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W.D.Pa.: Security Guards Not Entitled to Be Paid For Pre- and Postliminary Work or Time Spent Cleaning Uniforms, As Required By Employer; Complaint Dismissed
Schwartz v. Victory Sec. Agency, LP
This case was before the court on defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint for failure to state a claim. The plaintiffs, security guards employed by defendant, alleged that the defendant has failed to properly compensate them for pre- and post- shift work that defendant required them to perform as part of their jobs. In its decision, the court agreed, largely citing in apposite case law in support of its decision.
First, the court held that time spent performing pre- and post-liminary duties required by defendant, for which no compensation was received, was precluded by the portal-to-portal act. Accepting the facts underlying this claim, as required on the motion to dismiss the court explained:
“Throughout the relevant time period, Defendant ex-pected Plaintiffs “to be available to work before commencement of their shift, during their promised meal break and after completion of their assigned shift for work-related tasks.” Id. at ¶ 17. Plaintiffs per-formed pre-shift work including: receiving pass down instructions, checking equipment, reviewing post orders, collecting schedules, meeting with supervisors, guarding, monitoring, patrolling, inspecting, and surveying. Id. at ¶ 19. Plaintiffs regularly performed post-shift work that included: preparing logs and event reports, collecting schedules, meeting with supervisors and providing pass down instructions. Id. at ¶ 29. Such work was undertaken by Plaintiffs for approximately 15–30 minutes of pre-shift work each day and 15 minutes to two hours of post-shift work per week. Id. at ¶¶ 26, 36. Defendant knew that such work was regularly performed because “Defendant’s agents regularly encouraged, instructed, suffered and per-mitted” Plaintiffs to perform this work and observed them doing so. Id. at ¶¶ 22, 31. Plaintiffs did not receive full compensation for the pre-shift and post-shift work that they performed because Defendant’s timekeeping and pay practices improperly placed the burden on Plaintiffs. Id. at ¶ 23, 33. Defendants also failed to implement any rules, systems or procedures to prohibit Plaintiffs from performing such work or to ensure that they were properly paid for such work. Id. at ¶ 24, 34.”
Notwithstanding these detailed allegations, the court concluded “Plaintiffs do not detail how Defendant’s failed to compensate them for pre- and post-shift work” and dismissed the claim (without prejudice) on this basis.
Addressing plaintiffs’ second claim, regarding defendant’s failure to pay them for time (1 to 2 hours per week) they were required to spend cleaning their uniforms, in order to meet defendant’s dress code requirements, the court found this claim equally unavailing. After a brief discussion of recent case law regarding the definition of tasks that are integral to work (so as to make them compensible), the court summarily concluded that “[h]ere… while Plaintiffs may have been required to wear and therefore maintain their uniforms, such actions were not integral and indispensible to Plaintiffs’ principal activity, providing security.” In so doing, the court ignored the obvious parallels of the uniform maintenance to other cases where courts found that similar activities were integral (i.e. feeding, training and walking of K-9 dogs by police officers while “off-duty”). Given the fact that the defendant required the plaintiffs to wear these uniforms, and that they maintain the uniforms in a presentable fashion it is unclear how the court reached its conclusion in this regard.
It will be interesting to see whether the plaintiffs will appeal this decision, which seems to be out of line with prevailing authority outside of the Third Circuit regarding these issues.
Click Schwartz v. Victory Sec. Agency, LP to read the entire Decision.
9th Cir.: While Home Data Transmissions Taking 15 Minutes Are Not De Minimis, Because Workers Are Completely Relieved Of Duty Between Finishing Work And Performing The Transmissions, They Are Not Part Of The Continuous Workday
Rutti v. Lojack Corp., Inc.
The district court granted Lojack summary judgment, holding that Rutti’s commute was not compensable as a matter of law and that the preliminary and postliminary activities were not compensable because they either were not integral to Rutti’s principal activities or consumed a de minimis amount of time. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of compensation under federal law for Rutti’s commute and for his preliminary activities. However, they vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Rutti’s claim for compensation of his commute under California law and on his postliminary activity of required daily portable data transmissions. It is compensability of the postliminary portable data transmissions that is discussed here.
Discussing the claim it revived, the Court stated, “Lojack requires that Rutti, after he completes his last job for the day and goes ‘off-the-clock,’ return home and send a PDT transmission to Lojack using a modem provided by Lojack. The transmissions have to be made every day as they provide Lojack with information concerning all the jobs its technicians perform during the day. The transmissions appear to be ‘part of the regular work of the employees in the ordinary course of business,’ and are ‘necessary to the business and [are] performed by the employees, primarily for the benefit of the employer, in the ordinary course of that business.’ Dunlop, 527 F.2d at 401. Accordingly, at least on summary judgment, the district court could not determine that this activity was not integral to the Rutti’s principal activities.
Lojack might still be entitled to summary judgment, if it could be determined that this postliminary activity was clearly de minimis. The evidence before the district court, however, does not compel such a conclusion. The fact that several technicians testified that they spent no more than five to ten minutes a night on PDT transmissions might appear to give rise to a presumption that an activity is de minimis, see Lindow, 738 F.2d at 1062, but such a conclusion is neither factually nor legally compelling.
It is not factually compelling because, although it may take only five to ten minutes to initiate and send the PDT transmission, the record shows that the employee is required to come back and check to see that the transmission was successful, and if not, send it again. There is also evidence in the record that there are frequent transmission failures. Accordingly, the record does not compel a finding that the daily transmission of the record of the day’s jobs takes less than ten minutes.
