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N.D.Ohio: Where Defendant Retains Right to Reject Contracts Obtained by Door-to-Door Solicitors, Otherwise Allowed by Law to Enter Into Contracts, Outside Sales Exemption Inapplicable
Hurt v. Commerce Energy, Inc.
Following the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., courts continue to grapple with the issue of who is engaged in making sales, within the definition of the FLSA’s outside sales definition versus who simply helps solicit or promote sales to be made by others. This recent case distinguished door-to-door solicitors, who worked for the defendant energy company, from Christopher, and held that their duties could be non-exempt and more akin to those of the student salesman and military recruiters that Christopher in turn had distinguished from the pharmaceutical sales reps involved in that case. As such, the court denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. In so doing, the court provided some needed guidance on the issue of who is engaged in sales and who is not, for purposes of application of the “outside sales exemption.”
The court discussed the following facts relevant to this issue:
The Plaintiffs worked as door-to-door salespeople for Just Energy Marketing. They worked at various times from 2009 to 2013 at Just Energy’s Beachwood, Ohio office. During most of that time, Dennis Piazza was the regional distributor for the Beachwood office. Just Energy says that Piazza is an independent contractor himself, and his business is separately incorporated as Star Energy, Inc.
A. Ohio Regulations & PUCO
Because Just Energy operates in multiple states, it adopted policies to have its door-to-door workers comply with Ohio regulations. Specifically, in Ohio, the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (“PUCO”) regulates energy suppliers like Just Energy. Generally, PUCO requires suppliers who solicit door-to-door to provide customers with acknowledgment forms; have independent third-party verification of at least fifty percent of all its customers; print terms and conditions in tenpoint type or greater; and require the door-to-door solicitors to display a valid photo identification.
But Just Energy’s door-to-door solicitors have additional requirements. In 2010, Commerce Energy entered into a settlement agreement with the Ohio PUCO to renew its retail natural gas supplier certificate. That agreement resulted from an investigation into customer complaints about the sales, solicitation, and enrollment practices of Just Energy’s residential door-to-door solicitors.
In the settlement, Commerce Energy agreed to implement an in-state quality assurance program “to provide the company with additional oversight of its sales force, as well as retrain all Ohio sales agents to assure compliance with PUCO’s rules.” Commerce also agreed that all its new customers would be subject to a new third-party independent verification process. That process requires door-to-door solicitors to initiate a third-party verification call before leaving the premises. The solicitors cannot be present on the premises during the call, and they cannot return to the premises after the call. Just Energy’s policies for its Ohio door-to-door solicitors reflect these requirements.
B. Hiring and Orientation
For its door-to-door solicitors, Just Energy often hires low-skill workers, many without prior sales experience. At its Beachwood office, Just Energy regional distributors and supervisors conducted short interviews before hiring these workers, sometimes completing the interviews in large groups. After the interviews, Just Energy required its solicitors to sign employment contracts.
The contracts required the Plaintiffs to comply with federal, state, and local laws and regulations and Just Energy Marketing’s codes of behavior. Further, the contracts said that the Plaintiffs would be paid a commission “according to the commission schedule in place at the time.” During the Plaintiffs’ employment, the commission schedule said that Just Energy paid the Plaintiffs approximately $35 for every order that they obtained. According to Just Energy, the Plaintiffs also “enjoyed the potential to earn productivity bonuses and additional commissions if customers remained with Commerce for certain periods of time.” But if “a customer cancelled an agreement after signing, then no commissions were paid at all; if the customer cancelled after the commission was already paid, it was subject to recoupment.”
After signing their employment contracts, Just Energy required its door-to-door workers to attend an orientation session led by a regional distributor. These orientation sessions covered a number of topics “including company and industry background, the products and services being sold, and helpful sales techniques.” After the orientation, Just Energy generally required the Plaintiffs to shadow a more experienced solicitor in the field for one or two days before soliciting customers on their own. Just Energy provided a script for the workers to use with customers. The Plaintiffs used these scripts to varying degrees.
C. Disputed Roles and Responsibilities
Just Energy and the Plaintiffs disagree about their respective roles and responsibilities. According to Just Energy, the Plaintiffs’ primary responsibilities were “knocking on potential customers’ doors, selling Commerce’s services and obtaining signed sales agreements for Commerce’s energy supplies.” Just Energy says that the “Plaintiffs were absolutely allowed to travel and work independently.” It says that they worked free from supervision, and Just Energy did not require them to work particular hours. Both parties agree, however, that the Plaintiffs worked approximately six to seven days a week for approximately twelve hours a day.
In contrast, the Plaintiffs say that Just Energy subjected them to significant supervision. They say that Just Energy regional distributors and supervisors controlled the length of the Plaintiffs’ work week and work day by assigning them to a work crew and van, sending the vans to solicit specific neighborhoods, and prohibiting the vans from returning to the office before 9 p.m. The Plaintiffs also say that Just Energy regional distributors required the Plaintiffs to knock on a specific number of doors and obtain a certain number of orders, required the Plaintiffs to report to the office every morning, prevented the Plaintiffs from working independently, controlled the Plaintiffs’ break time, and required the Plaintiffs to purchase and wear Just Energy branded clothing.
Initially, the court rejected the defendant’s contention that the plaintiffs “made sales” as defined by the outside sales exemption, as a matter of law:
The Plaintiffs’ evidence raises a genuine issue of material fact about whether they were “making sales,” and thus, qualified as outside salesman. FLSA does not define “outside salesman,” instead leaving it to be “defined and delimited … by regulations of the Secretary [of Labor].” The Department of Labor defines “outside salesman” as “any employee … [w]hose primary duty is … making sales within the meaning of [29 U.S.C. § 203(k) ]” and who is “customarily and regularly engaged away from the employer’s place or places of business in performing such primary duty.” Section 203(k) defines a “sale” as “any sale, exchange, contract to sell, consignment for sale, shipment for sale, or other disposition.”
In Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., the United States Supreme Court found that pharmaceutical representatives were exempt outside salespeople even though they did not actually accomplish a “sale” of drugs to the patient. Because Congress meant to define sales broadly to “accommodate industry-by-industry variations in methods of selling commodities,” the Supreme Court said that courts should consider the impact of regulatory requirements or “arrangements that are tantamount, in a particular industry, to a paradigmatic sale of a commodity.” Thus, because federal regulations prevented the pharmaceutical representatives from engaging in the actual sale of drugs to the patient, the Supreme Court found it was enough that the representatives “promoted” sales to doctors who in turn made “nonbinding commitments” to prescribe the drugs to their patients.
In Clements v. Serco, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that military recruiters were not exempt outside salespeople because they lacked the authority to enlist a recruit. There, recruiters “sold” potential recruits on the idea of the Army, but the Army retained the authority to enlist recruits. The Tenth Circuit held that the recruiters did not “make sales” because the Army required the recruits to report to a military processing station for a physical, job selection, and an oath before enlisting. Because the Army retained discretion to enlist a recruit, the recruiters were not outside salesman.
Similarly, in Wirtz v. Keystone Readers, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that “student salesman” were not outside salesman. There, a company hired student salesman to “obtain orders” for magazine subscriptions by door-to-door solicitation. The company required the student salesman to give their order cards to a “student manager,” who then contacted the customer, verified the customer met the company’s qualifications, and passed the order on to a “verifier.” The verifier then checked the order to make sure that the customer met the company’s qualifications. Only then did the company execute a contract. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the student salesman were not outside salesman because they did not “mak[e] sales of their own.”
Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, Just Energy fails to show, as a matter of law, that the Plaintiffs “made sales.” Just Energy says that Christopher should control because the Plaintiffs obtained “far more” than the nonbindinding commitments at issue in Christopher. The Court agrees that the Plaintiffs obtained contracts, but Christopher is distinguishable.
The court reasoned that unlike the pharmaceutical reps in Christopher, here the plaintiffs were not prohibited from entering into binding contracts as a matter of law, rather it was defendant’s internal policies alone that stopped them from doing so:
Unlike the pharmaceutical representatives in Christopher, the Plaintiffs are not prohibited from completing a contract by state or federal regulations. Instead, Just Energy prevented the Plaintiffs from completing a sale by retaining unlimited discretion to accept and reject the orders obtained by the Plaintiffs. For example, in Just Energy’s New Customer User Guide, Just Energy says: “This Agreement will become firm and binding when (i) Just Energy accepts this Agreement, and (ii) the LDC [local distributor] accepts and successfully implements the Customer’s enrolment submission from Just Energy.” Similarly, in Just Energy’s Regional Distributor Services Agreement, Just Energy says: “The Service Provider and the Principal understand and agree that JUST ENERGY or any Affiliate thereof retain the sole and unfettered discretion to reject any Energy Contract submitted (whether by an Independent Contractor, the Principal or the Service Provider).”
