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N.D.W.Va.: An FLSA Employer Held Liable For FLSA Violations Has No Right To Contribution Or Indemnification; Allowing Same Would Contravene The Purposes Of The FLSA

May 21, 2010 10:21 am / Leave a comment

McDougal v. G & S Tobacco Dealers, L.L.C.

This case was before the Court on the Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff’s (and current owner of the employer) and the Third-Party Defendant’s (former employer) cross motions for summary judgment.  In a nutshell, what started as a simple FLSA claim, “expanded into contract claims for indemnification and contribution by the [current] employer [Woodward] against the former owner [Oliverios] of the company that employed Plaintiff.”

Among other issues, the Court discussed whether there was any pleaded theory that could impose a duty of indemnity or contribution on the previous owner [Oliveros] for the current owner’s [Woodward’s] non-payment of Plaintiff for the time Plaintiff worked for Defendant, subsequent to the time Woodward took ownership of the company that employed Plaintiff.  Holding that no such duty of indemnity or contribution existed, the Court explained:

“1. With respect to Woodward’s claim for indemnification, contribution and breach of statutory or agency duties, the doctrine of conflict or obstacle preemption is dispositive.

Woodward’s state common law claims of contractual and implied indemnification and contribution against Oliverios for wages and benefits damages not paid to McDougal after July 17, 2007 in violation of FLSA and WPCA are preempted by the doctrine of conflict or obstacle preemption.

On the same date the parties argued the instant cross-motions for summary judgment before this Court, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals published its decision in Equal Rights Center, et al v. Archstone Multifamily Series I Trust, et al, 09-1453.

The following facts and claims of Archstone are analogous to the facts and claims of the instant case: Archstone hired architect Bolton to design multi-family apartment buildings which Archstone then had various contractors build. Of the units constructed, Equal Rights Center, et al alleged 71 failed to be constructed so that they were accessible to persons with disabilities in violation of FHA and ADA. Archstone and the Equal Rights Plaintiffs entered into a Consent Decree which required Archstone to retro-fit the 71 units to make them ADA and FHA compliant and to pay 1.4 million in damages and attorneys fees and expenses. Bolton did not join in the settlement but later entered into a separate consent decree with the Equal Rights Plaintiffs which did not include any admission of liability. Archstone cross-claimed against Bolton seeking damages based on state law causes of action: express indemnity; implied indemnity; breach of contract; and professional negligence.  After lengthy discovery and immediately prior to the dispositive motions deadline, Archstone sought leave to amend its cross-claim against Bolton to include a claim for contribution. Bolton objected. The District Court denied leave to amend. Thereafter the District Court granted Bolton summary judgment reasoning that Archstone’s causes of action were indemnity and de facto indemnity claims for violations of the FHA and ADA and, because no right to indemnification exists under the ADA or FHA, the state law claims asserted by Archstone would be antithetical to the purposes of the FHA and ADA and therefore preempted under the doctrine of conflict or obstacle preemption. Archstone appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed holding:

Obstacle preemption applies “where state law; stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’ “ …. where a state-law claim “interferes with the methods by which the federal statute was designed to reach [its] goal.” (internal citations omitted).

Obstacle preemption has been extended to state tort claims as well as positive enactments of state law. Id. citing Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 120 S.Ct. 1913, 146 L.Ed.2d 914 (2000).

Finding Archstone’s indemnification claims were preempted, the Court held:

Here, Archstone sought to allocate the full risk of loss to Niles Bolton for the apartment buildings at issue. Allowing an owner to completely insulate itself from liability for an ADA or FHA violation through contract diminishes its incentive to ensure compliance with discrimination laws. If a developer of apartment housing, who concededly has a non-delegable duty to comply with the ADA and FHA, can be indemnified under state law for its ADA and FHA violations, then the developer will not be accountable for discriminatory practices in building apartment housing. Such a result is antithetical to the purposes of the FHA and ADA.

The Court further held Archstone’s last minute attempt to amend its cross-claim was properly denied as prejudicial to Bolton. Moreover, the Court held: “As presented on appeal, the claim which Archstone presents in its amended complaint is a de facto indemnification claim, and such a claim is preempted under federal law. Therefore, allowing Archstone to amend under these circumstances to include a so-called contribution claim is, in any event, futile.”

A number of cases have addressed the issue of whether there is a right to contribution or indemnification for employers held liable under the FLSA and have held there is none. Herman v. R.S.R. Security Servs. Ltd., 172 F.3d 132, 143 (2nd Cir.1999). Relying on the rationale expressed in Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, 451 U.S. 77, 101 S.Ct. 1571, 67 L.Ed.2d 750 (1981),  the Herman Court held:

There is no right of contribution or indemnification for employers found liable under the FLSA. The reasons are readily apparent. First, the text of the FLSA makes no provision for contribution or indemnification. Second, the statute was designed to regulate the conduct of employers for the benefit of employees, and it cannot therefore be said that employers are members of the class for whose benefit the FLSA was enacted. Third, the FLSA has a comprehensive remedial scheme as shown by the express provision for private enforcement in certain carefully defined circumstances. Such a comprehensive statute strongly counsels against judicially engrafting additional remedies. Fourth, the Act’s legislative history is silent on the right to contribution or indemnification. Accordingly, we hold that there is no right to contribution or indemnification for employers held liable under the FLSA.

In Herman, Portnoy contended that even if the FLSA did not permit contribution or indemnification, those claims could be prosecuted under New York law in much the same way Woodward contends she should be permitted to prosecute claims for indemnification against Oliverios under West Virginia law. The Herman Court held: “This view of the law is flawed because the FLSA’s remedial scheme is sufficiently comprehensive as to preempt state law in this respect.” Herman v. R.S.R. Security Servs. Ltd., supra at 144.

The Fourth Circuit held in the 1992 case of Lyle v. Food Lion, Inc. 954 F.2d 984, 987: “In effect, Food Lion sought to indemnify itself against Tew for its own violation of the FLSA, which the district court found, and we agree, is something the FLSA simply will not allow. As the fifth Circuit has noted, ‘[t]o engraft an indemnity action upon this otherwise comprehensive federal statute would run afoul of the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution’ and ‘would undermine employers’ incentives to abide by the Act. LeCompt v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 780 S.2d 1260, 1264 (5th Cir.1986).’ “

In the instant suit, Oliverios were the employers of McDougal prior to July 17, 2007 and therefore responsible for any FLSA and WPCA claims arising for work performed by McDougal up to July 17th. However, Woodward uses the warranty and indemnification clauses of the 2007 contract in an attempt to hold Oliverios liable for Woodward’s failure to pay McDougal FLSA wages after July 17, 2007. In the alternative to the contract indemnification claim, Woodward attempts to shift ultimate responsibility for payment of post July 17, 2007 FLSA wages to Oliverios using equitable principles. In every event, Woodward seeks to delegate her duty to comply with the FLSA to Oliverio for all wages and damages owed including those starting with the contract closing on July 17, 2007. This she cannot do. The FLSA does not contain language that provides for such indemnification or contribution. Woodward is not a member of the class protected by the FLSA. The FLSA is a comprehensive remedial statute designed to give employees the right to sue their employers for violations of the act. This is precisely what McDougal did in bringing his action against Woodward. Herman, supra at 144. This court cannot and will not engraft an indemnity clause on the FLSA where there is none. LeCompt, supra at 1264.

