Home » Posts tagged 'FLSA' (Page 14)
Tag Archives: FLSA
W.D.N.Y.: Common Law Claims Not Preempted To the Extent They Provide a Remedy Not Available Under the FLSA
Gordon v. Kaleida Health
In an unusual procedural posture, this case was before the court on plaintiffs’ motion to remand their state common law claims, based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court held that it had subject matter jurisdiction however, because of FLSA preemption considerations. As discussed here, the court held that common law claims seeking to recover straight-time compensation otherwise not covered under the FLSA are not preempted by the FLSA.
Discussing the issue the court reasoned:
“In many district court cases where this issue has arisen, the plaintiffs’ common law claims were brought in conjunction with FLSA claims, based on the same facts, and seeking the same relief. In such cases, most courts have had no trouble dismissing the common law claims as preempted to the extent recovery is available under the FLSA, even where the plaintiff also brought wage claims under a parallel state statute. See, e.g., Guensel v. Mount Olive Bd. of Educ., Civ. No. 10–4452, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132102, at *19, 2011 WL 5599717 (D.N.J. Nov. 16, 2011) (common law claims that are “directly covered” by FLSA must be brought under the FLSA); DeMarco v. Northwestern Mem. Healthcare, Civ. No. 10–C–397, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88541, at *17–18, 2011 WL 3510905 (N.D.Ill. Aug. 10, 2011) (unjust enrichment and other state common law claims seeking relief available under the FLSA are preempted); Bouthner v. Cleveland Constr., Inc., Civ. No. RDB–11–244, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79316, at *21–22, 2011 WL 2976868 (D.Md. July 21, 2011) (although common law claim made no reference to FLSA, it was preempted where claim sought wages mandated by FLSA).
Two courts in this Circuit have expressly concluded that common law claims are preempted to the extent they seek recovery available under the FLSA, but are not preempted to the extent that state law provides a remedy not available under federal law. DeSilva v. N. Shore–Long Island Jewish Health Sys., 770 F.Supp.2d 497, 532–33 (E.D.N.Y.2011) (finding common law claims preempted by FLSA to extent they sought overtime wages, but not preempted to extent they sought straight-time pay not available under the FLSA); Barrus v. Dick’s Sporting Goods, Inc., 732 F.Supp.2d 243, 263 (W.D.N.Y.2010) (dismissing common law claims seeking unpaid overtime as preempted by FLSA, but allowing claim for unpaid straight time wages to go forward). Other district courts have held likewise. See, e .g., Monahan v. Smyth Auto., Inc., No. 10–CV–00048, 2011 Dist. LEXIS 9877, at *9–11, 2011 WL 379129 (S.D. Oh Feb. 2, 2011) (unjust enrichment claim not preempted where it was based on alleged failure to pay the state’s minimum wage, which was higher than FLSA minimum wage rate); Mickle v. Wellman Prods. LLC, No. 08–CV–0297, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63697, at *10–11, 2008 WL 3925266 (N.D.Okla.2008) (while state statute created a distinct cause of action for overtime compensation, the plaintiffs’ common law claim seeking such relief was duplicative of remedies provided by the FLSA and was preempted).
The law on this issue is by no means settled—some courts have declined to find common law claims preempted where a state’s statute incorporates the FLSA’s minimum wage and/or overtime provisions, and others have dismissed entirely common law claims for which the FLSA provides only partial relief. However, I find the foregoing cases from within this Circuit persuasive. As the DiSilva court noted, the FLSA’s savings clause expressly provides that wage and hour actions may be brought under state wage statutes, “it says nothing about a party’s ability to pursue general common law claims that have no specific relevance to the labor law context.” 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27138, at *93 (emphasis in original).
Here, Plaintiffs common law claims are not brought in conjunction with any claim for relief under the FLSA or the NYLL. They refer generally to statutory law only as the basis for calculating damages. This vague reference to “state law” is not enough to draw purely common law claims into the ambit of the FLSA’s savings clause. Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiffs are seeking unpaid overtime wages that are available under the FLSA, their common law claims are preempted, and to the extent they are seeking straight-time wages for which no federal relief is available, they are not.”
Click Gordon v. Kaleida Health to read the entire Decision and Order.
4th Cir.: Intracompany Complaints Regarding FLSA Violations Are Protected Activity Within the Meaning of Anti-Retaliation Provision of 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3)
Minor v. Bostwick Laboratories, Inc.
Jafari v. Old Dominion Transit Management Co.
In two new opinions, one published (Minor) and one unpublished (Jafari) the Fourth Circuit confirmed that post-Kasten, intracompany complaints of FLSA violations are sufficient to trigger the protections of the anti-retaliation provision of 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3).
In Minor, the lower court had dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint premised on a violation of 215, holding that internal complaints, as opposed to those to a government agency, do not constitute protected activity. Reversing the lower court, the Fourth Circuit held that such intracompany complaints are indeed protected activity and thus, trigger the protections of 215.
Framing the issue the Fourth Circuit explained:
“The sole question presented by this appeal is whether an employee’s complaint lodged within her company—as opposed to a complaint filed with a court or government agency—may trigger the protection of the FLSA’s antiretaliation provision. This is an issue of first impression in this circuit.”
Initially the court noted that neither Kasten, nor any Fourth Circuit case law was directly on point. However, following the majority of circuits to have addresssed the issue, the court concluded that the statute was ambiguous as to this point and given the remedial nature of the FLSA such informal complaints should be protected.
After discussing the ambiguity in 215’s language regarding “filing” a complaint, the court reasoned:
“The Supreme Court in Kasten determined that oral complaints could constitute protected activity within the meaning of § 215(a)(3) based upon “functional considerations.” 131 S.Ct. at 1333. In light of the ambiguous nature of § 215(a)(3)‘s “filed any complaint” language, we find that these same functional considerations dictate that intracompany complaints qualify as protected activity within the meaning of the FLSA’s antiretaliation provision.
We first consider the basic goals of the FLSA. Consistent with other authority, we conclude that, because of the statute’s remedial purpose, § 215(a)(3) must be interpreted to include intracompany complaints.
The FLSA was enacted to combat “labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers.” 29 U.S.C. § 202(a). “The central aim of the Act was to achieve … certain minimum labor standards.” Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292, 80 S.Ct. 332, 4 L.Ed.2d 323 (1960). To ensure compliance with the provisions enacted to serve this purpose, Congress “chose to rely on information and complaints from employees seeking to vindicate rights claimed to have been denied.” Id. It included the antiretaliation provision in recognition of the fact that “fear of economic retaliation might often operate to induce aggrieved employees quietly to accept substandard conditions.” Id. In light of these objectives, the Supreme Court has consistently held that the FLSA “must not be interpreted or applied in a narrow, grudging manner.” Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 597, 64 S.Ct. 698, 88 L.Ed. 949 (1944). We likewise recognized in Ball that where the statutory language permits, “we are instructed to read the FLSA to effect its remedial purposes.” 228 F.3d at 363–64.
With the statute’s purpose in mind, Kasten stated that “an interpretation [of § 215(a)(3) ] that limited the provision’s coverage to written complaints would undermine the [FLSA’s] basic objectives.” 131 S.Ct. at 1333. The Supreme Court further observed that such a limitation on the scope of the anti-retaliation provision would circumscribe flexibility in enforcing the FLSA. Id . at 1334. As a supporting point, the Supreme Court stated that “insofar as the antiretaliation provision covers complaints made to employers …, [limiting the scope of § 215(a)(3) ] would discourage the use of desirable informal workplace grievance procedures to secure compliance with the Act.” Id. Following this reasoning, we conclude that an interpretation that limits § 215(a)(3)‘s coverage to complaints made before an administrative or judicial body would overly circumscribe the reach of the antiretaliation provision in contravention of the FLSA’s remedial purpose. Allowing intracompany complaints to constitute protected activity within the meaning of § 215(a)(3), on the other hand, comports with the statute’s objectives as described by Congress’s findings and the Supreme Court’s interpretation of those findings.
Amici offer several persuasive policy arguments in support of this conclusion. They point out that protection of internal complaints encourages resolution of FLSA violations without resort to drawn-out litigation—and that failure to protect internal complaints may have the perverse result of encouraging employers to fire employees who believe they have been treated illegally before they file a formal complaint. Our sister circuits have voiced the same concerns in concluding that § 215(a)(3) protects intracompany complaints. See Valerio v. Putnam Assocs., Inc., 173 F.3d 35, 43 (1st Cir.1999) (“By protecting only those employees who kept secret their belief that they were being illegally treated until they filed a legal proceeding, the Act would discourage prior discussion of the matter between employee and employer, and would have the bizarre effect both of discouraging early settlement and creating an incentive for the employer to fire an employee as soon as possible after learning the employee believed he was being treated illegally.”).
