Home » Posts tagged 'Straight Time'
Tag Archives: Straight Time
S.D.N.Y.: De Minimis Exception Applies Only in Cases Where There is a “Practical Administrative Difficulty in Recording Time”
Chavez v. Panda Jive, Inc.
Anyone who handles more than a handful of FLSA cases no doubt knows that defendants often raise an affirmative defense regarding the de minimis nature of the work. Typically the defense asserted claims that even if the defendants failed to properly pay the plaintiff for all time due and owing under the FLSA, such time was de minimis, so no damages are due and owing. And, while most of the decisions discussing the issue focus on the amount of time that is (or is not) de minimis as a matter of law, a recent case sheds light on the narrow circumstances where the defense is even available to an employer. And, as it turns out, the defense is likely applicable far less than you might have thought, only in circumstances where there is a “practical administrative difficulty in recording [the employee’s] time,” as discussed briefly in this case.
In this case, the plaintiff’s time records clearly showed overtime hours worked, however the defendant paid him only straight time for his overtime hours, and not time and a half. As the court’s opinion indicates, initially the defendant had raised an exemption defense, however because the plaintiff was admittedly paid by the hour, the defendant ultimately conceded that the plaintiff was generally entitled to overtime (which he was not paid) when he worked over 40 hours in a work week. However, the defendant asserted that because such time was “de minimis” it was not recoverable under the FLSA. Rejecting defendant’s contention, the court explained:
The de minimis exception applies, however, only in cases where there is a “practical administrative difficulty of recording additional time,” such as an employee’s commuting time. Singh v. City of New York, 524 F.3d 361, 371 (2d Cir.2008) (Sotomayor, J.); Reich v. N.Y. Transit Auth., 45 F.3d 646, 652 (2d Cir.1995). This is not such a case: defendants concede that they paid Chavez only straight time for hours for which their own records explicitly show he was owed time and a half. See, e.g., Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment dated May 4, 2012 at 4–5; Tr. at 5–6. Accordingly, the Court grants summary judgment to plaintiff on the issue of liability against defendant Panda Jive for overtime hours Chavez worked prior to moving back to Penelope’s kitchen in December 2009.
Click Chavez v. Panda Jive, Inc. to read the entire Memorandum Order.
W.D.N.Y.: Common Law Claims Not Preempted To the Extent They Provide a Remedy Not Available Under the FLSA
Gordon v. Kaleida Health
In an unusual procedural posture, this case was before the court on plaintiffs’ motion to remand their state common law claims, based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court held that it had subject matter jurisdiction however, because of FLSA preemption considerations. As discussed here, the court held that common law claims seeking to recover straight-time compensation otherwise not covered under the FLSA are not preempted by the FLSA.
Discussing the issue the court reasoned:
“In many district court cases where this issue has arisen, the plaintiffs’ common law claims were brought in conjunction with FLSA claims, based on the same facts, and seeking the same relief. In such cases, most courts have had no trouble dismissing the common law claims as preempted to the extent recovery is available under the FLSA, even where the plaintiff also brought wage claims under a parallel state statute. See, e.g., Guensel v. Mount Olive Bd. of Educ., Civ. No. 10–4452, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132102, at *19, 2011 WL 5599717 (D.N.J. Nov. 16, 2011) (common law claims that are “directly covered” by FLSA must be brought under the FLSA); DeMarco v. Northwestern Mem. Healthcare, Civ. No. 10–C–397, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88541, at *17–18, 2011 WL 3510905 (N.D.Ill. Aug. 10, 2011) (unjust enrichment and other state common law claims seeking relief available under the FLSA are preempted); Bouthner v. Cleveland Constr., Inc., Civ. No. RDB–11–244, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79316, at *21–22, 2011 WL 2976868 (D.Md. July 21, 2011) (although common law claim made no reference to FLSA, it was preempted where claim sought wages mandated by FLSA).
Two courts in this Circuit have expressly concluded that common law claims are preempted to the extent they seek recovery available under the FLSA, but are not preempted to the extent that state law provides a remedy not available under federal law. DeSilva v. N. Shore–Long Island Jewish Health Sys., 770 F.Supp.2d 497, 532–33 (E.D.N.Y.2011) (finding common law claims preempted by FLSA to extent they sought overtime wages, but not preempted to extent they sought straight-time pay not available under the FLSA); Barrus v. Dick’s Sporting Goods, Inc., 732 F.Supp.2d 243, 263 (W.D.N.Y.2010) (dismissing common law claims seeking unpaid overtime as preempted by FLSA, but allowing claim for unpaid straight time wages to go forward). Other district courts have held likewise. See, e .g., Monahan v. Smyth Auto., Inc., No. 10–CV–00048, 2011 Dist. LEXIS 9877, at *9–11, 2011 WL 379129 (S.D. Oh Feb. 2, 2011) (unjust enrichment claim not preempted where it was based on alleged failure to pay the state’s minimum wage, which was higher than FLSA minimum wage rate); Mickle v. Wellman Prods. LLC, No. 08–CV–0297, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63697, at *10–11, 2008 WL 3925266 (N.D.Okla.2008) (while state statute created a distinct cause of action for overtime compensation, the plaintiffs’ common law claim seeking such relief was duplicative of remedies provided by the FLSA and was preempted).
The law on this issue is by no means settled—some courts have declined to find common law claims preempted where a state’s statute incorporates the FLSA’s minimum wage and/or overtime provisions, and others have dismissed entirely common law claims for which the FLSA provides only partial relief. However, I find the foregoing cases from within this Circuit persuasive. As the DiSilva court noted, the FLSA’s savings clause expressly provides that wage and hour actions may be brought under state wage statutes, “it says nothing about a party’s ability to pursue general common law claims that have no specific relevance to the labor law context.” 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27138, at *93 (emphasis in original).
Here, Plaintiffs common law claims are not brought in conjunction with any claim for relief under the FLSA or the NYLL. They refer generally to statutory law only as the basis for calculating damages. This vague reference to “state law” is not enough to draw purely common law claims into the ambit of the FLSA’s savings clause. Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiffs are seeking unpaid overtime wages that are available under the FLSA, their common law claims are preempted, and to the extent they are seeking straight-time wages for which no federal relief is available, they are not.”
Click Gordon v. Kaleida Health to read the entire Decision and Order.