Accordingly, the Court concludes that Woodward’s Third Party Plaintiff claims against Oliverios for indemnification or contribution to McDougal’s FLSA claims arising post July 17, 2007 whether the same are based on contractual or equitable contribution, indemnification, breach of contract, breach of warranty, agency, or another state contract or equity claim, are preempted by the provisions of the FLSA; are antithetical to the purpose of the FLSA; undermine the public policy established by the FLSA; and are barred by the doctrines of Conflict and Obstacle Preemption.

Even if Woodward, in light of the absence of the availability of contribution and/or indemnification for the FLSA claims of McDougal, contends that she is entitled to contribution from Oliverios solely for WVPA damages claimed by McDougal, that contention also fails. The federal court only recognizes a right to contribution under state law “in cases in which state law supplie[s] the appropriate rule of decision.” Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, supra at 97. The West Virginia’s Wage Payment and Collection Act (W.Va.Code, § 21-5-1 et seq.) provides a comprehensive method for employees forcing their immediate or ultimate employer to timely pay them in accord with law. It does not provide authorization or a method or a rule of decision for allocating claims of contribution toward the liability of the employer to timely pay his employee’s wages. Nor does it provide or recognize any method, contractual or equitable, for shifting the burden of paying wages in accord with law from the employer to a third person.”

Not discussed here, the Court held that language from the contract of sale of the employer from Oliverios to Woodward was binding, to the extent that Oliverios was required to pay the cost of Woodward’s legal defense arising from the lawsuit.

To read the entire decision, click here.

Arbitrator Rules That Massachusetts Trial Court System Must Pay Workers $30 Million In Retroactive Pay Increases, Boston Herald Reports

May 18, 2010 3:09 pm / Leave a comment

The Boston Herald is reporting that an Arbitrator has ruled that Massachusetts’ Trial Court system must pay its clerical workers $30 million in unpaid pay increases.

“In what is being called the costliest settlement of its type in state history, the financially strapped Trial Court system must shell out $30 million in back wages to thousands of unionized clerical workers, the Herald has learned.

In a decision reached May 7, an arbitrator ruled that the Trial Court broke its contract with Office and Professional Employees International Union, Local 6, by refusing to pay the negotiated 3 percent pay raises since 2007…

In addition to the $30 million in back pay, the Trial Court must find $17 million in unfunded raises for the union employees for the next budget year, starting in July, said Superior Court Justice Peter W. Agnes Jr., president of the Massachusetts Judges Conference.”

To read the entire article click here.

D.Colo.: Time Spent By Police Officers Donning And Doffing Their Uniforms And Equipment Is Compensable, Because It Is Integral And Indispensable To Their Police Duties

May 17, 2010 7:32 pm / Leave a comment

Rogers v. City and County of Denver

This case was before the Court on the parties’ respective motions for summary judgment.  Plaintiffs made several claims for unpaid wages based on a variety of “off-the-clock” claims.  Although the Court denied the parties’ motions with respect to most of the claims–either because the record was not fully developed, or because there were issues of fact–it held that the donning and doffing of uniforms and equipment by certain officers was compensable time.

“The first claim seeks compensation for time spent putting on and taking off the police uniform and equipment required for conducting police activity. For convenience of analysis, this claim is considered as it applies to patrol officers. The DPD Operations Manual prescribes the basic uniform to be worn on duty. It consists of a uniform shirt, uniform trousers, trouser belt, socks and authorized footwear. (DPD Op. Manual § 111.02.) A uniformed officer is generally required to carry a metal badge and nameplate, current DPD identification card, a valid Colorado driver’s license, and a standard uniform belt (“duty belt”) containing an authorized holster and firearm, ammunition case and ammunition, handcuffs and handcuff case, department issued tear gas and holder, flashlight, baton ring and belt “keepers.” (Id. § 111.03.) Uniformed officers are not required to wear basic hats or reflective apparel or carry batons, but officers must have those items available at all times. (Id. §§ 111.02(1), 111.02(12) & 111.03(13)). The Operations Manual describes particular situations in which basic hats and reflective apparel must be worn. The wearing of ballistic vests is encouraged, but not required. (Id. § 111.05(2)(e)).

The DPD does not require that donning and doffing the basic uniform take place at the assigned work station. Some district headquarters have storage lockers and rooms available for use at the officer’s individual choice. Some district buildings are too small and the officers must report in full uniform. The City argues that the option to put on and take off the uniform at home or elsewhere distinguishes this case from precedents established in the context of the meat industry and other hazardous occupations.

The option to change away from the duty station is not determinative. The principal activity of the patrol officers is policing the community. The police uniform is not “clothing” in any ordinary sense. It is the visible sign of authority and an essential element of the officer’s ability to command compliance with his commands and directives. It is analogous to the judicial robe. The uniform includes the equipment that are the tools that enable the officer to use physical force, including deadly force, for the protection of himself and others as circumstances require.

The City argues that the Plaintiffs’ clothes changing activities are excluded from compensation under 29 U.S.C. § 203(o). That section provides:

Hours Worked.-In determining for the purposes of sections 206 and 207 of this title the hours for which an employee is employed, there shall be excluded any time spent in changing clothes or washing at the beginning or end of each workday which was excluded from measured working time during the week involved by the express terms of or by custom or practice under a bona fide collective-bargaining agreement applicable to the particular employee.

CBAs between the City and the Denver Police Protective Association have been in effect since January 1, 1996. DPD officers have never been compensated for donning and doffing their uniforms and personal equipment. The City contends that this history of non-compensation shows an established custom or practice under the CBAs.

That argument is not persuasive.  Silence in collective bargaining is not the equivalent of a custom or practice of non-compensability.

In December 1985, the United States Department of Labor (“DOL”) issued a Wage and Hour Opinion Letter, stating that the time spent by a uniformed police officer donning and doffing the required uniform was not compensable time under the FLSA, where a collective bargaining agreement between a city and the union had no express provision regarding the compensability of clothes-changing time and there had been no custom or practice between the parties to consider such clothes changing time compensable. Wage & Hour Opinion Letter, Dec. 30, 1985, 1985 WL 1087351, Def.’s Ex. A-98. That opinion letter is not persuasive, but may be considered with respect to the issue of willfulness. Similarly, Wage & Hour Advisory Memorandum No.2006-2 dated May 31, 2006 (opining that changing into gear is not a principal activity if employees have the option and the ability to change at home) is relevant only to the issue of willfulness.

The judicially-created de minimis rule provides an exception to the FLSA’s requirement that all work be compensated.  There are genuine issues of material fact regarding the time and effort required to don and doff the DPD uniform and protective gear. The City’s de minimis defense is a factual issue for trial.

While donning and doffing the patrol officers uniform and equipment is compensable time under the FLSA as activity that is integral and indispensable to their police duties, the continuous work day does not begin or end with that activity. The plaintiffs are not asking for time spent commuting for those officers who chose to change at home. This ruling is applicable only to the uniformed officers on official duty. The facts concerning wearing uniforms and equipment during secondary employment are not adequately presented in the papers filed.   Similarly there is no clear evidentiary record concerning detectives and other non-uniformed officers.”