Indeed, the majority of circuits to consider the question of whether intracompany complaints are protected activity within the meaning of “filed any complaint” have answered in the affirmative, basing their decisions on the FLSA’s remedial purpose.FN8 See, e.g., Hagan v. Echostar Satellite, LLC, 529 F.3d 617, 626 (5th Cir .2008) (“We adopt the majority rule, which allows an informal, internal complaint to constitute protected activity under Section 215(a)(3), because it better captures the anti-retaliation goals of that section.”); Lambert v. Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997, 1004 (9th Cir.1999) (en banc) (finding that § 215(a)(3) covered internal complaints based on its remedial purpose); Valerio, 173 at 42 (same); EEOC v. White & Son Enters., 881 F.2d 1006, 1011 (11th Cir.1989) (same); Love v. RE/MAX of Am., Inc., 738 F.2d 383, 387 (10th Cir.1984) (same); Brennan v. Maxey’s Yamaha, Inc., 513 F.2d 179, 181 (8th Cir.1975) (same); see also EEOC v. Romeo Cmty. Sch., 976 F.2d 985, 989 (6th Cir.1992) (holding that an employee’s complaints to her employer were sufficient to trigger protection of the FLSA’s antiretaliation provision without explaining its rationale). Cf. Brock v. Richardson, 812 F.2d 121, 124–25 (3d Cir.1987) (holding that, because of the FLSA’s remedial purpose, a retaliatory firing based on an employer’s belief that an employee had filed a complaint—even when he had not—was prohibited by § 215(a)(3)). Thus, we adopt the majority view by holding that the remedial purpose of the FLSA requires intracompany complaints to be considered protected activity within the meaning of its antiretaliation provision.
Supporting our conclusion is the Secretary of Labor and the EEOC’s consistent position that intracompany complaints are included within the meaning of “filed any complaint.” We afford agency interpretations that do not have the force of law, like agency manuals and litigation documents, respect to the extent that they possess the “power to persuade.” Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587, 120 S.Ct. 1655, 146 L.Ed.2d 621 (2000) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140, 65 S.Ct. 161, 89 L.Ed. 124 (1944)). Factors we consider when determining whether an agency interpretation has the power to persuade include “the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, [and] its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements.” Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140; see also Cunningham v. Scibana, 259 F.3d 303, 306–07 (4th Cir.2001).
Here, the EEOC has set forth the position that intracompany complaints constitute “fil[ing] any complaint” within the meaning of § 215(a)(3) in the compliance manual it issues to field offices. 2 EEOC Compliance Manual § 8–II(B) & 8–II(B) n. 12 (2006). In addition, both the Secretary and the EEOC have argued in litigation that intracompany complaints are covered by the FLSA’s antiretaliation provision. See, e.g., Br. for the Sec. of Labor and the EEOC as Amici Curiae at 26–30; Br. for the Sec. of Labor as Amicus Curiae, Kasten v. Saint–Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 570 F.3d 834 (7th Cir.2009) (No. 08–2820). Thus, although it is not determinative, because the Secretary and the EEOC have consistently advanced this reasonable and thoroughly considered position, it “add[s] force to our conclusion.” Kasten, 131 S.Ct. at 1335.
We conclude by emphasizing that our holding that intracompany complaints may constitute “fil[ing] any complaint” under § 215(a)(3) does not mean that every instance of an employee “letting off steam” to his employer constitutes protected activity. Kasten, 131 S.Ct. at 1334. To the contrary, “the statute requires fair notice” to employers. Id. To protect employers from unnecessary uncertainty, “some degree of formality” is required for an employee complaint to constitute protected activity, “certainly to the point where the recipient has been given fair notice that a grievance has been lodged and does, or should, reasonably understand that matter as part of its business concerns.” Id. Therefore, the proper standard for the district court to apply is the aforementioned test articulated in Kasten: whether Minor’s complaint to her employer was “sufficiently clear and detailed for a reasonable employer to understand it, in light of both content and context, as an assertion of rights protected by the statute and a call for their protection.” Id. at 1335.
Minor’s allegations here meet the standard we have articulated to the extent required to survive a motion to dismiss. The facts as alleged in her complaint indicate that Minor expressed her concerns regarding FLSA violations to the chief operating officer of her company in a meeting specifically called for that purpose. Minor also alleges that this executive-level employee agreed to investigate her claims. At this stage, these allegations are sufficient. We note again that we express no view as to whether Minor should ultimately prevail under the standard we have articulated. We simply hold that, on the facts alleged, her complaint survives a motion to dismiss.”
Click Minor v. Bostwick Laboratories, Inc. to read the entire published Opinion. Click Jafari v. Old Dominion Transit Management Co. to read the companion unpublished Opinion. Also of interest is the DOL/EEOC Amici Brief filed in Jafari.
2 New Decisions Regarding Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements in Context of FLSA Claims Reach Opposite Results
Recent weeks have brought more opinions regarding the issue of whether specific arbitration agreements are enforceable. However, as two recent opinions show, these decisions continue to be fact-specific in virtually all instances, and judge and/or state-law specific in others. In the first case, Carey v. 24 Hour Fitness USA Inc., relying on Texas state law, the Fifth Circuit affirmed a lower court’s decision holding that an arbitration agreement allowing the employer to unilaterally change the terms lacked the necessary consideration to render the agreement enforceable. In a second case, LaVoice v. UBS Financial Services, Inc., a court within the Southern District of New York examined a different arbitration-related issue- the substantive unconscionability of a collective action waiver- concluding that compelling a potentially high value FLSA claim to arbitration on an individual basis does not conflict with the substantive law regarding the FLSA’s collective action provisions. Significantly, the court’s conclusion in this regard appears to conflict with another recent holding discussed here, in which another court within the same district held that collective action waivers are unenforceable per se, because they prevent employees from vindicating their substantive statutory rights under the FLSA.
Carey v. 24 Hour Fitness USA Inc.
Law360 aptly summarized this decision as follows:
“The Fifth Circuit on Wednesday allowed a proposed overtime class action against 24 Hour Fitness USA Inc. to go forward, finding an arbitration agreement at issue contained an ‘escape hatch’ for the fitness chain that made it unenforceable.
In a unanimous, published opinion, the appeals court upheld a Texas federal court’s ruling that the arbitration agreement in 24 Hour Fitness’ employee handbook was illusory because it allowed the company to retroactively modify or terminate the agreement.
Because 24 Hour Fitness reserved the right to unilaterally adjust the conditions of employment — including those which required employees to arbitrate claims on an individual basis — the appeals court found that the arbitration agreement was invalid from the outset.
‘If a 24 Hour Fitness employee sought to invoke arbitration with the company pursuant to the agreement, nothing would prevent 24 Hour Fitness from changing the agreement and making those changes applicable to that pending dispute if it determined that arbitration was no longer in its interest,’ the panel said.
Click Carey v. 24 Hour Fitness USA Inc. to read the entire Fifth Circuit Opinion.
LaVoice v. UBS Financial Services, Inc.
In LaVoice, the court held that an arbitration agreement, requiring individual arbitration was enforceable, despite plaintiff’s argument that such an scheme would deprive plaintiff of substantive statutory rights to proceed collectively under the FLSA. Discussing the issue, the court reasoned:
“…LaVoice also argues that the arbitration agreements between him and UBS are unenforceable because they would preclude him from exercising his statutory rights. To support this position, LaVoice likens the class waivers in the instant case with those that were found unenforceable in the Amex line of cases. LaVoice also draws comparison between his circumstances and those of the plaintiff in Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP, 768 F.Supp.2d 547 (S.D.N.Y.2011).
The enforceability of a class action waiver in an arbitration agreement must be considered on a case-by-case basis “on its own merits, governed with a healthy regard for the fact that the FAA is a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.” Amex II, 634 F.3d at 199. Turning to the class waiver at issue and LaVoice’s specific circumstances, this Court finds that the “practical effect of enforcement of the waiver” in the instant case would not “preclude” LaVoice from exercising his rights under the statutes. Id. at 196. The Court comes to its finding that LaVoice’s statutory rights will not be precluded by enforcement of the class waiver after reviewing his submissions regarding: his estimated damages claim, his estimated attorneys’ fees, his estimated expert fees, his disinclination to pursue his claims individually, his counsel’s disinclination to pursue the claims individually, and his likelihood of success at arbitration.
Although LaVoice and Defendants contest the value of LaVoice’s overtime claim, in reaching its decision, the Court accepts the figure cited in LaVoice’s own opposition papers of overtime claims between $127,000 to $132,000. Aff. Jeffrey G. Smith in Supp. of Opp’n. to Mot. to Compel Arbitration at ¶ 5. Assuming this self-reported value of claims, the Court finds that LaVoice’s circumstances differ drastically on their face from those of the plaintiffs in either the Amex line of cases or Sutherland. Plaintiffs in those cases could each only claim de minimus damages of less than $6000.
With respect to the estimated attorneys’ fees, the Court finds that, unlike the arbitration agreement at issue in Sutherland, the arbitration agreements at issue in the instant case would permit LaVoice to recover an award of attorneys’ fees. Since the agreements authorize the arbitrator(s) to “award whatever remedies would be available to the parties in a court of law” and awards of attorneys’ fees are mandatory for the prevailing party under the FLSA, the agreements themselves crate no impediment to LaVoice’s recovery of fees. See Ex. 6 to Decl. of Matthew Levitan at 20; Ex. 10 to Decl. of Matthew Levitan at 3; and 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (“The court in such action shall … allow a reasonable attorney’s fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the action.”) The instant case is therefore distinguishable from Sutherland and its consideration of attorneys’ fees in determining whether plaintiff’s claims were unarbitrable. See also Banus v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., No. 09–7128, 2010 WL 1643780, at *10 n. 61 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.23, 2010) (enforcing class action waiver in arbitration agreement where plaintiff’s estimated recovery was $45,675.36 and attorney’s fees would be “at least $100,000.”)
