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Trump DOL Announces Proposed Rule for Tip Credit Provisions To Permit Restaurants to Indirectly Retain Portion of Employees’ Tips Under Certain Circumstances and Pay Reduced Minimum Wage for Virtually All Hours Worked
Although it has long been the law that the owners and managers of restaurants, bars and other businesses employing tipped employees may not keep or share in any portion of tipped employees tips, the Trump DOL has proposed new rules to change that under certain circumstances. Under the new rules, neither the owners or the management of restaurants may share in tips directly. However, if the rules go into effect, the owners of restaurants could share in the tips indirectly by diverting tips from the employees who earned them to employees who do not normally earn tips (i.e. back of house staff like cooks, dishwashers, etc.), as long as the tipped employees are paid a direct wage of at least the regular minimum wage in addition to tips.
The U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) announced a proposed rule for tip provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) implementing provisions of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2018 (CAA).
In its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the DOL proposes to:
- Explicitly prohibit employers, managers, and supervisors from keeping tips received by employees;
- Remove regulatory language imposing restrictions on an employer’s use of tips when the employer does not take a tip credit. This would allow employers that do not take an FLSA tip credit to include a broader group of workers, such as cooks or dishwashers, in a mandatory tip pool.
- Incorporate in the regulations, as provided under the CAA, new civil money penalties, currently not to exceed $1,100, that may be imposed when employers unlawfully keep tips.
- Amend the regulations to reflect recent guidance explaining that an employer may take a tip credit for any amount of time that an employee in a tipped occupation performs related non-tipped duties contemporaneously with his or her tipped duties, or for a reasonable time immediately before or after performing the tipped duties.
- Withdraw the Department’s NPRM, published on December 5, 2017, that proposed changes to tip regulations as that NPRM was superseded by the CAA.
While an email from the DOL contends that “[t]he proposal would also codify existing Wage and Hour Division (WHD) guidance into a rule.” In fact, it would change long-standing WHD guidance to legalize certain practices currently deemed wage theft by the DOL.
New Rule Would Allow Restaurants to Require Tipped Employees to Subsidize Pay of Non-Tipped Employees
The CAA prohibits employers from keeping employees’ tips. DOL’s proposed rule would allow employers who do not take a tip credit (i.e. those who pay tipped employees direct wages at least equal to the regular minimum wage) to establish a tip pool to be shared between workers who receive tips and are paid the full minimum wage and employees that do not traditionally receive tips, such as dishwashers and cooks.
The proposed rule would not impact regulations providing that employers who take a tip credit may only have a tip pool among traditionally tipped employees. An employer may take a tip credit toward its minimum wage obligation for tipped employees equal to the difference between the required cash wage (currently $2.13 per hour) and the federal minimum wage. Establishments utilizing a tip credit may only have a tip pool among traditionally tipped employees.
New Rule Would Allow Restaurants to Pay Reduced Minimum Wage More Hours Performing Non-Tipped Duties Where Employees Are Unable to Earn Tips
Additionally, the proposed rule reflects the Department’s guidance that an employer may take a tip credit for any amount of time an employee in a tipped occupation performs related non-tipped duties with tipped duties. For the employer to use the tip credit, the employee must perform non-tipped duties contemporaneous with, or within a reasonable time immediately before or after, performing the tipped duties. The proposed regulation also addresses which non-tipped duties are related to a tip-producing occupation.
If adopted, this rule would do away with longstanding guidance from the DOL which requires employers to pay the regular minimum wage for hours of work spent performing non-tipped duties, to the extent such duties comprise more than 20% of an employee’s time worked during a workweek.
Proposed Rule Will Be Available for Review and Public Comment
After publication this NPRM will be available for review and public comment for 60 days. The Department encourages interested parties to submit comments on the proposed rule. The NPRM, along with the procedures for submitting comments, can be found at the WHD’s Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) website.
The proposed rules along with the recent selection of a notorious anti-worker/pro-business advocate Eugene Scalia to Secretary of Labor signal that the Trump administration’s effort to erode workers’ rights is likely to continue if not accelerate for the remainder of his presidency.
Budget Bill Limits Circumstances Under Which Employers Can Use Tip Pools; Clarifies Damages Due If Employers Improperly Retain Employees Tips
After contentious negotiations and threatened government shutdowns, on March 23, the President signed the 2018 Budget Bill into law. Of significance here, the bill resolved several longstanding regulatory issues.
The spending bill, includes an amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), which now prohibits employers—including managers and supervisors—from participating in tip-pooling arrangements, even where the employer does not seek to take the so-called tip credit and pays the employees the regular minimum wage rather than the tip-credit minimum wage, sometimes referred to as the “server’s wage” in the restaurant industry. In other words, under the new law employers, managers and supervisors can never share in a tip pool and employees can never be required to pay any portion of their tips to employers, managers or supervisors.
The amendment also clarifies two (2) issues which have divided courts regarding the disgorgement of illegally retained tips. While many courts have long-held that an employer who illegally requires employees to share tip with non-tipped employees (managers, supervisors, back-of-house and/or kitchen staff, etc.) must return all such tips to the employees, not all courts uniformly held as such. The amendment clarifies that damages resulting from illegal tip pooling include a return of all tips to the employees. The amendment also clarifies that employees’ damages include liquidated damages on all damages, including the disgorged tips, an issue which had previously divided courts and for which the Department of Labor had not provided guidance previously.