Here, neither Ohio law nor the PUCO agreement require Just Energy to retain unlimited rejection authority. And Just Energy has failed to provide evidence showing that this right to reject contracts was necessary to comply with regulations or the PUCO agreement. Just Energy has not shown that it accepts agreements that comply with the applicable regulations. The contracts the Plaintiffs bring to Just Energy are merely proposals until Just Energy accepts them. Therefore, because Just Energy retains an unlimited right of rejection, the Plaintiffs are more like the student salesman in Wirtz and the military recruiters in Serco whose employers retained discretion to accept and reject their orders.
Additionally, like the magazine company in Wirtz, Just Energy required the Plaintiffs to submit their orders for further review before Just Energy chose to accept or reject them. While it is true that Just Energy’s evidence shows that the PUCO agreement requires Just Energy to conduct third-party verification, Just Energy has failed to show that the regulations require a credit check and approval of the customer by the local distributor. Thus, the Plaintiffs’ evidence raises a genuine issue of material fact about whether the Plaintiffs were “making sales,” and thus, qualified for the outside salesman exemption.
The court also reasoned that the “external indicia” did not support defendant’s contention that the plaintiffs were engaged in outside sales, further distinguishing the case from Christopher. Last, the court relied on the FLSA’s purpose, and reasoned that here- unlike the $70,000 a year (plus) pharmaceutical reps at issue in Christopher– the FLSA’s guiding principles supported a finding that the plaintiffs were not outside sales exempt.
Subsequent to this decision, the defendant sought interlocutory review of the decision, but the motion for same was denied. Nonetheless, this one is likely headed to the Sixth Circuit, and it’s unclear what they will do with it. Stay tuned for a further update here if/when the Sixth Circuit ultimately weighs in.
Click Hurt v. Commerce Energy, Inc. to read the full Opinion and Order.
U.S.S.C.: Pharma Reps Outside Sales Exempt
In an anxiously awaited decision the Supreme Court handed down a 5-4 decision today holding that Pharmacy Reps are not entitled to overtime. Affirming the Ninth Circuit’s decision holding pharma reps to be outside sales exempt the conservative majority’s decision was delivered by Justice Alito.
Click Christopher v. Smithkline Beecham Corp. to read the entire decision.
D.Md.: For Application of Outside Sales Exemption, Any Fixed Site Used By Employee To Solicit Sales Is Considered Employer’s Place of Business
Speert v. Proficio Mortgage Ventures, LLC
This case was before the court on the plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment. The case concerned a group of mortgage loan originators who claimed they were wrongly denied minimum wages and overtime compensation by defendants. As discussed here, plaintiffs, who were loan originators employed by defendants, moved for a finding that the “outside sales exemption” was inapplicable to them. It appears undisputed that the plaintiffs worked in a satellite or branch office, rather than defendants’ main office or headquarters. Despite this fact, the court awarded plaintiffs summary judgment on this issue.
Citing the relevant CFR regs, the court explained:
“The only point otherwise argued by Defendants is that Plaintiffs concede they never performed any work at Proficio’s licensed Owings Mills, Maryland, office and, therefore, Plaintiffs have conceded they were “customarily and regularly engaged away from their employer’s place of business,” within the meaning of the “outside sales” exemption of 29 C.F.R. § 541.500. (Defs.’ Opp. 10.) Defendants’ interpretation of the exemption is contrary to the explanatory language of 29 C.F.R. § 541.502, which states, “[A]ny fixed site, whether home or office, used by a salesperson as a headquarters or for telephonic solicitation of sales is considered one of the employer’s places of business, even though the employer is not in any formal sense the owner or tenant of the property.” Given that language, it matters not whether Plaintiffs worked in Proficio’s “licensed” location or in another location. Defendants have not sustained their burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence the applicability of the “outside sales” exemption to Plaintiffs. In fact, no genuine dispute of material fact exists on the applicability of this exemption. It does not apply to the Plaintiffs.”
Although the law is fairly clear in this area, this case serves as a reminder that employees need not be working out of the employer’s headquarter’s or “home” office, in order to be considered working from an inside sales location within the meaning of the FLSA.
Click Speert v. Proficio Mortgage Ventures, LLC to read the entire Memorandum Opinion.
U.S.S.C.: Court Denies Certiorari to Novartis and Schering on Appeals of Decisions Finding Pharma Reps Non-Exempt Under the FLSA
Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. v. Lopes, Simona M. and Schering Corporation v. Kuzinski, Eugene, et al.
In a case with far sweeping ramifications for the pharmaceutical industry and its employees, following the Second Circuit’s decision that found pharmaceutical representatives (pharma reps) to be non-exempt and therefore, entitled to overtime, the Supreme Court has denied Plaintiff’s Petition for Cert, and therefore the issue remains largely unresolved. In a decision discussed here, the Second Circuit had previously held that the pharma reps were non-exempt, notwithstanding the pharmaceutical companies’ arguments that they were outside sales and/or administrative exempt. However, the Third Circuit, on facts it acknowledged were limited to the case before it, recently reached the opposite conclusion, holding Johnson & Johnson pharma reps to be exempt under the administrative exemption. Most recently, the Ninth Circuit held that, notwithstanding the fact that pharma reps cannot and do not consummate sales, their promotional activities are close enough to render them exempt under the outside sales exemption.
The Department of Labor had submitted an Amicus Brief in support of the employees in both the Second and Ninth Circuit cases. While the Second Circuit relied on the DOL’s Brief in large part, reaching its conclusion that the pharma reps are non-exempt, the Ninth Circuit rejected the arguments in the Brief.
It will be interesting to see if the large pharmaceutical companies, most of whom are in the midst of FLSA collective actions and/or state wage and hour class actions, will reclassify their pharma reps based on the Novartis decision. The stakes are huge, and the risk- if they chose not to- could be an imposition of liquidated damages, in addition to unpaid wage awards in any case(s) the employees win.
9th Cir.: Notwithstanding DOL’s Position Otherwise, Pharmaceutical Reps (PSRs) Are “Outside Sales” Exempt
Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.
This case was before the Ninth Circuit on the plaintiffs’ appeal from an order granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment, finding plaintiffs’, pharmaceutical reps (“PSRs”), to be exempt from the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) under the “outside sales” exemption. Although the DOL, filed an Amicus Brief, explaining that the type of work performed by the PSRs did not come within the “outside sales” exemption, because the PSR’s did not perform any sales, the Ninth Circuit disagreed.
Reasoning that the PSR employees came within the outside sales exemption, notwithstanding the fact that they did not complete sales, the court essentially held that their work was close enough to sales, that it should be deemed sales:
“Absent an agency-determined result, it is the province of the court to construe the relevant statutes and regulations. N. Cal. River Watch, 620 F.3d at 1088-89. As noted supra, Plaintiffs argue that by not transferring any product to physicians, they are not selling pharmaceuticals, but only “promoting” them. Plaintiffs say this distinction is warranted in light of the rule that the FLSA be “narrowly construed against … employers.” Webster, 247 F.3d at 914. For its part, Glaxo urges us to view “sale” in Section 3(k) in a commonsensical fashion, while contending that the meaning of “sale” is permissive. Glaxo urges us to adopt the rationale that the phrase “other disposition” in Section 3(k)’s definition of “sale” is a broad catch-all category. This view was cited with approval by the district court here, and is supported by the Secretary’s usage, dating back to 1940, of the language that an employee must “in some sense make a sale.” 69 Fed.Reg. at 22,162 (quoting “Executive, Administrative, Professional Outside Salesman” Redefined, Wage and Hour Division, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Report & Recommendations of the Presiding Officer (Harold Stein) at Hearings Preliminary to Redefinition, at 46 (Oct. 10, 1940)) (emphasis added).
