6th Cir.: Effect Of Impermissible Deductions On Exempt Status; Under Old Regs “Significant Likelihood” Standard All Weeks Rendered Non-Exempt; Under New Regs Only Weeks Where Impermissible Deductions Actually Occurred
Baden-Winterwood v. Life Time Fitness, Inc.
In this case, the 6th Circuit addressed a common issue raised in mis-classification cases: the effect of a compensation plan which makes impermissible deductions to otherwise exempt employees, whose exemptions require they be paid on a “salary basis.”
On July 10, 2007, the district court granted in part Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, finding “that the deductions from the salaries of eight Plaintiffs were deductions resulting from ‘variations in the quality or quantity of the work performed,’ in violation of the salary-basis test.”Baden-Winterwood v. Life Time Fitness, No. 2:06-CV-99, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49777, at *42 (S.D.Ohio July 10, 2007) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 541.602(a)). However, the district court limited Plaintiffs’ recovery to overtime pay for the three pay periods in 2005-the periods ending November 9, November 23, and December 9-during which Life Time Fitness took actual deductions from Plaintiffs’ salaries. Id. The court dismissed all other claims for overtime pay, including, in their entirety, the claims of the ten Plaintiffs who appealed.
The issue before the Court was whether Plaintiffs’ compensation plans satisfy the salary-basis test. Prior to August 23, 2004, the salary-basis test, as defined by regulation, provided:
“An employee will be considered to be paid “on a salary basis” within the meaning of the regulations if under his employment agreement he regularly receives each pay period on a weekly, or less frequent basis, a predetermined amount constituting all or part of his compensation, which amount is not subject to reduction because of variations in the quality or quantity of the work performed. 29 C.F.R. § 541.118(a) (1973). In August 2004, the DOL updated the regulations defining the salary-basis test. The new regulation states: An employee will be considered to be paid on a “salary basis” within the meaning of these regulations if the employee regularly receives each pay period on a weekly, or less frequent basis, a predetermined amount constituting all or part of the employee’s compensation, which amount is not subject to reduction because of variations in the quality or quantity of the work performed. 29 C.F.R. § 541.602(a) (effective August 23, 2004). Under both versions, Life Time Fitness bears the burden of proving that Plaintiffs were paid: (1) a predetermined amount, which (2) was not subject to reduction (3) based on quality or quantity of work performed. Notably, however, rather than include the term “employment agreement,” the updated regulations focus on pay received. Compare29 C.F.R. §§ 541.118(a), 541.602(a).”
Significantly, the Court explained, “[f]or our purposes, the salary-basis test has two interpretations of the phrase ‘subject to,’ both of which are relevant here. In 1997, in Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997), the Supreme Court adopted the interpretation offered by the Secretary of Labor that the salary-basis test denies exempt status “if there is either an actual practice of making … deductions [based on variations in quality or quantity of work performed] or an employment policy that creates a ‘significant likelihood’ of such deductions.” Id. at 461. Specifically, the Auer Court held
‘The Secretary’s approach rejects a wooden requirement of actual deductions, but in their absence it requires a clear and particularized policy-one which “effectively communicates” that deductions will be made in specified circumstances. This avoids the imposition of massive and unanticipated overtime liability … in situations in which a vague or broadly worded policy is nominally applicable to a whole range of personnel but is not “significantly likely” to be invoked against salaried employees.’
Thus, under Auer, an employee is not paid on a salary basis if (1) there is an actual practice of salary deductions or if (2) an employee is compensated under a policy that clearly communicates a significant likelihood of deductions. Id.
Following Auer, on March 31, 2003, the DOL provided published notice on a proposed set of new FLSA regulations. See Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions for Executive, Administrative, Professional, Outside Sales and Computer Employees, 68 Fed.Reg. 15,560 (Mar. 31, 2003). After a 90-day comment period, the DOL revised and released its final regulations, defining the exemptions under the FLSA. See Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions for Executive, Administrative, Professional, Outside Sales and Computer Employees, 69 Fed.Reg. 22,122 (Apr. 23, 2004). The new regulations became effective on August 23, 2004. Id.
Under the new regulations, the Secretary of Labor reinterpreted the salary-basis test. Life Time Fitness argues that the DOL specifically eliminated the “policy” part of the Auer test, whereby a “significant likelihood” of improper deductions was sufficient to cause an employee to lose his or her FLSA exemption. The new regulations (” § 541.603“) provide that “[a]n actual practice of making improper deductions demonstrates that the employer did not intend to pay employees on a salary basis.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.603(a). Moreover, Life Time Fitness argues that the new regulations limit the scope of recovery by providing that “[i]f the facts demonstrate that the employer has an actual practice of making improper deductions, the exemption is lost during the time period in which the improper deductions were made for the employees in the same job classification working for the same managers responsible for the actual improper deductions.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.603(b).