In light of the fervent anti-employee stance that the Department of Labor has taken under the current administration, this certainly must be celebrated as a victory for workers. Indeed, the law replaces a proposed regulation which garnered much opposition for its pro-wage theft stance and which was recently discovered to have been pushed through the regulatory process based on intentionally incomplete information provided by Secretary of Labor.
Click amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act to read the full text of the new law.
E.D.Mo.: Where Common Tip Pool Violations Alleged, Employees of Franchise Stores as Well as Those at Company-Owned Stores Similarly Situated at Stage 1
White v. 14051 Manchester, Inc.
This case was before the court on the plaintiffs’ motion for conditional certification. As discussed here, the plaintiffs sought to facilitate class notice to employees who worked at the franchise locations of the franchisee who employed them, as well as those who worked for “Hotshots” franchisor or company-owned locations. In support of their motion, plaintiffs argued that all tipped employees at all Hotshots locations, regardless of the owner, were required to participate in illegal tip pools whereby they were required to tip out back-of-the-house employees not eligible to participate in a valid tip pool. Rejecting the defendants’ argument that the court should limit the putative class to those tipped employees employed by the franchisee who employed plaintiffs the court explained, that it would be inappropriate to resolve the merits issue regarding which entities employed each putative class member at Stage 1.
Discussing this issue the court opined:
The Supreme Court has noted that whether a relationship is covered by the FLSA turns on the economic realities of the working relationship rather than technical definitions relating to employment. Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coop., Inc., 366 U.S. 28, 33, 81 S.Ct. 933, 6 L.Ed.2d 100 (1961). The FLSA defines “employee” broadly to include “any individual employed by an employer.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1)(2006). In turn, “employ” is defined as “to suffer or permit to work” 29 U.S.C. § 203(g), and an “employer” is any person “acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(d). “Thus, based on the language of the statute, an employee is any individual who is permitted to work by one acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer.” Helmert v. Butterball, LLC, No. 4:08CV00342, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28964, at *6 (E.D.Ark. Mar. 5, 2010); see also Nicholson v. UTi Worldwide, Inc., No. 3:09–cv–722, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41886, at *3 (S.D.Ill. Apr. 18, 2011)(conditionally certifying class of “forklift operators employed” by defendant that included workers hired through temporary staffing agencies).
The Court finds that, for purposes of this Motion, Defendants “permitted or suffered to work” all Hotshots employees, even those at the franchise locations. Given the FLSA’s broad definition of the “employee” and its remedial purpose, Defendants’ franchise arrangement demonstrates sufficient “control” for conditional class certification. Moreover, the employment relationship for franchise employees is disputed by the Plaintiffs, and the Court cannot make credibility determinations at this juncture. See Arnold v. DirecTv, Inc., No. 4:10–CV–352–JAR, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140777, at *8 (E.D.Mo. Sept. 28, 2012)(“The Court will not make any credibility determinations or findings of fact with respect to contradictory evidence presented by the parties at this initial stage.”).
The Court also finds that the proper class definition is all Hotshots employees who shared in any tip pool. Employees who participated in the tip pool were allegedly victims of the same policy or plan and denied compensation as a result of the tip-pooling arrangement. While the Court acknowledges that distinctions exist among the Hotshot’s teams and locations, Plaintiffs’ affidavits provide enough evidence at this stage to demonstrate employees were similarly situated and subject to a common practice. McCauley, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91375, at *12–13 (citing Busler v. Enersys Energy Products, Inc., No. 09–00159, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84500, at *9–10, 2009 WL 2998970 at *3 (W.D.Mo. Sep. 16, 2009)); see also Fast v. Applebee’s Intern., Inc., 243 F.R.D. 360, 363–64 (W.D.Mo.2007) (citations omitted) (“To be similarly situated, however, class members need not be identically situated. The ‘similarly situated’ threshold requires only a modest factual showing.”); Schleipfer v. Mitek Corp., No. 1:06CV109, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64042, at *9 (E.D.Mo. Aug. 29, 2007)(class members need not be identically situated). “[A]rguments concerning the individualized inquiries required and the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims are inappropriate at this stage of the proceeding and can be raised before the Court at the second, or decertification, stage.” Dominquez v. Minn. Beef Indus., No. 06–1002, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61298, at *10 (D.Minn. Aug. 21, 2007)(internal quotation omitted).
Click White v. 14051 Manchester, Inc. to read the entire Memorandum and Order.
DOL Publishes New FLSA Rules, Rejecting Pro-Employer Changes to Fluctuating Workweek and Comp Time, Clarifying Tip Credit Rules
On April 5, the Department of Labor (DOL) published its updates to its interpretative regulations regarding the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) in the Federal Register. to go into effect 30 days later. The Updating Regulations, revise out of date CFR regulations. Specifically, these revisions conform the regulations to FLSA amendments passed in 1974, 1977, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2007, and Portal Act amendments passed in 1996.