Plaintiffs’ contention that they do not “sell” to doctors ignores the structure and realities of the heavily regulated pharmaceutical industry. It is undisputed that federal law prohibits pharmaceutical manufacturers from directly selling prescription medications to patients. Plaintiffs suggest that despite being hired for their sales experience, being trained in sales methods, encouraging physicians to prescribe their products, and receiving commission-based compensation tied to sales, their job cannot “in some sense” be called selling. This view ignores the reality of the nature of the work of detailers, as it has been carried out for decades. Plaintiffs’ argument also fails to account for the fact that the relevant “purchasers” in the pharmaceutical industry, and the appropriate foci of our inquiry, are not the end-users of the drug but, rather, the prescribing physicians whom they importune frequently. See, e.g., Baum v. AstraZeneca LP, 605 F.Supp.2d 669, 678-79 (W.D.Pa.2009) (discussing why the “professional paradigm” places the physician as the relevant decision maker in the health services industry), aff’d on other grounds, 372 Fed. App’x 246 (3d Cir.2010). Unlike conventional retail sales, the patient is not at liberty to choose personally which prescription pharmaceutical he desires. As such, he cannot be fairly characterized as the “buyer.” Instead, it is patient’s physician, who is vested with both a moral and legal duty to prescribe medication appropriately, who selects the medication and is the appropriate focus of our “sell/buy” inquiry. In this industry, the “sale” is the exchange of non-binding commitments between the PSR and physician at the end of a successful call. Through such commitments, the manufacturer will provide an effective product and the doctor will appropriately prescribe; for all practical purposes, this is a sale. Because pharmaceutical manufacturers appreciate who the “real” buyer is, they have structured their 90,000-person sales force and their marketing tactics to accommodate this unique environment.
When a PSR visits a doctor, he or she attempts to obtain the absolute maximum commitment from his or her “buyer”-a non-binding commitment from the physician to prescribe the PSR’s assigned product when medically appropriate. In most industries, there are no firm legal barriers that prohibit the actual physical exchange of the goods offered for sale. Because such barriers do exist in this industry, the fact that commitments are non-binding is irrelevant; the record reveals that binding or non-binding, a physician’s commitment to a PSR is nevertheless a meaningful exchange because pharmaceutical manufacturers value these commitments enough to reward a PSR with increased commissions when a physician increases his or her use of a drug in the PSR’s bag. See, e.g., Baum, 605 F.Supp.2d at 681 (“This Court believes that other courts, and perhaps regulatory agencies, underestimate the significance of this oral commitment from physicians. In part, this error emerges from a misunderstanding of the ways in which human beings are socially and informally motivated. Sometimes lawyers and judges forget that a person’s word means something; remarkably, many people do not actually need a 400-page contract to bind themselves to their word.”).
Moreover, the industry has agreed upon and abides by the PhRMA Code to regulate the marketing of medicine to healthcare professionals-just as any consumer-products maker might develop rules to limit the express warranties its sales force might offer to a customer. Such industry practice and prevailing customs should inform our disposition. Cf. Reiseck v. Universal Commc’ns of Miami, Inc., 591 F.3d 101, 106 (2d Cir.2010) (in resolving whether advertising sales director was an administrative or sales worker in the publishing industry “a careful consideration of [employer’s] business model provides some clarity”).
Under Plaintiffs’ view, PSRs are not salespeople, despite the fact that more than 90,000 pharmaceutical representatives make daily calls on physicians for the purpose of driving greater sales. See IMS Health, 616 F.3d at 14. We cannot square this view with Section 3(k)’s open-ended use of the word “sale,” which includes “other disposition[s].” While we recognize that the FLSA is to be narrowly construed in light of its remedial nature, that general principle does not mean that every word must be given a rigid, formalistic interpretation. For example, for over seventy years, the Secretary has emphasized a sensible application of the exemptions; in the Preamble to the 2004 Rule, the Secretary employs the openended concept that a salesman is someone who “in some sense” sells. 69 Fed.Reg. at 22,162-63 (emphasis added). In other words, while the Secretary asks us to narrowly interpret this exemption, she herself acknowledges that technical considerations alone and changes in the way sales are made should not be grounds for denying the exemption. See 69 Fed.Reg. at 22,162.
To further explain our common sense understanding of why PSRs make sales, we find the paradigm “outside salesman” case Jewel Tea Co. v. Williams-instructive. 118 F.2d 202 (10th Cir.1941). The importance of Jewel Tea is illustrated by the fact that both parties and the amicus offer it as favorable precedent for their conflicting positions.
Jewel Tea involved a FLSA overtime-wage suit brought by three employees of a tea, coffee, and sundry goods manufacturer and distributor. 118 F.2d at 203. The plaintiffs held the position of “route salesmen” to “sell and distribute” products to customers in their homes. Id. The area in which the company sold its goods was divided and “[e]ach salesman [was] assigned an exclusive territory which he cover[ed].” Id. The employees made no immediate deliveries but instead took orders for future delivery, although they might advance an item to a customer. Id. The company provided sales training and sent a supervisor with a new hire on early sales calls before permitting the employee to “go out on a route by himself.” Id. at 204. Further, employees were taught a “five-point sale” method to employ when speaking with customers. Id. A certain degree of knowledge about the products and potential customers was also required-“[t]he salesman must know recipes for the preparation of the Company’s products … [and] must learn the general requirements of each family, in order to avoid over-stocking his customer and in order to anticipate the family’s needs.” Id. After working in the field during the day, employees completed some clerical tasks at night. Id. at 205. Finally, employees were paid a base salary plus a commission if their collections were in excess of a sum certain. Id.
The Jewel Tea plaintiffs brought suit to collect unpaid overtime, asserting they did not fall within the “outside sales” exemption, primarily employing the argument that they were “delivery men.” Id. at 208. In its decision denying plaintiffs overtime pay, the Tenth Circuit penned the oft-quoted justification for the outside sales exemption:
The reasons for excluding an outside salesman are fairly apparent. Such salesman, to a great extent, works individually. There are no restrictions respecting the time he shall work and he can earn as much or as little, within the range of his ability, as his ambition dictates. In lieu of overtime, he ordinarily receives commissions as extra compensation. He works away from his employer’s place of business, is not subject to the personal supervision of his employer, and his employer has no way of knowing the number of hours he works per day. To apply hourly standards primarily devised for an employee on a fixed hourly wage is incompatible with the individual character of the work of an outside salesman. Id. at 207-08.
Reviewing the undisputed facts here, we consider the rationale for applying the outside sales exemption to PSRs to be as “apparent” as it was in Jewel Tea. Of course, this case does not involve door-to-door consumer-product sales. But, the FLSA is not an industry-specific statute. As the Second Circuit recognized in Reiseck, not all FLSA claims will involve the “archetypal businesses envisaged by the FLSA,” 591 F.3d at 106. Even though there are differences, it is notable that the salesmen in Jewel Tea and Plaintiffs here each (1) worked in assigned territories, (2) did not make immediate deliveries, (3) were required to analyze client backgrounds, (4) received product training, (5) employed a pre-planned routine for client interaction, (6) were accompanied by supervisors for training, (7) were later subject to minimal supervisor oversight, (8) completed clerical activities at the end of the day, and (9) had a dual salary and commission-based compensation plan tied to their performance. Even though PSRs lack some hallmarks of the classic salesman, the great bulk of their activities are the same, as is the overarching purpose of obtaining a commitment to purchase (prescribe) something.
The primary duty of a PSR is not promoting Glaxo’s products in general or schooling physicians in drug development. These are but preliminary steps toward the end goal of causing a particular doctor to commit to prescribing more of the particular drugs in the PSR’s drug bag. Without this commitment and the concomitant increase in prescriptions, or drug volume, or market share-i.e. without more sales-the PSR would not receive his or her commission salary and could soon find himself or herself unemployed. While not all steps in the PSR’s daily activities constitute “selling,” that fact does not render the totality of those activities non-exempt promotion; “work performed incidental to and in conjunction with the employee’s own outside sales or solicitations … shall be regarded as exempt outside sales work … [and] … other work that furthers the employee’s sales efforts also shall be regarded as exempt work.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.500(b).
The Secretary’s distinction between selling and promoting is only meaningful if the employee does not engage in any activities that constitute “selling” under the Act. This much is seen from the plain language of the regulations, which gives the example of promotional work as “a company representative who visits chain stores, arranges the merchandise on shelves, replenishes stock by replacing old with new merchandise, sets up displays and consults with the store manager when inventory runs low, but does not obtain a commitment for additional purchases.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.503(c) (emphasis added). PSRs do far more than collect general data or provide consultations; indeed they ask for, and sometimes obtain, a commitment by the doctor to prescribe Glaxo drugs, and whether the doctor keeps that commitment is verified and traced using aggregated pharmacy data Glaxo collects. See IMS Health, 550 F.3d at 44-47 (“A valuable tool in this endeavor, available through the omnipresence of computerized technology, is knowledge of each individual physician’s prescribing history.”).