This decision appears to be in direct conflict with the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision discussed here, which held that time spent donning and doffing police uniforms and equipment was not compensable, because officers had the option of doing it at home.

Click here to read the entire decision.

Wal-Mart Settles Wage And Hour Lawsuit For Up To $86 Million, Reuters Reports

May 12, 2010 4:01 pm / Leave a comment

Reuters is reporting that Wal-Mart has agreed to pay up to $86 Million to settle a class-action lawsuit accusing it of failing to pay vacation, overtime and other wages to thousands of former workers in California.

According to Reuters, “[a]bout 232,000 people will share in the settlement, which was disclosed on Tuesday in a federal court filing.

It requires a minimum payout of $43 million, and “far exceeds other recent settlements” involving Wal-Mart, the filing shows. The accord requires court approval.”

To read the entire story click here.

W.D.Va.: Motion For Approval Of Settlement Agreement Denied, In Part, Because Of Impermissible Confidentiality Language

May 12, 2010 7:15 am / 1 Comment on W.D.Va.: Motion For Approval Of Settlement Agreement Denied, In Part, Because Of Impermissible Confidentiality Language

Poulin v. General Dynamics Shared Resources, Inc.

In a continuing trend, the Court, on the parties’ Joint Motion for approval of settlement, denied same, in part, due to the inclusion of confidentiality language in the proposed settlement agreement.  Initially, the Court denied the Motion due to the parties failure to lay out the basis for Plaintiff’s attorney’s fees.  However, the Court went on to add an alternative ground for its denial, citing to recent case law, as discussed here:

“Finally, the Settlement Agreement, as presently drafted, contains a confidentiality agreement. This, in pertinent part, provides that “Plaintiff agrees that he shall not disclose the fact of, and/or the terms and conditions of this Settlement Agreement and General Release except that Plaintiff may state that the Poulin action has been dismissed and may disclose the terms and conditions of this Settlement Agreement” under limited enumerated circumstances. Under the Settlement Agreement, “Plaintiff further agrees and acknowledges that confidentiality is a material term of this Agreement and any breach of the confidentiality provisions herein will be considered a material breach of the terms of this Agreement and he will be required to reimburse Defendant for any and all compensation and benefits paid to him or for his benefit under the terms of this Agreement.” Settlement Agreement and General Release, ¶ 13. Further, it provides that the Settlement Agreement, “as executed by the Parties, will be filed under seal.” Id. at ¶ 5.

The Court cannot approve these terms of the Settlement Agreement. The provision that “confidentiality is a material term of [the] Agreement” is in conflict with the Court’s opinions dated March 26, 2010 (docket no. 20) and April 23, 2010 (docket no. 23), which held that the parties had not identified significant interests to outweigh the public interest in access to judicial records, and required the proposed Settlement Agreement be made publicly available on the docket. Furthermore, a confidentiality provision in an FLSA settlement agreement undermines the purposes of the Act, for the same reasons that compelled the Court to deny the parties’ motion to seal their Settlement Agreement. See e.g., Valdez v. T.A.S. O. Prop., Inc., No. 8:09-cv-2250, 2010 WL 1730700, at *1 (M .D.Fla. Apr. 28, 2010); Dees v. Hydradry, Inc., — F.Supp.2d —-, 2010 WL 1539813, at *9 (M.D.Fla.2010) (“A confidentiality provision in an FLSA settlement agreement both contravenes the legislative purpose of the FLSA and undermines the Department of Labor’s regulatory effort to notify employees of their FLSA rights.”). Finally, the confidentiality provisions are likely unenforceable in light of the public filing of the Settlement Agreement. See e.g., Head v. v. & L Services III, Inc., No. 6:08-cv-917, 2009 WL 3582133, at *3 (M.D.Fla. Oct. 27, 2009) (noting that “the settlement agreements contain terms that this Court would not approve, such as the confidentiality provisions, which are partially unenforceable in light of the public filing of the agreements”). The Court cannot approve of a settlement agreement which includes these terms.”

It appears that the public policy grounds behind disallowing confidential settlement agreements in FLSA cases is beginning to pick up speed.

E.D.Pa.: Where Plaintiff Received Partial Liquidated Damages, Prejudgment Interest Due On The Remaining Unpaid Wages

May 9, 2010 9:04 pm / Leave a comment

Gonzalez v. Bustleton Services, Inc.

This case was before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Motion for an Award of Prejudgment Interest, subsequent to the Court’s holding that Defendant had violated the FLSA.  In its Order regarding liability, the Court awarded liquidated damages as to one aspect of Plaintiffs’ claim and denied liquidated damages as to a second component.  The Plaintiffs’ Motion sought prejudgment interest solely on the unpaid wages that the Court had not awarded liquidated damages upon.  The Court held that Plaintiffs were entitled to prejudgment interest on the unpaid wages for which they were not awarded liquidated damages.

After discussing the general presumption in favor of prejudgment interest, the Court addressed each of the Defendant’s arguments in turn:

“In response to Plaintiffs’ motion for prejudgment interest, Defendant first argues that Plaintiffs are not entitled to prejudgment interest because they have already received liquidated damages. It is well-settled in FLSA jurisprudence that a plaintiff cannot recover both liquidated damages and prejudgment interest because both serve the same purpose, namely to compensate employees for losses caused by delayed receipt of wages they are due. See Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 715, 65 S.Ct. 895, 89 L.Ed. 1296 (1945) (recovery of liquidated damages and prejudgment interest is “double compensation for damages arising from delay in the payment of the basic minimum wages”); see also Martin v. Cooper Elec. Supply Co., 940 F.2d 896, 910 (3d Cir.1991) (describing similar purpose of liquidated damages and prejudgment interest); Starceski v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 54 F.3d 1089, 1102 (3d Cir.1995) (contrasting punitive nature of liquidated damages in ADEA case with non-punitive liquidated damages in FLSA case). Thus, there is no dispute that the court cannot award prejudgment interest on wages for which liquidated damages have been awarded.

Defendant takes the argument a step further and asserts that any award of liquidated damages prohibits any award of prejudgment interest, I disagree. The cases upon which Defendant relies merely stand for the proposition that the court cannot award both liquidated damages and prejudgment interest on the same unpaid wages. See Bowers v. Foto-Wear, Inc., No. 03-1137, 2007 WL 4086339, at *6 (M.D.Pa. Nov.15, 2007) (declining to award prejudgment interest where court awarded liquidated damages on all unpaid wages); Friedrich, 1995 WL 412385, at *4 (awarding prejudgment interest when liquidated damages were denied); Signora v. Liberty Travel, Inc., 886 A.2d 284, 286-87 (Pa.Super.2005) (finding award of liquidated damages would be duplicative where prejudgment interest was granted on same award of unpaid wages).