As noted by several commentators, the final regulations are noteworthy for what was not included as much as for what was. Below is a brief description of the most significant changes and those changes originally proposed, that were not adopted:
Fluctuating Workweek Under 29 C.F.R. §778.114
The proposed regulations issued by DOL in 2008 under the Bush administration (73 Fed. Reg. 43654) would have amended regulations on the “fluctuating workweek” method of calculating overtime pay for nonexempt employees who have agreed to received pay in the form of fixed weekly payments rather than in the form of an hourly wage. The proposed regulations would have amended 29 C.F.R. §778.114 to permit payments of non-overtime bonuses and incentives (such as shift differentials) “without invalidating the guaranteed salary criterion required for the half-time overtime pay computation.” The DOL left out this proposed change from the final rules however, saying it had “concluded that unless such payments are overtime premiums, they are incompatible with the fluctuating workweek method of computing overtime.” Explaining the decision not to amend the FWW reg, the DOL noted that “several commenters … noted that the proposal would permit employers to reduce employees’ fixed weekly salaries and shift the bulk of the employees’ wages to bonus and premium pay” contra to the FLSA’s intent. The DOL’s decision to decline the proposed amendment is consistent with virtually all case law on this issue, as discussed here and here.
The DOL has also decided to revise the proposed regulations’ interpretation of Congress’ 1974 amendment, section 3(m) of the FLSA, to require advance notice to tipped employees of information about the tip credit the employer is permitted to take based on its employees’ tips. The final rule combines existing regulatory provisions to assure such employees are notified of the employer’s use of the tip credit, and how the employer calculates it. This regulation too is consistent with case law on the subject, requiring advanced notice of the tip credit.
The final rules also do not include a proposed change that would have allowed public-sector employers to grant employees compensatory time requested “within a reasonable period” of the request, instead of on the specific dates requested. Instead, the final rule will leave the regulations unchanged, “consistent with [DOL’s] longstanding position that employees are entitled to use compensatory time on the date requested absent undue disruption to the agency.”
The new CFR regulations go into effect on May 5, 2011.
D.Md.: Employer-Owner Could Not Share in Employee Tip Pool Under FLSA, Regardless of Extent of His Bartending Activities
Gionfriddo v. Jason Zink, LLC
In this case tipped employees challenged the validity of the employer’s tip pool, due to the participation of “non-tipped employees” in the tip pool. The case was before the court on a variety of motions. Of significance here, the parties moved by cross motions for summary judgment on the issue of whether the defendant’s tip pool arrangement was valid or not. The court held that the owner-operators participation in the tip pool necessarily rendered it invalid, notwithstanding the fact that he regularly bartended side by side with his tipped employer bartenders. In doing so, the court rejected the defendant’s argument that an owner-operator, who earns primarily tips, can transform himself into a tipped employee, such that he may permissibly participate in a tip pool with other tipped employees.
The court reasoned:
“As previously mentioned, the Fair Labor Standards Act was enacted to eliminate “labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers.” Pub.L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq.). To effectuate this aim, the FLSA requires that employees be paid a minimum wage of $7.25 per hour. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1)(c). An exception exists for “tipped employees.” “Tipped employees” are those employees that are “engaged in an occupation in which [they] customarily and regularly receive[ ] more than $30 a month in tips.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(t). Those employees are required to receive at least the minimum wage, but their employers are permitted to pay a direct wage of $2.13 per hour and then take a “tip credit” to meet the $7.25 per hour minimum wage requirement. 29 U.S.C. § 203(m). In other words, an employer satisfies the FLSA if he pays his tipped employees at least $2.13 per hour, and that wage, in conjunction with the tips they receive, make up at least the $7.25 per hour minimum wage. Employees are permitted to share tips through a tip pooling or tip splitting arrangement so long as each employee customarily receive more than $30 per month in tips. 29 C.F.R. § 531.54. However, “[i]f tipped employees are required to participate in a tip pool with other employees who do not customarily receive tips, then the tip pool is invalid and the employer is not permitted to take a ‘tip credit.’ “ Wajcman v. Inv. Corp. of Palm Beach, 620 F.Supp.2d 1353, 1356 n. 3 (S.D.Fla.2009) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 203(m)). In the present case, the bartenders at the Taverns participated in a collective tip pool that was divided up according to a formula that accounts for the hours worked by each bartender.
Mr. Zink worked as a bartender at the Taverns and concedes that he participated in the tip pool. Mr. Zink also concedes that he satisfies the definition of “employer” under Section 203(d) of the FLSA. See Defs.’ Cross Mot. Summ. J. at 24, ECF No. 51-1. Both parties agree that bartending is typically a tipped occupation. Where the parties disagree, however, is on the question of whether an “employer” may also be a “tipped employee” and receive a share of the tip pool. Defendants argue that despite his status as an employer, Mr. Zink is nevertheless permitted to share in the tip pool because he can simultaneously be an “employer” and a tipped “employee” under the FLSA. In other words, because Mr. Zink works as a bartender, a position that ordinarily receives tips, his status as an employer is immaterial to the FLSA analysis. Plaintiffs respond by arguing that allowing Mr. Zink to simultaneously benefit from the “tip credit” exception to the minimum wage requirements and at the same time personally receive tips would be completely contradictory to the purpose behind the FLSA. Plaintiffs maintain that Mr. Zink, as the sole owner of the Taverns, and the Plaintiffs’ employer, simply may not participate in a tip pool, and that to the extent he did participate in a tip pool, that tip pool is invalid under the FLSA. In short, the question before this Court is to what extent, if any, an owner-employer who also tends bar is permitted to receive tips from an employee tip pool.