In its comments, the DOL explains that while the new rule represents a departure from the Secretary’s position in Auer,”[t]he ‘significant likelihood’ test is not found in the FLSA itself or anywhere in the existing Part 541 regulations. Moreover, nothing in Auer prohibits the [DOL] from making changes to the salary[-]basis regulations after appropriate notice and comment rulemaking.” Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions, 69 Fed.Reg. at 22,180. The DOL stated its reasoning behind the changes:
Any other approach, on the one hand, would provide a windfall to employees who have not even arguably been harmed by a “policy” that a manager has never applied and may never intend to apply, but on the other hand, would fail to recognize that some employees may reasonably believe that they would be subject to the same types of impermissible deductions made from the pay of similarly situated employees.
Under the Auer test, the Court, found that Defendants’ policy whereby deductions would be made (although they were not in practice violated the salary basis requirements) violated the salary basis test, explaining:
The district court erred in concluding that there was not enough evidence to suggest Life Time Fitness intended to enforce its permissive policy. The Auer subject-to-reduction test requires only a “clear and particularized policy-one which ‘effectively communicates’ that deductions will be made in specified circumstances.” 519 U.S. at 461. The test does not require a formulaic set of “magic words” indicating that the test is mandatory. If employers can avoid overtime liability by crafting payment policies with permissive (may ) language instead of mandatory (will ) language, then the purposes of the FLSA would clearly be frustrated. Rather, as set out by this Court in Takacs and Whisman, Auer’s test is better satisfied by a policy that demonstrates that deductions are “more than a mere theoretical possibility” and that “permit[s] disciplinary or other deductions in pay ‘as a practical matter.’ ” 246 F.3d at 781
Here, Life Time Fitness’s pre-August 23, 2004 compensation plan subjected employees’ pay to reductions under the Auer test. The compensation plan at issue does more than create a theoretical possibility of deduction; instead it plainly lays out a policy under which Life Time Fitness would make future deductions. Therefore, under the old regs, the Court found the Plaintiffs were non-exempt for all weeks within the relevant statute of limitations period.
However, since the current regulations require an actual violation, the Court held that the otherwise exempt employees were only stripped of their exempt status, and thus entitled to overtime for the 3 weeks when the pay practice was actually used to reduce their “salary.” In all other weeks, the Court found the salary basis test met, and thus found that, aside from three weeks where actual reduction were made, the Plaintiffs remained exempt, notwithstanding the three weeks where deductions were actually made.”
W.D.Pa.: Grants Conditional Certification Under FLSA In Automatic Deduction/Meal Break Case
Camesi v. University of Pittsburgh Medical Center
Describing the policy in question, the Court stated:
“Non-exempt employees are the subject of Defendants’ written “UPMC Compensation Manual.” Although different versions of the Manual have existed, Defendants advise that the relevant provisions have remained materially the same
MEAL PERIODS
UPMC attempts to grant a 30-minute meal period for all employees even though meal periods are not required under the FLSA. Typically, this meal period is unpaid. However, meal periods must be counted as hours worked unless all three of the following conditions are met:
• The meal period must be scheduled for 30 minutes;
• The employee is completely relieved of all duties during the meal period; and
• The employee is free to leave the workstation or area.
If a non-exempt employee does not receive 20 consecutive minutes of uninterrupted time it will be considered work time and will be paid. Answering a page or beeper is considered to be an interruption. The time and attendance system (KRONOS) has an automatic feature that will deduct a 30 minute meal period after 5 hours of time worked. If an employee does not receive a meal period and it is to be recorded as time worked, it is the employee’s responsibility to make sure the automatic [meal] deduction is cancelled via the manner designated by the department. Employees must immediately notify their supervisors if they are unable to appropriately record their time.”
Considering the lighter burden Plaintiffs have on this Stage 1 Motion for Conditional Certification, the Court noted, “Plaintiffs have placed into the record the undisputed written policies of UPMC regarding non-exempt employees’ ‘meal breaks.’ By implication, UPMC’s policies dictate that meal breaks lasting twenty minutes or longer, but less than thirty minutes, qualify as ‘bona fide meal periods’ that are non-compensable under the FLSA. See 29 C.F.R § 785.19(a) ( “Section 785.19(a)“). At least for the purposes of conditional certification, Defendants’ position is unsupported by Section 785.19(a):
Bona fide meal periods are not worktime. Bona fide meal periods do not include coffee breaks or time for snacks. These are rest periods. The employee must be completely relieved from duty for the purposes of eating regular meals. Ordinarily 30 minutes or more is long enough for a bona fide meal period. A shorter period may be long enough under special conditions. The employee is not relieved if he is required to perform any duties, whether active or inactive, while eating.