As previously discussed, the purpose of prejudgment interest is to compensate the plaintiff for losses resulting from the delayed payment of wages. See Brooklyn, 324 U.S. at 715; Martin, 940 F.2d at 910. Here, Plaintiffs received an award of liquidated damages under the FLSA for two years of unpaid wages owed for the credited overtime for which they had not been properly compensated. They have not received any compensation for the delayed payment of the third year of credited overtime or any of the uncompensated morning and evening time. The equities favor an award of prejudgment interest for these unpaid wages. See Brock v. Richardson, 812 F.2d 121, 127 (3d Cir.1987) (explaining the “usual equities favor” award of prejudgment interest in FLSA case).

Defendant also argues that the court’s denial of liquidated damages for the uncompensated morning and evening time under the FLSA precludes an award of prejudgment interest. See Def.’s Memo. at 4. This is incorrect. Although liquidated damages and prejudgment interest both seek to compensate the plaintiff for the delay in receiving his wages in the FLSA context, the denial of liquidated damages does not dictate the denial of prejudgment interest. In fact, in some of the cases cited by Defendant, the court awarded prejudgment interest while denying liquidated damages. See, e.g., Frie drich. In order to avoid liquidated damages, the burden is on the defendant to show that it was acting in good faith and “had reasonable grounds for believing that his act or omission was not a violation of the [FLSA].” 29 U.S.C. § 260. With respect to prejudgment interest, the Third Circuit has said that prejudgment interest is presumed unless the “usual equities in favor of such interest are not applicable.” Pignataro, 593 F.3d at 273 (citing Brock, 812 F.2d at 126). Here, although I find that Defendant had a reasonable basis for failing to compensate Plaintiffs for the morning and evening time, this does not change the fact that Plaintiffs were denied wages they were owed. The purpose of prejudgment interest is served by such an award in this case.

Defendant also seems to argue that because the court did not award liquidated damages on the additional year of credited overtime damages provided by PMWA, Plaintiffs’ are not entitled to now seek prejudgment interest on these additional unpaid wages because it gives Plaintiffs “a second bite at the apple.” See Def.’s Memo. at 9. The main problem with Defendant’s argument is that PMWA does not provide for liquidated damages and caselaw has not extended this remedy to PMWA cases. See 43 P.S. § 333.113 (damages available as civil remedy do not include liquidated damages). Accordingly, Plaintiffs properly did not seek liquidated damages under PMWA, see Pls.’ Proposed Findings and Conclusions at ¶ 96 n. 14, and the court did not award them. There is no bar to Plaintiffs’ request for prejudgment interest.

Next, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s failure to request prejudgment interest prior to the filing of the current motion precludes such recovery. See Def.’s Memo. at 8. I disagree. In their Complaint, Plaintiffs seek “[c]ompensatory and back pay damages to the fullest extent permitted under federal and state law.” Compl. at Prayer for Relief. At the final pretrial conference, counsel agreed that submissions concerning the calculation of damages would follow the court’s findings and conclusions. In their Proposed Findings and Conclusions, Plaintiffs specifically reference prejudgment interest as an alternative to liquidated damages. See Pls.’ Proposed Findings and Conclusions at ¶ 99 n. 15. I also note that Defendant has suffered no prejudice based on the Plaintiffs’ request for prejudgment interest at this time.

In addition, Defendant argues that the court should decline to award prejudgment interest on the uncompensated morning and evening time because this is not an easily calculable fixed sum, particularly because “it was the Plaintiffs’ lack of credibility which led to the uncertainty.” Def.’s Memo. at 10. Defendant relies on Pennsylvania easel aw which states that interest is due “[w]henever a fixed sum of money is wrongfully withheld from a party to whom it is properly due.” Id. at 9 (quoting Friedrich, 1995 WL 412385, at *3). Here, Defendant argues that the calculation of prejudgment interest is made uncertain by Plaintiffs’ lack of credibility, itself. Thus, the award of prejudgment interest would be inequitable.

At trial, Plaintiffs testified that they arrived at the shop before work and performed work prior to leaving for the jobsite every workday. Defendant presented credible evidence that Plaintiffs left from the shop only 35% of the time and went directly to the jobsite from their homes 65% of the time. In fact, Defendant presented evidence identifying specific jobs for which Plaintiffs traveled directly to the jobsite. Therefore, I found that Plaintiffs were entitled to 35% of the total uncompensated morning and evening time. Although I agree that Plaintiffs are partially to blame for any uncertainty in the calculation of prejudgment interest, Defendant lost the Plaintiffs’ timesheets, see N.T. 10/13/09 at 87-88, and thereby contributed to the uncertainty.

Moreover, considering the purpose of prejudgment interest, I believe the equities favor such an award for the uncompensated morning and evening time. Plaintiffs were not paid the wages they were owed and have not had the use of that money. Thus, an award of prejudgment interest is appropriate.”

M.D.Fla.: Approval Of Confidential Settlement In FLSA Case Rejected; Confidentiality Frustrates Remedial Purposes Of The FLSA

May 1, 2010 9:14 am / 3 Comments on M.D.Fla.: Approval Of Confidential Settlement In FLSA Case Rejected; Confidentiality Frustrates Remedial Purposes Of The FLSA

Dees v. Hydradry, Inc.

This case was before the Court on the parties’ Joint Stipulation of Dismissal.  Although, the Court noted that, “a private settlement and stipulation for dismissal ends the typical case without judicial intervention, the Eleventh Circuit requires the district court to review the settlement of an FLSA claim. See Lynn’s Food Stores, Inc. v. United States, 679 F.2d 1350 (11th Cir.1982).”

As part of a lengthy discussion of the remedial purposes behind the FLSA, the history of the FLSA and the applicable case law regarding waiver and settlements, and the role of the Court in the settlement process, the Court reasoned that no such resolutions of FLSA cases should involve confidentiality provisions, because such provisions contravene the public policy behind the FLSA’s implementation.

“ii. A Confidentiality Provision Contravenes FLSA Policy

Because of worry that settling with one employee will encourage other employees to assert FLSA rights, the employer may seek to maintain the confidentiality of the settlement agreement. But a confidentiality provision furthers resolution of no bona fide dispute between the parties; rather, compelled silence unreasonably frustrates implementation of the “private-public” rights granted by the FLSA and thwarts Congress’s intent to ensure widespread compliance with the statute. To further Congress’s intent, the Department of Labor requires the employer of an employee covered by the FLSA to display conspicuously in the workplace a detailed notice of the employee’s FLSA rights. By including a confidentiality provision, the employer thwarts the informational objective of the notice requirement by silencing the employee who has vindicated a disputed FLSA right.

Furthermore, Section 15(a)(3) of the FLSA proscribes an employer’s retaliating against an employee for asserting rights under the FLSA. If an employee covered by a confidentiality agreement discusses the FLSA with fellow employees or otherwise asserts FLSA rights, the employer might sue the employee for breach of contract. The employer’s most proximate damages from the employee’s breach are the unpaid FLSA wages due other employees who learned of their FLSA rights from the employee who breached the confidentiality agreement. A confidentiality agreement, if enforced, (1) empowers an employer to retaliate against an employee for exercising FLSA rights, (2) effects a judicial confiscation of the employee’s right to be free from retaliation for asserting FLSA rights, and (3) transfers to the wronged employee a duty to pay his fellow employees for the FLSA wages unlawfully withheld by the employer. This unseemly prospect vividly displays the inherent impropriety of a confidentiality agreement in settlement of an FLSA dispute.

