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S.D.N.Y.: Delay in Asserting Equitable Tolling Not a Bar to Its Application
Chen v. Grand Harmony Restaurant, Inc.
This case was before the court in an unusual procedural posture on defendants’ proactive motion requesting that the court deny tolling of the statute of limitations on plaintiffs’ FLSA and NYLL claims arguing that (1) it is too late for Plaintiffs to make a request for equitable tolling; (2) the equitable tolling doctrine cannot be applied to the remaining individual defendants, as they were not obligated by federal or state law to post the notices at issue; and (3) there is no justification to toll the statute of limitations. The Magistrate Judge held that plaintiffs had not waived their right to assert a right to equitable tolling based on the passage of time. The defendants then objected to the Magistrate’s R&R on this ground. Adopting the Magistrate’s reasoning the court reasoned:
“In his Report, Magistrate Judge Katz properly concluded that Plaintiffs are not barred from invoking the doctrine of equitable tolling because of a delay in raising the issue. Equitable tolling is a matter within the sound discretion of the Court. Defendants do not cite any relevant statutory or case law authority to support their claim that Plaintiffs have waived their right to request that the Court equitably toll the statute of limitations by waiting until this stage in the litigation. Further, Defendants had prior notice that Plaintiffs intended to seek damages back to the beginning of their employment. Plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that Defendants’ actions occurred throughout Plaintiffs’ employment and Defendants acknowledged that the entire period of Plaintiffs’ employment was at issue both in their answer and throughout discovery. The issue of equitable tolling was therefore present, at least implicitly, from the beginning of the action.”
Click Chen v. Grand Harmony Restaurant, Inc. to read the entire Memorandum Decision and Order.
D.Mass.: FLSA Provides For “Gap Time” Claims Where Plaintiff Paid Nothing For Certain Hours, Notwithstanding Fact That Average Hourly Wage Exceeded Minimum Wage
Norceide v. Cambridge Health Alliance
This case was before the court on multiple motions. As discussed here, the court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ so-called “gap time” claims. The case is of significance because the court bucked the predominant trend, and- rather than accepting prior case law as gospel- examined the issue anew. In so doing, the court held that “gap time” claims are permissible under the FLSA.
Before we get to the court’s analysis though, it’s important to actually explain what gap time is. Gap time is comprised of non-overtime hours (their inclusion in an employee’s time in the workweek would not bring the employee above the 40 hour overtime threshold), typically worked off-the-clock. Because some employees have a sufficiently high hourly rate, when all hours (including those the employer failed to specifically pay the employee for) are divided into the renumeration paid to the employee in a given week, the resulting number can be higher than the minimum wage. The question then arises as to whether the FLSA only provides for an employee to receive minimum wage when all hours are divided into the weekly renumeration OR whether it requires an employee to be paid the minimum wage on an hourly basis for all such hours worked. These extra hours- which do not bring the average hourly wage below minimum rate- are referred to as “gap time.” Most courts have held that the FLSA does not provide for recovery of such “gap time” hours. However, this court disagreed.
Examining the issue, the court reasoned:
“According to CHA, Plaintiffs’ minimum wage claims should be dismissed because they do not allege that CHA ever paid them less than the operative minimum wage. Specifically, CHA argues that, if the total wages paid to any given plaintiff in a week were divided by the total hours worked in the week, then the average hourly wage would be greater than the minimum wage. For instance, suppose that one week Barbatine was scheduled to work 26 hours at a rate of $10.00 an hour and was paid accordingly, meaning she earned $260. However, in fact, she worked an additional 4 hours during her breaks and before/after her shifts and was not paid for this time. According to CHA, Barbatine has no claim for a minimum wage violation, since $260 divided by 30 hours is an average hourly wage of $8.67, which still exceeds the minimum wage.
In reality, Plaintiffs counter, Barbatine was being paid at a rate of $0 per hour for her additional 4 hours. CHA intended for its payment of $260 to cover her scheduled shifts and nothing more. Barbatine’s payment statement for the week in question on its face would indicate that she was getting paid for 26 hours of work, not 30. I agree with Plaintiffs.
The weekly average wage measuring rod that CHA argues should be utilized when assessing minimum wage violations stems from the Second Circuit’s decision in United States v. Klinghoffer Bros. Realty Corp., 285 F.2d 487 (2d Cir.1960). In that case, due to some financial difficulties their employer faced, security guard employees agreed to work an additional six hours per week but not be paid for this time until some later date. Id. at 489–90. The employer, however, never provided compensation for this extra work. The federal government charged the company with violating the FLSA. The Second Circuit dismissed the government’s minimum wage claim on the basis of the weekly average wage theory. Id. at 490. Articulating the purpose of the FLSA only as “guarantee [ing] a minimum livelihood to the employees,” the court found that “the Congressional purpose is accomplished so long as the total weekly wage paid by an employer meets the minimum weekly requirements of the statute, such minimum weekly requirement being equal to the number of hours actually worked that week multiplied by the minimum hourly statutory requirement.” Id. at 490 (citing H.R.Rep. No. 75–2738, at 28 (1938); Sen. Rep. No. 75–884, at 1–3 (1937); H.R.Rep. No. 75–1452, at 8–9 (1937)).
Since the court’s decision in 1960, several other circuits have adopted the Second Circuit’s approach—what has come to be known as the Klinghoffer rule. However, they have mostly done so by citing to Klinghoffer without any further analysis of whether, in fact, the weekly average rule effectuates the legislative intent of the FLSA’s minimum wage law. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Labor v. Cole Enter., Inc., 62 F.3d 775, 780 (6th Cir.1995) (simply noting what “several courts have held”); Hensley v. MacMillan Bloedel Containers, Inc., 786 F.2d 353, 357 (8th Cir.1986) (citing to Klinghoffer without analysis); Blankenship v. Thurston Motor Lines, 415 F.2d 1193, 1198 (4th Cir.1969) (stating without explanation that Klinghoffer “contains a correct statement of the law”). The D.C. Circuit is a notable exception, accepting the weekly average wage rule in Dove v. Coupe only after its own analysis. 759 F.2d 167, 171–72 (D.C.Cir.1985). The First Circuit, however, has yet to address whether to use the hour-byhour or the Klinghoffer weekly average measure for evaluating minimum wage law compliance. In my view, as explained below, the Klinghoffer weekly average method ignores the plain language of the minimum wage provision and undermines the FLSA’s primary purpose of ensuring a fair wage for workers.
My review of the FLSA is guided by principles of statutory construction; my interpretation “depends upon reading the whole statutory text, considering the purpose and context of the statute, and consulting any precedents or authorities that inform the analysis.” Dolan v. Postal Service, 546 U.S. 481, 486, 126 S.Ct. 1252, 163 L.Ed.2d 1079 (2006).
