption. Here, we discuss only the portion of the decision pertaining to the outside sales exemption.
The Court first recited the relevant facts, “Mr. Burling, was employed as a sales representative from March 15, 2006 to November 29, 2007 by Defendant Real Stone Source, LLC, d/b/a Rox Pro. Real Stone is a distributor of Rox Pro products which is a natural modular stone system used in construction. (Dkt. No. 28,Dkt. No. 27-3, p. 37). Real Stone products are distributed exclusively through a network of local dealers from whom the ultimate consumer buys the product. (Dkt. No. 26, Ex. E). Mr. Burling was hired as a Real Stone sales representative for a seven state area comprised of Washington, Oregon, Idaho, Montana, Wyoming, Utah, and Colorado. Mr. Burling was tasked with contacting existing and potential local dealers and pitching Real Stone’s products to them. For prospective local dealers, Mr. Burling’s pitch was in an effort to get them interested in serving as a local dealer of Real Stone products. Once interested, Real Stone would determine whether the prospective dealer met its qualifications and, if so, approve them as a local dealer. For existing dealers, Mr. Burling continued to educate them on Real Stone Products and also aided them in selling Real Stone products through various efforts including promotions and outreach to consumers.”
Agreeing with Plaintiff, and the cases holding that the outside sales exemption can only apply where an employee makes actual sales, the Court said, “This Court finds the cases cited by Mr. Burling to be the correct analysis to apply here. See Kuzinski v. Schering Corp., 604 F.Supp.2d 385 (D.Conn. March 30, 2009). Although the California District Court cases cited by Real Stone discuss the FLSA, they were applying California Labor Law. Notably, the Barnick court recognized that there is a distinction between the FLSA and California Labor Law. There, the court stated that the employee’s argument that he was only promoting, not selling, because he never received commitments from the physicians was “likely a correct application of the distinction between promotion and sales laid down by the Department of Labor and several federal courts with regard to the FLSA” but that it did not apply to the California Labor Law. Barnick, 522 F.Supp.2d at 1264.FN2Where, as here, the case does not raise claims of California Labor Law but, instead, the FLSA, the analysis from cases applying the FLSA are more appropriately used. As such the Court will first consider whether Mr. Burling made sales as defined by the FLSA. See Kuzinski v. Schering Corp., 604 F.Supp.2d 385 (D.Conn. March 30, 2009).”
The Court adopted the reasoning of several of the pharmaceutical sales representative cases, stating, “[t]he Court finds Real Stone has failed its burden of demonstrating that, as a matter of law, Mr. Burling was an exempt outside salesperson. The facts in the record demonstrate that Mr. Burling did not make any sales. The Court rejects Real Stone’s theory that its sales representatives were a part of every sale in their territory. (Dkt. No. 27-3, pp. 109-111), (Dkt. No. 27-4, pp. 24, 51-52), (Dkt. No. 31-2, p. 103). Mr. Burling’s job was to create a network of local dealers, educate the local dealers and contractors about the product, and bolster consumer desire to purchase the product from the local dealers who in turn bought from Real Stone. (Dkt. No. 27-3, pp. 94-96). This is consistent in the depositions of both Mr. Burling and Mr. Motarex as well as Real Stone’s “Sales Philosophy and Market Strategy” document. (Dkt. No. 26-2, Ex. E), (Dkt. No. 27-3, pp. 96-111, Motarex Depo.), (Dkt. No. 27-3, pp. 54-66, Burling Depo.). Both Mr. Burling and Mr. Motarex testified that Real Stone sales representatives were hired to establish a network of dealers in their territory, provide sales support to those dealers by promoting the products and educating the consumers, and engaging in further advanced marketing strategies to “create buzz” for the products and increase consumer purchases from the dealers. (Dkt. No. 26-2, Ex. E). In sum, to “generate” and/or “drive” sales to the local dealers. (Dkt. No. 27-3, pp. 25-28), (Dkt. No. 31-2, pp. 93, 95-96).”
Ultimately, the Court concluded, “[b]ecause the facts here do not demonstrate that Mr. Burling actually made sales, the Court finds the outside salesperson exemption does not apply. Instead the facts show that Mr. Burling’s primary duty was to promote and market the Real Stone brand in such a way so as to create a network of local dealers in his territory and to bolster a market for the products such that consumers were continually buying the products from the local dealers. Accordingly, the Court will grant Mr. Burling’s motion for partial summary judgment on this point.”
Although not discussed at length here, the Court also analyzed the applicability of the claimed administrative exemption, before ultimately deciding issues of fact precluded a finding one way or another.