The court also evaluated and rejected plaintiff’s claim that expert costs to be incurred would be prohibitive in an individual claim, whereas spreading the cost over a collective group would be more palatable and rejected same, in the context of plaintiff’s proffered argument that his counsel would be disinclined to pursue his claims on an individual basis by themselves.
The court concluded, “[i]n light of the foregoing, the Court finds that LaVoice has not met his “burden of showing the likelihood of incurring” such “prohibitively expensive” costs such that the class waiver provisions in the instant action would preclude him from bringing his claims against Defendants in an individual or collective capacity. Amex II, 634 F.3d at 197 (citing Randolph, 531 U.S. at 92.)”
Click LaVoice v. UBS Financial Services, Inc. to read the entire Memorandum and Order compelling the case to arbitration on an individual basis.
As more and more cases are decided following recent United States Supreme Court jurisprudence on arbitrability and class waiver issues, it’s becoming more and more clear that the results are very fact-specific to each case. Hopefully, higher courts will begin to weigh in on some of the broader issues and give some clarity in the near future.
N.D.Cal.: Life Insurance Broker Not a “Retail or Service Establishment;” 7(i) Retail Sales Exemption Inapplicable
Burden v. SelectQuote Ins. Services
This case was before the court on the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. As discussed here, Defendant, a life insurance agency, argued that plaintiffs, its life insurance brokers, were exempt from the FLSA’s overtime provisions pursuant to the so-called retail sales exemption. While the court held that defendant could make out 2 of the 3 elements required for application of the exemption, ultimately it held that the exemption was inapplicable because defendant lacked a retail concept.
Pursuant to Section 7(i), certain employees are exempt from the FLSA’s overtime provisions if three conditions must be met: (1) the employee must be employed by a retail or service establishment; (2) the employee’s regular rate of pay must exceed one and one-half times the applicable minimum wage for every hour worked in a workweek in which overtime hours are worked; and (3) more than half the employee’s total earnings in a representative period must consist of commissions. Here, the court held that the defendant could not satisfy element (1) and therefore the exemption did not apply.
Analyzing the issue, the court reasoned:
“Section 779.317 expressly identifies “insurance” as being among the “list of establishments to which the retail concept does not apply.” 29 C.F.R. § 779.317 (identifying: “Brokers, custom house; freight brokers; insurance brokers, stock or commodity brokers” and “Insurance; mutual, stock and fraternal benefit, including insurance brokers, agents, and claims adjustment offices.”) (emphasis added). SelectQuote acknowledges that “[i]nsurance” and “insurance brokers” are expressly identified in § 779.317, but nonetheless asserts that § 779.317 is inapposite because it is operating a “new type of business” that is “not covered by the Insurance Industry exclusion from the ‘retail concept’ in the FLSA regulations.” Mot. at 18.
As support for its position, SelectQuote relies principally on two out-of-circuit cases, which ostensibly concluded that a business lacking a retail concept under § 779.317 may nonetheless qualify for the retail or service exemption. Mot. at 18–19. In Hodgson v. Centralized Servs., Inc., 457 F.2d 824 (4th Cir.1972), the court held that an income tax preparation service qualified as a retail or service establishment under the FLSA, notwithstanding a prior DOL interpretation stating that “accounting firms” lacked the retail concept. Id., 457 F.2d at 827. In reaching its decision, the court noted that the DOL’S pre–1949 exclusion of “accounting firms” should not “arbitrarily embrace the unsophisticated business activities of the defendants in an area of service which came into being and had developed throughout the country only during the past decade.” Id.
In Selz v. Investools, Inc., No. 2:09–CV–1042 TS, 2011 WL 285801 (D.Utah Jan.27, 2011), the court ruled that a company that marketed products and services to educate individuals on how to personally invest in exchange markets online and aid them in doing so did not qualify as one of the specific establishments exempt from the retail exception. While noting that that § 779.317 specifies that educational institutions, finance companies and investment counseling firms lack a retail concept, the employer, “as a marketer of materials that teach and aid individuals to do their own financial investing, does not fit into the traditional concept of an educational institution, such as a for-profit university; a finance company, such as a bank; or an investment counseling firm.” Id. at *6 (emphasis added). The court concluded that “marketing tools to aid individuals in independently investing personal funds is its own industry” and therefore § 779.317 was not a bar to the FLSA exemption afforded under 29 U.S.C. § 317(i). Id .
SelectQuote claims that like the businesses in Hodgson and Selz, it too has developed a business model that is not encompassed in § 779.317. According to SelectQuote, its direct marketing approach “turned the life insurance industry on its head” by having its agents contact prospective customers by telephone instead of in person-more like the independent broker model traditionally existing in the property and casualty insurance business. Mot. at 2. In SelectQuote’s words, “One of the old adages in the insurance industry before 1985 was that property and casualty insurance was bought and life insurance was sold. SelectQuote’s insight was to change that paradigm so that life insurance too could just be bought by the average consumer.” Id.
SelectQuote’s self-aggrandizing arguments for avoiding the preclusive effect of § 779.317 are unavailing. In both Hodgson and Selz, the type of businesses operated by the defendants did not previously exist. In Hodgson, the court noted that the defendant’s tax preparation service had then only come into existence within a relatively recent period of time. 457 F.2d at 827. Likewise, in Selz, the court focused on the fact that the defendant’s business of selling do-it-yourself investment materials did not fall under the rubric of a bank, finance company or educational institution. 2011 WL 285801, at *6. In contrast, SelectQuote’s business bears none of the hallmarks of a new type of business establishment. Although SelectQuote has changed the method by which an agent sells life insurance—namely, directly by telephone instead of face-to-face—the fact remains that SelectQuote is still selling life insurance.
Moreover, SelectQuote’s own statements purporting to explain why its business supposedly is so revolutionary underscores the logical flaws in its argument. Section 779.317 identifies “Insurance” and “insurance brokers”—not “life insurance” or “term life insurance”—as establishments lacking a retail concept. See 29 C.F.R. § 779.317. Ironically, what SelectQuote claims to be “new” is not new at all; rather, as SelectQuote itself acknowledges, it simply is employing direct marketing methods that have long been used in the property and casualty insurance business. Singh Decl. ¶ 5. In other words, SelectQuote has made life insurance sales more like the traditional insurance brokerages, which clearly are within the scope of § 779.317. In Hodgson and Selz, the defendants changed a specifically-listed industry so fundamentally as to distinguish it from an industry listed in section 779.317. See Selz, 2011 WL 285801, at *6; Hodgson, 457 F.2d at 827. The logic of those cases does not apply in cases such as the present, where a company simply has changed its business to be more like a business which indisputably falls within the scope of § 779.317. For these reasons, the Court finds that SelectQuote falls within the insurance brokerage industry that section 779.317 finds to lack the requisite retail concept to qualify for an exemption from the FLSA’s overtime requirements.
As an alternative matter, SelectQuote argues that the Court should decline to apply § 779.317 on the ground that it lacks a rational basis for concluding that insurance establishments are not exempt as a retail or service establishment. Mot. at 20–22. According to SelectQuote, “[s]ection 779.317 is an ‘antiquated interpretation’ that does not take into account the fundamental changes over the past four decades regarding what is considered a ‘retail or service establishment,’ and it should not preclude SelectQuote from applying the section 7(i) exemption to Burden.” Id. at 22.
To support its position, SelectQuote points to cases where courts have declined to defer to the DOL’s list of non-retail establishments set forth in § 779.317 where there is no discernable rational basis for the DOL’s determination that type of business lacks a retail concept. See Martin v. The Refrigeration Sch., Inc. ., 968 F.2d 3 (9th Cir.1992) (holding that there was no rational basis for § 779.317‘s distinction that “[s]chools (except schools for mentally or physically handicapped or gifted children)” lack a retail concept); Reich v. Cruises Only, Inc., 1997 WL 1507504, at *5 (M.D.Fla. June 5, 1997) (finding that there was no rational basis for the DOL’s inclusion of “[t]ravel agencies” as establishments lacking a retail concept). However, these cases are distinguishable in that they did not involve the insurance industry. Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that the inclusion of financial companies, including insurance establishments, in § 779.317 is proper. See Mitchell, 359 U.S. at 290–91.
In light of the above, the Court finds that § 779.317 is a persuasive embodiment of the Department of Labor’s “body of experience and informed judgment.” See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. The Court further finds that SelectQuote has not shown “plainly and unmistakably” that Burden’s exemption was within the “terms and spirit” of the FLSA. See Arnold, 361 U.S. at 392. As an insurance broker, SelectQuote is not a “retail or service establishment” and thus is not exempt from the FLSA’s overtime requirements. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(a); 29 C.F.R. § 779.317. Therefore, SelectQuote is not entitled to summary judgment of Burden’s second cause of action. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).”
Click Burden v. SelectQuote Ins. Servicesto read the entire Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. For further information on the the 7(i) exemption generally, see DOL Fact Sheet #20: Employees Paid Commissions By Retail Establishments Who Are Exempt Under Section 7(i) From Overtime Under The FLSA.
S.D.Fla.: Defendants Did Not Moot FLSA Case By Tender of Unpaid Wages and Liquidated Damages Without Attorneys Fees and Costs
Diaz v. Jaguar Restaurant Group, LLC
In the first post-Dionne II case, a court in the Southern District has denied an FLSA defendants’ motion to dismiss based on tender of unpaid wages and liquidated damages, absent payment of attorneys fees and costs. The bizarre procedural history involved the defendants “tender” of wages and liquidated damages, only after prevailing at trial, and reversal at the Eleventh Circuit due to the trial court’s order permitting the defendants to amend their answer to assert a previously unpled exemption during the trial.