I begin by looking to the language of the statute. See Kasten v. Saint–Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., ––– U.S. ––––, ––––, 131 S.Ct. 1325, 1331, 179 L.Ed.2d 379 (2011). The FLSA’s minimum wage provision mandates that an employer pay to each non-exempt employee “wages at the following rates: (1) except as other provided … not less than—(A) $5.85 an hour, beginning on the 60th day after May 25, 2007; (B) $6.55 an hour, beginning 12 months after that 60th day; and (C) $7.25 an hour, beginning 24 months after that 60th day.” 29 U.S.C. § 206(a). As the other courts to have considered this language concede, it speaks only of an hourly wage. Thus, while it is does not explicitly state how to calculate what an employee has been paid for a hour’s worth of work, the statute’s text is explicit that, with respect to the minimum wage, the only metric Congress envisioned was the hour, with each hour having its own discrete importance.
To be sure, other parts of the FLSA speak of a “workweek.” But, this unit of time is used for determining worker entitlement to other protections, most importantly overtime, not for assessing violations of the minimum wage law. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(2) (“[N]o employer shall employ any of his employees who in any workweek is engaged in commerce … for a workweek longer than forty hours … unless such employee receives compensation for his employment in excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed.”). In fact, the other provisions of the FLSA support the conclusion that, for the purpose of determining a minimum wage violation, the use of any unit of time other than an hour is a contrivance. When Congress meant to use the word “workweek” it did so. When it meant to use “hour” that was the word it used.
The FLSA’s legislative history does not explicitly address whether an hour-by-hour or weekly-average method should be employed when determining compliance with the minimum wage law. However, it does makes clear that Congress’ overriding riding purpose when enacting the FLSA was to ensure, as the bill’s name implies, fairness for workers. “The principal congressional purpose in enacting the [FLSA] was to protect all covered workers from substandard wages and oppressive working hours, ‘labor conditions [that are] detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency and general well-being of workers.’ ” Barrentine v. Arkansas–Best Freight Sys. Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 739, 101 S.Ct. 1437, 67 L.Ed.2d 641 (1981) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 202(a)). One way Congress attempted to effectuate this somewhat amorphous goal through the FLSA was by “guarantee[ing] a minimum livelihood to the employees covered by the Act,” Klinghoffer, 285 F.2d at 490 (citing H.R.Rep. No. 75–2738, at 28 (1938); Sen. Rep. No. 75–884, at 1–3 (1937); H.R.Rep. No. 75–1452, at 8–9 (1937)). While the Senate and House reports do not indicate whether Congress had in mind a formula for determining the amount necessary for “a minimum livelihood,” they do reveal that Congress considered the test to be whether a worker received “ ‘a fair day’s pay for a fair day’s work,’ ” Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 578, 62 S.Ct. 1216, 86 L.Ed. 1682 (1942) (quoting 81 Cong. Rec. 4983 (1937) (message of President Roosevelt)); see also Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 739.FN5
Congress’ primary concern with protecting worker—not employers—buttresses the above conclusion that the plain language of the minimum wage provision should be read as an endorsement of the hour-by-hour method. When a statute is susceptible to two opposing interpretations—here, the hour-by-hour and weekly average methods—it must be read “in the manner which effectuates rather than frustrates the major purpose of the legislative draftsmen.” Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 31–32, 68 S.Ct. 1375, 92 L.Ed. 1787 (1948). While the weekly method does ensure that workers earn a base amount after working a certain number of hours in a week, it frustrates the overall purpose of promoting fairness for workers.
Take the Barbatine example above. There, CHA intended for the $260 to compensate for only the 26 hours she was scheduled to work. CHA, therefore, got four free hours of work from Barbatine, while Barbatine received the same amount of compensation after working 30 hours as she would have for working 26 hours. Such a compensation scheme does promote not an environment in which a worker is ensured “a fair day’s pay for a fair day’s work.’ ” See Travis, 41 F.Supp. at 9 (“[I]f the act is given a very strict construction[,] averaging is probably not permitted.”); see also Dove, 759 F.2d at 171.
Taken together, the plain language of the minimum wage provision, the remaining parts of the FLSA, and the Congress’ primary goal of protecting workers buttresses the conclusion that Congress intended for the hour-by-hour method to be used for determining a minimum wage violation. Here, Plaintiffs have alleged that CHA knew the Plaintiffs were working more hours than reported on their time sheet and that it was not compensating its employees for this time. In other words, Plaintiffs have alleged that CHA intentionally paid its workers $0 for each unrecorded hour worked during their meal breaks and before/after their shifts. This allegation is sufficient to state a claim for a minimum wage violation at this stage, and CHA’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ FLSA minimum wage claim is DENIED.”
It will be interesting to see if other courts begin following this well-reasoned opinion, and allowing for the recovery of “gap time” under the FLSA.
Click Norceide v. Cambridge Health Alliance to read the entire Memorandum and Order re: Motion to Dismiss, Motion to Amend, Motion for Conditional Certification.
D.Conn.: In “Salary Misclassification” Case, Unpaid OT Calculated at Time and a Half Rate, Not FWW
Perkins v. Southern New England Telephone Co.
This case, concerning allegations that the plaintiffs were “salaried misclassified” was before the court on the parties’ cross-motions in limine for a determination as to how damages should be calculated by the jury. While the defendants argued that they should be entitled to calculate any back wages due at “half-time” pursuant to the fluctuating workweek (“FWW”), the plaintiffs argued that the damages must be calculated using the FLSA’s default methodology of time and a half. Because the FWW would result in back wages of less than 1/3 of the amount of a time and a half calculation, the stakes were big. Because this case was not one of first impression, the court surveyed the previous cases from around the country, as well as DOL interpretive bulletins in reaching its decision. Significantly, the court declined to follow prior Circuit decisions, which it reasoned were not well-founded, instead opting to follow a series of district court decisions that discussed the issue in far more detailed and well-reasoned opinions.
Holding that plaintiffs’ damages were to be calculated at time and a half, the court reasoned:
“Although the Second Circuit has not addressed the use of the fluctuating workweek method in a misclassification case, other Courts of Appeal have applied section 778.114 to misclassification cases. See Clements v. Serco, Inc., 530 F.3d 1224, 1230–31 (10th Cir.2008); Valerio v. Putnam Assocs. Inc., 173 F.3d 35, 40 (1st Cir.1999); Blackmon v. Brookshire Grocery Co., 835 F.2d 1135, 1138 (5th Cir.1988). None of these cases, however, provide any meaningful analysis regarding the merits of adapting the fluctuating workweek method to the misclassification context. Instead, the Tenth Circuit and the First Circuit base their finding on another case, Bailey v. County of Georgetown, wherein the Fourth Circuit held that section 778.114 does not require that the employee understand the manner in which overtime pay is calculated in order to apply the fluctuating workweek method. See Bailey v. Cnty. of Georgetown, 94 F.3d 152, 156 (4th Cir.1996). The plaintiffs in Bailey, however, were contesting the rate of overtime they were receiving, not whether they were entitled to overtime at all. See id. at 153–54 (describing the facts of the case). Consequently, Bailey is easily distinguishable from the case at hand. Also failing to address the applicability of the fluctuating workweek method to misclassification cases, Blackmon provides only a cursory explanation of computing overtime according to section 778.114. Blackmon, 835 F.2d at 1138–39.