This precise question is an issue of first impression in this District and in the Fourth Circuit, but not elsewhere. Every court that has considered the issue has unequivocally held that the FLSA expressly prohibits employers from participating in employee tip pools. “Congress, in crafting the tip credit provision of section 3(m) of the FLSA did not create a middle ground allowing an employer both to take the tip credit and share employees’ tips.” Chung v. New Silver Palace Restaurant, Inc., 246 F.Supp.2d 220, 230 (S.D.N.Y.2002); see also, e.g., Morgan v. SpeakEasy, LLC, 625 F.Supp.2d 632, 652 (N.D.Ill.2007) (quoting Chung, 246 F.Supp.2d at 230); Ayres v. 127 Restaurant Corp., 12 F.Supp.2d 305, 308-09 (S.D.N.Y.1998) (finding tip pool invalid as a result of general manager’s participation); Davis v. B & S, Inc., 38 F.Supp.2d 707, 714 (N.D.Ind.1998) (“an employer is not eligible to take the tip credit, and will be liable for reimbursing an employee the full minimum wage that employee would have earned, if the employer exercises control over a portion of the employee’s tips”).
Despite the clear weight of authority holding that employers may not participate in employee tip pools, Defendants seek to carve out a novel legal question where there is none. Essentially, Defendants argue that the analysis undergirding the cases holding that employers may not participate in employee tip pools is fundamentally flawed because those courts considered the issue under the faulty premise that a particular individual may only be an employer or a tipped employee, and not both. See Defs.’ Cross Mot. Summ. J. at 26-34, ECF No. 51-1; Defs.’ Reply at 16, ECF No. 58. Defendants rely on a textual interpretation of the FLSA, and argue that as a result of the Act’s broad definition of “employer,” it is also possible for an employer to be a tipped employee if that person participates in an activity that customarily receives tips, such as bartending. Id. In this regard, Defendants are mistaken-the cases holding that employers may not participate in employee tip pools do not take the position that under no circumstances will an “employer” be prohibited from participating in a tip pool-indeed, in close cases courts have gone to great lengths to determine whether a person who possesses some managerial control may be considered a “tipped employee” under the FLSA. For example, in Rudy v. Consol. Restaurant Cos., No. 3:08-CV-0904-L, 2010 WL 3565418 (N.D.Tex. Aug. 18, 2010), the district court considered whether maître d’s, who possessed some managerial authority over regular restaurant waiters, were properly considered “tipped employees” as a result of their significant interaction with customers. Id. at *4-9. Similarly, in Davis v. B & S, Incorporated, 38 F.Supp.2d 707, 714 (N.D.Ind.1998), the court found that a material fact existed with regard to whether a general manager could participate in a tip pool and declined to grant summary judgment to the employee. Id. at 717 (“because issues of fact remain as to whether [the general manager] was a ‘tipped employee’ with regard to his work with the disc jockeys, the validity of his participation in the tip pool … cannot be resolved as a matter of law”).”
Click Gionfriddo v. Jason Zink, LLC to read the entire order.
S.D.Ohio: Inclusion Of Maître D’ In Tip Pool Not Necessarily Illegal; Evidence Demonstrated Maître D’ Lacked Management Duties To Make Him An FLSA Employer, If He Did Not Hire Or Fire
Strange v. Wade
This case was before the court on plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment regarding a variety of issues. Although the court granted the motion in some respects, as discussed here, it denied the motion with respect to plaintiff’s claim that defendant’s inclusion of the maître d’ in its tip pool was illegal and invalidated the tip pool. The court held that on the record before it, it was not possible to conclude that the maître d’ was a management employee rather than a properly tipped service employee.
Discussing this issue the court reasoned:
“The FLSA expressly prohibits employers from participating in employee tip pools. “Congress, in crafting the tip credit provision of section 3(m) of the FLSA did not create a middle ground allowing an employer both to take the tip credit and share employees’ tips.” Chung v. New Silver Place Rest., Inc., 246 F.Supp.2d 220, 230 (S.D.N.Y.2002); Wajcman v. Investment Corp. of Palm Beach, No. 07-80912-CIV, 2008 WL 783741, *3 (S.D.Fla. March 20, 2008) (“The theory here is that employees who exercise substantial managerial authority over the day to day operations of the business are functionally the ‘employers’ themselves”). Where employers participate in a tip pool, the pool is invalid. See Ayres v. 127 Restaurant Corp., 12 F.Supp.2d 305 (S.D.N.Y.1998) (tip pool violated FLSA where general manager, who had authority to suspend, hire and fire employees and analyze payroll costs, was allowed to participate in the pool).
Plaintiff argues that Pigall’s tip pool was invalid because Brown was a manager and shared in the pool. (Doc. 22-1.) In support of its argument, Plaintiff points to Brown’s guaranteed compensation, his participation in the opening of the restaurant, his authority to train, schedule and supervise the wait staff, and his authority to hire and fire employees. (Id.) Plaintiff cites to the depositions of Brown and de Cavel, wherein both men testified that Brown was considered part of the restaurant’s management team. (de Cavel Dep. 50:13-14; Brown Dep. 59:17-22.) These facts, Plaintiff argues, unequivocally establish that Brown was an employer for purposes of the FLSA. See Ayres, 12 F.Supp.2d at 307-08 (general manager of restaurant, who had full authority to suspend or terminate employees, supervised wait staff, made hiring decisions, assumed responsibility for budget and received weekly salary of $2000 was not an employee who “customarily and regularly received tips” under the FLSA).
