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W.D.Tex.: Emotional Distress and Punitive Damages Unavailable In FLSA Retaliation Claim
Douglas v. Mission Chevrolet
In addition to seeking unpaid overtime wages and liquidated damages under the FLSA, the Plaintiff alleged that he was entitled to emotional distress and/or punitive damages as a result of claimed retaliation in violation of the anti-retaliation provisions of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3). Defendant moved to dismiss plaintiff’s claim for retaliation, asserting that neither emotional distress damages nor punitive damages are available under the FLSA. Construing comparable Fifth Circuit law pertaining to ADEA claims, the court agreed and dismissed the plaintiff’s retaliation claim.
The court addressed each type of damages separately:
“1. Emotional distress damages
The damages provision of the anti-retaliation section of the FLSA states, in relevant part,:
Any employer who violates the provisions of section 215(a)(3) of this title shall be liable for such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of section 215(a)(3) of this title, including without limitation employment, reinstatement, promotion, and the payment of wages lost and an additional equal amount as liquidated damages. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
Circuit courts that have addressed the issue have held that “legal or equitable relief” includes emotional distress damages. See Moore v. Freeman, 355 F.3d 558, 563-64 (6th Cir.2004) (emotional distress damages are recoverable under the anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA); Broadus v. O.K. Indus., Inc., 238 F.3d 990, 992 (8th Cir.2001) (emotional distress damages are recoverable in Equal Pay Act retaliation case); Lambert v. Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997, 1017 (9th Cir.1999) (reversing and remanding emotional distress award of $75,000 under anti-retaliation provision of FLSA for determination of appropriate amount of emotional distress damages); Avitia v. Metro. Club of Chi., Inc., 49 F.3d 1219, 1228-29 (7th Cir.1995) (citing Travis v. Gary Cmty. Mental Health Ctr., Inc., 921 F.2d 108, 111-12 (7th Cir.1990)) (emotional distress damages are recoverable under the anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA). The Fifth Circuit has yet to address whether emotional distress damages are available in an FLSA anti-retaliation claim.
However, the Fifth Circuit has held that the remedies provisions of the FLSA and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) must be interpreted consistently. See Lubke v. City of Arlington, 455 F.3d 489, 499 (5th Cir.2006) (“Because the remedies available under the ADEA and the FMLA [Family and Medical Leave Act] both track the FLSA, cases interpreting remedies under the statutes should be consistent.”); see also Johnson v. Martin, 473 F.3d 220, 222 (5th Cir.2006) (applying ADEA precedent to the FLSA to determine whether wages earned after termination offset lost wage damages because “[t]he FLSA and ADEA have the same remedies provisions”).
The Fifth Circuit has addressed whether emotional distress damages are available under the ADEA, which has similar remedies provisions as the FLSA. See Dean v. Am. Sec. Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir.1977). In Dean, the Fifth Circuit rejected the argument that the statutory language “legal or equitable relief” in the ADEA includes emotional distress damages. Id. at 1038. In so holding, the Fifth Circuit emphasized the notably absent phrase “general damages,” “punitive damages,” or any type of damages based on emotional distress from the ADEA’s damages provisions. Id. at 1038-39. In the FLSA damages provision cited above, the same phrases are absent.
Since the Fifth Circuit has expressed its desire for the FLSA’s remedies provision to be interpreted consistently with the ADEA’s remedies provision, and since emotional distress damages are not available in claims brought under the ADEA, see Dean, 559 F.2d at 1038, this Court must hold that emotional distress damages are also unavailable under the FLSA. It is for this reason that another judge on this Court has already reached the same conclusion in another case. See Rumbo v. Southwest Convenience Stores, LLC, No. EP-10-CA-184-FM (W.D.Tex. July 19, 2010) (order granting motion to dismiss) (employing similar reasoning in granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claims for emotional distress damages and punitive damages in an FLSA anti-retaliation claim). Therefore, Plaintiff may not recover damages based on emotional distress in his anti-retaliation claim brought under the FLSA.
2. Punitive damages
Similarly, Defendant contends punitive damages are not available in an anti-retaliation claim based on the FLSA, Mot. 2, while Plaintiff claims punitive damages are recoverable. Resp. 3. Federal appellate courts that have considered the issue are split on whether a plaintiff can recover punitive damages in an FLSA anti-retaliation claim. Compare Travis, 921 F.2d at 111-12 (punitive damages are available in an FLSA anti-retaliation claim), with Snapp v. Unlimited Concepts, Inc., 208 F.3d 928, 933-35 (11th Cir.2000) (punitive damages are not available in an FLSA anti-retaliation claim). The Fifth Circuit, however, has yet to address whether punitive damages are available under an anti-retaliation claim brought pursuant to the FLSA.