In contrast, several district courts have held that applying the fluctuating workweek method to a misclassification violates the plain language of section 778.114. Generally, these courts hold that the language of section 778.114 requires both “(1) a clear mutual understanding that a fixed salary will be paid for fluctuating hours, apart from overtime premiums; and (2) the contemporaneous payment of overtime premiums.” See Russell v. Wells Fargo & Co., 672 F.Supp.2d 1008, 1013 (N.D.Cal.2009) (emphasis in original); Ayers v. SGS Control Servs., Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19634 at *40–42 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2007); Rainey v. Am. Forest & Paper Assoc., Inc., 26 F.2d 82, 100–02 (D.D.C.1998) (finding that as a matter of law, the employer cannot prove a clear mutual understanding or contemporaneous payment of overtime premiums in a misclassification case); see also Urnikis–Negro, 616 F.3d at 678 (“Besides looking forward rather than backward, the interpretive rule plainly envisions the employee’s contemporaneous receipt of a premium apart from his fixed wage for any overtime work he has performed.”); 29 C.F.R. 778.114, supra at 4–5. Because the employer in a misclassification case has necessarily not made any contemporaneous payment of overtime premiums, these courts find that section 778.114 is inapplicable in a misclassification case. In addition, courts have found that assessing damages according to section 778.114 may actually frustrate the purpose of the FLSA. See, e.g., In re Texas EZPawn Fair Labor Standards Act Litig., 633 F.2d 395, 404–05 (W.D.Tex.2008) (using a hypothetical situation to demonstrate that the fluctuating workweek method may result in overtime compensation that is 375% lower than the traditional method, and asserting that using the fluctuating workweek method to calculate damages in misclassification cases allows employers to “escape the time and one-half requirement of the FLSA”).
This court agrees with other district courts that have analyzed this issue and concludes that section 778.114 does not support the use of the fluctuating workweek method in the circumstances presented in this misclassification case.”
As noted by the court, the Second Circuit has not weighed in on this issue as of yet. Therefore, it will be interesting to see if this case ends up there, giving another Circuit an opportunity to weigh in on this issue, which the Supreme Court recently declined to take up.
Click Perkins v. Southern New England Telephone Co. to read the entire Ruling on the cross-motions in limine.
S.D.Cal.: Although Arbitration Agreement With Class Waiver Enforceable, Confidentiality Provision Stricken as Unconscionable Because Overbroad
Grabowski v. Robinson
This case was before the court on defendant’s motion to compel arbitration on an individual (rather than class) basis. Although the court noted that plaintiffs were required to sign the arbitration agreement contained in their compensation agreements, under threat of forfeiture of commissions, the court held that did not make the agreement unenforceable as entered into under duress. The court also, in large part, dismissed other arguments regarding the substantive and procedural unconscionability of the agreement. However, as discussed here, the court held that the confidentiality provision which barred any discussion of the litigation without the other party’s consent to be far too broad.
Discussing the confidentiality provision the court stated:
“Plaintiff contends: ‘[T]he Defendant’s rules impose confidentiality which unfairly favors Defendant. While arbitration normally is not open to the public, the Defendant’s rules go much further. Defendant’s rules require that the record of the proceedings be confidential under threat of a sanction order by the arbitrator.’
The Employment Dispute Mediation/Arbitration Procedure contains a provision entitled, “Confidentiality,” which states:
All aspects of the arbitration, including without limitation, the record of the proceeding, are confidential and shall not be open to the public, except (a) to the extent both Parties agree otherwise in writing, (b) as may be appropriate in any subsequent proceedings by the Parties, or (c) as may otherwise be appropriate in response to a governmental agency or legal process, provided that the Party upon whom such process is served shall give immediate notice of such process to the other Party and afford the other Party an appropriate opportunity to object to such process.
At the request of a Party or upon his or her initiative, the Arbitrator shall issue protective orders appropriate to the circumstances and shall enforce the confidentiality of the arbitration as set forth in this article.
In Davis, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated that, under California law, “[c]onfidentiality by itself is not substantively unconscionable,” but the employer’s “confidentiality clause … is written too broadly” and “unconscionably favors [the employer],” when the clause at issue “would prevent an employee from contacting other employees to assist in litigating (or arbitrating) an employee’s case.” Davis, 485 F.3d at 1078–79 (“The clause precludes even mention to anyone ‘not directly involved in the mediation or arbitration’ of ‘the content of the pleadings, papers, orders, hearings, trials, or awards in the arbitration’ or even ‘the existence of a controversy and the fact that there is a mediation or an arbitration proceeding.’ ”). In this case, the confidentiality provision in the Employment Dispute Mediation/Arbitration Procedure is broader than what the court in Davis indicated would be conscionable. Cf. id. at 1079 (noting that “[t]he parties to any particular arbitration, especially in an employment dispute, can always agree to limit availability of sensitive employee information (e.g., social security numbers or other personal identifier information) or other issue-specific matters, if necessary”).
The Court finds that the confidentiality provision in the arbitration agreement is substantively unconscionable under California law.”
While courts- seemingly bound by a recent slew of employer/arbitration-friendly decisions from the Supreme Court- continue to compel arbitration and enforce class and collective action provisions contained in arbitration agreements, this decision seems somewhat in line with the remedial nature of the FLSA and related state wage and hour laws. One way employees and their counsel can try to even the playing field might be to seek court-approved notice of pending litigation, notwithstanding the inability to proceed as a class/collective action. Notifying other employees of existing litigation (and their rights to be paid in accordance with wage and hour laws) would certainly be in line with the remedial purposes of the FLSA and related state wage and hour laws. In any event, the court’s holding that an employer cannot hide its alleged violations for other employees certainly seems to be a step in the right direction.
Click Grabowski v. Robinson to read the entire Opinion.
E.D.Pa.: Dukes Does Not Affect Court’s Analysis On 216(b) Conditional Cert Motion; Defendant’s Motion to Reconsider Denied
Spellman v. American Eagle Exp., Inc.
In one of the first decisions, post-Dukes, to clarify what affect the Supreme Court’s recent decision will have on conditional certification of FLSA cases, the answer appears to be not much.
In Dukes, the Supreme Court held that the trial court had inappropriately certified a class of over a million women employed by Wal-mart, based on claims of gender bias. The Supreme Court reasoned that the plaintiffs had not met their burden to demonstrate the requisite commonality required by FRCP 23. In the wake of Dukes, there was much speculation as to whether courts would extend the reasoning in Dukes to cases seeking conditional certification of collective actions under 216(b) of the FLSA. In one of the first decisions rendered on this issue, the answer appears to be a resounding no.