A confidentiality provision in an FLSA settlement agreement both contravenes the legislative purpose of the FLSA and undermines the Department of Labor’s regulatory effort to notify employees of their FLSA rights. “The statute was a recognition of the fact that due to the unequal bargaining power as between employer and employee, certain segments of the population required federal compulsory legislation to prevent private contracts on their part which endangered the national health and efficiency and as a result the free movement of goods in interstate commerce.” Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 706-07 (1945). The district court should reject as unreasonable a compromise that contains a confidentiality provision, which is unenforceable and operates in contravention of the FLSA.”

Later in the opinion the Court discussed the issue of confidentiality in greater detail, reasoning that beyond evaluating a settlement for “reasonableness,” the Court has other functions when  reviewing FLSA settlements, specifically to ensure that such settlements and records of same are available for public review:

“B. External Factors: Does the Compromise, Although Reasonable, Otherwise Frustrate Implementation of the FLSA

In evaluating a compromise, the district court should also consider an array of “external” or contextual factors pertinent to the statutory purpose of the FLSA. Compromise of a retrospective dispute may be permissible if, for example, the FLSA issue in a case is unresolvably close on the facts or the law or some extraordinary circumstance (say, a suddenly disabled claimant or an employer in liquidation) commends a speedy or certain resolution. On the other hand, several factors may commend rejecting a proposed compromise, including the presence of other employees situated similarly to the claimant, a likelihood that the claimant’s circumstance will recur, a history of FLSA non-compliance by the same employer or others in the same industry or geographic region, or the requirement for a mature record and a pointed determination of the governing factual or legal issue to further the development of the law either in general or in an industry or in a workplace. In all instances, the district court should faithfully execute the congressional mandate for “minimum wages, promptly paid … for the lowest paid segment of the nation’s workers.” D.A. Schulte v. Gangi, 328 U .S. 108, 116 (1946).

IV. The Effect of Judicial Review: “Confidential” FLSA Settlement Agreements and Public Access to Court Records

“Parties who settle a legal dispute rather than pressing it to resolution by the court often do so, in part anyway, because they do not want the terms of the resolution to be made public.” Jessup v. Luther, 277 F.3d 926, 928 (7th Cir.2002). See generally Laurie Kratzky Dore, Secrecy by Consent: The Use and Limits of Confidentiality in the Pursuit of Settlement, 74 Notre Dame L.Rev. 283 (1999). In an FLSA action, the employer worries that compromise with an employee who has vindicated a valuable FLSA right will inform and encourage other employees, who will vindicate their FLSA rights (or who will wrongly, but expensively for the employer, conclude that additional wages are due). Although perhaps both uncomfortable and expensive to an employer, vindication of FLSA rights throughout the workplace is precisely the object Congress chose to preserve and foster through the FLSA.

In the typical settled case, the district judge remains unaware of the terms of compromise, and the parties enforce the settlement agreement, if necessary, only through a separate action.  The parties maintain the confidentiality of their compromise by submitting a stipulation for dismissal under Rule 41, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In an FLSA case, however, Lynn’s Food requires the parties to obtain judicial approval of the compromise. Forced to submit the agreement to the court after filing a motion for approval, the parties often seek to preserve the confidentiality of the compromise either by moving to submit the agreement under seal or by requesting an “in camera review” of the agreement.

In the typical FLSA case, however, neither attempt to conceal the compromise comports with the public’s right of access to a judicial proceeding, which right is “an essential component of our system of justice [and] instrumental in securing the integrity of the process.” Chicago Tribune Co. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 263 F.3d 1304, 1311 (11th Cir.2001). The judge’s “approving” a settlement constitutes a “public act,” and the public “has an interest in knowing what terms of settlement a federal judge would approve.”   Jessup, 277 F.3d at 929.  As an active component of the judge’s decision, the settlement agreement is presumptively a public record. See Brown v. Advantage Eng’g, Inc., 960 F.2d 1013, 1016 (11th Cir.1992) (“Once a matter is brought before a court for resolution, it is no longer solely the parties’ case, but also the public’s case.”); Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assocs., 800 F.2d 339, 343 (3d Cir.1986) (“[T]he common law presumption of access applies to motions filed in court proceedings and to the settlement agreement … filed and submitted to the district court for approval.”). The public enjoys the right both to attend a trial or hearing and to inspect and copy a judicial record.

The presumption that the record of a judicial proceeding remains public “is surely most strong when the ‘right at issue is of a ‘private-public character,’ as the Supreme Court has described employee rights under the FLSA.” Stalnaker, 293 F.Supp.2d at 1264 (quoting Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 708 (1945)). Sealing an FLSA settlement agreement between an employer and employee, reviewing the agreement in camera, or reviewing the agreement at a hearing without the agreement’s appearing in the record (in any event precluding other employees’ and the public’s access to, and knowledge of, the agreement) thwarts Congress’s intent both to advance employees’ awareness of their FLSA rights and to ensure pervasive implementation of the FLSA in the workplace.

Furthermore, before sealing a document, the district court must identify and articulate “an overriding interest based on findings that [a seal] is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. The interest is to be articulated along with findings specific enough that a reviewing court can determine whether the [sealing] order was properly entered.” Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California, 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984). Preventing the employee’s co-workers or the public from discovering the existence or value of their FLSA rights is an objective unworthy of implementation by a judicial seal, which is warranted only under “extraordinary circumstances” typically absent in an FLSA case. Absent an “overriding interest” in the preservation of some “higher value,” the court should not abide the parties’ request for a seal

The parties’ stipulation to seal the agreement (and the absence of a third-party objection to sealing the compromise agreement) fails to justify a seal. In Citizens First National Bank of Princeton v. Cincinnati Insurance Co., 178 F.3d 943, 944-45 (7th Cir.1999), Judge Posner states:

The parties to a lawsuit are not the only people who have a legitimate interest in the record compiled in a legal proceeding…. [T]he public at large pays for the courts and therefore has an interest in what goes on at all stages of a judicial proceeding. That interest does not always trump the property and privacy interests of the litigants, but it can be overridden only if the latter interests predominate in the particular case, that is, only if there is good cause for sealing a part or the whole of the record in that case. The determination of good cause cannot be elided by allowing the parties to seal whatever they want, for then the interest in publicity will go unprotected unless the media are interested in the case and move to unseal. The judge is the primary representative of the public interest in the judicial process and is duty-bound therefore to review any request to seal the record (or part of it). He may not rubber stamp a stipulation to seal the record. See also Wilson v. American Motors Corp., 759 F.2d 1568, 1571 (11th Cir.1985) (“[I]t is the rights of the public, an absent third party, which are preserved by prohibiting closure of public records….”).