Just as it held with respect to emotional distress damages, the Fifth Circuit in Dean held that punitive damages are unavailable under the ADEA. 559 F.2d at 1038. As discussed above, because the ADEA and FLSA must be interpreted consistently with respect to remedies, see Lubke, 455 F.3d at 499; Johnson, 473 F.3d at 222, this Court must hold that punitive damages are not recoverable in an anti-retaliation claim brought under the FLSA.”
Click Douglas v. Mission Chevrolet to read the entire opinion.
E.D.Ark: Punitive Damage Awards Permissible For FLSA Retaliation Claims
Wolfe v. Clear Title, LLC
This case was before the Court on Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. In resolving the Motion in favor of the Plaintiff, the Court also held that punitive damages are permissible to a Plaintiff in an FLSA retaliation case brought pursuant to 29 U.S.C. 215(a), after acknowledging a split of authority on the issue between Circuit courts and trial level courts within the Eighth Circuit as well.
“The prohibition on retaliation is stated in 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3), which makes it unlawful to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any employee because the employee has filed a complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted a proceeding under the FLSA. The majority of circuits have held that this provision protects an employee who makes an internal complaint to the employer. Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp. ., 570 F.3d 834, 838 (7th Cir.2009). The Eighth Circuit has interpreted the statute to prohibit discrimination against an employee who asserts or threatens to assert FLSA rights. Brennan v. Maxey’s Yamaha, Inc., 513 F.2d 179, 183 (8th Cir.1975). That interpretation has been criticized as contrary to the plain language of subsection 215(a)(3). See Kasten, 570 F.3d at 840 (holding that the phrase “file any complaint” requires a plaintiff employee to submit some sort of writing). Needless to say, the holding of the Eighth Circuit in Brennan v. Maxey’s Yamaha, Inc., is binding on this Court. Here, the conduct of which Wolfe complains falls within the prohibition of subsection 215(a)(3) as broadly interpreted by the Eighth Circuit.
The courts are divided on the issue of whether the FLSA provides for punitive damages for employees who are subject to retaliation for claiming their rights under that statutory scheme. The Seventh Circuit has held that punitive damages are available in FLSA retaliation cases. Travis v. Gary Community Mental Health Ctr., 921 F.2d 108, 112 (7th Cir.1990). The only other circuit to address the issue thus far is the Eleventh Circuit, which held that punitive damages are not available in FLSA retaliation cases. Snapp v. Unlimited Concepts, Inc., 208 F.3d 928 (11th Cir.2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 975, 121 S.Ct. 1609, 149 L.Ed.2d 474 (2001).FN1 The only district courts in the Eighth Circuit to address the issue are the Eastern and Western Districts of Missouri, and they, too, have reached opposite conclusions. The Eastern District of Missouri has followed the Eleventh Circuit in two cases. Huang v. Gateway Hotel Holdings, 520 F.Supp.2d 1137, 1143 (E.D.Mo.2007); Tucker v. Monsanto Co., 2007 WL 1686957 (E.D.Mo. June 8, 2007). Even before the Eleventh Circuit decided Snapp, the Eastern District of Missouri had held, without discussion, that the FLSA does not provide for punitive damages in retaliation cases. Waldermeyer v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 782 F.Supp. 86, 88 (E.D.Mo.1991). On the other hand, the Western District of Missouri followed the Seventh Circuit in one case decided before Snapp, O’Brien v. Dekalb-Clinton Counties Ambulance Dist., 1996 WL 565817, at *6 (W.D.Mo. June 24, 1996) (“In the absence of conflicting interpretation of the amended section 16(b) by another circuit, the court is persuaded to follow the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning and hold that compensatory and punitive damages are available for violation of the FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision.”). See also Johnston v. Davis Security, Inc., 217 F.Supp.2d 1224, 1230-31 (D.Utah 2002) (holding that punitive damages are not recoverable under subsection 216(b)); Lanza v. Sugarland Run Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 97 F.Supp.2d 737, 739-42 (E.D.Va.2000) (same). But see Marrow v. Allstate Sec. & Investigative Services, 167 F.Supp.2d 838, 842-46 (E.D.Pa.2001) (holding that punitive damages are recoverable in a claim for retaliation under the FLSA).
The remedies for violating the FLSA are set out in 29 U.S.C. § 216. Subsection 216(a) provides:
Any person who willfully violates any of the provisions of section 215 of this title shall upon conviction thereof be subject to a fine of not more than $10,000, or to imprisonment for not more than six months, or both. No person shall be imprisoned under this subsection except for an offense committed after the conviction of such person for a prior offense under this subsection.