Defendants agree that Brown participated in the tip pool but argue that he was not a manager and, thus, the tip pool was not invalid by virtue of the fact that Brown participated in it. Defendants point to Dole v. Continental Cuisine, Inc., 751 F.Supp. 799 (E.D.Ark.1990), to support their contention that Brown cannot be considered an employer under the Act. In Continental Cuisine, the individual in question was the maître d’ of the restaurant alleged to have violated the FLSA. 751 F.Supp. at 802-03. The maître d’ was responsible for setting up the dining room, seating and greeting customers, serving the first drink to customers, scheduling shifts for the wait staff, interviewing applicants for positions as waiters and waitresses, and recommending that persons be hired or fired. Id. at 800. Because the maître d’ did not have final authority to hire and fire employees, set wages, control restaurant operations, or control payroll, he was not considered an employer for purposes of the FLSA. Id. at 803. Defendants argue that, similar to the maître d’ in Continental Cuisine, Brown did not have the requisite managerial authority to be considered an employer under the Act.
The Court agrees with Defendants that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Brown is an employer under the FLSA. Although the parties appear to agree on many of the duties that Brown performs, there is conflicting testimony regarding whether Brown had full authority to hire and fire workers and how much control Brown exercised at the restaurant. For example, although Brown testified that he made final hiring decisions, he acknowledged that he was “not at liberty to hire someone” without de Cavel first meeting with that person. (Brown dep. 53:3-54:15.) Meanwhile, de Cavel testified that Brown was part of his management team and “fire[d] a few people without [his] agreement” (de Cavel dep. 50:13-14; 20:9-10). Conversely, Brown testified that he had no responsibility “for any decision that involved spending money.” (Brown dep. 51:19-20.) Based on the current record, and construing all facts in favor of Defendants, the Court believes that genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment on this issue. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment regarding the validity of the restaurant’s tip pool is DENIED.”
To read the entire decision, click here.
EDITOR’S NOTE: In a recent decision going one step further, a court in the Northern District of Texas held on similar evidence, that as a matter of law, the inclusion of a maître d’ did not render a tip pool illegal. Rudy v. Consolidated Restaurant Companies, Inc., 2010 WL 3565418 (N.D.Tex. Aug. 18, 2010).
It is clear from both of these decisions that while there is room for the argument that inclusion of a maître d’ may render an otherwise valid tip pool invalid, it is a very fact intensive issue and plaintiff attorneys would be wise to fully develop their factual record on issues of hiring/firing powers if they prosecute these claims.
Click here, to read more about the rules, regulations and laws applicable to Tipped Employees.
Daprizio v. Harrah’s Las Vegas, Inc.
This case was before the Court on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ state law claims on several grounds. As discussed here, the Court ruled that the FLSA precludes Nevada State Law Class Action claims.
“The Court finds that the FLSA precludes the state law class action. The conflict between the two mass action schemes involves the mechanisms by which parties become members of a suit. Defendant argues that “allowing the parallel claims to be pursued concurrently would allow the application of the collective action opt-out mechanism of Rule 23, invoked by the state law claims, to govern what Congress intended to be a more limited situation of opt-in collective action [under the FLSA].” (Mot. Dismiss 13, ECF No. 2). The Court agrees. The FLSA states that, “No employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such action unless he gives consent in writing to become such a party and such consent is filed in the court in which such action is brought.” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). This is the “opt-in” provision used for FLSA collective actions, under which a putative class member is not bound unless he or she affirmatively opts in to the suit. Gardenvariety class actions, however, are governed by Rule 23, which states that “the court will exclude from the class any member who requests exclusion.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(c)(2)(B)(v). This is the “opt-out” provision, under which members of a certified class must affirmatively opt out of the class or be bound by the class action litigation. This divergence between the respective opt-in and opt-out procedures of a FLSA collective action and a garden-variety class action results in a class action under state labor laws being preempted by the FLSA’s collective action scheme.
The Ninth Circuit has based its preemption analysis on the Supreme Court’s three categories: (1) express preemption-“where Congress explicitly defines the extent to which its enactments preempt state law”; (2) field preemption-“where state law attempts to regulate conduct in a field that Congress intended the federal law exclusively to occupy”; and (3) conflict preemption-“where it is impossible to comply with both state and federal requirements, or where state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Williamson v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 208 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir.2000) (citing Indus. Truck Ass’n, Inc. v. Henry, 125 F.3d 1305, 1309 (9th Cir.1997) (citing English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-80 (1990))). “Consideration of the issues arising under the Supremacy Clause ‘start[s] with the assumption that the historical police powers of the states [are] not to be superseded by … Federal Act unless that [is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’ “ Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947)). “Preemption issues must be decided on a case-by-case basis.” Williamson, 208 F.3d at 1155.