Reviewing an FLSA settlement agreement under seal conflicts with the public’s access to judicial records, frustrates appellate review of a judge’s decision to approve (or reject) an FLSA compromise, contravenes congressional policy encouraging widespread compliance with the FLSA, and furthers no judicially cognizable interest of the parties. A proper consideration of the intent of Congress and the public’s interest in judicial transparency permits only one method to obtain judicial review of a compromise of an FLSA claim. The parties must file the settlement agreement in the public docket. See Stalnaker, 293 F.Supp. at 1262-64; see also Hanson v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. 08-80182-CIV, 2009 WL 1490582 (S.D.Fla. May 26, 2009) (requiring the parties to submit an unsealed copy of their settlement agreement).

V. Conclusion

To ensure that “all our able-bodied working men and women [receive] a fair day’s pay for a fair day’s work,” the FLSA requires a covered employer to pay each employee a minimum wage and overtime. To combat the typically unequal bargaining power between employer and employee, Congress prohibits a private agreement altering FLSA rights. An employee entitled to FLSA wages may compromise his claim only under the supervision of either the Department of Labor or the district court.

If presented in an FLSA action with a notice of settlement, a stipulation for dismissal, an offer of judgment, or the like, the judicial approval required by Lynn’s Food and the public’s right of access to a judicial proceeding compel the parties to file their agreement in the public docket of the district court. As an initial matter, the district court must determine whether the employee purports to compromise an FLSA right. If judicial scrutiny confirms that the parties’ settlement involves no compromise, the district court should approve the settlement and dismiss the case (if the employer has paid) or enter judgment for the employee (if the employer has not paid). If the parties’ proposed resolution requires the employee to compromise an FLSA right, the district court must scrutinize the compromise for “fairness.”

An employee’s right to a minimum wage and overtime is unconditional, and the district court should countenance the creation of no condition, whether confidentiality or any other construct, that offends the purpose of the FLSA. An employer is obligated unconditionally to pay a minimum wage and overtime to the complainant and his fellow employees; the district court should not become complicit in any scheme or mechanism designed to confine or frustrate every employee’s knowledge and realization of FLSA rights. Accordingly, the district court evaluating an FLSA compromise should examine first the “internal” fairness of the compromise, including the existence of a bona fide dispute and the absence of a prospective waiver, confidentiality agreement, or other provision antithetical to the FLSA. If the proposed compromise is fair and reasonable to the employee, the court should consider whether any other external factor, such as the need to resolve definitively an issue affecting similarly situated employees, recommends rejecting the compromise. If the compromise is fair and reasonable to the employee and furthers the implementation of FLSA rights in the workplace, the court should approve the compromise.

For the reasons stated in this order, the parties’ stipulation of dismissal is rejected.”

Needless to say, it will be interesting to see if other court’s follow the Court’s reasoning.

EDITOR’S NOTE: Less than a week after this opinion, Judge Merryday, who authored the opinion, went a step further in another case, holding that settlement agreements in FLSA cases that prohibit an employee from disparaging his or her employer are equally inappropriate.   See McGowan v. CSPS Hotel, Inc., 8:09-cv-02311-SDM-MAP (M.D.Fla. Apr.29, 2010).

9th Cir.: Complaint That Failed To Allege Entity Exercised Control Over Nature And Structure Of The Employment Relationship Did Not Properly Allege Defendant Was “Employer”

April 29, 2010 6:55 am / Leave a comment

Dianda v. PDEI, Inc.

Plaintiff-appellant Joseph Dianda worked for two days as a “best boy” in the production of a television commercial, but was allegedly paid three days late. Dianda sued the production company and PDEI, Inc. (“PDEI”) for various violations under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and California law.  In the case below, all defendants moved to dismiss the action. The district court denied the motion as to the production company, but granted the motion as to PDEI after determining that PDEI was not Dianda’s “employer” under the FLSA or California law.  Dianda appealed and the 9th Circuit affirmed, discussing the requirements for an “employer” under both the FLSA and California law.  Here, because the Complaint failed to adequately allege that PDEI exercised control over the nature and structure of the Plaintiff’s employment, the Court affirmed the dismissal as to PDEI.

“I. ‘Employer’ Status Under California’s Labor Code and FLSA

The essence of the test for “employer” status under the California Labor Code is “whether the principal has the right to control the manner and means by which the worker accomplishes the work.” Estrada v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 327, 335 (Cal.Ct.App.2007). FLSA’s test is broader, asking whether the “individual [here, PDEI] exercises control over the nature and structure of the employment relationship.” Boucher v. Shaw, 572 F.3d 1087, 1090-91 (9th Cir.2009) (quotation marks omitted).

Dianda has not shown that PDEI had the right to control the details of his work or that PDEI exercised control over his employment relationship. In his deposition, Dianda admitted that PDEI did not tell him how to do his job, PDEI did not hire him, PDEI did not terminate him, PDEI never communicated with him in any way, and Dianda never took instructions or directions from PDEI concerning the commercial. Nonetheless, Dianda argues that his pay stub and W-2 form identify PDEI as the “employer.” However, “[t]he parties’ label is not dispositive and will be ignored if their actual conduct establishes a different relationship.” Estrada, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d at 335-36. See also Real v. Driscoll Strawberry Assocs., Inc., 603 F.2d 748, 755 (9th Cir.1979) (“Economic realities, not contractual labels, determine employment status for the remedial purposes of the FLSA.”). Furthermore, PDEI’s alleged use of its own account to pay wages and PDEI’s maintenance of payroll records are explainable as part of the service it provides as a payroll company. See, e.g., Moreau v. Air France, 356 F.3d 942, 950-52 (9th Cir.2004) (determining that Air France was not a joint employer of contracted service workers where Air France’s involvement was to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements).”

D.N.J.: Defendants’ Purported Use Of Fluctuating Workweek (FWW) Violated FLSA, Because There Was No “Fixed” Amount As Straight Time Pay; Docking Of Pay, Although Infrequent Violated FLSA; Time And A Half Damages Due

April 28, 2010 6:51 am / 1 Comment on D.N.J.: Defendants’ Purported Use Of Fluctuating Workweek (FWW) Violated FLSA, Because There Was No “Fixed” Amount As Straight Time Pay; Docking Of Pay, Although Infrequent Violated FLSA; Time And A Half Damages Due

Brumley v. Camin Cargo Control, Inc.

This matter was before the Court on the cross-motions for summary judgment filed by Defendant and Plaintiffs, on a variety of issues arising from Defendant’s purported use of the Fluctuating Workweek (FWW), to calculate Plaintiffs’ overtime compensation.  As discussed partially herein, Defendant’s motion was denied in its entirety and Plaintiffs’ motion was granted in part and denied in part.  Significantly, the Court held that Defendant’s purported use of the FWW violated the FLSA for a variety of reasons, and under such circumstances, Plaintiffs’ damages were to be calculated using the FLSA’s default time and a half method not the FWW, as Defendant’s had proposed.

After outlining the applicable law, the Court first discussed the Defendant’s infrequent docking of Plaintiffs’ pay, ruling that same necessarily resulted in a failure to comply with the stringent requirements of 29 C.F.R. 778.114, and thus Defendant was not entitled to summary judgment.