This case was before the court on the defendant’s motion seeking reconsideration of the court’s prior order conditionally certifying a class of drivers employed by defendant. Plaintiffs alleged that defendant, a trucking company, improperly misclassified all of its drivers as independent contractors, when they were really employees. Holding that plaintiffs had met their lenient burden of proof as so-called stage one, the court conditionally certified a nationwide class of drivers, all of whom had been classified as independent contractors. Following the Duke’s decision, the defendant sought reconsideration of the order conditionally certifying the class. Denying the motion, the court explained that the differences between FRCP 23, the class action provision under which Dukes was decided and 216(b), the opt-in provision for FLSA collective actions render Dukes inapplicable in the context of an FLSA collective action. As such, the court denied defendant’s motion.
The court reasoned:
“The instant case is a collective action brought pursuant to the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Unlike Rule 23 class actions. the FLSA requires collective action members to affirmatively opt in to the case. See § 216(b). To determine whether the proposed group of plaintiffs is “similarly situated,” and therefore qualified to proceed as a conditional collective action, a district court applies a two-step test. See Smith v. Sovereign Bancorp, Inc., No. 03–2420, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21010 (E.D.Pa. Nov. 13, 2003). In the first step, which is assessed early in the litigation process, the plaintiff at most must make only a “modest factual showing” that the similarly situated requirement is satisfied. See Bosley v. Chubb Corp., No. 04–4598, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10974, at *7–9 (E.D.Pa. Jun. 3, 2005). The Plaintiffs have made this modest factual showing, and this Court’s analysis is not affected by Dukes. The second step of the collective action certification process will be conducted at the close of class-related discovery, at which time this Court will conduct “a specific factual analysis of each employee’s claim to ensure that each proposed plaintiff is an appropriate party.” Harris v. Healthcare Servs. Grp., Inc., No. 06–2903, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55221, at *2 (E.D.Pa. Jul. 31, 2007). At this second stage, AEX may argue that Dukes‘s analysis of what constitutes a “common question” is persuasive to this Court’s analysis of whether an FLSA collective action should be certified. In the interim, AEX’s motion for reconsideration is denied.”
Click Spellman v. American Eagle Exp., Inc. to read the entire Order.
3d Cir.: Defendant May Not “Pick Off” a Putative Collective Action by Tendering Full Relief to Named-Plaintiff at Outset
Symczyk v. Genesis Healthcare Corp.
In an issue that has now been addressed by several circuits in recent years, the Third Circuit was presented with the question of whether a defendant-employer in an FLSA case may “pick off” a putative collective action (prior to conditional certification), where it tenders full relief to the named-Plaintiff. Consistent with other circuits to have taken up this issue, the Third Circuit held that a defendant may not do so and that such an offer of judgment (OJ) does not moot a putative collective action. As such, the court reversed the decision below, dismissing the case on mootness grounds.
In dismissing the case initially, the trial court below reasoned, “[Plaintiff] does not contend that other individuals have joined her collective action. Thus, this case, like each of the district court cases cited by Defendants, which concluded that a Rule 68 offer of judgment mooted the underlying FLSA collective action, involves a single named plaintiff. In addition, Symczyk does not contest Defendants’ assertion that the 68 offer of judgment fully satisfied her claims….”
After discussing the application of full tender relief offers in the Rule 23 context, the court concluded that the same reasoning precludes picking off the named-plaintiff in a representative action brought pursuant to 216(b). Instead, the court held that a motion for conditional certification in an FLSA case made within a reasonable time “relates back” to the time of the filing of the Complaint and thus such a representative action may proceed, notwithstanding to purportedly “full tender” offer to the named-plaintiff. The court explained:
“Although the opt-in mechanism transforms the manner in which a named plaintiff acquires a personal stake in representing the interests of others, it does not present a compelling justification for limiting the relation back doctrine to the Rule 23 setting. The considerations that caution against allowing a defendant’s use of Rule 68 to impede the advancement of a representative action are equally weighty in either context. Rule 23 permits plaintiffs “to pool claims which would be uneconomical to litigate individually.” Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809, 105 S.Ct. 2965, 86 L.Ed.2d 628 (1985). Similarly, § 216(b) affords plaintiffs “the advantage of lower individual costs to vindicate rights by the pooling of resources.” Hoffmann–La Roche, 493 U.S. at 170. Rule 23 promotes “efficiency and economy of litigation.” Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 349, 103 S.Ct. 2392, 76 L.Ed.2d 628 (1983). Similarly, “Congress’ purpose in authorizing § 216(b) class actions was to avoid multiple lawsuits where numerous employees have allegedly been harmed by a claimed violation or violations of the FLSA by a particular employer.” Prickett v. DeKalb Cnty., 349 F.3d 1294, 1297 (11th Cir.2003).
When Rule 68 morphs into a tool for the strategic curtailment of representative actions, it facilitates an outcome antithetical to the purposes behind § 216(b). Symczyk’s claim-like that of the plaintiff in Weiss—was “acutely susceptible to mootness” while the action was in its early stages and the court had yet to determine whether to facilitate notice to prospective plaintiffs. See Weiss, 385 F.3d at 347 (internal quotation marks omitted). When the certification process has yet to unfold, application of the relation back doctrine prevents defendants from using Rule 68 to “undercut the viability” of either’ type of representative action. See id. at 344.
Additionally, the relation back doctrine helps safeguard against the erosion of FLSA claims by operation of the Act’s statute of limitations. To qualify for relief under the FLSA, a party plaintiff must “commence” his cause of action before the statute of limitations applying to his individual claim has lapsed. Sperling v. Hoffmann–La Roche, Inc., 24 F.3d 463, 469 (3d Cir.1994). For a named plaintiff, the action commences on the date the complaint is filed. 29 U.S.C. § 256(a). For an opt-in plaintiff, however, the action commences only upon filing of a written consent. Id. § 256(b). This represents a departure from Rule 23, in which the filing of a complaint tolls the statute of limitations “as to all asserted members of the class” even if the putative class member is not cognizant of the suit’s existence. See Crown, Cork & Seal Co. 462 U.S. at 350 (internal quotation marks omitted). Protracted disputes over the propriety of dismissal in light of Rule 68 offers may deprive potential opt-ins whose claims are in jeopardy of expiring of the opportunity to toll the limitations period—and preserve their entitlements to recovery—by filing consents within the prescribed window.
In sum, we believe the relation back doctrine helps ensure the use of Rule 68 does not prevent a collective action from playing out according to the directives of § 216(b) and the procedures authorized by the Supreme Court in Hoffmann–La Roche and further refined by courts applying this statute. Depriving the parties and the court of a reasonable opportunity to deliberate on the merits of collective action “conditional certification” frustrates the objectives served by § 216(b). Cf. Sandoz, 553 F.3d at 921 (explaining “there must be some time for a[n FLSA] plaintiff to move to certify a collective action before a defendant can moot the claim through an offer of judgment”). Absent undue delay, when an FLSA plaintiff moves for “certification” of a collective action, the appropriate course—particularly when a defendant makes a Rule 68 offer to the plaintiff that would have the possible effect of mooting the claim for collective relief asserted under § 216(b)—is for the district court to relate the motion back to the filing of the initial complaint.