A court of this District has ruled that the FLSA precludes state-law labor class actions. In Williams v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc., the court found that “the class action mechanisms of the FLSA and Rule 23 are incompatible. It would be inappropriate to permit Plaintiff’s attempt to circumvent the restrictive opt-in requirement of the FLSA….” No. 2:05-CV-0605-RCJ-LRL, 2007 WL 2429149 at *4 (D.Nev. Aug. 20, 2007) (Jones, J.). In Trendwest Resorts, the defendant’s employees were attempting to recover overtime wages under the FLSA as well as under California state labor law. The court pointed out that notice was sent to 1578 employees of Trendwest Resorts in California and Nevada, but only 194 individuals had opted into the putative class. Id. Had Rule 23 been implemented, the other 1100 California employees who failed to affirmatively opt in would have been brought into the case. Id . In the present case, there is only one complaining party and an unknown number of potential class members. “[T]he policy behind requiring FLSA plaintiffs to opt in to the class would largely be thwarted if a plaintiff were permitted to back door the shoehorning in of unnamed parties through the vehicle of calling upon similar state statutes that lack such an opt-in requirement.” Leuthold v.. Destination Am., Inc., 224 F.R.D. 462, 470 (N.D.Cal.2004) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiff argues that no preemption issue exists since none of the three types of preemption apply. Express and field preemption are not in dispute since neither side alleges that the federal law expressly preempts state law or that labor disputes are strictly a federal issue. Conflict preemption, Plaintiff argues, also does not apply because the “Nevada overtime and minimum wage claims do not ‘stand as an obstacle’ to Congress’ purpose in enacting the FLSA.” (Resp. Mot. Dismiss 9:11-12, ECF No. 14). In support of this argument, Plaintiff points to the “savings clause” of the FLSA which allows states to enact wage and hour laws more favorable to workers than the minimum requirements of the FLSA and quotes Williamson, which states that, “the FLSA’s ‘savings clause’ is evidence that Congress did not intend to preempt the entire field.” 208 F.3d at 1151 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 218(a)). This argument is unpersuasive for two reasons. First, the savings clause of the FLSA that Plaintiff mentions deals expressly with minimum wages and child labor laws. The language leaves little room for broader inference and probably no room for broader application. Second, the quote from Williamson Plaintiff mentions explicitly refers to field preemption, a type of preemption Plaintiff explicitly disclaims. The savings clause simply means that plaintiffs may bring FLSA collective actions based on violations of state wage and hour laws that are stricter than federal requirements. But the fact that Congress permits suit based on a state’s wage and hour requirements that are stricter than those in the FLSA does nothing to ameliorate the conflict between the FLSA opt-in provision and the Rule 23 opt-out provision.
Because of the tension between the opt-in procedure of an FLSA collective action and the opt-out procedure of a garden-variety Rule 23 class action, a conflict exists. See, e.g., Rose v. Wildflower Bread Co., No. CV09-1348-PHX-JAT, 2010 WL 1781011, at *3 (D.Ariz. May 4, 2010). The Ninth Circuit has stated even more broadly in dicta that “[c]laims that are directly covered by the FLSA (such as overtime and retaliation disputes) must be brought under the FLSA.” Williamson, 208 F.3d at 1154. This could be read as preempting even Plaintiff’s individual claim, but that question is not before the Court.”
There continues to be a rift between various circuits (and even within circuits) as to whether so-called hybrid FLSA Collective Actions may co-exist with State Law Class claims. Stay tuned to see whether the Supreme Court will ultimately weigh in.
To read the entire decision, click here.
9th Cir.: Tip Pool That Required Tipped Employees To Share Tips With Non-Tipped Employees Did Not Violate FLSA, Because Restaurant Paid Tipped Employees Cash Wages In Excess Of Minimum Wage And Did Not Claim Tip Credit
Cumbie v. Woody Woo, Inc.
This case was before the Ninth Circuit to decide whether a restaurant violates the Fair Labor Standards Act, when, despite paying a cash wage greater than the minimum wage, it requires its wait staff to participate in a “tip pool” that redistributes some of their tips to the kitchen staff. The Court ruled that such a tip sharing arrangement does not violate the FLSA.
Describing the tip pool at issue, the Court said, “[Plaintiff] worked as a waitress at the Vita Café in Portland, Oregon, which is owned and operated by Woody Woo, Inc., Woody Woo II, Inc., and Aaron Woo (collectively, “Woo”). Woo paid its servers a cash wage at or exceeding Oregon’s minimum wage, which at the time was $2.10 more than the federal minimum wage. In addition to this cash wage, the servers received a portion of their daily tips. Woo required its servers to contribute their tips to a “tip pool” that was redistributed to all restaurant employees . The largest portion of the tip pool (between 55% and 70%) went to kitchen staff (e.g., dishwashers and cooks), who are not customarily tipped in the restaurant industry. The remainder (between 30% and 45%) was returned to the servers in proportion to their hours worked.”
The Court below dismissed Plaintiff’s Complaint on Defendant’s 12(b)(6) Motion, holding that Plaintiff failed to state a claim for minimum wages, because she acknowledges she was paid in excess of minimum wage, but challenged the legality of Defendant’s tip pool nonetheless. This appeal ensued.