The Order reads in part:
“To a great extent, the pending motion to dismiss has now been rendered moot by the Eleventh Circuit’s substitute opinion entered in the case of Dionne v. Floormasters Enterprises, Inc., No. 09-15405 (11th Cir. Jan. 13, 2012), which clarified that the Court’s opinion in that case is limited to its very narrow facts and, specifically, requires a concession of mootness and does not apply to the tender of full payment of amounts claimed by the employee in a FLSA case before trial or after judgment. The pending motion is based entirely upon a proposed extension of the Court’s now-withdrawn original opinion. Moreover, other cases that considered the issues raised here rejected attempts to expand the scope of the original opinion. See, e.g., Tapia v. Florida Cleanex, Inc., No. 09-21569 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 12, 2011) (Ungaro, J., D.E. 67, collecting cases). Judge Ungaro’s opinion has now been sustained by the Eleventh Circuit on rehearing. And, even under the original panel opinion, the Court could not possibly find that Defendant’s unilateral actions taken after a trial and an appeal rendered Plaintiff’s claim for damages and attorneys’ fees moot. But, in any event, the entire issue is now moot for purposes of this case.”
Click Diaz v Jaguar Restaurant Group, LLC to read the entire Order (contained in the Docket Sheet for the case at Docket Entry 108).
Thanks to Rex Burch for the head’s up on this Order.
D.Minn.: Where Agreement Silent As to Collective Action, Case May Proceed on Collective Basis in Arbitration
Mork v. Loram Maintenance of Way, Inc.
This case was before the court on the defendant’s motion to compel arbitration on an individual basis. While, the parties were in agreement that the case should be remanded to arbitration, the salient issue before the court was whether the arbitration agreement- silent on the issue of collective/class proceedings- allowed for collective treatment of the case. The court held that the parties had agreed to collective treatment of claims by the agreement’s silence. Thus, the case was remanded to arbitration, but to be treated as a collective action.
Initially the court held that, based on the absence of clear authority one way or another from the Supreme Court, the court had the authority to decide whether the case could proceed on a collective basis. Having made this decision, it proceeded into its analysis.
Discussing the standard it would apply, the court explained:
“The scope of an arbitration agreement is determined with reference to the agreement of the parties as evidenced by the terms of “the arbitration agreement itself or [based on] some background principle of contract law that would affect its interpretation.” See AT & T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1750 (2011). The Court must “give effect to the contractual rights and expectations of the parties.” Stolt–Nielsen, 130 S.Ct. at 1774 (citation omitted); see Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler–Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985) (“as with any other contract, the parties’ intentions control”). Imposition of a particular type of arbitration cannot be based solely “on policy judgments.” Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. at 1750. Like any contract dispute, however, ambiguities in the agreement must be construed against the drafter. See, e.g., Advantage Consulting Group, Ltd. v. ADT Sec. Sys., Inc., 306 F.3d 582, 588 (8th Cir.2002).
In facing the question of whether to compel collective versus individual arbitration, the Court must therefore determine what the parties agreed to in the Arbitration Clause. A mere agreement to arbitrate, without more, does not imply agreement to collective arbitration. Cf. Stolt–Nielsen, 130 S.Ct. at 1775. This approach is consistent with Eighth Circuit precedent in the context of class arbitrations, Dominium Austin Partners, L.L.C. v. Emerson, 248 F.3d 720, 728–29 (8th Cir.2001), and consolidation of individual arbitrations, Baesler v. Cont’l Grain Co., 900 F.2d 1193, 1195 (8th Cir.1990). In Emerson and Baesler, the Eighth Circuit held that an arbitration agreement must provide for the type of arbitration which is sought to be compelled by the Court.
Loram urges a restrictive reading of Baesler, Emerson, and Stolt–Nielsen which would require explicit reference to, and acceptance of, collective arbitration in order for Mork’s claim to proceed on a collective basis. Those cases do not stand for such a strict standard. In Stolt–Nielsen, the Supreme Court’s statement that an intention to authorize class arbitration cannot be “infer[red] solely from the fact of the parties’ agreement to arbitrate,” Stolt–Nielsen, 130 S.Ct. at 1775 (emphasis added), indicates that such an intention may be inferred and need not be explicitly stated. The majority in Stolt–Nielsen therefore “[did] not insist on express consent to class arbitration.” Id. at 1783 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Accordingly, “Stolt–Nielsen does not foreclose the possibility that parties may reach an ‘implicit’—rather than express—‘agreement to authorize class-action arbitration.’ “ Jock v. Sterling Jewelers Inc., 646 F.3d 113, 123 (2d Cir.2011); see Jones v. St. Paul Cos ., Inc., 495 F.3d 888, 893 (8th Cir.2007) (“[F]ederal courts are bound by the Supreme Court’s considered dicta almost as firmly as by the Court’s outright holdings, particularly when … [the dicta] is of recent vintage and not enfeebled by any [later] statement.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
In sum, the question before the Court is not whether the Arbitration Clause used the precise words “collective arbitration.” Rather, the Court must determine whether the Arbitration Clause evinces sufficient indicia of agreement between the parties that a claim within its scope may proceed on a collective basis. In doing so, the Court must keep in mind that Loram drafted the language of the Arbitration Clause and, therefore, that ambiguities must be construed against it. Advantage Consulting, 306 F.3d at 588.
The Court notes that the test from Stolt–Nielsen stated here may be more stringent that the appropriate test for contracts of adhesion. See Stolt–Nielsen, 130 S.Ct. at 1783 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court apparently spares from its affirmative-authorization requirement contracts of adhesion presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.”). Because the Court concludes that the Arbitration Clause does affirmatively authorize collective arbitration, there is no need to address whether the CAA was a contract of adhesion and therefore subject to a less stringent standard. The Court notes, however, that the parties here, unlike those in Stolt–Nielsen, are not both “sophisticated business entities” with comparable bargaining power, see id. at 1775, and the CAA appears to have been a “take-it-or-leave-it” boilerplate contract.”
The court then applied its standard and held that the silence of the parties on the collective issue demonstrated the indicia that the parties agreed to collective arbitration:
“While the parties distinguish between “express” and “implied” agreement to collective arbitration, as discussed above, the relevant question is whether there exists sufficient indicia that the parties agreed to undertake collective arbitration in the event of an employment dispute. While the Arbitration Clause does not refer explicitly to collective claims, the Court concludes that it does authorize such claims to proceed before an arbitrator.
To begin, the Arbitration Clause applies to “claims or disputes of any nature arising out of or relating to the employment relationship” and “statutory claims … arising out of or resulting from [Mork’s] employment with Loram.” (CAA ¶ 8 (emphasis added).) Mork’s claim that he and similarly situated coworkers were deprived of overtime pay is undisputedly related to “the employment relationship” and his FLSA claim is “statutory.” An action arising from FLSA violations “may be maintained against any employer … in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction by any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated.” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (emphasis added). Thus, Mork has a statutory right to bring a FLSA claim on behalf of himself and similarly situated Field Application Technicians, and such a claim arises out of his employment relationship with Loram.
Loram contends that Mork’s ability to bring a claim on behalf of similarly situated employees is foreclosed because the Arbitration Clause’s references to potential arbitral parties include only Loram and Mork. For example, the Arbitration Clause provides that the arbitrator will have “exclusive authority to resolve any dispute or claim relating to, arising out of, or resulting from my employment with Loram” and the “statutory claims” covered by the Arbitration Clause are those “arising out of or resulting from my employment with Loram or the formation or the termination of my employment with Loram.” (CAA ¶ 8 (emphasis added).) These statements, Loram argues, show that the Arbitration Clause does not authorize collective arbitrations.
The Court is not persuaded that the Arbitration Clause’s particular reference to disputes between Mork and Loram must be read to preclude a collective claim. Mork’s FLSA claim is no less a claim “arising out of [his] employment with Loram” because it implicates similarly situated employees. The FLSA claim remains “his.” Viewed in even the most charitable light, Loram’s argument only creates some amount of ambiguity in the Arbitration Clause—ambiguity that must be resolved in Mork’s favor. Advantage Consulting, 306 F.3d at 588.
The conclusion that the Arbitration Clause permits collective arbitration is also supported by the contrast between its broad delegation of “any claims and disputes” to arbitration and its exclusion of only “claims or disputes [arising out of the CAA], or the breach, termination or invalidity thereof.” (CAA ¶ 8.) By negative implication, collective arbitration—a type of arbitration not expressly excluded—can be presumed to be covered by the wide ranging terms of the Arbitration Clause, particularly in light of the factors already discussed.
The Court further notes that the Arbitration Clause provides that arbitration be conducted in accordance with model rules provided by the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) “in force at the time of the claim or dispute” and that the AAA “shall administer any such arbitration.” (CAA ¶ 8.) The AAA’s “Policy on Class Arbitrations” states that the AAA will “administer demands for class arbitration … if (1) the underlying agreement specifies that disputes arising out of the parties’ agreement shall be resolved by arbitration in accordance with any of the Association’s rules, and (2) the agreement is silent with respect to class claims, consolidation or joinder of claims.” See American Arbitration Association, Policy on Class Arbitrations, July 14, 2005, available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=25967. Even as interpreted by Loram, the Arbitration Clause in this case satisfies both criteria.