In Reisick, the Second Circuit highlighted an important distinction between selling and promoting, noting that the latter is directed to the public at large, as opposed to a particular client:
Consider a clothing store. The individual who assists customers in finding their size of clothing or who completes the transaction at the cash register is a salesperson under the FLSA, while the individual who designs advertisements for the store or decides when to reduce prices to attract customers is an administrative employee for the purposes of the FLSA. Reiseck, 591 F.3d at 107. At Glaxo, Plaintiffs had no interest in “generally” promoting sales by the company or improving sales across the board. Rather, Plaintiffs directed their sales efforts only towards certain products, only to a discrete group of physicians, and only within a defined geographic area. Targeting physicians is not based on mass appeals or general advertisements, but is the result of a personalized review of each physician’s prescribing habits and history. The process, like any sales process, is tailored to the customer’s preferences.
We also find that the Secretary’s acquiescence in the sales practices of the drug industry for over seventy years further buttresses our decision. The outside sales exemption has existed since 1938. Detail men have practiced their craft over that same period. Generally, they have been considered salespeople. Until the Secretary’s appearance in Novartis, the DOL did not challenge the conventional wisdom that detailing is the functional equivalent of selling pharmaceutical products. Indeed, the DOL has recognized as much in its Dictionary of Occupation Titles, which provides the following definition for pharmaceutical detailers:
Promotes use of and sells ethical drugs and other pharmaceutical products to physicians, [dentists], hospitals, and retail and wholesale drug establishments, utilizing knowledge of medical practices, drugs, and medicines: Calls on customers, informs customer of new drugs, and explains characteristics and clinical studies conducted with drug. Discusses dosage, use, and effect of new drugs and medicinal preparations. Gives samples of new drugs to customer. Promotes and sells other drugs and medicines manufactured by company. May sell and take orders for pharmaceutical supply items from persons contacted.
D.O.L. Dictionary of Occupational Titles § 262.157-010 (4th ed.1991) (emphases added). Likewise, although it emerged in a different context, we find Judge Posner’s observation in Yi v. Sterling Collison Centers, Inc., 480 F.3d 505, 510-11 (7th Cir.2007), informative-while it is “possible for an entire industry to be in violation of the [FSLA] for a long time without the Labor Department noticing[, the] more plausible hypothesis is that the … industry has been left alone” because DOL believed its practices were lawful.
In view of many similarities between PSRs and salespeople in other fields, pharmaceutical industry norms, and the acquiescence of the Secretary over the last seventy-plus years, we cannot accord even minimal Skidmore deference to the position expressed in the amicus brief. Under Skidmore, “[t]he fair measure of deference to an agency administering its own statute has been understood to vary with circumstances, and courts have looked to the degree of the agency’s care, its consistency, formality, and relative expertness, and to the persuasiveness of the agency’s position.” United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001) (internal citations omitted); see also League of Wilderness Defenders v. Forsgren, 309 F.3d 1181, 1189 (9th Cir.2002) (quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140) (internal quotation marks omitted). Many, if not all, of these hallmarks of “respectful” deference are absent here. The about-face regulation, expressed only in ad hoc amicus filings, is not enough to overcome decades of DOL nonfeasance and the consistent message to employers that a salesman is someone who “in some sense” sells. Moreover, we are unable to accept an argument that fails to account for industry customs and emphasizes formalism over practicality, in particular the argument that “obtaining a commitment to buy” is the sine qua non of the exemption. Under the Secretary’s view, “sale” means unequivocally the final execution of a legally binding contract for the exchange of a discrete good. In addition to the point that such stringent wording is not found in Section 3(k), or plausibly implied from phrases like “other disposition,” the Secretary’s approach transforms what since the time of Jewel Tea has been recognized as a multi-factor review of an employee’s functions into a single, stagnant inquiry.
Telephones, television, shopping malls, the Internet and general societal progress have largely relegated the professional pitchman embodied in Jewel Tea to the history books. But selling continues, and, as in prior eras, a salesperson learns the nuances of a product and those of his or her potential clientele, tailors a scripted message based on intuition about the customer, asks for the customer to consider her need for the product, and then receives a commission when the customer’s positive impression ultimately results in a purchase.
For the past seventy-plus years, selling in the pharmaceutical industry has followed this process. PSRs are driven by their own ambition and rewarded with commissions when their efforts generate new sales. They receive their commissions in lieu of overtime and enjoy a largely autonomous work-life outside of an office. The pharmaceutical industry’s representatives-detail men and women-share many more similarities than differences with their colleagues in other sales fields, and we hold that they are exempt from the FLSA overtime-pay requirement.
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s summary judgment for Defendant-Appellee SmithKline Beecham Corporation.”
Click Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp. to read the entire decision.
S.D.Tex.: Upon Reconsideration, Pharmaceutical Reps Nonexempt; Court Elects To Adopt Second Circuit’s Reasoning
Harris v. Auxilium Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
This case was before the court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration of the court’s prior decision granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. The court had previously held that the Plaintiff’s, pharmaceutical representatives were exempt from the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) under both the administrative and outside sales exemptions. Plaintiff sought reconsideration in light of the United States Secretary of Labor’s amicus curiae brief filed in In re Novartis Wage and Hour Litigation. Granting the Plaintiff’s Motion, the court reversed itself, finding that the Second Circuit’s recent opinion was more persuasive than the contrary jurisprudence.
Discussing the exemption issues, the court reasoned:
“In its previous order, this Court determined that Harris could not bring a FLSA claim because her position as a Medical Sales Consultant (“MSC”), or pharmaceutical representative, took her out of FLSA’s purview. This Court found that the MSC position was exempt from FLSA under the “administrative” and “outside sales” exemptions.
Shortly after this Court’s order came out, the Department of Labor (“DOL”) filed an amicus curiae brief in a case then pending before the Second Circuit, In re Novartis Wage & Hour Litigation, 611 F.3d 141 (2010). In Novartis, The DOL argued that, under its regulations, pharmaceutical representatives “do not meet the requirements for either the outside sales or administrative exemption.” (Br. for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Supp. of Pls.-Appellants, Doc. No. 106-2, at 5.) Regarding the outside sales exemption, the DOL noted that, “[b]ecause the [pharmaceutical representatives] do not sell any drugs or obtain any orders for drugs, and can at most obtain from the physicians a non-binding commitment to prescribe NPC’s drugs to their patients when appropriate, [they] do not meet the regulation’s plain and unmistakable requirement that their primary duty must be ‘making sales.’ “ (Id. at 10.) Under the administrative exemption, the DOL noted that, although pharmaceutical representatives work independently, that “does not suffice to qualify for the administrative exemption; [the representatives] do not perform any primary duties that are largely comparable to those found in 29 C.F.R. § 541.202(b), such as formulating or implementing management policies, utilizing authority to deviate from established policies, providing expert advice, or planning business objectives.” (Doc. No. 106-2, at 21.)
While this motion for reconsideration was pending at this Court, the Second Circuit concluded that under the DOL’s regulations, pharmaceutical representatives are not outside salesmen or administrative employees for the purposes of FLSA’s overtime pay requirements. Novartis, 611 F.3d at 149. The Novartis court determined that the DOL’s interpretations were “entitled to ‘controlling’ deference,” id., under the Supreme Court’s decision in Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997).
After a review of the applicable authority, this Court adopts the reasoning of the Second Circuit and holds that Plaintiffs are not outside salesmen or administrative employees under FLSA. This Court recognizes that district courts are split on the issue, and that some courts have specifically rejected the DOL’s reasoning as set forth in its Novartis amicus brief. See, e.g., Christopher v. SmithKlein Beecham Corp., 2010 WL 396300, at *1-2 (D.Ariz. Feb. 1, 2010). In this Court’s opinion, however, the Novartis court sets forth a persuasive and reasoned analysis for its deference to the DOL’s interpretation of its regulations. As the Novartis court pointed out, the DOL’s interpretations “do far more than merely parrot the language of the FLSA,” and are therefore “entitled to ‘controlling’ deference unless those interpretations are ‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.’ “ 611 F.3d at 153 (quoting Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997)). This Court further agrees that no such error or inconsistency exists. Id.
Auxilium points this Court to two opinions in the Third Circuit that came to the opposite conclusion on this question: Smith v. Johnson & Johnson, 593 F.3d 280 (3d Cir.2010), and Baum v. AstraZeneca LP, 372 F. App’x 246 (3d Cir.2010). Neither of these cases, however, considers the impact of the DOL’s amicus brief on their decisions. Therefore, they do not provide a reasoned counterweight to the Second Circuit’s analysis.”
EDITOR’S NOTE: There continues to be a split of authority with respect to whether pharmaceutical representatives are exempt or nonexempt under the FLSA. Within the last week, another court, analyzing the very same issue–whether reconsideration (of an order granting defendant summary judgment) in light of the Novartis ruling and the DOL’s amicus brief(s) was warranted–another court held that the decision was not due to be reconsidered and allowed its prior decision to stand. Schaefer-Larose v. Eli Lilly and Co., 2010 WL 3892464, at *1 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 29, 2010).