“On appeal, [Plaintiff] argue[d] that because Woo’s tip pool included employees who are not ‘customarily and regularly tipped employees,’ 29 U.S.C. § 203(m), it was ‘invalid’ under the FLSA, and Woo was therefore required to pay her the minimum wage plus all of her tips. Woo argue[d] that Cumbie’s reading of the FLSA is correct only vis-à-vis employers who take a ‘tip credit’ toward their minimum-wage obligation. See id.” Defendant, argued that, “[b]ecause [it] did not claim a ‘tip credit,’ it contends that the tip-pooling arrangement was permissible so long as it paid her the minimum wage, which it did.”
Affirming the lower Court’s decision, finding the pay policy at issue to be legal, the Ninth Circuit discussed the applicable law:
“Williams establishes the default rule that an arrangement to turn over or to redistribute tips is presumptively valid. Our task, therefore, is to determine whether the FLSA imposes any “statutory interference” that would invalidate Woo’s tip-pooling arrangement. The question presented is one of first impression in this court.
Under the FLSA, employers must pay their employees a minimum wage. See29 U.S.C. § 206(a). The FLSA’s definition of “wage” recognizes that under certain circumstances, employers of “tipped employees” may include part of such employees’ tips as wage payments. See id.§ 203(m). The FLSA provides in relevant part:
In determining the wage an employer is required to pay a tipped employee, the amount paid such employee by the employee’s employer shall be an amount equal to- (1) the cash wage paid such employee which for purposes of such determination shall be not less than the cash wage required to be paid such an employee on August 20, 1996; and (2) an additional amount on account of the tips received by such employee which amount is equal to the difference between the wage specified in paragraph (1) and the wage in effect under section 206(a)(1) of this title.
The additional amount on account of tips may not exceed the value of the tips actually received by an employee. The preceding 2 sentences shall not apply with respect to any tipped employee unless such employee has been informed by the employer of the provisions of this subsection, and all tips received by such employee have been retained by the employee, except that this subsection shall not be construed to prohibit the pooling of tips among employees who customarily and regularly receive tips. Id.
We shall unpack this dense statutory language sentence by sentence. The first sentence states that an employer must pay a tipped employee an amount equal to (1) a cash wage of at least $2.13, plus (2) an additional amount in tips equal to the federal minimum wage minus such cash wage. That is, an employer must pay a tipped employee a cash wage of at least $2.13, but if the cash wage is less than the federal minimum wage, the employer can make up the difference with the employee’s tips (also known as a “tip credit”). The second sentence clarifies that the difference may not be greater than the actual tips received. Therefore, if the cash wage plus tips are not enough to meet the minimum wage, the employer must “top up” the cash wage. Collectively, these two sentences provide that an employer may take a partial tip credit toward its minimum-wage obligation. See29 U.S.C. §§ 203(m), 206(a)(1) (1996).
The third sentence states that the preceding two sentences do not apply (i.e., the employer may not take a tip credit) unless two conditions are met. First, the employer must inform the employee of the tip-credit provisions in section 203(m). Second, the employer must allow the employee to keep all of her tips, except when the employee participates in a tip pool with other customarily tipped employees.
Cumbie argues that under section 203(m), an employee must be allowed to retain all of her tips-except in the case of a “valid” tip pool involving only customarily tipped employees-regardless of whether her employer claims a tip credit. Essentially, she argues that section 203(m) has overruled Williams, rendering tip-redistribution agreements presumptively invalid. However, we cannot reconcile this interpretation with the plain text of the third sentence, which imposes conditions on taking a tip credit and does not state freestanding requirements pertaining to all tipped employees. A statute that provides that a person must do X in order toachieve Y does not mandate that a person must do X, period.
If Congress wanted to articulate a general principle that tips are the property of the employee absent a “valid” tip pool, it could have done so without reference to the tip credit. “It is our duty to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute.” United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955) (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, we decline to read the third sentence in such a way as to render its reference to the tip credit, as well as its conditional language and structure, superfluous.
Here, there is no question that Woo’s tip pool included non-customarily tipped employees, and that Cumbie did not retain all of her tips because of her participation in the pool. Accordingly, Woo was not entitled to take a tip credit, nor did it. See Richard v. Marriott Corp., 549 F.2d 303, 305 (4th Cir.1977) (“[I]f the employer does not follow the command of the statute, he gets no [tip] credit.”). Since Woo did not take a tip credit, we perceive no basis for concluding that Woo’s tippooling arrangement violated section 203(m).
Recognizing that section 203(m) is of no assistance to her, Cumbie disavowed reliance on it in her reply brief and at oral argument, claiming instead that “[t]he rule against forced transfer of tips actually originates in the minimum wage section of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 206.” Section 206 provides that “[e]very employer shall pay to each of his employees … wages” at the prescribed minimum hourly rate. Id. § 206(a).
While section 206 does not mention tips, let alone tip pools, Cumbie maintains that a Department of Labor (“DOL”) regulation elucidates the meaning of the term “pay” in such a way as to prohibit Woo’s tip-pooling arrangement. She refers to the regulation which requires that the minimum wage be “paid finally and unconditionally or ‘free and clear,’ “ and forbids any “ ‘kick [ ]-back’ … to the employer or to another person for the employer’s benefit the whole or part of the wage delivered to the employee.” 29 C.F.R. § 531.35. The “free and clear” regulation provides as an example of a prohibited kick-back a requirement that an employee purchase tools for the job, where such purchase “cuts into the minimum or overtime wages required to be paid him under the Act.” Id.