While this AAA policy was promulgated after the execution of the Arbitration Clause, the parties here agreed to be bound by the AAA rules in force “at the time of the claim or dispute.” (CAA ¶ 8.) The parties thus intended to be bound by future iterations of those rules. Loram’s decision to follow and abide by AAA rules therefore lends further support to the Court’s conclusion that the Arbitration Clause authorizes collective arbitration.
It is important to note that Mork has not moved the Court to consolidate otherwise independent actions into a single proceeding as was the case in Baesler, 900 F.3d at 1194–95. Rather, Mork seeks to proceed with a single, statutorily prescribed collective claim. Consolidation is a method by which a Court may efficiently resolve otherwise legally independent claims which happen to share a common question of law or fact. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 42(a). A FLSA collective action, in contrast, is a mechanism in which one claim can vindicate the rights of many. If Mork were seeking consolidated treatment of independent claims brought by employees, the Court would hesitate in considering those claims as “arising out of or resulting from [Mork’s] employment with Loram.” (See CAA ¶ 8.)
The Court also notes that some of the concerns raised by the Supreme Court about class arbitration are not present in the sort of collective arbitration sought by Mork. For one, a FLSA collective action is unlike a class action under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because similarly situated employees must always “opt-in” to a FLSA action. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Worries about an arbitrator “adjudicat[ing] the rights of absent parties” without affording them the full panoply of protections provided in court are therefore greatly diminished. See Stolt–Nielsen, 130 S.Ct. at 1776.
Finally, while fully cognizant that policy judgments may not be dispositive in this legal analysis, see Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. at 1750, the Court would be remiss if it did not briefly address the consequences of adopting a rule that an arbitration agreement cannot allow for collective or class arbitration except where the agreement explicitly uses and ratifies those precise terms. Such a rule would lead to great uncertainty, calling into question the countless arbitration agreements that have been executed in the shadow of a less stringent rule. Moreover, the adoption of such a rule would likely prevent the vindication of workers’ basic rights under the FLSA. See Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP, 768 F.Supp.2d 547, 553–54 (S.D.N.Y.2011).”
Click Mork v. Loram Maintenance of Way, Inc. to read the entire Memorandum of Law and Order.
11th Cir.: Following Tender of Unpaid Wages and Liquidated Damages, an Employer Only Moots a Case if the Plaintiff Agrees to Dismissal, Absent Payment of Mandatory Fees and Costs
Dionne v. Floormasters Enterprises, Inc.
Following a controversial opinion that created more questions than it answered, the Eleventh Circuit reconsidered it’s prior Opinion in this case and in so doing largely restricted its holding to the unique facts presented in the case. Previously the Court had held that an employer, who denies liability for nonpayment for overtime work, need not pay attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) if the employer tenders the full amount of overtime pay claimed by an employee, and moves to dismiss on mootness grounds where the employee concedes that “the claim for overtime should be dismissed as moot. Although the prior Opinion seemed restricted to these unique facts where the employee conceded that the overtime claim should be dismissed (but attempted to reserve as to fees/costs), courts throughout the Eleventh have since expanded the holding to scenarios where the employee makes no such stipulation. Here, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the prior decision, but clarified and limited its applicability.
Significantly, the Eleventh Circuit included the following footnote in its new Opinion:
“Our decision in this matter addresses a very narrow question: whether an employee who conceded that his claim should be dismissed before trial as moot, when the full amount of back pay was tendered, was a prevailing party entitled to statutory attorney’s fees under § 216(b). It should not be construed as authorizing the denial of attorney’s fees, requested by an employee, solely because an employer tendered the full amount of back pay owing to an employee, prior to the time a jury has returned its verdict, or the trial court has entered judgment on the merits of the claim.”
It remains to be seen exactly how the new Dionne Opinion will be applied by trial courts, but it does appear that much of the uncertainty created by the initial Opinion has now been resolved. To that end, it appears that a Plaintiff who has suffered a theft of his or her wages can now safely accept tender of such wages (and liquidated damages) in response to a lawsuit to collect same, without fear that the employer can avoid payment of mandatory fees and costs, as long as they do not agree that the tender moots the case.
Click Dionne v. Floormasters Enterprises, Inc. to read the entire Opinion on Petition for Rehearing.
C.D.Cal.: Where Defendant’s Rounding Policy Was Facially Neutral No FLSA Violation
Alonzo v. Maximus, Inc.
In this case, brought under the FLSA and California State laws, plaintiffs alleged a variety of wage and hour violations, including failure to include all appropriate compensation when calculating regular rates (and resulting overtime premiums), unpaid off-the-clock work and impermissible rounding of work-time. Following discovery, the case was before the court on defendant’s motion for summary judgment. As discussed here, the court granted defendant’s motion with regard to plaintiffs’ rounding claim, because the evidence demonstrated that the rounding was facially neutral and did not have the overall effect of reducing plaintiffs’ reported time and resulting wages.
Significant to the rounding claim, it was undisputed that defendant’s timekeeping policy required plaintiffs to round their time worked to the nearest quarter of an hour (whether higher or lower) and that plaintiffs self-reported and thus self-rounded their reported time each day/week.
Discussing the rounding issue the court reasoned:
“Defendant moves for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ Rounding Claim on the basis that Defendant’s time rounding policy is facially neutral, and, therefore, permissible under California law. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED.
While no California statute or regulation expressly addresses the permissibility of using a rounding policy to calculate employee work time, the United States Department of Labor has adopted a regulation regarding rounding pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act (the “FLSA”) that permits employers to use time rounding policies under certain circumstances:
It has been found that in some industries, particularly where time clocks are used, there has been the practice for many years of recording the employees’ starting time and stopping time to the nearest 5 minutes, or to the nearest one-tenth or quarter of an hour. Presumably, this arrangement averages out so that the employees are fully compensated for all the time they actually work. For enforcement purposes this practice of computing working time will be accepted, provided that it is used in such a manner that it will not result, over a period of time, in failure to compensate the employees properly for all the time they have actually worked. 29 C.F.R. § 785.48(b) (2011).
While few Courts have interpreted this regulation, those that have recognize that the regulation permits employers to use a rounding policy for recording and compensating employee time as long as the employer’s rounding policy does not “consistently result[ ] in a failure to pay employees for time worked.” See, e.g., Sloan v. Renzenberger, Inc., No. 10–2508–CM–JPO, 2011 WL 1457368, at *3 (D.Kan. Apr.15, 2011).
That is, an employer’s rounding practices comply with § 785.48(b) if the employer applies a consistent rounding policy that, on average, favors neither overpayment nor underpayment. East v. Bullock’s, Inc., 34 F.Supp.2d 1176, 1184 (D.Ariz.1998) (granting summary judgment in employer’s favor where “evidence show[ed] that [employer’s] rounding system may not credit employees for all the time actually worked, but it also credits employees for time not actually worked” so that the employer’s “rounding practices average[d] out sufficiently to comply with § 785.48(b)”); see also Adair v. Wis. Bell, Inc., No. 08–C–280, 2008 WL 4224360, at *11 (E.D.Wis. Sept.11, 2008) (approving policy where there was no evidence to suggest it systematically favored employer); Contini v. United Trophy Mfg., No. 6:06–cv–432–Orl–18UAM, 2007 WL 1696030, at *3 (M.D.Fla. June 12, 2007) (granting employer’s motion for summary judgment where the “[employer], throughout [the employee’s] employment, [used] a consistent policy as to the rounding of clocking-in and clocking-out, which [was] both fair and evenly applied to all employees.”).
An employer’s rounding practices violate § 785.48(b) if they systematically undercompensate employees. See, e.g., Russell v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 721 F.Supp.2d 804, 820 (N.D.Ill.2010) (time rounding and log-out policies may violate FLSA if they “cause[ ] plaintiffs to work unpaid overtime”); Austin v. Amazon .com, Inc., No. C09–1679JLR, 2010 WL 1875811, at *3 (W.D.Wash. May 10, 2010) (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss where policy “allows rounding when it benefits the employer without disciplining the employee; but disciplines the employee when the rounding does not work to the employer’s advantage”); Eyles v. Uline, Inc., No. 4:08–CV–577–A, 2009 WL 2868447, at *4 (N.D.Tex. Sept.4, 2009) (granting summary judgment for plaintiff where defendant’s rounding policy “encompasses only rounding down”); Chao v. Self Pride, Inc., No. Civ. RDB 03–3409, 2005 WL 1400740, at *6 (D.Md. June 14, 2005) (ruling that employer’s practice of rounding employee time down violated FLSA).
The parties concede that the federal standard governs this case, as California courts look to federal regulations under the FLSA for guidance in the absence of controlling or conflicting California law, Huntington Mem’l Hosp. v. Superior Court, 131 Cal.App.4th 893, 903, 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 373 (2005), and the California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (the “DLSE”) has adopted the Department of Labor regulation in its Enforcement Policies and Interpretation Manual (“DLSE Manual”), DLSE Manual §§ 47.1–47.2.
It is undisputed that Defendant employed a facially neutral time rounding policy. Defendant’s Corporate Employee Manual required employees to self-report their time “on a daily basis by recording hours worked to the nearest quarter hour” on timesheets provided at the beginning of the pay period. (Doc. 127–13, Ex. R at 110; id., Ex. S at 127.) And Defendant’s human resources managers testified that Employment Case Managers in each of Defendant’s San Diego, Orange County, and Los Angeles locations adhered to this policy by rounding their hours worked to the nearest quarter hour and entering that figure on a daily basis into an electronic time sheet on Defendant’s computer system. (Doc. 127–17 ¶ 5 (San Diego); Doc. 130–15 ¶ 5 (Orange County); Doc. 130–14 ¶ 5 (Los Angeles).)