N.D.Ill.: Pharmaceutical Representatives Not Outside Sales Or Administrative Exempt Under FLSA
Jirak v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc.
This case was before the Court on the parties cross-Motions for Summary Judgment on the hot-button issue of whether Plaintiffs, pharmaceutical representatives, were exempt–under either the outside sales or administrative exemption–or non-exempt and entitled to overtime. Joining the minority of courts to have decided the issue to date, the Court granted Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment and denied Defendant’s Motion.
The Court cited the following facts as relevant to its inquiry:
“Defendant is a global, broad-based health care company headquartered in Illinois. (R. 144, Pls.’ Facts ¶ 1.) Plaintiffs are current and former employees of Defendant that worked as Pharmaceutical Representatives (“Representatives”). (Id. ¶ 2.) Representatives had the core duties of “generating market share and market share growth for assigned professional pharmaceutical products” and “mak[ing] selling presentations to physicians and other health care professionals.” (R. 149, Def.’s Facts ¶ 8.) Representatives, however, did not promote Defendant’s products directly to patients or end-users. (R. 144, Pls.’ Facts ¶ 53.)
Representatives received initial training from Defendant on science and selling skills. (R. 149, Def.’s Facts ¶ 10.) This included training on product and competitor product information as well as selling techniques and techniques to determine the physician’s needs. (Id. ¶¶ 11, 13-14.) After the initial period of training, Representatives received training to continue to develop these skills and were also encouraged to participate in sales training outside of the company. (Id. ¶¶ 16, 19.)
Representatives were evaluated on their ability to utilize their training in the field. (Id. ¶ 10.) During “calls” or visits to health care providers, Defendant expected Representatives to adhere to company policies and federal and state laws that govern the pharmaceutical industry. (R. 144, Pls.’ Facts ¶ 11.) Their evaluations were based on job responsibilities that included “selling to customers” and “coordinat[ing] sales efforts.” (R. 149, Def.’s Facts ¶ 20.) Defendant provided each Representative with a “call list” specifying the physicians in their assigned territory that they were to present information about Defendant’s products. (R. 144, Pls.’ Facts ¶¶ 8, 10.) Defendant ranked the physicians on the “call list” and Representatives were expected to call on the higher-ranked physicians with more frequency than others . (Id. ¶¶ 39-40.) Each Representative was also supplied with a laptop computer to enter “call notes” describing what they did on a particular sales call. (Id. ¶ 11.) District Managers (“DMs”) had access to these “call notes” to ensure that Representatives were following appropriate procedure. (Id.) DMs could also conduct “ride alongs” to monitor Representatives during their calls. (Id.)
Representatives were expected to deliver “core messages” created by Defendant’s marketing department about the products to health care providers. (Id. ¶¶ 4-5, 41.) Although Plaintiffs contend that Representatives “could not deviate” from these messages, the record illustrates that Representatives were not provided “transcripts of communications to be repeated verbatim.” (R. 144, Pls.’ Facts ¶ 4; R. 162, Def.’s Resp. Facts ¶ 4.) Rather, they were free to “weave” these “core messages” into “their overall product conversations with doctors.” (Id.)
To assist with “core message” delivery, Defendant’s marketing department provided “visual aids” and material that Representatives could use or distribute during their calls. (R. 144, Pls.’ Facts ¶¶ 6, 9.) The messaging and material was created under the supervision of Defendant’s medical, regulatory, and legal departments to ensure compliance with industry and company policy. (R. 162, Def.’s Resp. Facts ¶ 6.) Although Representatives were “prohibited” from using aids that had not been approved by Defendant, they did have discretion to decide which, if any, materials to use during a particular call. (Id. ¶ 9.) Representatives were evaluated on their ability to “consistently giv[e] a logical, reasonable call-to-action/close on every sales call to drive product adoption and utilization.” (R. 149, Def.’s Facts ¶ 26.) “Closing,” however, did not create a contract or an enforceable commitment by the doctor to write a prescription for Defendant’s products. (R. 144, Pls.’ Facts ¶ 19.)
Even if the targeted doctor wrote a prescription for the product and it was filled by a pharmacy, Defendant did not recognize income. (Id. ¶ 15.) Rather, Defendant recognized revenue when their “trade group” provided pharmaceutical products to wholesale and retail customers. (Id.) Eighty to ninety percent of the revenue recognized by Defendant came from sales to wholesalers. (Id.) The remaining ten to twenty percent, was from sales to managed care entities, VA hospitals, long-term care facilities, independent hospital, independent pharmacies, and other small entities. (Id.; R. 162, Def.’s Resp. Facts ¶ 15.) However, in addition to their base wages, Representatives were paid “incentive compensation” that was calculated, in part, based on prescriptions written in the Representatives’ assigned territory. (R. 149, Def.’s Facts ¶¶ 30-35.)”
Holding that neither the outside sales exemption, nor the administrative exemption was applicable, the Court reasoned:
“I. Outside Salesmen Exemption
The DOL regulations define an “outside salesman” as an employee: (1) Whose primary duty is: (i) making sales within the meaning of section 3(k) of the [FLSA], or (ii) obtaining orders or contracts for services or for the use of facilities for which a consideration will be paid by the client or customer; and (2) Who is customarily and regularly engaged away from the employer’s place or places of business in performing such primary duty. 29 C.F.R. § 541.500(a). “Primary duty” means “the principal, main, major or most important duty that the employee performs.” Id. at § 541.700(a). “Sale” or “sell” under the FLSA “includes any sale, exchange, contract to sell, consignment for sale, shipment for sale, or other disposition.” Id. at § 541.501(b); 29 U.S.C. § 203(k). The regulations indicate that “promotion work” is “one type of activity often performed by persons who make sales, which may or may not be exempt outside sales work, depending upon the circumstances under which it is performed.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.503(a). “Promotion activities directed toward consummation of the employee’s own sales are exempt.” Id. § 541.503(b). However, “[p]romotional activities designed to stimulate sales that will be made by someone else are not exempt outside sales work.” Id.
Plaintiffs argue that the outside sales exemption does not apply in this case because Representatives “do[ ] not sell anything” and health care providers “do [ ] not purchase anything.” (R. 145, Pls .’ Mem. at 2.) In support of their argument, Plaintiffs cite an amicus curiae brief submitted by the DOL in an appeal pending before the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, In Re Novartis Wage and Hour Litigation. (Id. at 3.) In its brief, the DOL argues that the district court in that case committed legal error when it concluded that the pharmaceutical sales representatives employed by Novartis Pharmaceutical Corporation (“NPC”) were exempt from the overtime requirements of the FLSA under the outsides sales and administrative exemptions. (R. 146-21, Ex. U-DOL Brief.)
In the context of the outside sales exemption, the DOL emphasizes the fact that pharmaceutical sales representatives do not sell or take orders for NPC’s drugs; rather, “they provide information to target physicians about NPC’s drugs with the goal of persuading the physicians to prescribe those drugs to their patients.” (Id. at 5.) The DOL contends that “[b]ecause the reps do not sell any drugs or obtain any orders for drugs, and can at most obtain a non-binding commitment to prescribe NPC’s drugs to their patients when appropriate,” they “do not meet the regulation’s plain and unmistakable requirement that their primary duty must be ‘making sales.’ “ (Id. at 10.) The DOL acknowledges that the sales reps duties “bear some of the indicia of sales.” (Id. at 5.) However, the DOL contends that insofar as the reps’ work increases NPC’s sales, “it is non-exempt promotional work ‘designed to stimulate sales that will be made by someone else’ “ and that “a ‘sale’ for the purpose of the outside sales exemption requires a consummated transaction directly involving the employee for whom the exemption is sought.” (Id. at 10 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 541.503(b)), 11-12.)
Plaintiffs argue that pursuant to Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997), the DOL’s amicus brief is “entitled to substantial deference by this Court.” (R. 145, Pls.’ Mem. at 4.) Auer involved a disputed interpretation of whether a class of law enforcement officers met the “salary-basis” test for overtime pay exemption under the FLSA. 519 U.S. at 454-55. The Secretary of Labor filed an amicus brief explaining why, in his view, the regulations gave exempt status to the officers. Id. at 461. The Supreme Court deferred to the Secretary’s interpretation explaining that the test was “a creature of the Secretary’s own regulations” and therefore his interpretation was “controlling unless ‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulations.’ “ Id. at 461 (citations omitted); see also Whetsel v. Network Prop. Servs., Inc., 246 F.3d 897, 901 (7th Cir.2001) (quoting Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc. 501 U.S. 680, 702 (1991)) (“[i]f the regulation is ambiguous, then we defer to any reasonable construction by the Secretary”).
