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Tag Archives: Prevailing Plaintiff
11th Cir.: Following Tender of Unpaid Wages and Liquidated Damages, an Employer Only Moots a Case if the Plaintiff Agrees to Dismissal, Absent Payment of Mandatory Fees and Costs
Dionne v. Floormasters Enterprises, Inc.
Following a controversial opinion that created more questions than it answered, the Eleventh Circuit reconsidered it’s prior Opinion in this case and in so doing largely restricted its holding to the unique facts presented in the case. Previously the Court had held that an employer, who denies liability for nonpayment for overtime work, need not pay attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) if the employer tenders the full amount of overtime pay claimed by an employee, and moves to dismiss on mootness grounds where the employee concedes that “the claim for overtime should be dismissed as moot. Although the prior Opinion seemed restricted to these unique facts where the employee conceded that the overtime claim should be dismissed (but attempted to reserve as to fees/costs), courts throughout the Eleventh have since expanded the holding to scenarios where the employee makes no such stipulation. Here, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the prior decision, but clarified and limited its applicability.
Significantly, the Eleventh Circuit included the following footnote in its new Opinion:
“Our decision in this matter addresses a very narrow question: whether an employee who conceded that his claim should be dismissed before trial as moot, when the full amount of back pay was tendered, was a prevailing party entitled to statutory attorney’s fees under § 216(b). It should not be construed as authorizing the denial of attorney’s fees, requested by an employee, solely because an employer tendered the full amount of back pay owing to an employee, prior to the time a jury has returned its verdict, or the trial court has entered judgment on the merits of the claim.”
It remains to be seen exactly how the new Dionne Opinion will be applied by trial courts, but it does appear that much of the uncertainty created by the initial Opinion has now been resolved. To that end, it appears that a Plaintiff who has suffered a theft of his or her wages can now safely accept tender of such wages (and liquidated damages) in response to a lawsuit to collect same, without fear that the employer can avoid payment of mandatory fees and costs, as long as they do not agree that the tender moots the case.
Click Dionne v. Floormasters Enterprises, Inc. to read the entire Opinion on Petition for Rehearing.
S.D.Ind.: FLSA Defendant Not Entitled to Discovery of Plaintiff’s Attorney’s Billing Records, Until Such Time Plaintiff Is “Prevailing Party”
Johnson v. Bridges of Indiana, Inc.
This case was before the court on the defendant’s motion to compel discovery of plaintiff’s attorney’s billing records. In denying the motion, the court noted that only a “prevailing” plaintiff is entitled to attorney’s fees. As such, the request was premature.
Denying the motion to compel, the court explained:
“The FLSA directs courts to award reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs to prevailing plaintiffs.” Spegon v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 175 F.3d 544, 550 (7th Cir.1999) (emphasis added). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(2) and the common practice in this District requires the court to establish an appropriate fee after the Plaintiff has prevailed at trial. Plaintiff has not yet, and may never, become a “prevailing plaintiff.” Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure explains: “Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense …. Because Plaintiff has not yet become a prevailing party, her attorney’s billing records are not relevant to any claim she has raised against Defendants, nor is it relevant to any defense that Defendants might raise.”
Click Johnson v. Bridges of Indiana, Inc. to read the entire decision.
2d. Cir.: Contested Attorney’s Fee Petition Must Be Accompanied By Contemporaneous Time Records
Scott v. City of New York
After prevailing at trial, the Plaintiff in this Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) case, moved for an award of attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to 216(b). The Defendant opposed the amount of attorney’s fees sought by Plaintiff’s attorney. The trial court awarded plaintiffs’ attorney partial attorney fees, based on the fees asserted. The Defendant appealed the award, asserting that the fee award was improper, inasmuch as the Plaintiff’s attorney had not submitted contemporaneous time records in support of his fee application. Plaintiff’s attorney cross-appealed from denial of certain of those fees. On appeal, the Second Circuit held that a contested attorney’s fee petition must be accompanied by contemporaneous time records. Therefore, they remanded the case back to the trial court in order to make a detailed finding regarding appropriate fees to be awarded (or in the alternative to state the basis for an exemption from such requirements).
Click Scott v. City of New York to read the entire opinion.
W.D.Mich.: FLSA Permits Successful Plaintiff To Recover Costs Which Are ‘Normally Charged To A Fee-paying Client’ In Addition To Those Enumerated In § 1920
Carlson v. Leprino Foods Co.
This case was before the Court on both parties’ objections to the Report and Recommendation (R&R) issued by the Magistrate Judge regarding an award of fees and costs following the settlement of a collective action. Of note, the Plaintiffs objected to the R&R issued by the Magistrate Judge, because the Magistrate cut over $2,000 in miscellaneous costs Plaintiffs requested. The Court extensively discussed the award of the attorneys fees to the prevailing Plaintiffs and, as discussed here, reinstated the miscellaneous costs, opining that a prevailing Plaintiff in an FLSA case is entitled to recover those types of costs ‘normally charged to a fee-paying client,’ in addition to those enumerated in § 1920.
Specifically, discussing the award of costs, the Court reasoned:
“Finally, Plaintiffs object that the Magistrate Judge should not have deducted $2,343.45 in miscellaneous expenses from the total award of costs. (Pls.’ Objections to Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge, docket # 221, at 8.) The Court agrees. The Report and Recommendation states that Plaintiffs failed to describe these miscellaneous expenses with particularity and that the expenses therefore are not recoverable. (Report and Recommendation, docket # 219, at 12.) However, Plaintiffs described the expenses with particularity in Exhibit 2 of their original fee petition. (Br. in Support of Mot. for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs, docket # 196, Ex. 2.) The miscellaneous expenses identified include, without limitation, costs for travel, supplies, web maintenance, translations, and telephone service. (Id.) These are the sort of costs which are “normally charged to a fee-paying client.” See, e.g., Renfro v. Indiana Mich. Power Co., 2007 WL 710138 at *1 (W.D.Mich., Mar.6, 2007) (overruled on other grounds, 497 F.3d 573 (6th Cir.2007) (citations omitted)); Communities for Equity v. Mich. High School Athletic Ass’n, 2008 WL 906031 at *22-23 (W.D.Mich., Mar.31, 2008). The total award for costs to Plaintiffs should include the $2,343.45 for miscellaneous expenses.”
Overtime Law Blog 