Plaintiffs do not dispute the mechanics of Defendant’s time reporting policy. In fact, their expert acknowledges that “class members were required to and did round [the total hours worked] to the nearest quarter hour” on their self-reported time sheets. (Doc. 126–5 ¶ 12.) Rather, Plaintiffs contend that “[o]ver a period of time, such rounding resulted in putative class members being paid for less than all the time they actually worked” in violation of § 785.48. (Doc. 126–5 ¶ 12.)
In support of their contention, Plaintiffs point to records generated at Defendant’s San Diego locations by an electronic system used to record when employees entered and exited Defendant’s offices (the “Simplex System”). The Simplex System was “essentially the electronic equivalent of a sign in/sign out sheet. An employee could punch in their number when they arrived at the workplace and then punch in the number when they left the workplace.” (Doc. 127–17 ¶ 6.; see also Doc. 136–2, Ex. A. 52:9–22.) Based on those entries, the Simplex System generated reports “in a variety of formats [showing] various clock-in and clock-out times for each employee for each date” (the “Simplex Records”). (Doc. 127–18 ¶ 16.) At least some employees also used the Simplex System to record the beginning and end of their lunch breaks. (Doc. 136–2, Ex. A. at 54:8–13.)
Plaintiffs used a sample of these Simplex Records to perform two statistical analyses. In the first, Plaintiffs compared the clock-in/clock-out times recorded by Simplex on a particular day with shift beginning and end times for that day. Plaintiffs conclude that their analysis shows that the number of minutes that would have been subtracted from employees’ time under Defendant’s rounding policy was 5.4% more than the number of minutes that would have been added to their time under Defendant’s rounding policy. (Doc. 129–4 ¶ 5; Doc. 127–18 ¶ 19.) In the second, Plaintiffs compared the total hours reflected on Simplex Records for a given employee on a particular day with the total amount paid to that employee reflected on his or her timesheets. Plaintiffs conclude that analysis reveals a net underpayment of 472.72 minutes for the sample group. (Doc. 129–4 ¶ 8.) Based on these statistical comparisons, Plaintiffs assert a triable issue of fact as to whether Defendant’s rounding policy is invalid under California law because it “result[ed], over a period of time, in failure to compensate the employees properly for all the time they have actually worked.” 29 C.F.R. § 785.48(b). Plaintiffs are mistaken.
Even assuming the accuracy of Plaintiffs’ mathematical calculations, which Defendant disputes, Plaintiffs’ statistical analysis of Simplex Records does not create a genuine issue of material fact as to their Rounding Claim. At oral argument, Plaintiffs’ counsel conceded that the evidentiary record is devoid of evidence that Simplex Records reflect time actually worked by Plaintiffs, as opposed to time Plaintiffs may have been present on Defendant’s premises but not engaged in work activities. Rather, Plaintiffs’ counsel clarified that the Rounding Claim is based on Plaintiffs’ contention that all on-premises time reflected by Defendant’s Simplex Records constitutes time during which Plaintiffs were subject to Defendant’s control, and, therefore, compensable as a matter of law under the California Supreme Court’s decision in Morillion v. Royal Packing Co., 22 Cal.4th 575, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 3, 995 P.2d 139 (2000). The Court disagrees with Plaintiffs’ reading of Morillion.
In Morillion, the California Supreme Court considered whether employees who were required by their employer to travel to a work site on the employer’s buses were “subject to the control of [the] employer” such that their travel time constituted compensable “hours worked” under Industrial Welfare Commission wage order No. 14–80. Id. at 578. The Court concluded that the employees were “subject to the control of [their] employer” during the time they traveled to the employer’s work site because the employer “require[d] plaintiffs to meet at the departure points at a certain time to ride its buses to work,” “prohibited them from using their own cars,” and “subject[ed] them to verbal warnings and lost wages if they [did not use the employer’s transportation].” Id. at 587. Accordingly, the employees’ compulsory travel time constituted compensable “hours worked.” Id. at 594. In so ruling, however, the Court clarified that:
[E]mployers do not risk paying employees for their travel time merely by providing them with transportation. Time employees spend traveling on transportation that an employer provides but does not require its employees to use may not be compensable as ‘hours worked .’ Instead, by requiring employees to take certain transportation to a work site, employers thereby subject those employees to its control by determining when, where, and how they are to travel. Id. at 588 (emphasis added). “The level of the employer’s control over its employees, rather than the mere fact that the employer requires the employee’s activity, is determinative.” Id . at 587.
This case does not present a situation in which Plaintiffs were “subject to the control of [Defendant]” such that all time spent on Defendant’s premises is compensable under the reasoning and holding of Morillion. Here, unlike in Morillion, Plaintiffs have presented no evidence that Defendant required them to arrive at its offices before their shifts began or to remain on the premises after their shifts ended. Nor have they presented evidence that Plaintiffs were engaged in work during any of the on-premises time reflected on their Simplex Records that was not accounted for in their electronic time sheets. In the absence of such evidence, the Simplex Records are simply immaterial to whether Defendant’s rounding policy systematically undercompensated Plaintiffs, and, therefore do not create a genuine issue of material fact as to the legality of Defendant’s rounding policy.
Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED as to Plaintiffs’ Rounding Claim.”
Click Alonzo v. Maximus, Inc. to read the entire Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment.
S.D.Ohio: 21 Late Opt-ins May Be Properly Added Despite Lack of Good Cause Showing
Heaps v. Safelite Solutions, LLC
This case was before the court on the defendant’s motion to strike the consents of opt-in plaintiffs filed after the court-imposed deadline (45 days from mailing of notice), and plaintiff’s cross-motion for order allowing late opt–ins. Citing judicial economy and the remedial principles underlying the FLSA, the court denied the defendant’s motion to strike and granted plaintiff’s cross-motion, allowing the opt-in plaintiffs to remain in the case. Significantly, the court granted plaintiff’s motion without requiring a showing of good cause as to why the opt-ins filed their consents up to 2 months beyond the deadline imposed by the court.
Permitting the late opt-ins to remain in the case, the court reasoned:
“The FLSA provides the procedure for potential plaintiffs to opt-in to a collective action but does not specify when the potential plaintiff must opt-in. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(b), 255, 256. Consequently, deadlines to opt-in are established by the trial court. The FLSA also does not “provide a standard under which a court should consider whether to include opt-in plaintiffs whose consent forms are filed after the court-imposed deadline has passed.” Ruggles v. Wellpoint, Inc., 687 F.Supp.2d 30, 37 (N.D.N.Y.2009).
Although the caselaw on this issue is wide-ranging, courts have generally decided the question by balancing various combinations of the following factors: (1) whether ‘good cause’ exists for the late submissions; (2) prejudice to the defendant; (3) how long after the deadline passed the consent forms were filed; (4) judicial economy; and (5) the remedial purposes of the FLSA. Id. (citing Ayers v. SGS Control Servs., Inc., 2007 WL 3171342, at *4–5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.9, 2007) (requiring that late opt-in plaintiffs show good cause for their untimely consent filings), Robinson–Smith v. Gov’t Empl. Ins. Co., 424 F.Supp.2d 117, 123–24 (D.D.C.2006) (considering the potential prejudice to the defendant and the purposes of the FLSA), Raper v. State of Iowa, 165 F.R.D. 89, 92 (S.D.Iowa 1996) (considering potential prejudice to the defendant and judicial economy), Monroe v. United Air Lines, Inc., 94 F.R.D. 304, 305 (N.D.Ill.1982) (considering how long after the deadline the consent forms were filed); but see Reyes v. Texas Ezpawn, L.P., 459 F.Supp.2d 546, 566–67 (S.D.Tex.2006) (dismissing plaintiffs who filed consent forms after the opt-in period without any discussion of the above factors)).
Balancing all of the above factors, the Court finds that the 21 opt-in plaintiffs may be properly added despite their failure to submit consent notices prior to the Court’s deadline. Although Plaintiffs have offered no good cause for their failure to timely file these consent forms, all of the other factors weigh in their favor. See id. (permitting late consent opt-in plaintiffs to join collective class even though the plaintiffs offered no good cause for their failure to timely file, but all other factors weighed in their favor); In Re Wells Fargo Home Mortgage Overtime Pay Litigation, No. MDL 06–01770 MHP, 2008 WL 4712769 at *2 (N.D.Cal. Oct.23, 2008) (rejecting a “rigid application of a ‘good cause’ standard” because it “does not fully respond to the various factors with which the court must concern itself” such as judicial economy and prejudice to the defendant) (citing Raper, 165 F.R.D. at 89).
Given that over 200 persons have consented to opt-in, the inclusion of these 21 plaintiffs, approximately 10% increase in the size of the potential class, will not overly burden or prejudice Defendants. See Abubakar v. Co. of Solano, No. Civ. S–06–2268, 2008 WL 550117 at *2 (E.D.Cal. Feb.27, 2008) (holding a 15% increase in liability, 23 plaintiffs added to a class of 155, was not prejudicial). Also, all of these consent notices were filed with the Court within a few months after the deadline and the majority of them within one month, not presenting any unfair surprise or requiring that Defendants take any additional steps to defend this action. See Raper, 165 F.R.D. at 92 (finding no prejudice to the defendant by allowance of the addition of plaintiffs even after liability had been determined). Thus, Defendant has not been prejudiced by a significant delay and the addition of these opt-in plaintiffs should not hamper the discovery process already underway.