Defendant argues that the Court should grant “no deference” to the DOL’s amicus brief. (R. 161, Def.’s Opp’n Mem. at 8.) Defendant claims that the DOL’s interpretation of what it means to “sell” under the outside sales exemption is not based on “language of the DOL’s own creation;” but rather, “statutory language created by Congress.” (Id. at 9.) Therefore, Defendant argues that pursuant to Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006), the DOL’s interpretation is not entitled to controlling deference. (Id.) In Gonzales, the Supreme Court held that it would not accord deference to an Attorney General rule interpreting a “parroting regulation” that “just repeats two statutory phrases and attempts to summarize the others.” 546 U.S. at 257. The Court reasoned that: “[a]n agency does not acquire special authority to interpret its own words when, instead of using its expertise and experience to formulate a regulation, it has elected merely to paraphrase the statutory language.” Id.
The Court, however, is not persuaded by Defendant’s argument because the regulations at issue in this case do not merely “parrot” the FLSA. The Court acknowledges that both the regulations and the FLSA define “sale” or “sell” to include “any sale, exchange, contract to sell, consignment for sale, shipment for sale, or other disposition.” See 29 C.F.R. § 541.501(b); 29 U.S.C. § 203(k). The regulations, however, go further and provide guidance directly applicable to the issue in this case: when the outside sales exemption applies. The regulations explain that “sales” under the exemption include the transfer of both tangible and intangible property, and that “outside sales work” includes both the sale of commodities and obtaining orders or contracts for services or the use of facilities. See 29 C.F.R. § 541.501. Further, the regulations provide guidance as to when “promotion work” falls under the outside sales exemption. Id. at § 541.500(b). As such, the regulations do more than merely repeat or summarize the FLSA. See Harrell v. United States Postal Serv., 445 F.3d 913, 925-26 (7th Cir.2006) (determining that although the DOL’s interpretation “follows closely the language of the statute,” it is entitled to deference because “the regulation goes beyond the mere recitation of the statutory language and speaks to the issue presented in this case”). Accordingly, the Gonzales exception to awarding deference to the DOL’s interpretation does not apply here. Moreover, even if the Court did find that the DOL’s brief was not entitled to deference, its interpretation is still “entitled to respect” to the extent that “it has the ‘power to persuade.’ “ Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 256 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).
After careful review, this Court finds that the DOL’s interpretation is both persuasive and consistent with our analysis of the regulations. The regulations dictate that if an employee does not make any sales and does not obtain any orders or contracts, then the outside sales exemption does not apply. See 29 C.F.R. § 541.500(a). Further, the regulations state that “promotional work that is incidental to sales made, or to be made, by someone else is not exempt outside sales work” and that “promotional activities designed to stimulate sales that will be made by someone else are not exempt outside sales work.” Id. at § 541.503(a)-(b). The latter regulation describes promotional activities generally, and does not distinguish between activities that are “incidental” versus “essential” to sales. See id. at § 541.503(b). In this case, the Court acknowledges that Representatives’ promotional activities were not “incidental” to Defendant’s sales; rather, such activity was an essential component of Defendant’s business strategy. (See R. 149, Def.’s Facts ¶ 8.) However, the activities did not generate Representatives’ “sales,” but instead stimulated “sales” Defendant’s “trade group.” (See R. 144, Pls.’ Facts ¶¶ 15, 19.) Therefore, Representatives’ promotional activities are not exempt under the regulation.
Further, the Court finds that this conclusion is consistent with the DOL’s prior position that a “sale” for the purpose of the outside exemption requires a consummated transition involving the employee for whom the exemption is sought. For example, the DOL found that the outside sales exemption did not apply to “enrollment advisors” or college recruiters whose duties included “selling” the school and “inducing” student applicants, which resulted in the advisors personally obtaining a signed enrollment application and a nonrefundable $50.00 application fee. DOL Opinion Letter, 1998 DOLWH LEXIS 17, at *3, 7 (Feb. 19, 1998). The DOL explained that the activities of the position were more “analogous to sales promotion work” because “like a promotion person who solicits customers for a business,” the college recruiter identifies customers and induces their application but does not “make a contractual offer of its educational services to the applicant.” Id. at *7. See also DOL Opinion Letter, FLSA2006-16, 2006 WL 1698305, at *2 (May 22, 2006) (finding that “ ‘selling the concept’ of donating to a charity does not constitute ‘sales’ for purposes of the outside sales exemption” because the solicitors do not obtain orders or contracts and the “exchange of a token gift for the promise of a charitable donation” is not a “sale”).
In arguing that Representatives “made sales” within the meaning of the FLSA, Defendant relies on the Novartis district court decision as well as the opinion of the only court in this Circuit to address the issue, Schaefer-LaRose v. Eli Lily & Co., 663 F.Supp.2d 674 (S.D.Ind.2009). (R. 148, Def.’s Mem. at 6-12.) The district court in Novartis found that “the realities of the pharmaceutical industry” was “incompatible” with engaging in a “narrow reading” of the outside sales exemption and that a determination that sales representatives are exempt “produces results that reflect the exemptions terms and spirit.” 593 F.Supp.2d at 653. Similarly, the Schaefer court noted that the pharmaceutical industry was “unique” because “the only individuals who can legally authorize a purchase of the medication and who thus drive demand for those drugs” are physicians. 663 F.Supp.2d at 684. As such, the Schaefer court found that although the pharmaceutical sales representatives in that case did not provide “direct sales of the medications,” they represented a “special category with regard to ‘making sales’ “ and thus fell within the FLSA’s outside sales exemption. Id. at 684-85.
This Court, however, declines to follow these decisions and carve out this “special category.” Instead, pursuant to the Seventh Circuit’s mandate that FLSA exemptions must be “narrowly construed against the employer seeking the exemption,” Schmidt, 599 F.3d at 631, the Court finds that Representatives do not “plainly and unmistakably” come within the outside sales exemption. See Jackson, 56 Fed. Appx. at 270. It is clear that Representatives bear some indicia of salesmen (as evidenced by hiring considerations, training, their evaluation criteria and incentive pay). However, pursuant to both the plain text of the outside sales exemption and the DOL’s interpretation of it, Representatives fail to satisfy the primary duty test of the exemption because they do not “make sales” under the statute. (See R. 146-21, Ex. U-DOL Brief at 11 (“a ‘sale’ for the purpose of the outside sales exemption requires a consummated transaction directly involving the employee for whom the exemption is sought”).) See also Kuzinski v. Schering Corp., 604 F.Supp.2d 385, 402-03 (D.Conn.2009) (“Because [pharmaceutical sales reps] undisputedly do not ‘sell’ or make any ‘sales’ as those terms are defined in the FLSA and its implementing regulations, they fall outside the FLSA’s outside sales exemption.”); Ruggeri v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharms., Inc., 585 F.Supp.2d 254, 272 (D.Conn.2008) (“Because Defendant has not shown that [pharmaceutical sales reps] make sales or obtain contracts or orders, the outside sales exemption is inapplicable.”).
Thus, Representatives are not exempt from the overtime requirements of the FLSA under the outside sales exemption. Accordingly, summary judgment is granted to Plaintiffs on this issue.
II. Administrative Exemption
Next, the parties present cross-motions on the issue of whether Representatives are exempt from the overtime requirements of the FLSA under the administrative exemption. (R. 145, Pls.’ Mem at 11-19; R. 148, Def.’s Mem. at 12-20.) The DOL Regulations define an “administrative employee” as someone: (1) Compensated on a salary or fee basis at a rate of not less than $455 per week … exclusive of board, lodging or other facilities; (2) Whose primary duty is the performance of office or non-manual work directly related to the management or general business operations of the employer or the employer’s customers; and (3) Whose primary duty includes the exercise of discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of significance. 29 C.F.R. § 541.200. There is no dispute that Representatives in this case meet the first prong of the administrative employee exemption. (See R. 145, Pls.’ Mem at 11-19; R. 148, Def.’s Mem. at 12-20.) The parties, however, disagree as to whether Representatives performed work “directly related” to Defendant’s management or business operations and whether Representatives exercised “discretion and judgment with respect to matters of significance.” (Id.)
Turning first to prong three of the exemption, the regulations explain that, “the exercise of discretion and independent judgment involves the comparison and the evaluation of possible courses of conduct, and acting or making a decision after the various possibilities have been considered.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.202(a). “The term ‘matters of significance’ refers to the level of importance or consequence of the work performed.” Id. The exercise of discretion and independent judgment requires “more than the use of skill in applying well-established techniques, procedures or specific standards described in manuals or other sources.” Id. at § 541.202(e). The employee must have “authority to make an independent choice, free from immediate direction or supervision.” Id. at § 541.202(c). Further, an employee does not meet the requirement “merely because the employer will experience financial losses if the employee fails to perform the job properly.” Id. at § 541.202(f).