Subsection 216(b) provides, in pertinent part:
Any employer who violates the provisions of section 215(a)(3) of this title shall be liable for such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of section 215(a)(3) of this title, including without limitation employment, reinstatement, promotion, and the payment of wages lost and an additional equal amount as liquidated damages.
In Travis, the Seventh Circuit held that this provision authorizes legal relief, “a term commonly understood to include compensatory and punitive damages.” Travis, 921 F.2d at 111. Otherwise, the analysis in Travis was fairly cursory.
In Snapp, the Eleventh Circuit engaged in a lengthy, detailed analysis of the statutory scheme and arrived at a conclusion opposite from that reached in Travis. The court held in Snapp that the term “legal relief” ordinarily would include punitive damages, but interpreting the statute in the light of the principle of ejusdem generis, the court said that the term “legal relief” in subsection 216(b) should be construed to include only compensatory relief, not punitive damages, because the specific items listed in that subsection as “legal or equitable relief” were all designed to make plaintiffs whole. Snapp, 208 F.3d at 934. The court also said that the statute was structured so that punitive sanctions were covered in subsection 216(a), while subsection 216(b) provided remedies for making aggrieved employees whole. Id. at 935.
The most thorough critique of the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning in Snapp appears to be the critique of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Marrow. There, the court said that application of the maxim of ejusdem generis to subsection 216(b) was inappropriate because the subsection prefaces its list of various forms of relief with the phrase “including without limitation.” Marrow, 167 F.Supp.2d at 844 (emphasis by the Marrow court). “The most sensible reading of that phrase leads to the conclusion that by listing several potential forms of relief, Congress did not mean to exclude others.” Id. Moreover, Marrow reasoned, the purpose of subsection 215(a)(3) is not purely compensatory but is intended to deter employers from engaging in retaliation, so that limiting subsection 216(b) to remedies designed to make the plaintiff whole would not fully implement the intent of Congress. Id. The court in Marrow also found unpersuasive the argument that because Congress provided criminal sanctions in subsection 216(a) it could not have meant to include punitive damages in subsection 216(b). Id.
Although the issue is obviously not free from doubt, the undersigned is persuaded by the reasoning Marrow. Subsection 216(b) was drafted broadly to authorize “such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of section 215(a)(3) of this title, including without limitation….” As Snapp noted:
“Legal relief” is certainly a broad formulation. It would have almost no boundary were it not for the commonly understood decision between the “legal” and “equitable” powers of a court. Where such an expansive term is used, we look for clues within the statute to help us understand the exact nature of the “legal relief” that Congress intended; and we are not disappointed when we look to section 216(b).Snapp, 208 F.3d at 934. The only limitation on the term “legal relief” stated in subsection 216(b) is that it be “appropriate to effectuate the purposes of section 215(a)(3)….” The ordinary meaning of “legal relief” as including punitive damages is consistent with that limitation because punitive damages may be appropriate in some cases to effectuate the purposes of subsection 215(a)(3). It is contrary to the legislative intent, as expressed in this broadly worded provision, to exclude punitive damages from the relief authorized by subsection 216(b). The maxim of ejusdem generis is an aid to ascertaining legislative intent and should not be employed to defeat legislative intent, to make general words meaningless, or to reach a conclusion inconsistent with other rules of construction. Donovan v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 666 F.2d 315, 326 (8th Cir.1981); United States v. Clark, 646 F.2d 1259, 1265 (8th Cir.1981).
Nor is the undersigned persuaded by the argument in Snapp that punitive sanctions are covered in subsection 216(a), while subsection 216(b) is designed to make plaintiffs whole. In Snapp, the court said, “Congress has already covered punitive damages in section 216(a); and there is simply no reason to carry the punitive element over from section 216(a) to section 216(b), a provision intended to compensate not punish.” Snapp, 208 F.3d at 935. Section 216 has five subsections: subsection 216(a) provides for criminal sanctions; subsection 216(b) provides for civil actions by aggrieved employees; subsection 216(c) provides for civil actions by the Secretary of Labor to recover unpaid minimum wages or overtime compensation on behalf of employees to which those wages are owed; subsection 216(d) states certain narrow exceptions to “liability or punishment” under the FLSA; and subsection 216(e) authorizes civil penalties for child labor violations. Section 216 is not structured so as to have a punishment section and a compensation section; instead, the structure includes a section providing for criminal prosecution by the government prosecuting attorneys, a section providing for civil actions by aggrieved employees, a section providing for civil actions by the Secretary of Labor to recover minimum wages and overtime on behalf of employees, and a section providing for civil penalties for child labor violations. The fact that in subsection 216(a) Congress provided criminal sanctions for willful violations of section 215 supports rather than undercuts the notion that the remedies available under subsection 216(b) include punitive damages, for it shows that Congress regarded willful violations as serious enough to warrant punishment and as a form of misconduct that stands in need of deterrence-which is to say that Congress determined that in some cases punishment would be “appropriate to effectuate the purposes of section 215(a)(3).” Moreover, that subsection 216(e) provides for penalties shows that subsection 216(a) was not intended as an exhaustive statement of the punishment available for violations of the FLSA.