Upon remand, should Symczyk move for “conditional certification,” the court’ shall consider whether such motion was made without undue delay, and, if it so finds, shall relate the motion back to December 4, 2009the date on which Symczyk filed her initial complaint. If (1) Symczyk may yet timely seek “conditional certification” of her collective action, (2) the court permits the case to move forward as a collective action (by virtue of Symczyk’s satisfaction of the “modest factual showing” standard), and (3) at least one other similarly situated employee opts in, then defendants’ Rule 68 offer of judgment would no longer fully satisfy the claims of everyone in the collective action, and the proffered rationale behind dismissing the complaint on jurisdictional grounds would no longer be applicable. If, however, the court finds Symczyk’s motion to certify would be untimely, or otherwise denies the motion on its merits, then defendants’ Rule 68 offer to Symczyk—in full satisfaction of her individual claim—would moot the action.
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the judgment of the District Court and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
Thus, while ultimately the OJ might have the effect of mooting the case, it could not do so prior to a reasonable opportunity to plaintiff of seeking conditional certification of same.
Click Symczyk v. Genesis Healthcare Corp. to read the entire decision.
11th Cir.: Board of Dental Examiners Not “Arm of the State” Entitled to Sovereign Immunity
***** EDITOR’S UPDATE *****:
On July 13, 2012, the Eleventh Circuit granted the Board of Dental Examiners of Alabama’s motion for rehearing, based on a subsequent decision of Alabama’s highest court which held that the Board was in fact an “arm of the state.” As they had in the prior decision, the Eleventh Circuit deferred to the courts of Alabama. Since a higher court in Alabama had ruled that the Board was an “arm of the state,” the Eleventh Circuit reversed itself (and the court below) and entered judgment on behalf of the Board holding that it was sovereign immune as an “arm of the state” of Alabama. Thus, the initial Opinion discussed below is no longer good law.
Click Versiglio v. Board of Dental Examiners of Alabama to read the entire substituted Opinion on Petition for Rehearing.
Versiglio v. Board of Dental Examiners of Alabama
This case was before the Eleventh Circuit on the Board’s appeal asserting that the court below erred when it held that it was not subject to Eleventh Amendment immunity from the FLSA as an “arm of the state.” Rejecting this contention and affirming the decision below, the Eleventh Circuit relied, almost entirely, on the fact that the highest court of Alabama had previously held that the Board was not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.
The Court summarized the issue before it as follows:
“Appellant Board of Dental Examiners of Alabama (the “Board”) appeals the district court’s judgment denying it sovereign immunity protection as an arm of the state of Alabama. Appellee Natalie Versiglio contends that the Board is sufficiently independent from the state of Alabama, that it is not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, and that her claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act should be allowed to continue. The Supreme Court in Alden v. Maine settled the matter of state employees suing under the FLSA, writing, “We hold that the powers delegated to Congress under Article I of the United States Constitution do not include the power to subject nonconsenting States to private suits for damages in state courts. We decide as well that the State of Maine has not consented to suits for overtime pay and liquidated damages under the FLSA.” 527 U.S. 706, 712, 119 S.Ct. 2240, 2246 (1999). Thus, the question before this court is whether the Board is an arm of the state. For the reasons stated below, we conclude that at this time it is not and affirm the judgment of the district court.”
Discussing the parties assertions regarding the applicability of the Eleventh Amendment to Defendant the Eleventh Circuit, the court appeared to find Board’s arguments more compelling. Specifically, the court noted that in creating the Board, the Alabama legislature made specific findings that supported the argument that the Board was an “arm of the state.” Further, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the Plaintiffs’ arguments that Board’s independence- including the composition of its Board and its discretion to spend its funds- supported the finding that it was not an “arm of the state,” based on prior jurisprudence. Curiously, the court also questioned the Plaintiffs’ assertion that the State treasury was not implicated by the case before it. Instead, the court reasoned that- despite the fact that the State does not allocate, administer or collect the funds used by the Board- ultimately the State would likely have to pay any judgment.
Notwithstanding all of the above, the court still concluded that that the Board was not subject to Eleventh Amendment immunity, but relied almost entirely on a decision by Alabama’s highest court in reaching its holding. The court reasoned:
“Despite the strength of the Board’s claim of sovereign immunity under the Miccosukee test, one factor weighs heavily against it. On April 1, 2011, the Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama released its opinion in Wilkinson v. Board of Dental Examiners of Alabama, 2011 WL 1205669, 2011 Ala. Civ.App. LEXIS 88 (Ala. Civ.App. April 1, 2011). FN3 In its opinion, the state appeals court conducted the first substantial analysis by a state court of the Board’s status as a state agency. FN4 The Board argued that it was immune from suit in state court pursuant to Article 1, Section 14 of the Alabama Constitution. That section provides that “the State of Alabama shall never be made a defendant in any court of law or equity.” Alabama courts have construed this immunity to extend to arms of the state. Armory Comm’n v. Staudt, 388 So.2d 991, 993 (Ala.1980). The test for entities seeking immunity is much like this court’s test: whether “a lawsuit against a body created by legislative enactment is a suit against the state depends on the character of power delegated to the body, the relation of the body to the state, and the nature of the function performed by the body.” Id. Applying this test, the Court of Civil Appeals examined many of the provisions discussed above, concluding that the Board is not an arm of the state and thus “is not entitled to § 14 immunity.” Wilkinson, 2011 Ala. Civ.App. Lexis 88 at *16, 2011 WL 1205669 at *5.
This court gives great deference to how state courts characterize the entity in question. This practice is in keeping with the ordinary deference granted state courts when they interpret matters of state concern. See Silverberg v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 710 F.2d 678, 690 (11th Cir.1983) (“A federal court applying state law is bound to adhere to decisions of the state’s intermediate appellate courts absent some persuasive indication that the state’s highest court would decide the issue otherwise.”). Federal courts are often more skeptical of state court decisions involving issues of sovereign immunity, as otherwise “[a] state would have too much self-interest in extending sovereign immunity to as many of its agencies and corporate creations as possible.” Miller–Davis Co. v. Illinois State Toll Highway Auth., 567 F.2d 323, 330 (7th Cir.1977). However, that concern is obviated when, as here, the state court finds that an entity is not an arm of the state. Id. (“Especially when a state supreme court does not extend immunity but, rather, holds that an entity is not to be deemed the state for purposes of sovereign immunity, we think the federal courts must pay careful attention to the state opinion.”).