“With respect to decreases in the fixed salary, regulation calls for a fixed salary regardless of the length of the workweek. 29 C.F .R. § 778.114 (“An employee employed on a salary basis may have hours of work which fluctuate from week to week and the salary may be paid him pursuant to an understanding with his employer that he will receive such fixed amount as straight time pay for whatever hours he is called upon to work in a workweek, whether few or many.”). An employer may deduct from an FWW employee’s vacation time bank for workdays missed, but may not deduct from the fixed salary for time an FWW employee misses from work. DOL Opinion Letter, 1999 WL 1002399 (May 10, 1999). Similarly, the DOL stated that “it is the longstanding position of the Wage and Hour Division that an employer utilizing the fluctuating workweek method of payment may not make deductions from an employee’s salary for absences occasioned by the employee[,]” unless the deductions are of a nonroutine disciplinary nature “for willful absences or tardiness or for infractions of major work rules.” DOL Opinion Letter, 2006 WL 1488849 (May 12, 2006).

Several of the cases cited by the parties are not on point with respect to the issue of salary decreases under the FWW. Although Aiken v. County of Hampton discusses the FWW, its ruling on the fixed salary requirement relates to deductions from accrued vacation banks and the effect of legal holidays that are not at issue in the instant matter. 977 F.Supp. 390, 395-97 (D.S.C.1997). Lance v. Scotts Co. addresses the effect of commissions on FWW calculations, something governed by 29 C.F.R. § 778.118, a regulation not at issue here. No. 04-5270, 2005 WL 1785315, at *4-7 (N.D.Ill. Jul. 21, 2005) (Keys, M.J.). Rau v. Darling’s Drug Stores, Inc. addresses not the existence of a fixed weekly payment, but the correct calculation of damages for a non-exempt, salaried employee. 388 F.Supp. 877, 883-86 (E.D.Pa.1977). In Spring v. Washington Glass Co. the parties stipulated to the use of the FWW to calculate overtime pay damages, so the issue of whether it applied was never contested before that court. 153 F.Supp. 312, 318-19 (W.D.Pa.1957).

Defendant does, however, cite Cash v. Conn Appliances, Inc., 2 F. Supp 2d 884, 906 (E.D.Tx.1997), which supports the proposition that it did not violate the FWW when it docked inspectors for missing work. Cash read the regulation as permitting an employer to dock pay when an employee failed to show up for scheduled work. 2. F. Supp 2d at 906 (“The docking policy only called for a loss of pay for absences during scheduled time; it in no way sanctioned reducing pay because of a failure to assign a coefficient employee forty hours of work for a week.”). Cash also holds that occasional violations of FWW requirements do not result in a broad invalidation of the method when calculating damages. Id. This Court fails to find the Cash interpretation of the regulation persuasive as to docking of employees’ pay. First, the regulation itself specifies that the fixed salary must be paid regardless of hours worked without reference to which party is responsible for the shortfall. 29 C.F.R. § 778.114 (“The ‘fluctuating workweek’ method of overtime payment may not be used unless … the employer pays the salary even though the workweek is one in which a full schedule of hours is not worked.”). Second, the DOL’s interpretation of the regulation denies employers the ability to routinely dock the fixed FWW salary. DOL Opinion Letter, 2006 WL 1488849 (May 12, 2006); DOL Opinion Letter, 1999 WL 1002399 (May 10, 1999).

Here, Defendant concedes that on at least one occasion, it docked a Plaintiff inspector’s fixed salary for an impermissible reason. (Def. Reply Br. at 6.) Although it characterizes such an event as statistically insignificant, such an argument goes to weight. This Court, therefore, denies summary judgment to Defendants on the issue of whether they complied with the FWW method of paying the Plaintiff inspectors.”

Next, the Court held that the addition of certain premium pay into Plaintiffs’ straight time pay each week resulted in non-fixed straight time pay, and thus violated the requirements for use of the FWW, in lieu of the default time and a half methodology required by the FLSA.

“The relevant language in the regulation regarding additional payments to FWW employees reads as follows: “[w]here all the legal prerequisites for use of the ‘fluctuating workweek’ method of overtime payment are present, the Act, in requiring that ‘not less than’ the prescribed premium of 50 percent for overtime hours worked be paid, does not prohibit paying more.” 29 C.F.R. § 778.114(c). Department of Labor (“DOL”) Opinion Letters interpreting the FWW regulation have weighed in on the issue of additional payments. The DOL has stated that an employer can make additional payments to an FWW employee for a holiday occurring in a given week. DOL Opinion Letter, 1999 WL 1002399 (May 10, 1999). An employer may also pay employees more than the minimum calculated rate under the FWW method for overtime. DOL Opinion Letter, 2002 WL 32255314 (Oct. 31, 2002).

Courts interpreting the FWW, however, have emphasized that additional payments can result in the finding that there is no fixed salary. Although the court in O’Brien v. Town of Agawam found that variations in the weekly pay of law enforcement officers for other reasons prevented the finding of a fixed FWW salary, it used this reasoning with regard to incentive payments:

The officers’ compensation varies from week to week even without reference to the number of hours worked. Any officer required to work a nighttime shift receives money-expressly termed “additional compensation” under the CBA-in the form of a $10 shift-differential payment added to his check for the week. The Supreme Court has specifically held that such shift differentials, when paid, are part of the worker’s regular rate of pay. Bay Ridge Operating Co. v. Aaron, 334 U.S. 446, 468-69 (1948). So while the shift differential itself may be small, it requires the larger conclusion that most officers do not receive a “fixed amount” for their straight-time labor each week.  350 F.3d 279, 288-89 (1st Cir.2003). See also Dooley v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 369 F. Supp 2d 81, 86 (D.Mass.2005) (following O’Brien ). Similarly, Ayers v. SGS Control Servs., Inc. found that employees performing similar work to the inspector Plaintiffs in this case did not receive a fixed salary because they received lump-sum “day-off pay” and “sea pay” for working on their days off and on offshore vessels. No. 03-9077, 2007 WL 646326, at *8-10 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2007). Finally, a case in this District, Adeva v. Intertek USA, Inc., stands for the proposition that shift premiums preclude application of the FWW. No. 09-1096, 2010 WL 97991, at *2-3 (D.N.J. Jan. 11, 2010) (Chesler, J.). “The record demonstrates that Plaintiffs’ compensation for non-overtime hours varied, depending upon earned offshore pay, holiday pay or day-off pay. The Court is convinced that due to such payments, Plaintiffs cannot receive the fixed salary required to apply the FWW.” Id.

Some of the cases brought forth by Defendant are inapposite. See, e.g., Clements v. Serco, Inc., 530 F.3d 1224, 1230-31 (10th Cir.2008) (commissions under the FWW); Lance, No. 04-5270, 2005 WL 1785315, at *4-7 (same). Two, however, are potentially instructive. In Cash, discussed supra, the court found that the defendant had failed to incorporate bonuses into its calculation of the regular rate, thereby decreasing plaintiffs’ overtime, but that such failure was considered insufficient to deny the defendant the benefit of the FWW. 2 F. Supp 2d at 893 n. 17, 896, 908. The court in Aiken found that an employer’s payment of holiday pay to a law enforcement officer who worked on a holiday did not result in the absence of a fixed salary. 977 F.Supp. at 399-400. The reasoning used in Aiken was that the employee would have received the holiday pay anyway, regardless of whether or not the employee worked the holiday, and that the holiday pay simply operated as a permissible increase in overtime pay under the circumstances. Id.