In summary, subsection 216(b) was intended to authorize civil actions by aggrieved employees in which the employees could recover any form of legal or equitable relief that might be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of subsection 215(a)(3). In some cases, punitive damages might be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of that subsection. Therefore, punitive damages may in the proper case be recoverable under subsection 216(b).”
D.Kan.: Punitive Damages Unavailable In Equal Pay Act (EPA) Retaliation Claim
Allen v. Garden City Co-op, Inc.
Plaintiff moved to compel the individual Defendant’s financial information, claiming that it was relevant to her claim for punitive damages arising under her Equal Pay Act (EPA) claim. In denying the Motion to compel, the Court addressed the issue of damages available to a Plaintiff in a retaliation claim under the EPA, FLSA and/or ADEA:
“In its most simple terms, the Equal Pay Act makes it illegal for an employer to pay members of the opposite sex different wages for the same work. The Act is codified at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d), making it part of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq.
At least one court in this District has discussed the issue of punitive damages under the FLSA, noting with favor that other Circuits have “held that the FLSA’s enforcement provisions … do not permit a plaintiff to recover mental distress or punitive damages of this type.” Goico v. Boeing Co., 347 F.Supp.2d 986, 995 (citing Goldstein v. Manhattan Industries, Inc., 758 F.2d 1435, 1446 (11th Cir.1985)).
In Goico, the issue before the Court was whether punitive damages are allowable for claims of discrimination and retaliation under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”). The Court observed that “[t]he enforcement provisions of the ADEA, which were patterned after the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), state in part that the ADEA shall be enforced in accordance with the provisions of the FLSA …” 347 F.Supp.2d at 994. The Court continued by noting that the ADEA’s enforcement provisions state that “any violation of the ADEA shall be deemed a violation of the FLSA …”Id.Although Goico is an ADEA case, it specifically discusses whether punitive damages are allowable under the FLSA because of the ADEA’s reliance on that Act’s enforcement provisions. Thus, the Goico court’s discussion of punitive damages under the ADEA is clearly applicable to the present analysis of punitive damages under the Equal Pay Act/FLSA.
The Goico court also discussed the Seventh Circuit’s exception to this rule, which allows punitive damages in retaliation claims brought under the FLSA. Id., at 996 (discussing Travis v. Gary Comm. Mental Health Center, 921 F.2d 108 (7th Cir.1990)). The Travis opinion discusses the effect of the 1977 amendment to the FLSA, “which added language essentially identical to the ‘appropriate legal relief’ provision of the ADEA …” Goico, 347 F.Supp.2d at 996 (citing Travis, 921 F.2d at 111-12. According to the Seventh Circuit, “[a]ppropriate legal relief includes damages,” and the 1977 Amendment to the FLSA “does away with the old limitations” under which damages are allowable “without establishing new ones.” Travis, 921 F.2d at 112. Therefore, according to Travis, punitive damages “are appropriate” under the FLSA “for intentional torts such as retaliatory discharge.”Id.
As stated previously, Plaintiff seeks punitive damages through her Equal Pay Act retaliation claim.
In Goico, Senior District Judge Wesley Brown analyzed the Travis exception and unequivocally stated that there is no support for “the view that Congress intended to single out retaliation claims under the FLSA (or ADEA) for potentially far greater recovery than it allowed with respect to virtually all other types of employment discrimination claims.” 347 D.Kan. at 997. Goico continued, holding that “that the Travis exception for retaliation claims is not well-founded, and is not a persuasive basis for abandoning the long-standing rule that damages for mental distress and punitive damages are not available on claims under the ADEA.”Id.
Because the recovery available under the ADEA is analogous to that allowed under the FLSA, the Court believes that this language from Goico is applicable to the Equal Pay Act issue currently pending before the Court. The Court thus finds that Plaintiff has failed to establish that her punitive damage claim under Count I is not spurious. Therefore the court cannot allow discovery to proceed relating to Defendant McClelland’s financial worth at this time. However, in the event the assigned trial judge in this case rules that Plaintiff is entitled to seek punitive damages on her FLSA retaliation claim, Plaintiff may renew her motion to compel.”