Furthermore, we have not adopted a ten or fifteen minute de minimis rule. Although we noted in Lindow, that “most courts have found daily periods of approximately 10 minutes de minimis even though otherwise compensable,” we went on to hold that “[t]here is no precise amount of time that may be denied compensation as de minimis ” and that “[n]o rigid rule can be applied with mathematical certainty.” 738 F.2d at 1062. The panel went on to set forth a three-prong standard, which would have been unnecessary if the panel had intended to adopt a ten or fifteen minute rule.
The application of this three-prong test to the facts in this case do not compel a conclusion that the PDT transmissions are de minimis. The first prong, “the practical administrative difficulty of recording the additional time,” id. at 1063, is closely balanced in this case. Certainly, it is difficult to determine exactly how much time each technician spends daily on the PDT transmissions. It is also not clear what activities should be covered. Is the time when the technician comes back to check to see if the transmission was successful included? When a technician is waiting until ten minutes after the hour, is he “engaged to wait” or “waiting to be engaged?” See Owens, 971 F.2d at 350. Although it may be difficult to determine the actual time a technician takes to complete the PDT transmissions, it may be possible to reasonably determine or estimate the average time. For example, there is evidence in the record that Lojack had agreed to pay one technician an extra 15 minutes a day to cover the time spent on PDT transmissions. In sum, the inherent difficulty of recording the actual time spent on a particular PDT transmission does not necessarily bar a determination that the PDT transmissions are not de minimis. See Reich v. Monfort, Inc., 144 F.3d 1329, 1334 (10th Cir.1998) (holding that the time it took meat packers to don and shed their employer-mandated clothing was not de minimis even though “the practical difficulty of supervising and recording the additional time weighs in favor of finding it noncompensable”).
The other two prongs, “the aggregate amount of compensable time,” and “the regularity of the additional work,” Lindow, 738 F.2d at 1063, favor Rutti. Rutti asserts that the transmissions take about 15 minutes a day. This is over an hour a week. For many employees, this is a significant amount of time and money. Also, the transmissions must be made at the end of every work day, and appear to be a requirement of a technician’s employment. This suggests that the transmission “are performed as part of the regular work of the employees in the ordinary course of business,” Dunlop, 527 F.2d at 401, and accordingly, unless the amount of time approaches what the Supreme Court termed “split-second absurdities,” the technician should be compensated. See Anderson, 328 U.S. at 692.
Our review of the record suggests that the PDT transmissions are an integral part of Rutti’s principal activities and that there are material issues of fact as to whether the PDT transmissions are de minimis. Accordingly, the grant of summary judgment in favor of Lojack on Rutti’s claim for the transmissions must be vacated. See Balint v. Carson City, Nev., 180 F.3d 1047, 1054 (9th Cir.1999) (holding that in reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we do “not weigh the evidence or determine the truth of the matter, but only determines whether there is a genuine issue for trial”). This does not mean that on remand, Lojack may not be able to make a persuasive factual showing for summary judgment under the standard clarified in this opinion. We, however, decline to make such a decision in the first instance.”
The Court then turned to Plaintiff-Appellant’s argument that the compensability of the work necessarily made postliminary commute time compensable under the “continuous workday” rule. Rejecting this argument, the Court explained:
“Finally, Rutti argues that under the continuous workday doctrine, because his work begins and ends at home, he is entitled to compensation for his travel time, citing Dooley v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 307 F.Supp.2d 234 (D.Mass.2004). In Dooley, automobile damage appraisers sought compensation for the time they spent traveling from their offices in their homes to locations where they inspected damaged cars. Id. at 239. The district court first determined that the work the appraisers undertook at home constituted principal activities. Id. at 242. The court then determined that compensation was not prohibited by the Portal-to-Portal Act, and concluded that those appraisers who could show that they performed work at home before or after their daily appraisals were entitled to compensation. Id. at 249.
Even were we to adopt the continuous workday doctrine set forth in Dooley, Rutti would not be entitled to compensation for his travel time to and from the job sites. We have already determined that Rutti’s preliminary activities that are not related to his commute are either not principal activities or are de minimis. Accordingly, his situation is not analogous to the situation in Dooley. See 307 F.Supp.2d at 245 (“The first and last trip of the day for these appraisers is not a commute in the ordinary sense of the word-it is a trip between their office, where their administrative work is performed, and an off-site location.”).
Our determination that Rutti’s postliminary activity, the PDT transmission, is integrally related to Rutti’s principal activities might support the extension of his work day through his travel back to his residence, were it not for 29 C.F.R. § 785.16. This regulation provides that “[p]eriods during which an employee is completely relieved from duty and which are long enough to enable him to use the time effectively for his own purposes are not hours worked.” Lojack allows a technician to make the transmissions at any time between 7:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m. Thus, from the moment a technician completes his last installation of the day, he “is completely relieved from duty.” His only restriction is that sometime during the night he must complete the PDT transmission. Because he has hours, not minutes, in which to complete this task, the intervening time is “long enough to enable him to use the time effectively for his own purpose.” See Mireles v. Frio Foods, Inc., 899 F.2d 1407, 1413 (5th Cir.1990) (holding that waiting time “greater than forty-five minutes are not compensable because Plaintiffs were not required to remain on Defendant’s premises during such periods and could use such periods effectively for their own purposes”). Rutti has not shown that the district court erred in determining that neither his preliminary nor postliminary activities extended his workday under the continuous workday doctrine.”