29 C.F.R. § 785.19(a). Lastly, the Court explained, “[i]f ‘special conditions’ warranting a deviation from the standard thirty-minute meal period exist, Defendants have failed to identify them.”
E.D.La.: FLSA Defendants Not Entitled To Discover Plaintiffs’ Social Security Numbers Because Irrelevant; Need To Comply With Tax Laws Insufficient Reason
Baca v. Brother’s Fried Chicken
Before the Court were: (1) the motion of the defendants, Omar Hamdan, Fatmah Hamdan, Alberta, Inc., FHH Properties, LLC, and Alberta Management, LLC, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(e), for a more definite statement; and (2) the motion of the plaintiffs, Angela Mericia Baca and Abigail Analqueto, for a protective order limiting inquiries with in terrorem effect. The motions were related. The defendants’ sought an order requiring the plaintiffs to provide Social Security numbers and addresses. The plaintiffs sought a protective order barring the defendants from inquiring into this information. The Court granted Plaintiffs’ Motion and denied Defendants’.
The Court noted, “[i]n Topo v. Dhir, 210 F.R.D. 76 (S.D.N.Y.2002), the court stated:Courts have generally recognized the in terrorem effect of inquiring into a party’s immigration status when irrelevant to any material claim. In particular, courts have noted that allowing parties to inquire about the immigration status of other parties, when not relevant, would present a danger of intimidating that would inhibit plaintiffs in pursuing their rights.”
The Court, in granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Protective Order and denying Defendants’ Motion discussed the 5th Circuit case In re Reyes, 814 F.2d 168,170 (5th Cir.1987) paraphrasing, “[t]here is much stronger justification in this case [for a writ of mandamus] where there is no possible relevance and the discovery could place in jeopardy unrelated personal status matters.” Id. at 170-71. “Inasmuch as the protections provided by the FLSA apply to undocumented aliens, the plaintiffs’ immigration status, Social Security numbers and addresses are not relevant. In Agusiegbe v. Petroleum Associates of Lafayette, 486 So.2d, 314 (La.App. 3rd 1986), the defendant contended that the plaintiff falsely represented himself to be employable as a U.S. citizen. The court held that the LWPA applied to all employees, regardless of their nationality. Id. at 316. The information sought by defendants is not relevant to plaintiffs’ LWPA claims.
The defendants urge that the information is required to permit them to comply with the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code for the completion of Forms 1099 and W-2. The burden of reporting payroll information rests with the employer. The defendants have not demonstrated why they could not have obtained this information when the plaintiffs first began working for them. The plaintiffs are not required to provide it to defendants in connection with the pending FLSA and LWPA claims.”
Costco Accused Of Wage Law Violations
The New York Times is reporting that Costco Wholesale, the warehouse club, has been sued by a California worker alleging false imprisonment because, she says, employees are locked in stores against their will for 15 minutes after they are off duty.
The complaint, which seeks to represent several hundred Costco workers in California, asks for $50 million in back pay plus damages from 2005 until the present.
To read the full story, go to the New York Times website.
$39 Million Settlement In Stock Brokers’ Wage And Hour Case Receives Preliminary Approval
The National Law Journal is reporting that a federal judge in Los Angeles has approved a $39 million preliminary settlement to resolve the multidistrict litigation between Wachovia Corp. and more than 10,000 stock brokers who alleged that they were denied overtime pay and other wages.
“U.S. District Judge David O. Carter also approved a final settlement in which Prudential Financial Inc., whose retail brokerage division was sold to Wachovia in 2003, agreed to pay $11 million to former stock brokers.
The settlements approved on May 11 are the latest involving overtime allegations brought by stock brokers. (In re: Wachovia Securities Wage & Hour Litigation, MDL No. 1807 (C.D. Calif.))
The stock brokers, referred to as financial advisers or financial adviser trainees, alleged that they were misclassified as exempt from overtime under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FSLA) and state wage and hour laws.
They also claimed that they were not reimbursed for business expenses and did not receive timely paychecks upon leaving the company.
California stock brokers alleged that they were not given breaks for meals and rest periods as required by state law.
In its motion for preliminary approval, Wachovia, recently acquired by Wells Fargo & Co. Inc., said that the recent change in its corporate ownership would result in changes in policy and practices that could complicate the litigation.”
The article said that those affected by the settlement are financial advisers and trainees who worked for Wachovia Corp., Wachovia Securities LLC or First Union Securities Inc. “Most of the class members must make FLSA claims, but subclasses in the settlement are identified for workers with state claims in California, Illinois, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New York and Ohio.”