According to Cumbie, her forced participation in the “invalid” tip pool constituted an indirect kick-back to the kitchen staff for Woo’s benefit, in violation of the free-and-clear regulation. As she sees it, the money she turned over to the tip pool brought her cash wage below the federal minimum in the same way as the tools in the regulation’s example. The Secretary of Labor agrees, asserting that “if the tipped employees did not receive the full federal minimum wage plus all tips received, they cannot be deemed under federal law to have received the minimum wage ‘free and clear,’ and the money diverted into the invalid tip pool is an improper deduction from wages that violates section 6 of the Act.”
Cumbie acknowledges that the applicability of the “free and clear” regulation hinges on “whether or not the tips belong to the servers to whom they are given.” This question brings us back to section 203(m), which we have already determined does not alter the default rule in Williams that tips belong to the servers to whom they are given only “in the absence of an explicit contrary understanding” that is not otherwise prohibited. 315 U.S. at 397. Hence, whether a server owns her tips depends on whether there existed an agreement to redistribute her tips that was not barred by the FLSA.
Here, such an agreement existed by virtue of the tippooling arrangement. The FLSA does not restrict tip pooling when no tip credit is taken. Therefore, only the tips redistributed to Cumbie from the pool ever belonged to her, and her contributions to the pool did not, and could not, reduce her wages below the statutory minimum. We reject Cumbie and the Secretary’s interpretation of the regulation as plainly erroneous and unworthy of any deference, see Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997), and conclude that Woo did not violate section 206 by way of the “free and clear” regulation.
Finally, Cumbie argues against the result we reach because “[a]s a practical matter, it nullifies legislation passed by Congress.” Her argument, as we understand it, is that Woo is functionally taking a tip credit by using a tip-pooling arrangement to subsidize the wages of its non-tipped employees. The money saved in wage payments is more money in Woo’s pocket, which is financially equivalent to confiscating Cumbie’s tips via a section 203(m) tip credit (with the added benefit that this “de facto” tip credit allows Woo to bypass section 203(m)‘s conditions).
Even if Cumbie were correct, “we do not find [this] possibility … so absurd or glaringly unjust as to warrant a departure from the plain language of the statute.” Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 519 U.S. 248, 261 (1997). The purpose of the FLSA is to protect workers from “substandard wages and oppressive working hours.” Barrentine v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 739 (1981) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 202(a)). Our conclusion that the FLSA does not prohibit Woo’s tip-pooling arrangement does not thwart this purpose. Cumbie received a wage that was far greater than the federally prescribed minimum, plus a substantial portion of her tips. Naturally, she would prefer to receive all of her tips, but the FLSA does not create such an entitlement where no tip credit is taken. Absent an ambiguity or an irreconcilable conflict with another statutory provision, “we will not alter the text in order to satisfy the policy preferences” of Cumbie and amici. Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., Inc., 534 U.S. 438, 462 (2002).
The Supreme Court has made it clear that an employment practice does not violate the FLSA unless the FLSA prohibits it. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000). Having concluded that nothing in the text of the FLSA purports to restrict employee tip-pooling arrangements when no tip credit is taken, we perceive no statutory impediment to Woo’s practice. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.”
The Las Vegas Review-Journal is reporting that, “[t]hree Wynn Las Vegas dealers are taking their claims of unfair tip pooling to federal court with a new lawsuit that claims the resort’s tip sharing policy violates federal labor laws.
Attorneys for three of the plaintiffs named in a state lawsuit against Wynn Las Vegas filed the lawsuit in U.S. District Court in Nevada late Thursday. The federal lawsuit claims the Wynn tip-pooling policy violates the Fair Labor Standards Act.”
Apparently “[t]he decision to file in federal court was made in response to a U.S. Department of Labor brief that was filed siding with a worker in Oregon in a tip-pooling case — Misty Cumbie v. Woody Woo [a case now pending at the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals]…
The Labor Department’s brief says the worker in Oregon was correct in challenging her company’s tip-pooling policy, which the department said violates the Fair Labor Standards Act.”
The story discussed Wynn’s potential defense to the case as well. “Wynn dealers attorney Robin Potter said the Oregon case marks the first time the Department of Labor has come out against tip pooling in cases in which the employer was not taking part in a “tip credit” system. Tip credits allow employers to pay less than the minimum wage to workers who can expect to earn most of their salary from tips.
Wynn Las Vegas doesn’t use tip credits and pays its workers minimum wage.
But the Labor Department said in the Woody Woo case that the tipped employees were paid minimum wage but were still required to contribute their tips to ‘an invalid tip pool,” and a portion of that pool was shared with nontipped employees.’
To read the full story go to the Las Vegas Review-Journal website.
Today’s L.A. Times is reporting that, “a California appeals court reversed a ruling that had ordered the coffee giant to pay more than $100 million in restitution for allowing shift supervisors to share baristas’ tips.
The class-action lawsuit was brought on behalf of more than 100,000 current and former baristas in 2004 by former barista Jou Chau, who complained that shift supervisors were illegally getting a cut of employee tips.
San Diego County Superior Court Judge Patricia Cowett ruled in favor of the baristas last year after a bench trial and awarded $86 million in restitution plus about $20 million in interest. Starbucks called the decision ‘fundamentally unfair and beyond all common sense and reason.'”
To read the full story go to the Los Angeles Times Website.