In terms of judicial economy, were the Court to deny the admission of these plaintiffs, they would still be able to file separate claims for relief against Defendant, who would still face the prospect of defending against their individual FLSA claims. See Ruggles, 687 F.Supp.2d at 37 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 256(b)). Indeed, Plaintiffs suggest that they would file separate actions and then request consolidation with the instant action. (ECF No. 85 at 6) (the untimely plaintiffs “only option will be to file identical, individual claims with the Court” and this Court would be permitted to consolidate those individual lawsuits under Fed.R.Civ.P. 42(a) “because the cases will all ‘involve a common question of law or fact’ ”). “Obviously, there is little economy in spawning identical FLSA lawsuits that themselves might be properly joined with this lawsuit in the future.” Ruggles, 687 F.Supp.2d at 38 (citing Abubakar, 2008 WL 550117 at *2) (noting the futility in requiring late opt-in plaintiffs to file separately given the foreseeability of a consolidation order pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 42(a)).
Finally, this Court agrees with other courts’ holdings that with respect to the FLSA, “[a] generous reading, in favor of those whom congress intended to benefit from the law, is also appropriate when considering issues of time limits and deadlines.” Kelley v. Alamo, 964 F.2d 747, 750 (8th Cir.1992) (citation omitted); see also Ruggles, 687 F.Supp.2d at 38 (agreeing with a generous reading of the FLSA in favor of those whom congress intended to benefit from the statute in late opt-in circumstance); In re Wells Fargo Home Mortg. Overtime Pay Litigation, 2008 WL 4712769 at *2 (same); Schaefer–LaRose v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 1:07–cv–1133–SEB–TAB, 2008 WL 5384340, at *2 (S.D.Ind. Dec.17, 2008) (same).”
Click Heaps v. Safelite Solutions, LLC to read the entire Opinion and Order.
S.D.N.Y.: Collective Action Waiver Unenforceable Because It Would Prevent Employees From Vindicating Their Substantive Statutory Rights Under the FLSA
Raniere v. Citigroup Inc.
In an issue appearing more and more these days, this case was before the court on the defendant’s motion to compel arbitration on an individualized basis. Although the plaintiffs raised several issues regarding the enforceability of the arbitration agreement at issue, as discussed here, the case is significant because it held that- as a matter of law- purported waivers of the right to participate in an FLSA collective action are unenforceable, because they prevent employees from vindicating their substantive statutory rights (that are not waivable).
In so holding, the court reasoned:
“Plaintiffs make two arguments to the effect that the collective action waiver is unenforceable because it would prevent Plaintiffs from vindicating their substantive statutory rights. The first, and broader, of these arguments is that if the waiver is given effect, the FLSA will not serve both its remedial and deterrent functions. Plaintiffs’ second, narrower, contention is that to give effect to the collective action waiver and arbitration agreement here would have the practical effect of precluding Plaintiffs from pursuing the enforcement of their statutory rights due to the costs involved.
It is well recognized that employees cannot release their substantive rights under the FLSA by private agreement. See Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 707, 65 S.Ct. 895, 89 L.Ed. 1296 (1945) (“No one can doubt but that to allow waiver of statutory wages by agreement would nullify the purposes of the Act.”); see also Bormann v. AT & T Commc’ns, Inc., 875 F.2d 399 (2d Cir.1989) (“[P]rivate waiver of claims under the [FLSA] has been precluded by such Supreme Court decisions as Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 65 S.Ct. 895, 89 L.Ed. 1296 (1945), and D.A. Shulte, Inc. v. Gangi, 328 U.S. 108, 66 S.Ct. 925, 90 L.Ed. 1114 (1946).” (citations omitted)).
It is likewise well established that “ ‘[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.’ “ Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 123 (quoting Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26); see also Desiderio, 191 F.3d at 205–06. Arbitration of a claim of statutory rights will only be compelled if that claim can be effectively vindicated through arbitration. See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637 n. 19 (noting that if arbitration clause and other contractual provisions “operated in tandem as a prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory remedies,” “we would have little hesitation in condemning the agreement as against public policy”); Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 90 (noting that “even claims arising under a statute designed to further important social policies may be arbitrated because so long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate his or her statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum the statute serves its functions.” (citations and internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)).
Federal substantive law of arbitrability requires federal courts to declare otherwise operative arbitration clauses unenforceable when enforcement would prevent plaintiffs from vindicating their statutory rights. American Express II, 634 F.3d at 199; see also Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 47–48 (1st Cir.2006); Hadnot v. Bay, Ltd., 344 F.3d 474, 478 n. 14 (5th Cir.2003); Paladino v. Avnet Computer Technologies, Inc., 134 F.3d 1054, 1062 (11th Cir.1998); Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP, 768 F.Supp.2d 547, 549 (S.D.N.Y.2011); Chen–Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 785 F.Supp.2d 394 (S.D.N.Y.2011); DeGaetano v. Smith Barney, Inc., 983 F.Supp. 459, 469 (S.D.N.Y.1997).
The Second Circuit addressed this issue in American Express I, 554 F.3d 300. The Court concluded that the class action waiver in that case was unenforceable because plaintiffs had demonstrated that they otherwise would not be able to vindicate their statutory rights “in either an individual or collective capacity,” id. at 314 (emphasis in original), due to the great expense of pursuing that antitrust litigation and the small individual recovery each plaintiff could expect. As such, the waiver would have the practical effect of ensuring no claims would be brought at all, granting the defendant “de facto immunity from … liability.” Id. at 320. The Supreme Court vacated American Express I and remanded for reconsideration in light of Stolt–Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., ––– U.S. ––––, 130 S.Ct. 1758, 176 L.Ed.2d 605 (2010). American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., ––– U.S. ––––, 130 S.Ct. 2401, 176 L.Ed.2d 920. On remand, the Circuit again found the arbitration provision unenforceable because “the class action waiver in this case precludes plaintiffs from enforcing their statutory rights” due to the prohibitive cost of litigating on an individual basis. American Express II, 634 F.3d at 197–99.
In Ragone, 595 F.3d 115, the Court of Appeals again confirmed the importance of the statutory rights analysis, indicating its willingness, if in dicta, to hold unenforceable an arbitration agreement containing a shortened statute of limitations and a fee-shifting provision that would “significantly diminish a litigant’s rights under Title VII.” 595 F.3d at 125–26. The Court of Appeals discussion in Ragone demonstrates “that the holdings of American Express apply not only to ‘negative value’ class action claims, that is, claims that are so small in value that it is not economically viable to pursue them as individual claims.” Chen–Oster, 785 F.Supp.2d at 408.
Defendants are incorrect that the Supreme Court’s decision in AT & T, –––U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 179 L.Ed.2d 742, overrules American Express and Ragone. AT & T addressed only whether a state law rule holding class action waivers unconscionable was preempted by the FAA. ––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 179 L.Ed.2d 742. The holdings of both the American Express cases and Ragone were based, in contrast and as this decision must be, on federal arbitral law, and AT & T in no way alters the relevance of those binding circuit holdings. See Chen–Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 2011 WL 2671813 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2011) (holding that AT & T does not abrogate American Express or Ragone and noting that “it remains the law of the Second Circuit that an arbitration provision which precludes plaintiffs from enforcing their statutory rights is unenforceable.” Id. at *4). Moreover, while the dissent in AT & T noted with concern that “agreements that forbid the consolidation of claims can lead small-dollar claimants to abandon their claims rather than to litigate,” 131 S.Ct. at 1760, AT & T involved the vindication of state, not federal, rights. Thus, even if AT & T is read broadly to acquiesce to the enforcement of an arbitral agreement that as a practical matter would prevent the vindication of state rights in the name of furthering the strong federal policy favoring arbitration, that would not alter the validity of the federal statutory rights analysis articulated in Mitsubishi, Green Tree, American Express and Ragone. The Court accordingly analyses the present issues under the reasoning articulated in those cases.
i. The Right to Proceed Collectively Under the FLSA Cannot be Waived
The Second Circuit has not determined whether the collective action provisions of the FLSA are integral to its structure and function, and, as such, whether an agreement waiving that right can be enforced.
The First Circuit has expressly reserved decision on this question. Skirchak v. Dynamics Research Corp., 508 F.3d 49, 62 (1st Cir.2007) (“We do not need to decide if class actions under the FLSA may ever be waived by agreement…. We also do not reach the question of whether such waivers of FLSA class actions are per se against public policy under either the FLSA or the Massachusetts Fair Wage Law”). And while a number of other Circuits have accepted that, at least in principle, arbitration agreements containing waivers of the right to proceed collectively under the FLSA are enforceable, those decisions were either based upon a premise rejected by the Second Circuit or did not reach the question here. See Horenstein v. Mortgage. Mkt., Inc., 9 F. App’x 618, 619 (9th Cir.2001); Carter v. Countrywide Credit Indus. ., Inc., 362 F.3d 294, 297–98 (5th Cir.2004); Vilches v. Travelers Co., Inc., 413 Fed. App’x 487, 494 n. 4 (3d Cir.2011); Caley v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 428 F.3d 1359, 1378 (11th Cir.2005); Adkins v. Labor Ready, Inc., 303 F.3d 496, 503 (4th Cir.2002).
