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11th Cir.: Trial Court Erred In Allowing Defendants To Amend Their Affirmative Defenses At Trial To Add Previously Unpled Exemption

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Diaz v. Jaguar Restaurant Group, LLC

Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Defendants, her former employer, for unpaid overtime wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–216. During trial, the district court allowed Jaguar to amend its Answer pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b) to include the administrative exemption as an affirmative defense as it found that Diaz had injected the issue through her testimony at trial. The jury returned a verdict finding that Diaz had worked more than 40 hours per week for which she was not compensated, but also finding that she was exempt from the requirements of the FLSA as she was an administrative employee.  On appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, Plaintiff challenged the district court’s decision to allow Defendant to amend its Answer during trial. The Eleventh Circuit reversed, and remand the case to the district court for a trial on damages.

In reversing, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned:

“Jaguar failed to plead the administrative exemption as an affirmative defense in its Answer. In the fourteen months between the filing of its Answer and the commencement of trial, Jaguar never moved to amend its Answer to include the administrative exemption. Jaguar also did not raise the issue of the administrative exemption during discovery. The only time Jaguar raised the issue prior to trial was by inserting it in one line of the Joint Pretrial Stipulation and in the proposed Joint Jury Instructions, to which Diaz objected. Jaguar did not raise the issue during the pretrial conference and the district court did not include the issue in its Omnibus Order Following Pretrial Conference. If ever there were a classic case of waiver, this is it! See Latimer v. Roaring Toyz, Inc., 601 F.3d 1224, 1239 (11th Cir. 2010) (“Failure to plead an affirmative defense generally results in a waiver of that defense.”). Jaguar repeatedly waived the administrative exemption defense by failing to plead the defense in its Answer and by failing to move to amend its Answer before trial.

Ideally, cases should be tried on their merits. Accordingly, even if Jaguar failed to plead the administrative exemption defense, the district court could allow Jaguar to amend its Answer during trial if the issue was tried by the parties’ express or implied consent, or included in a pretrial order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(b); see Steger v. Gen. Elec. Co., 318 F.3d 1066, 1077 (11th Cir. 2003) (“[I]ssues not raised in the pleadings may be treated as if they were properly raised when they are ‘tried by express or implied consent of the parties,’ Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b), or are included in a pretrial order.”). In this case, the issue was not included in the district court’s Omnibus Order Following Pretrial Conference. Further, it is clear that the administrative exemption issue was not tried by the parties’ express consent as Diaz opposed the insertion of the issue in the Joint Pretrial Stipulation, proposed Joint Jury Instructions, and at trial. See R. Vol. 5: 160–65. The district court, however, found that the issue was tried by implied consent as it believed Diaz introduced the issue of the administrative exemption through her testimony at trial. Thus, the district court allowed the amendment.

The district court erred in finding that the administrative exemption issue was tried by implied consent and in thereby allowing Jaguar to amend its Answer.  That issue was not tried by implied consent as Diaz’s testimony was relevant to another defense in this case: Jaguar’s independent contractor defense. “The introduction of evidence arguably relevant to pleaded issues cannot serve to give a party fair notice that new issues are entering the case.” Wesco Mfg., Inc. v. Tropical Attractions of Palm Beach, Inc., 833 F.2d 1484, 1487 (11th Cir. 1987); see Jimenez v. Tuna Vessel Granada, 652 F.2d 415, 421 (5th Cir. 1981) (stating that implied consent cannot be found when “evidence is introduced that is relevant to an issue already in the case and there is no indication that the party who introduced the evidence was seeking to raise a new issue”). Diaz’s testimony was relevant to counter Jaguar’s independent contractor defense, and she clearly was not seeking to raise the administrative exemption as a new issue. Further, we cannot conclude that her testimony was “much more strongly relevant” to the administrative exemption than to the independent contractor defense, which could be construed as notice of a new issue. See United States f/u/b/o Seminole Sheet Metal Co. v. SCI, Inc., 828 F.2d 671, 677 (11th Cir. 1987). Thus, her testimony cannot be considered implied consent to try the administrative exemption.”

Click Diaz v. Jaguar Restaurant Group, LLC, to read the entire opinion.


2 Comments

  1. OlderThanDirt says:

    This is a very disturbing case. Although the 11th Cir– in the end and Per Curian, with a 6th Cir judge in attendance to monitor the sparkling cleanliness of the 11th Circuit’s laundry–upheld rule(s) of law and notice pleading that have formed the backbone of the FRCP since 1938 (the same year the FLSA was enacted, oddly) the trial court judge, **a judge of the United States**, was prepared to basically nullify the entire concept of notice pleading just so he could strike down this employee’s case. The 11th C.’s opinion said: “If ever there were a classic case of waiver, this is it!” The exclamation mark belongs to the judges (none of whom though was brave enough to take authorship).

    11th C. remanded this case back for trial on “damages.” Wait for it…fluctuating workweek, and rigidly enforced, too. So with such a hammer at the trial court’s disposal why would it have felt the need to take such an extraordinary step to punish one upstart employee who had the temerity to demand the wages she was due under law? And hasn’t a prayer of ever seeing under FWW anyway.

    And I would remind the attorney trying Ms. Diaz’s case to dot every “i” and cross every “t” three times when presenting her fee-shifting toll to this court. I’m betting the model for damages here will be Saizan v. Delta Concrete Products, waving about in the moonlight like that arm rising up out of the river in the final scene of “Deliverance.” Dueling banjos, anyone?

  2. […] of wages and liquidated damages, only after prevailing at trial, and reversal at the Eleventh Circuit due to the trial court’s order permitting the defendants to amend their answer to assert a […]

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