“The phrase ‘discretion and independent judgment’ must be applied in the light of all the facts involved in the particular employment situation in which the questions arises.” Id. at § 541.202(b). The regulations, however, provide factors to consider when determining whether an employee’s duties meet this threshold. Id. These factors include, but are not limited to, whether the employee “carries out major assignments in conducting the operations of the business”; “has authority to commit the employer in matters that have significant financial impact”; “has authority to waive or deviate from established policies and procedures without prior approval”; and “has authority to negotiate and bind the company on significant matters.” Id.
Defendant argues that Representatives “regularly exercised discretion and independent judgment with matters of significance.” (R. 148, Def.’s Mem. at 13-19.) Specifically, Defendant asserts that Representatives built relationships, created “pre-call plans” and customized their calls to develop a specific strategy to increase their effectiveness with targeted physicians, which resulted in an increase in Defendant’s market share. (Id.) Defendant cites the recently decided case Smith v. Johnson & Johnson, 593 F.3d 280 (3d Cir.2010), in support of their argument. (R. 169, Def.’s Reply at 6-10; R. 173, Def.’s Mot. to File Supp. Authority.) The facts before the Third Circuit (the only circuit to address the administrative exemption status of pharmaceutical sales representatives), however, do not persuade this Court to reach the same conclusion in this case. The Third Circuit noted that the plaintiff, Smith, “executed nearly all of her duties without direct oversight” and during her deposition “described herself as the manager of her own business who could run her territory as she saw fit.” Smith, 593 F.3d at 285. Although Smith argued that she lacked discretion with respect to matters of significance and that her previous statements were “overinflated” and “mere puffery,” the Third Circuit was “unwilling to ignore Smith’s testimony” and accepted her statements “as an accurate description of her position .” Id.
The facts before this Court are distinguishable from Smith and indicate that Representatives did not exercise discretion and independent judgment, but instead used their sales skill to apply Defendant’s well established techniques and procedures. For example, the record illustrates that Representatives did not independently solicit doctors, but worked from a “call list” provided by Defendant that specified the physicians in their assigned territory that they were to target. (R. 144, Pls.’ Facts ¶¶ 8, 10.) The “call list” also dictated the frequency that Defendant expected Representatives to visit the targeted physicians. (Id. ¶ 39.) Further, although Representatives had flexibility to determine how to best craft the appropriate message for a particular doctor (R. 162, Def.’s Resp. Facts ¶ 4), they did not engage in sales “calls” “independent [ly],” and were not “free from immediate direction.” See 29 C.F.R. § 541.200. Representatives were expected to adhere to company policies and to deliver Defendant’s “core messages” about the products during “calls.” (R. 144, Pls.’ Facts ¶¶ 4-5, 11, 41.) Representatives could use or distribute marketing material provided by Defendant but were “prohibited” from creating their own material. (Id. ¶¶ 6, 9; R. 162, Def.’s Resp. Facts ¶ 9.) Further, because Representatives could not prepare contracts or create an enforceable commitment by a doctor to write a particular prescription (R. 144, Pls.’ Facts ¶ 19), they did not have the authority to negotiate and bind Defendant in significant matters or matters that had a significant financial impact. See 29 C.F.R. § 541.202(b).
Moreover, pursuant to the DOL’s interpretation, duties similar to those of the Representatives in this case, “do[ ] not suffice to qualify for the administrative exemption.” (R. 146-21, Ex. U-DOL Brief at 21.) In the Novartis brief, the DOL asserts that NPC’s pharmaceutical sales representatives do not perform duties that require the exercise of discretion and independent judgment as contemplated by the regulations. (Id. at 21.) Rather, the DOL states:
The facts are clear that, within the stringent restrictions on Reps’ work activities, the Reps’ discretion is limited to such matters as what time of day to visit a particular doctor, the manner in which to approach the doctor based on the doctor’s personality, and how best to deliver (i.e., to ‘fit in’) the NPC’s ‘core message’ for a particular drug given the time constraints of a visit. Id. at 26. Accordingly, the DOL argues that the district court in Novartis erred in concluding that NPC’s pharmaceutical sales representatives are administrative employees because they do not exercise discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of significance. (Id. at 17.)
The DOL interpretation is consistent with previous agency decisions addressing the discretion and independent judgment prong of the exemption. See, e.g., DOL Opinion Letter, FLSA2006-27, 2006 DOLWH LEXIS 37, at *7 (July 24, 2006) (citation omitted) (stating that discretion and independent judgment requires more than “mak[ing] limited decisions, within clearly ‘prescribed parameters’ ”); DOL Opinion Letter, 2000 DOLWH LEXIS 23, at *5 (July 17, 2000) (“An employee who merely applies his knowledge in following prescribed procedures or determining which procedure to follow … is not exercising discretion and independent judgment within the meaning of section 541.2, even if there is some leeway in reaching a conclusion.”).
Accordingly, this Court finds that in light of the facts of this case, Representatives do not exercise discretion and independent judgment and thus do not meet the administrative exemption. Therefore, summary judgment is granted to Plaintiffs on this issue.
3rd. Cir.: “Senior Professional Sales Representative” For Pharmaceutical Company Exempt From Overtime Provisions Of FLSA Under Administrative Exemption
Smith v. Johnson and Johnson
The Court below determined that Plaintiff was exempt under the Administrative Exemption, based on her duties and salary while employed as a “Senior Professional Sales Representative.” On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed.
Discussing the relevant facts, the Court stated:
“From April 2006 to October 2006, McNeill Pediatrics, a J & J wholly-owned subsidiary, employed Smith in the position of Senior Professional Sales Representative. In essence, Smith’s position required her to travel to various doctors’ offices and hospitals where she extolled the benefit of J & J’s pharmaceutical drug Concerta to the prescribing doctors. J & J hoped that the doctors, having learned about the benefits of Concerta, would choose to prescribe this drug for their patients. Smith, however, did not sell Concerta (a controlled substance) directly to the doctors, as such sales are prohibited by law.
J & J gave Smith a list of target doctors that it created and told her to complete an average of ten visits per day, visiting every doctor on her target list at least once each quarter. To schedule visits with reluctant doctors, Smith had to be inventive and cultivate relationships with the doctor’s staff, an endeavor in which she found that coffee and donuts were useful tools. J & J left the itinerary and order of Smith’s visits to the target doctors to her discretion. The J & J target list identified “high-priority” doctors that issued a large number of prescriptions for Concerta or a competing product, and Smith could choose to visit high-priority doctors more than once each quarter. J & J gave her a budget for these visits and she could use the money in the budget to take the doctors to lunch or to sponsor seminars.
At the meetings, Smith worked off of a prepared “message” that J & J provided her, although she had some discretion when deciding how to approach the conversation. J & J gave her pre-approved visual aids and did not permit her to use other aids. J & J trained its representatives to gauge a doctor’s interest and knowledge about the product, eventually building to a “commitment” to prescribe the drug.
In Smith’s deposition she made it clear that she appreciated the freedom and responsibility that her position provided. Though a supervisor accompanied Smith during the doctor visits on a few days each quarter, by her own calculation Smith was unsupervised 95% of the time. As Smith explained during her deposition, “[i]t was really up to me to run the territory the way I wanted to. And it was not a micromanaged type of job. I had pretty much the ability to work it the way I wanted to work it.” App. at 54. According to Smith’s job description, she was required to plan and prioritize her responsibilities in a manner that maximized business results. J & J witnesses testified (and J & J documents confirmed) that Smith was the “expert” on her own territory and was supposed to develop a strategic plan to achieve higher sales.
Before her visits, Smith completed pre-visit reports to help her select the correct strategy for that day’s visits. At the end of her day, Smith completed post-visit reports summarizing the events of the visits. Smith would refer back to this information before her next visit to the same doctors. After adding up the time she spent writing pre-visit reports, driving, conducting the visits, writing post-visit reports, and completing other tasks, Smith worked more than eight hours per day.
Smith earned a base salary of $66,000 but was not paid overtime, though J & J, at its discretion, could award her a bonus. J & J considered the number of Concerta prescriptions issued in Smith’s territory in determining her bonus. The collection of this data and its direct relationship to Smith’s efforts was, however, subject to error as purchasers might fill their prescriptions in another territory or with a pharmacy that would not release the pertinent information to J & J.”