Finding that the Board is entitled to sovereign immunity would require this court to interpret Alabama law in a way that is diametrically opposed to the findings of the highest state court to consider the issue. Such a ruling would also create the incongruous result of having a “state agency” that is immune from suit under federal law but not under state law. Cf. Alden, 527 U.S. at 793 n.29, 119 S.Ct. at 2285 n.29 (noting in a different context that the Framers of the Eleventh Amendment “would have considered it absurd that States immune in federal court could be subjected to suit in their own courts”). As such, we believe that a holding by this court that the Board is an arm of the state for purposes of sovereign immunity would be inappropriate.
For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm the district court’s finding that the Board is not entitled to sovereign immunity protection as an arm of the state of Alabama.”
Click Versiglio v. Board of Dental Examiners of Alabama to read the entire decision.
4th Cir.: Job Applicant Lacked Standing Under § 215 for Retaliation Against Prospective Employer; Protections Extend Only to “Employees”
Dellinger v. Science Applications International Corp.
Plaintiff commenced this action under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (“FLSA”) against Science Applications International Corporation which, she alleges, retaliated against her, in violation of the FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3), by refusing to hire her after learning that she had sued her former employer under the FLSA. As discussed here, the district court granted Science Applications’ motion to dismiss, concluding that Plaintiff was not an “employee” of Science Applications, as defined in the FLSA, and that the FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision does not cover prospective employees. On appeal, Dellinger contended that the district court’s reading of the statute was too narrow and that the FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision protects any employee that has been the victim of FLSA retaliation by “any person,” including future employers. Affirming the dismissal, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the FLSA gives an employee the right to sue only his or her current or former employer and that a prospective employee cannot sue a prospective employer for retaliation.
Rejecting the common sense approach proffered by the Plaintiff (and supported by the DOL, who filed an Amicus Brief in support of the Plaintiff), the Fourth Circuit reasoned:
“While § 215(a)(3) does prohibit all “persons” from engaging in certain acts, including retaliation against employees, it does not authorize employees to sue “any person.” An employee may only sue employers for retaliation, as explicitly provided in § 216(b). The use of the term “person” in § 215(a) is attributable to the structure of the provision, which prohibits a number of separate acts in addition to retaliation, not all of which are acts performed by employers. For instance, § 215(a)(1) prohibits any person from transporting “any goods in the production of which any employee was employed in violation of section 206 [minimum wages] or section 207 [maximum hours] of this title.” Thus, Congress prohibited the shipment of goods produced by employees who are paid in violation of the Act, and for enforcement, it authorized the criminal prosecution of any “person” violating the prohibition. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(a). Just as there is no remedy for an employee to sue such a shipper, there is also no remedy for an employee to sue anyone but his employer for violations of the anti-retaliation provision. Accordingly, if the person retaliating against an employee is not an employer, the person is not subject to a private civil action by an employee under § 216(b).
Considering the Act more broadly, we cannot overlook the fact that the FLSA was intended at its core to provide minimum wages and maximum hours of work to ensure employees a minimum standard of living necessary for “health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers.” 29 U.S.C. § 202(a). The anti-retaliation provision is included, not as a free-standing protection against any societal retaliation, but rather as an effort “to foster a climate in which compliance with the substantive provisions of the [FLSA] would be enhanced.” Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 293 (1960). Thus, the anti-retaliation provision was meant to ensure that employees could sue to obtain minimum wages and maximum hours from their employers without the employers taking adverse action against them for the exercise of those rights. This purpose is inherent in the employment relationship, which is the context in which the substantive provisions operate.
We have been unable to find any case that extends FLSA protections to applicants or prospective employees. Indeed, prior cases have reached the conclusion that we have, applying the anti-retaliation provision only within the employer-employee relationship. See, e.g., Glover v. City of North Charleston, S.C., 942 F.Supp. 243, 245 (D.S.C.1996) (noting that the “any employee” language in the anti-retaliation provision mandates that the plaintiff have an employment relationship with the defendant); Harper v. San Luis Valley Reg’l Med. Ctr., 848 F.Supp. 911 (D.Col.1994) (same); cf. Darveau v. Detecon, Inc., 515 F.3d 334, 340 (4th Cir.2008) (requiring, as part of a prima facie FLSA retaliation case, a showing of “adverse action by the employer”); Dunlop v. Carriage Carpet Co., 548 F.2d 139 (6th Cir.1977) (holding that an employee could sue his former employer when the former employer retaliated against the employee by advising a prospective employer that the employee had previously filed an FLSA suit).
We are sympathetic to Dellinger’s argument that it could be problematic to permit future employers effectively to discriminate against prospective employees for having exercised their rights under the FLSA in the past. The notion, however, that any person who once in the past sued an employer could then sue any prospective employer claiming that she was denied employment because of her past litigation would clearly broaden the scope of the FLSA beyond its explicit purpose of fixing minimum wages and maximum hours between employees and employers. We are, of course, not free to broaden the scope of a statute whose scope is defined in plain terms, even when “morally unacceptable retaliatory conduct” may be involved. Ball v. Memphis Bar–B–Q Co., 228 F.3d 360, 364 (4th Cir.2000).
Dellinger urges us to extend the FLSA’s definition of “employee” to protect job applicants, pointing to other statutes under which applicants are protected. In particular, she refers to the Energy Reorganization Act, the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), the Occupational Safety and Health Act (“OSHA”), and the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act. Reference to these statutes, however, does not advance her cause. The case cited by Dellinger with respect to the Energy Reorganization Act merely assumed, without deciding, that an applicant was covered under that Act. See Doyle v. Secretary of Labor, 285 F.3d 243, 251 n. 13 (3d Cir.2002). While the NLRA does protect prospective employees from retaliation, the Act itself defines “employee” more broadly than does the FLSA, providing that the term “employee” “shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer” unless explicitly stated. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3). With respect to OSHA and the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act, regulations implementing those statutes have been promulgated to extend protections to prospective employees. See 29 C.F.R. § 1977.5(b) (OSHA); 29 C.F.R. § 1981.101 (Pipeline Safety Improvement Act). The Secretary of Labor has not, however, promulgated a similar regulation for the FLSA.
Because we conclude that the text and purpose of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 link the Act’s application closely to the employment relationship and because the text of the applicable remedy allows for private civil actions only by employees against their employers, we hold that the FLSA anti-retaliation provision, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3), does not authorize prospective employees to bring retaliation claims against prospective employers. The judgment of the district court is accordingly affirmed.”
In a must-read strong dissent, authored by Judge King, he indicated that he would have reversed the dismissal at the district court below. Following a lengthy discussion of the parallels in this case to the Robinson case- in which the Supreme Court reversed an en banc decision of the Fourth Circuit and concluded that similar statutory text in Title VII should be read expansively to protect former employees- Judge King explained that he would have held that job applicants are protected by § 215. Judge King challenges the majority who he asserts ignored binding opinions from both the Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit in favor of what he calls their “textualist” approach:
“It is unlawful under the FLSA ‘for any person,’ not just employers, ‘to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any employee because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted … any proceeding under or related to this chapter[.]’ 29 U.S.C. § 215(a), –(a)(3). The Act criminalizes willful violations of § 215, and it also provides civil recourse to ’employees affected’ by the retaliatory acts described in subsection (a)(3). See § 216(a), –(b). Affected employees are entitled to “legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of” the antiretaliation provision, ‘including without limitation employment, reinstatement, promotion, and the payment of wages lost and an additional equal amount as liquidated damages.’ § 216(b). Liability attaches to ‘[a]ny employer,’ id., which ‘includes any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee .’ § 203(d).