This Court finds that Cash and Aiken can be distinguished on their facts. Cash dealt with employees of an appliance store; Aiken dealt with law enforcement personnel. The only cases brought to this Court’s attention that deal with inspectors similar to Plaintiffs are Ayers and Aveda, and this Court finds their reasoning persuasive as to the applicability of the FWW to this case, not only because of the factual similarity, but because they give meaning to the plain language of 29 C.F.R. § 778.114. Plaintiffs were paid day off pay and holiday pay in addition to their regular salary and overtime. (Def. R. 56.1 Statement ¶¶ 15, 39, 41.) For example, Camin concedes that the use of day off and holiday pay resulted in the one inspector’s non-overtime earnings varying from $1,670 to $2,170 over two pay periods. (Def. Opp. R. 56.1 Statement § 23.) Such a scheme results in the absence of the “fixed salary” required by the regulation. 29 C.F.R. § 778.114(a); Aveda, No. 09-1096, 2010 WL 97991, at *2-3. This Court therefore grants Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on the issue of whether Defendant’s policies and practices violated the FLSA due to the absence of the fixed salary requirement, and declines to reach the remaining arguments of the parties on the FWW. Adeva, No. 09-1096, 2010 WL 97991, at *3.”

Having held that the Defendant’s pay structure violated the FLSA, the Court next turned to the issue of how to calculate Plaintiffs’ damages, and held that the appropriate measure of damages was the FLSA’s default time and a half, not the FWW as Defendant had argued.

“Camin moves this Court to find that any liability it is subject to for violation of the FWW method of calculating pay be done so according to the FWW method. (Def. Br. at 24-27.) It maintains that such a measure of damages is permissible where the violation is computational as opposed to a violation of the clear understanding requirement or the minimum wage. (Id. at 24-25.) Plaintiffs argue that such a damages calculation is impermissible where a prerequisite to the FWW has not been met by the employer. (Pl. Opp. Br. at 24-26).

The primary case relied upon by Camin is Cash. The discussion of the FWW in Cash is quite broad, and describes the measure of damages available in FWW claims under many factual scenarios. 2 F. Supp 2d at 896-97. Cash noted that under the FWW, “[l]iability arises if the employer either miscomputes overtime pay or uses the fluctuating workweek method despite the absence of one or more of the criteria for doing so[,]” but differentiated between the types of violation in which damages were available. Id. at 896. The discussion of the available remedies breaks down into two broad categories: those where the measure of damages would be calculated under the FWW and those where overtime compensation would be adjusted so that it would be recalculated at the default FLSA rate of “time-and-a-half” overtime. Id. The following violations were permitted damages calculations under the FWW in Cash: “[e]mployer infrequently violated the minimum wage criterion and failed to cure its breaches fully[,]” “[e]mployer infrequently violated the minimum wage criterion and made no effort to cure its breaches[,]” and “[e]mployer made a computational mistake.” Id. at 896-97. Cash found that the following violations abrogated the FWW: “[e]mployer regularly violated the minimum wage criterion” and “[e]mployer violated the clear understanding criterion, full schedule criterion or both.” Id. at 896. The Cash court only considered failure of an employer to provide a fixed salary insofar as such a failure would lower overtime rates. Id. at 896.

Although this Court finds the discussion of damages in Cash useful, it is not entirely persuasive. This Court found supra that the fixed salary requirement of the FWW was violated. The regulation states that the fixed salary is a prerequisite to use of the FWW method. 29 C.F.R. § 778.114(c). The Cash court found that when other prerequisites of the FWW method were systematically violated, that the employer could not obtain the benefit of the FWW in calculating damages, but failed to reach the same conclusion concerning the fixed salary. Id. at 896. Instead, this Court finds the pre-trial motions opinion in Ayers v. SGS Control Servs., Inc. persuasive. No. 03-9078, 2007 WL 3171342, at *1-3 (S .D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2007) (“Ayers II” ). In Ayers II, the Court found that as the defendant had violated the fixed salary requirement of the FWW method, it could not have damages calculated under the FWW method. No. 03-9078, 2007 WL 3171342, at *2. The Court held that the proper measure of damages was the default FSLA method: “time-and-a-half for all hours over 40.” Id. at *3. This Court finds that the default FSLA damages calculation, “time-and-a-half for all hours over 40,” will also apply to Plaintiffs who have suffered FWW violations in this case, and that summary judgment on this issue is denied to Defendant.”

Although not discussed here, the Court ruled that the factual issues precluded a finding regarding liquidated damages, and the length of the statute of limitations, at the summary judgment stage.

This case is one of several pending against Oil & Gas Inspection companies currently.  To read more about a similar case, brought on behalf of OGC Inspectors at Inspectorate America, click here.  You can also learn more about similar separate cases pending against Intertek Caleb Brett, Saybolt, Amspec and Inspectorate America by calling 1-888-OVERTIME.

U.S.Jud.Pan.Mult.Lit.: 12 Cases Against Bank of America For “Personal Bankers” Claiming Off-the-Clock Work Transferred to Kansas For Discovery, Because First-Filed There, Central Location, Lighter Docket And Capable Judge

April 20, 2010 7:08 am / Leave a comment

In re Bank of America Wage and Hour Employment Practices Litigation

Defendants Bank of America moved, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407, for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings of this litigation, consisting of 12 different related actions, in the Central District of California. Plaintiffs in two actions support the motion. Plaintiffs in five actions supported centralization of some actions, but suggest excluding certain actions from centralized proceedings. Plaintiffs in five other actions oppose centralization or inclusion of their actions in centralized proceedings. Plaintiffs, in the first instance or in the alternative, suggested the Central District of California, the Northern District of California, or the District of Kansas as transferee district.

Significantly, the Court noted:

“All of these cases contain allegations that Bank of America routinely fails to pay its employees for off-the-clock overtime work in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act and/or state law. To be sure, there are differences among the cases. However, as a general rule the similarities seem to outweigh the differences. As we explain below more specifically, we believe that centralization under Section 1407 will eliminate duplicative discovery; prevent inconsistent pretrial rulings, including with respect to class certification; and conserve the resources of the parties, their counsel, and the judiciary.”

Additionally, the Court explained that Bank of America acknowledged its timekeeping policies were the same nationwide for the employees in question.  Therefore, the Court concluded that the cases were ripe for centralization.  Explaining that the discovery for all cases was most suitable to be centralized in Kansas, the Court reasoned:

“The parties have suggested a number of acceptable transferee districts. For instance, Bank of America makes a strong argument for the Central District of California as the central focus of the litigation. For the following reasons, however, we conclude that the District of Kansas would be the best forum. The first-filed Brawner action is pending in that district, with a motion for class certification currently pending. The district is centrally located for the parties and the likely discovery in this nationwide litigation. It has docket conditions that are significantly more favorable than the other primary contenders for this litigation. More specifically and of paramount importance, Judge John W. Lungstrum has the experience, energy and time to handle this litigation efficiently.”

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