Applying the Administrative Exemption to the facts of this case, the Court held, that the Administrative Exemption was applicable to Smith. The Court reasoned, “[w]hile testifying at her deposition Smith elaborated on the independent and managerial qualities that her position required. Her non-manual position required her to form a strategic plan designed to maximize sales in her territory. We think that this requirement satisfied the “directly related to the management or general business operations of the employer” provision of the administrative employee exemption because it involved a high level of planning and foresight, and the strategic plan that Smith developed guided the execution of her remaining duties. See29 C.F.R. § 541.203(e) (“Human resources managers who formulate, interpret or implement employment policies and management consultants who study the operations of a business and propose changes in organization generally meet the duties requirements for the administrative exemption.”); Reich v. John Alden Life Ins. Co. ., 126 F.3d 1, 3-5, 12 (1st Cir.1997) (applying administrative employee exemption to marketing representatives who dealt with licensed independent insurance agents who, in turn, dealt with purchasers of insurance products).
When we turn to the “exercise of discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of significance” requirement, we note that Smith executed nearly all of her duties without direct oversight. In fact, she described herself as the manager of her own business who could run her own territory as she saw fit. Given these descriptions, we conclude that Smith was subject to the administrative employee exemption. Cf. Cote v. Burroughs Wellcome Co., 558 F.Supp. 883, 886-87 (E.D.Pa.1982) (applying administrative employee exemption to medical “detailer” even though description of employee’s duties was more parsimonious than Smith’s description of her duties here).
Smith nevertheless has asked us to limit the significance of her testimony and find that she lacked discretion with respect to matters of significance. Indeed, her attorney contended at oral argument on this appeal that Smith overinflated her importance during the deposition, and that we should consider her statements mere puffery. We are unwilling to ignore Smith’s testimony to hold that there is an issue of material fact merely because of Smith’s request that we do so. In this regard, we point out that when Smith testified she surely understood the significance of her testimony in the context of this case. In the circumstances before us, we accept Smith’s deposition testimony as an accurate description of her position and thus we will affirm the order granting J & J summary judgment.FN3
In reaching our result we have not overlooked our opinion in Martin v. Cooper Elec. Supply Co., 940 F.2d 896 (3d Cir.1991), on which Smith heavily relies. Rather, we find that Cooper is distinguishable on the facts. Moreover, we agree with the District Court that changes in the Secretary’s regulations since Cooper make that case inapplicable here. See Smith, 2008 WL 5427802, at *8-9.”
Interestingly, neither the Court below, nor the Third Circuit, reached the hot button issue of whether Smith was subject to the Outside Sales Exemption, despite the fact that the issue was briefed both on Defendant’s Motion below, and on cross-appeal.
D.Idaho: “Sales Representative” Who Educated Retailers, But Did Not “Sell” To Customers, Not Subject To Outside Sales Exemption Under FLSA
Burling v. Real Stone Source, LLC
The case was before the Court on the parties’ respective motions for summary judgment on exemption issues. The Court agreed with Plaintiff that he was not subject to the outside sales exemption, and further held that issues of fact precluded a finding regarding the applicability of the administrative exemption. Here, we discuss only the portion of the decision pertaining to the outside sales exemption.
The Court first recited the relevant facts, “Mr. Burling, was employed as a sales representative from March 15, 2006 to November 29, 2007 by Defendant Real Stone Source, LLC, d/b/a Rox Pro. Real Stone is a distributor of Rox Pro products which is a natural modular stone system used in construction. (Dkt. No. 28,Dkt. No. 27-3, p. 37). Real Stone products are distributed exclusively through a network of local dealers from whom the ultimate consumer buys the product. (Dkt. No. 26, Ex. E). Mr. Burling was hired as a Real Stone sales representative for a seven state area comprised of Washington, Oregon, Idaho, Montana, Wyoming, Utah, and Colorado. Mr. Burling was tasked with contacting existing and potential local dealers and pitching Real Stone’s products to them. For prospective local dealers, Mr. Burling’s pitch was in an effort to get them interested in serving as a local dealer of Real Stone products. Once interested, Real Stone would determine whether the prospective dealer met its qualifications and, if so, approve them as a local dealer. For existing dealers, Mr. Burling continued to educate them on Real Stone Products and also aided them in selling Real Stone products through various efforts including promotions and outreach to consumers.”
Agreeing with Plaintiff, and the cases holding that the outside sales exemption can only apply where an employee makes actual sales, the Court said, “This Court finds the cases cited by Mr. Burling to be the correct analysis to apply here. See Kuzinski v. Schering Corp., 604 F.Supp.2d 385 (D.Conn. March 30, 2009). Although the California District Court cases cited by Real Stone discuss the FLSA, they were applying California Labor Law. Notably, the Barnick court recognized that there is a distinction between the FLSA and California Labor Law. There, the court stated that the employee’s argument that he was only promoting, not selling, because he never received commitments from the physicians was “likely a correct application of the distinction between promotion and sales laid down by the Department of Labor and several federal courts with regard to the FLSA” but that it did not apply to the California Labor Law. Barnick, 522 F.Supp.2d at 1264.FN2Where, as here, the case does not raise claims of California Labor Law but, instead, the FLSA, the analysis from cases applying the FLSA are more appropriately used. As such the Court will first consider whether Mr. Burling made sales as defined by the FLSA. See Kuzinski v. Schering Corp., 604 F.Supp.2d 385 (D.Conn. March 30, 2009).”
The Court adopted the reasoning of several of the pharmaceutical sales representative cases, stating, “[t]he Court finds Real Stone has failed its burden of demonstrating that, as a matter of law, Mr. Burling was an exempt outside salesperson. The facts in the record demonstrate that Mr. Burling did not make any sales. The Court rejects Real Stone’s theory that its sales representatives were a part of every sale in their territory. (Dkt. No. 27-3, pp. 109-111), (Dkt. No. 27-4, pp. 24, 51-52), (Dkt. No. 31-2, p. 103). Mr. Burling’s job was to create a network of local dealers, educate the local dealers and contractors about the product, and bolster consumer desire to purchase the product from the local dealers who in turn bought from Real Stone. (Dkt. No. 27-3, pp. 94-96). This is consistent in the depositions of both Mr. Burling and Mr. Motarex as well as Real Stone’s “Sales Philosophy and Market Strategy” document. (Dkt. No. 26-2, Ex. E), (Dkt. No. 27-3, pp. 96-111, Motarex Depo.), (Dkt. No. 27-3, pp. 54-66, Burling Depo.). Both Mr. Burling and Mr. Motarex testified that Real Stone sales representatives were hired to establish a network of dealers in their territory, provide sales support to those dealers by promoting the products and educating the consumers, and engaging in further advanced marketing strategies to “create buzz” for the products and increase consumer purchases from the dealers. (Dkt. No. 26-2, Ex. E). In sum, to “generate” and/or “drive” sales to the local dealers. (Dkt. No. 27-3, pp. 25-28), (Dkt. No. 31-2, pp. 93, 95-96).”
Ultimately, the Court concluded, “[b]ecause the facts here do not demonstrate that Mr. Burling actually made sales, the Court finds the outside salesperson exemption does not apply. Instead the facts show that Mr. Burling’s primary duty was to promote and market the Real Stone brand in such a way so as to create a network of local dealers in his territory and to bolster a market for the products such that consumers were continually buying the products from the local dealers. Accordingly, the Court will grant Mr. Burling’s motion for partial summary judgment on this point.”
Although not discussed at length here, the Court also analyzed the applicability of the claimed administrative exemption, before ultimately deciding issues of fact precluded a finding one way or another.
9th Cir. Seeks Clarification From California Supreme Court Re: Proper Classification Of Pharmaceutical Sales Reps
On May 5, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals certified the question of exempt status (under California state law) of pharmaceutical sales representatives to the California Supreme Court.
The 9th Circuit asked for guidance from the California Supreme Court to determine two issues, pertaining to the oft-litigated issues of whether Pharmaceutical Sales Reps are outside sales exempt and/or administrative exempt under those so-called exemptions in the California Wage and Hour law, which is similar to the FLSA. The first question focuses on whether or not pharmaceutical representatives fall within the “outside sales exemption.” The other question focuses on the administrative exemption and whether or not application is applicable to the pharmaceutical sales reps at issue as well.
Pharmaceutical sales reps across the country will be watching this and other key cases in the months to come. If you worked as a pharmaceutical sales rep within the last 3 years, you may may entitled to overtime pay which was incorrectly denied to you, if you worked more than 40 hours per week.
Call 1-888-OVERTIME or visit http://www.overtimeadvocate.com to learn more about your overtime rights today.