A plain reading of these several sections of the Act, taken together, indicates that Congress was concerned enough with retaliatory conduct to impose criminal penalties on actual decisionmakers (“any person”), regardless of whether that person could also be considered the employing entity or was acting at the entity’s behest. Civil liability for retaliation, on the other hand, is reserved for employers and their agents who are sued by an “employee,” which generally means “any individual employed by an employer.” § 203(e)(1). Science Applications is undoubtedly an employer subject to the Act, and Ms. Dellinger broadly qualifies as an employee, having once sued her former employer for allegedly violating the FLSA. It does not follow perforce, however, that “Dellinger could only sue Science Applications if she could show … that Science Applications was her employer.” Ante at 7 (emphasis added).
It would hardly be a stretch to interpret the FLSA to permit Ms. Dellinger’s action, particularly considering that other, similar remedial statutes already apply to employees in her situation…
…I am therefore left to wonder why, in the face of a statute’s relative silence as to a material enforcement term, we must presume that a particular avenue is foreclosed because it is not explicitly mentioned, rather than permitted because it is not specifically prohibited. See Healy Tibbitts Builders, Inc. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 444 F.3d 1095, 1100 (9th Cir.2006) (“[F]aced with two reasonable and conflicting interpretations, [an act] should be interpreted to further its remedial purpose.”). The majority’s decision today bucks the trend begun by Robinson, which is indisputably toward an expansive interpretation of protective statutes like Title VII and the FLSA to thwart employer retaliation. See, e.g., Gomez–Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474, 491 (2008) (concluding that, under applicable provision of ADEA, federal employee may state claim for retaliation as form of discrimination); CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 457 (2008) (ruling that anti-discrimination provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 encompass action for retaliation); Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 178 (2005) (same with respect to Title IX).
Behind this impressive array of authority is the Supreme Court’s acknowledgment of the vital role that antiretaliation provisions play in regulating a vast range of undesirable behaviors on the part of employers. See, e.g., Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., Tenn., 129 S.Ct. 846, 852 (2009) (observing that fear of retaliation is primary motivation behind employees’ failure to voice concerns about bias and discrimination and reversing Sixth Circuit’s judgment in employer’s favor as inconsistent with primary objective of Title VII to avoid harm to employees) (citations omitted); Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57 (2006) (explaining that liability for Title VII retaliation extends well beyond those actions affecting terms and conditions of employment to include employer’s acts outside workplace that are “materially adverse to a reasonable employee or job applicant”). There is no reason to doubt that similar concerns obtain in the FLSA context, as expressed in Reyes–Fuentes v. Shannon Produce Farm, 671 F.Supp.2d 1365, 1368 (S.D.Ga.2009) (“Congress chose to rely upon information and complaints from employees seeking to vindicate their rights. Plainly, effective enforcement could thus only be expected if employees felt free to approach officials with their grievances”) (citations omitted).”
Given the strong dissent of Judge King, it is possible if not likely that this case might be headed to the Supreme Court. This is certainly one to keep an eye on.
Click Dellinger v. Science Applications International Corp. to read the entire Opinion and Dissent.
S.D.Fla.: Pharma Rep (PSR) Entitled to Overtime If She Worked Over 40 Hours; Administrative and Outside Sales Exemptions Inapplicable
Palacios v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
Pharmaceutical companies have been involved in a series of cases in recent years, regarding the exempt status of their pharmaceutical sales representatives (“PSRs”). While the DOL has stated in a multiple amicus briefs that PSRs performing typical duties are not exempt under either the outside sales exemption or administrative exemption, the industry has stubbornly refused to reclassify its PSRs as non-exempt and begin paying overtime.
In the most recent case, Judge Ursula Ungaro in the Southern District of Florida joined the Second Circuit, the DOL and several other District-level courts around the country, and held that a Boehringer PSR was neither outside sales exempt nor administratively exempt.
First, the court rejected the contention that the plaintiff was subject to the outside sales exemption. Noting that she could not be outside sales exempt, if she did not perform sales, the court explained:
“Here, there is no dispute that Plaintiff was not permitted to give healthcare providers drugs in exchange for anything of value. It is also undisputed that the employees in Boehringer’s Trade Relations and Managed Markets sell drugs to retailers, and the retailers sell the drugs to patients with prescriptions for them. Moreover, there is no dispute that Plaintiff was not an employee in the Trade Relations and Managed Markets groups. Thus, none of the work that Plaintiff performed involved the “transfer of title to tangible property.” At best, Plaintiff’s presentation of Boehringer’s core message to physicians was non-exempt promotional work that was incident to the sales made by individuals in the Trade Relations and Managed Market groups. Accordingly, the Court agrees with the Second Circuit’s rationale. Plaintiff’s inability to transfer ownership of any one of the drugs she was responsible for in exchange for money, her inability to take a purchase order for any of the drugs, and her inability to obtain a binding commitment from physicians to prescribe a drug, renders her unable to make a “sale” as defined under the FLSA and its implementing regulations. See In re Novartis, 611 F.3d at 154.”
In a footnote, the court discussed the fact that it was declining to follow the Ninth Circuit’s liberal reading of the phrase “sale.”
Specifically, the court said:
“The Court declines to follow the Ninth Circuit’s liberal reading of the phrase “sale” and its tenuous application of the outside sales exemption to PSRs. The crux of the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in SmithKline Beecham is as follows: Because the products for which PSRs are responsible may be legally dispensed only with a prescription written by a licensed healthcare provider, the relevant purchaser is the healthcare provider, and thus PSRs make a “sale” when they obtain non-binding commitments from providers that they will write a prescription. 635 F.3d at 396. The undersigned disagrees with the contention that the relevant purchaser is the healthcare provider. First, the healthcare provider is not bound to write a prescription just because she tells a PSR that she will. Second, even if the provider writes a prescription, she does not actually purchase anything. The prescription merely allows a patient to purchase a given drug; it does not guarantee that there will be a “transfer of title to tangible property” because the prescription does not obligate the patient to purchase the drug. Accordingly, PSRs like Plaintiff cannot make a “sale” to physicians, because physicians cannot purchase the drugs.”