Specifically, the court in Caley did not address whether the right to proceed collectively under the FLSA may be waived as a matter of federal law. Instead, it addressed whether such waivers were unconscionable under Georgia state law principles. See Caley, 428 F.3d at 1377–79.
The Second Circuit has rejected the reasoning relied on in Horenstein, Adkins, Carter, and Vilches. In American Express, the Second Circuit noted that the issue of whether statutorily granted collective action rights under the ADEA, which incorporates by reference the collective action rights granted in the FLSA, could be waived was not decided by Gilmer, 500 U.S. 20, 111 S.Ct. 1647, 114 L.Ed.2d 26, because “because a collective and perhaps a class action remedy was, in fact, available in that case.” American Express II, 634 F.3d at 195–96; American Express I, 554 F.3d at 314 (same). Countrywide, Adkins, Horenstein, and Vilches, the latter three relying on Johnson v. West Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366, 377 (3d Cir.2000), assumed that Gilmer resolved whether collective enforcement rights were waivable. See Vilches, at 494 n. 4 (citing Adkins, 303 F.3d at 503 (citing Johnson, 225 F.3d at 377)); Adkins, 303 F.3d at 503 (citing Johnson, 225 F.3d at 377); Countrywide, 362 F.3d at 298 (citing Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32). Under the Second Circuit’s precedents, Gilmer does not. See American Express II, 634 F.3d at 195–96. Accordingly, the issue presented by Plaintiffs here, namely whether the right to proceed collectively under the FLSA is unwaivable—beyond such a clause being unenforceable were Plaintiffs to demonstrate that to do so would have the practical effect of denying them their substantive rights—is an open question in this Circuit.
This issue is fundamentally distinct, and more nuanced, than that presented in Gilmer, which addressed whether ADEA claims are arbitrable at all. Here, Plaintiffs do not contest that individually filed FLSA claims are generally arbitrable or that were the agreement to permit proceeding as a collective in arbitration, as the parties could in Gilmer, see American Express II, 634 F.3d at 195–96, that such a provision would be enforceable. Accordingly, this case does not oppose the strong federal policy favoring arbitration with the rights granted in the FLSA, but instead only questions whether the right to proceed collectively may be waived.
There are good reasons to hold that a waiver of the right to proceed collectively under the FLSA is per se unenforceable—and different in kind from waivers of the right to proceed as a class under Rule 23. Collective actions under the FLSA are a unique animal. Unlike employment-discrimination class suits under Title VII or the Americans with Disabilities Act that are governed by Rule 23, Congress created a unique form of collective actions for minimum-wage and overtime pay claims brought under the FLSA.
The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, and its original collective action provision, was a product of the forces that gave rise to what has been termed the constitutional revolution of 1937, marking a high point in the clash of the federal courts with President Roosevelt and New Deal legislators. The original FLSA collective action provision, passed in the wake of the “switch in time that saved nine,” provided that
[a]ny employer who violates the provisions of section 6 or section 7 of this Act shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be, and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages. Action to recover such liability may be maintained in any court of competent jurisdiction by any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated, or such employee or employees may designate an agent or representative to maintain such action for and in behalf of all employees similarly situated. The court in such action shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney’s fee to be paid by the defendant and costs of the action.
Fair Labor Standards Act, 75 Cong. Ch. 676, § 16(b), 52 Stat. 1060, 1069 (1938). As the Supreme Court has noted, this provision appeared for the first time in the bill reported by a Conference Committee of both Houses. See Brooklyn Sav. Bank, 324 U.S. at 705 n. 15 (citing H. Rep. No. 2738, 75th Cong.3d Sess., at 33). The bill that later became the FLSA took over thirteen months to become law and went through a variety of iterations, creating a veritable raft of legislative history. Within this, however, “[t]he only reference to Section 16(b) was by Representative Keller….” Id. at 705 n. 16. Representative Keller stated in relevant part:
Among the provisions for the enforcement of the act an old principle has been adopted and will be applied to new uses. If there shall occur violations of either the wages or hours, the employees can themselves, or by designated agent or representatives, maintain an action in any court to recover the wages due them and in such a case the court shall allow liquidated damages in addition to the wages due equal to such deficient payment and shall also allow a reasonable attorney’s fees and assess the court costs against the violator of the law so that employees will not suffer the burden of an expensive lawsuit. The provision has the further virtue of minimizing the cost of enforcement by the Government. It is both a common-sense and economical method of regulation. The bill has other penalties for violations and other judicial remedies, but the provision which I have mentioned puts directly into the hands of the employees who are affected by violation the means and ability to assert and enforce their own rights, thus avoiding the assumption by Government of the sole responsibility to enforce the act. Id. (citing 83 Cong. Rec. 9264).
This collective action provision was amended by the Portal–to–Portal Act of 1947, the history of which has been described by the courts in the following manner:
In 1947, in response to a “national emergency” created by a flood of suits under the FLSA aimed at collecting portal-to-portal pay allegedly due employees, Congress enacted the Portal–to–Portal amendments to the FLSA. 61 Stat. 87 (1947). The original, stated purpose of the bill containing these amendments was: “To define and limit the jurisdiction of the courts, to regulate actions arising under certain laws of the United States, and for other purposes.” 93 Cong. Rec. 156 (H.R.2157). To this end, the amendments, among other things, barred unions from bringing representative actions under the FLSA. Arrington v. Nat. Broadcasting Co., Inc., 531 F.Supp. 498, 500 (D.D.C.1982) (citations omitted); see also United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 1564 of N.M. v. Albertson’s, Inc., 207 F.3d 1193, 1200–01 (11th Cir.2000) (noting the Arrington court’s “exhaustive survey of the legislative history of the 1947 amendments”). As amended, FLSA collective actions allow “plaintiffs the advantage of lower individual costs to vindicate rights by the pooling of resources. The judicial system benefits by efficient resolution in one proceeding of common issues of law and fact arising from the same alleged” unlawful activity. Hoffman–La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 170, 110 S.Ct. 482, 107 L.Ed.2d 480 (1989) (describing the collective action provisions under the ADEA, which are by reference those of the FLSA).
More specifically, the revised collective action provision that resulted from these amendments limited representative suits to those workers who submit written opt-in notices. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (“No employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such action unless he gives his consent in writing to become such a party and such consent is filed in the court in which such action is brought”). FLSA actions are, consequently, not true representative actions as under Rule 23, but instead those actions brought about by individual employees who affirmatively join a single suit. These collective action provisions were crafted by not one but over the course of several Congresses to balance the need to incentivize the bringing of often small claims by way of collectivization in order to ensure the statute’s function, while barring actions “brought on behalf of employees who had no real involvement in, or real knowledge of, the lawsuit.” Arrington, 531 F.Supp. at 501. The Act’s, and more specifically this provision’s, lengthy legislative history evidences Congress’ precise determination of how this balance should be struck in order to ensure the statute’s remedial and deterrent functions.
In addition, as the Supreme Court has described,
[t]he legislative history of the Fair Labor Standards Act shows an intent on the part of Congress to protect certain groups of the population from substandard wages and excessive hours which endangered the national health and well-being and the free flow of goods in interstate commerce. The statute was a recognition of the fact that due to the unequal bargaining power as between employer and employee, certain segments of the population required federal compulsory legislation to prevent private contracts on their part which endangered national health and efficiency as a result of the free movement of goods in interstate commerce. Brooklyn Sav. Bank, 324 U.S. at 706–07. Although the right to sue under the FLSA is compensatory, “it is nevertheless an enforcement provision.” Id. at 709. Not the least integral aspect of this remedy is the ability of employees to pool resources in order to pursue a collective action, in accordance with the specific balance struck by Congress. The particular FLSA collective action mechanism was additionally a Congressional determination regarding the allocation of enforcement costs, as the ability of employees to bring actions collectively reduces the burden borne by the public fisc, as Representative Keller noted. See 83 Cong. Rec. 9264. Moreover, prohibition of the waiver of the right to proceed collectively accords with the Congressional policy of uniformity with regard to the application of FLSA standards, see H. Rep. No. 2182, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. at 6–7, because an employer is not permitted to gain a competitive advantage because his employees are more willing to assent to, or his human resources department more able to ascertain, collective action waivers than those of his competitors. As the Supreme Court has noted, “the purposes of the Act require that it be applied even to those who would decline its protections.” Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 105 S.Ct. 1953, 85 L.Ed.2d 278 (1985). It is not enough to respond that such a waiver should be upheld in the name of the broad federal policy favoring arbitration, simply because the waiver was included in an arbitration agreement. An otherwise enforceable arbitration agreement should not become the vehicle to invalidate the particular Congressional purposes of the collective action provision and the policies on which that provision is based.
In sum, a waiver of the right to proceed collectively under the FLSA is unenforceable as a matter of law in accordance with the Gilmer Court’s recognition that “[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute.” Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26. See also Chen–Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 785 F.Supp.2d 394 (S.D.N.Y.2011) (holding arbitral provision waiving right to proceed as a class unenforceable as to Title VII pattern and practice claims).”
Further, because the arbitration agreement at issue said that if the collective action waiver were found to be unenforceable, the case(s) must be litigated in court, the court held that the case should not be remanded to arbitration, having held the collective action waiver unenforceable.
Click Raniere v. Citigroup Inc. to read the entire Opinion.
Overtime Law Blog 