The court also held that plaintiff’s duties failed to satisfy either prong of the administrative exemption’s duties requirements. The court explained:
“Here, Plaintiff was not involved in “running or servicing” Boehringer’s business. Instead, Plaintiff worked out of her vehicle or in physicians’ offices communicating to physicians Boehringer’s carefully scripted core message. Boehringer has separate departments in its corporate headquarters that are responsible for preforming administrative duties and running and servicing its business. For example, Boehringer has separate Trade Relations and Managed Markets groups, and separate advertising, sales operation, and commercial analytics departments. Plaintiff never worked in any of these groups or departments. Plaintiff’s role was to merely perform promotional work that aided these departments in their duties. Plaintiff also was not involved in Boehringer’s “management policies or general operations.” She never performed any work in the functional areas of tax, finance, accounting, auditing, advertising, research and development, personnel management, human resources, labor relations, government relations, or information technology. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s role was not related to the management or general business operations of Boehringer.”
After holding that plaintiff’s role was not related to the management or generatl business operations of defendant, it also addressed the plaintiff’s lack of independent discretion:
“In comparing Plaintiff’s primary duties against the factors set forth in § 541.202(b), the Court finds no evidence in the record that Plaintiff had any authority to formulate, affect, interpret, or implement Boehringer’s management or operating policies, or that she was involved in planning Boehringer’s long-term or short-term business objectives, or that she carried out major assignments in conducting the operation of Boehringer’s business, or that she had any authority to commit Boehringer in matters that have significant financial impact. See In re Novartis, 611 F.3d at 157. For example, although Plaintiff could decide how to use funds reserved for promotional events, her managers gave her a strict budget for each event, which she was not permitted to exceed. The record does not indicate that Plaintiff was allowed to negotiate and bind Boehringer to any significant matters, or waive or deviate from Boehringer’s established policies and procedures without its prior approval. Moreover, Plaintiff’s ability to determine how best to engage physicians, develop a rapport with them, and address their questions and concerns about a particular product are all skills that Plaintiff developed and honed through Boehringer’s training sessions. And, although Plaintiff determined how best to approach physicians, Boehringer never allowed her to stray outside the core message. Finally, even though Plaintiff had discretion in determining the order in which she would visit physicians, Boehringer determined which physicians she would visit, required her to visit every physician on its list, and mandated how many times she had to visit each physician in a six-month period. If Plaintiff did not visit every physician on the list the specified number of times, she was subject to discipline. In light of all the controls that Boehringer placed upon Plaintiff, the Court finds that Plaintiff did not exercise discretion or independent judgment relating to matters of significance.”
Click Palacios v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc. to read the entire Order on Motions for Summary Judgment.
Andrew Frisch, the publisher of the Overtime Law Blog, represents Ms. Palacios. If you are a Pharmaceutical Sales Rep who believes you have been wrongly denied overtime, call Mr. Frisch at (888)OVERTIME or click here to learn about your wage and hour rights today.
S.D.Fla.: Defendant May Not Seek SJ Against Individual Plaintiffs Where Case Remains Certified At Stage 2
Hernandez v. Starbucks Coffee Co.
In this case plaintiffs, “store managers” at Starbucks claimed they had been uniformly misclassified as exempt employees and wrongly denied overtime as a result. The case was before the court on defendant’s motion for summary judgment regarding 4 individual plaintiffs in the (certified) class—on the ground that these Plaintiffs offered generally consistent testimony that compels the conclusion that they are exempt “executive” employees as a matter of law. Significantly, prior to defendant filing its motion for summary judgment, the court had denied defendant’s motion to decertify the class. The court denied defendant’s motion, largely on the ground that it is inappropriate for a defendant to attempt to target individual plaintiffs for summary judgment, where the class is proceeding as a whole and liability will therefore be determined on a classwide rather than individual basis.
The court explained:
“Before reaching the merits of this argument, the Court must first consider whether it is even proper for Defendant to move for summary judgment as to selected individual Plaintiffs when the Court is presented with a collective action. Relying upon Hogan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 361 F.3d 621, 623 (11th Cir.2004), Defendant argues that where a “FLSA collective action has been conditionally certified but no ruling has been made as to whether the case will proceed to trial as a collective action, the district court may entertain summary judgment motions as to individual plaintiffs.” [DE–241, pg. 12]; see also Lindsley v. Bellsouth Telecomm., Inc., Case No. 07–6569, 2009 WL 322144, at *2 (E.D.La. Feb.9, 2009) (denying motion to strike motion for summary judgment against an individual, named plaintiff, finding it “appropriate to choose [the individual plaintiff] as a test plaintiff to resolve the issue of employee versus independent-contractor status.”).
In response, Plaintiffs argue that the Court should reject Defendant’s attempt to have its motion treated as one directed to only certain individuals, as opposed to the class as a whole, pointing to Judge Marra’s conclusion in Pendlebury v. Starbucks Coffee Company, Case No. 04–80521–CIV–KAM, DE–495 (S.D. Fla. filed Jan. 8, 2008). Plaintiffs point out that unlike Hogan, 361 F.3d at 623, neither this Court nor Plaintiffs have consented to a “test plaintiff” procedure, and Defendant cannot randomly select certain individual Plaintiffs and at the same time seek to prohibit Plaintiffs from using testimony from other Plaintiffs in order to oppose the entry of summary judgment. Defendant attempts to refute this argument by contending that Rule 56(a) permits it to seek summary judgment as to a claim or defense, or part of a claim or defense, and reiterates the holding in Hogan. Defendant also argues that Plaintiffs have not cited to any authority prohibiting the Court from considering such a motion where as here the Court has not yet conducted a stringent review of the propriety of collective treatment.
Importantly, subsequent to Defendant filing the instant motion for summary judgment, on June 28, 2011, this Court denied Defendant’s motion for decertification [DE–300], concluding that Plaintiffs are similarly situated and can proceed as a class. As such, the Court has now conducted a stringent review of the propriety of collective treatment and found collective treatment to be appropriate. Defendant’s reliance on Hogan as its basis for moving for summary judgment as to only four (4) individual Plaintiffs is misplaced. Defendant similarly attempted to raise this argument and rely on Hogan in filing its motion for partial summary judgment in Pendlebury. The Pendlebury court rejected Defendant’s argument, pointing out that in Hogan the court had specifically authorized the selection of test plaintiffs for purposes of discovery and motions for summary judgment. Case No. 04–80521–CIV–KAM, DE–495 at pg. 3. The court concluded that “allowing Defendant to move for summary judgment against particular individuals who are indistinguishable from other members of the class defeats the entire purpose of a collective action.” Id. at 5. Instead, the court held that since the action was certified as a collective action, the court would “only address dispositive motions that resolve common issues of law or fact as to the entire class or an identifiable subclass.” Id.
Similarly here, the Court has already concluded that collective treatment is appropriate and has not authorized the use of “test” plaintiffs. Instead it appears that Defendant unilaterally selected individuals as its “test” plaintiffs. Notably, Defendant does not argue that these Plaintiffs somehow represent a “subclass” or otherwise address the Pendlebury court’s ruling on this issue in any manner. Consequently, the Court finds that it is not proper for Defendant to move for summary judgment as to individual Plaintiffs given the Court’s recent conclusion that Plaintiffs shall proceed as a class.”
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