A final approval hearing is set for Oct. 5, 2009.
To read the full article go to the National Law Journal’s website at $39 million settlement in stock brokers’ wages-and-hours action
N.D.Ga.: Apartment Broker, Whose Customers Were The Apartment Homes And Not Renters, Not A “Retail Establishment” Subject To 7(i) Exemption Of The FLSA
Russell v. Promove, LLC
This case was before the Court on all parties’ motions for summary judgment. Plaintiffs had cross-moved for summary judgment, seeking a finding from the Court that Defendant, an apartment broker, was not a “retail” establishment, subject to the 7(i) exemption of the FLSA as a matter of law. Granting this branch of Plaintiffs’ Motion, the Court stated, in part:
“A retail or service establishment is defined as “an establishment 75 per centum of whose annual dollar volume of sales of goods or services (or of both) is not for resale and is recognized as retail sales or services in the particular industry.”29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(2) (1988); 29 C.F.R § 779.312. First, Plaintiffs argue that the Defendants’ business is not regarded as retail and that such a concept cannot be artificially created in an industry that lacks a traditional concept of retail and servicing.; Schussler v. Employment Consultants, 333 F.Supp. 1387, 1390 (N.D.Ill.1971). Plaintiffs argued that the “mom and pop” type shops which conduct similar business to the Defendants do not comprise an apartment locator industry. In response, Defendants assert that when Defendant Todd White founded the predecessor of ProMove in 1990, he relied on industry standards to determine employee payment and commission structure.
The record before the Court sufficiently establishes the nature of ProMove’s business to allow the Court to reach a conclusion regarding the claimed exemption. Though the parties disagree as to the conclusions to be drawn from the evidence, the underlying facts are largely undisputed. Prospective renters come into ProMove’s business locations and receive referrals to apartment homes. These renters pay nothing for the referral. ProMove’s compensation, if any, comes from the apartment homes if the prospective renter chooses the apartment, identifies ProMove as the referral source, and pays the first month’s rent. Based on the undisputed facts, the Court concludes that the apartment homes are ProMove’s customers. The payment for ProMove’s service comes entirely from the apartment homes. The fact that the payment is not made until the first month’s rent is paid does not alter the fact that the payment is from the apartment home. ProMove’s business serves the apartment homes as its customers, not the general public.
Also, the Court finds that ProMove’s business is closely akin to a broker. Even though ProMove does not have the authority to negotiate terms of the lease agreements, it serves the function of bringing the landlords and tenants together much as a real estate agent would do in a real estate transaction. Such businesses have been identified by the DOL as lacking the retail concept. 29 C.F.R. § 779.317. Also, its brokering function occurs prior to the “very end of the stream of distribution,” and thus, does not meet the examples of retail and service establishments provided by the DOL. 29 C.F.R. § 779.318.
Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that Defendants failed to prove the applicability of the Section 7(i) retail or service establishment exemption. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment as to Defendants’ retail or service exemption defense is GRANTED.”
D.Kan.: Mortgage Broker Not “Retail Establishment”; Financial Specialists Not “Retail” Exempt
Underwood v. NMC Mortg. Corp.
This case was before the Court on Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendant, a mortgage broker, moved for summary judgment asserting that it was a “retail establishment” and that, therefore, Plaintiffs, who were “financial specialists” facilitating their loans, were exempt for the overtime provisions of the FLSA, under the so-called retail exemption. The Court found that Defendant is not a retail establishment, and therefore Plaintiffs are not retail exempt.
“Plaintiffs assert that the facts are analogous to the facts in Saunders v. Ace Mortgage Funding, Inc, in which that court distinguished Gatto and found that the retail or service establishment exemption did not apply. In Saunders, plaintiffs brought a collective action under the FLSA seeking overtime and minimum wage compensation from their employer. The employer, Ace Mortgage (”Ace”), matched mortgage borrowers with lenders for a fee. Ace primarily brokered loans, but it also engaged in a small amount of direct lending called “table funding” where the bank provided the funding for the loan but the loan closed in Ace’s name. Ace also closed a small number of loans in its own name using its warehouse line of credit.
In Saunders, the District of Minnesota examined whether Ace was part of the “financial industry” because the businesses listed in 29 C.F.R. § 779.317 that lacked a retail concept included “credit companies,” “small loan and personal loan companies,” and “finance companies.”
29 C.F.R. § 779.317 specifically cites to Mitchell for the proposition that these type of financial businesses lack a retail concept. The Saunders court found that the facts in Gatto were factually distinguishable because Ace engaged in a small amount of direct lending and declined to use the reasoning in Gatto. It concluded that Ace was part of the financial industry and therefore could not qualify as a retail or service establishment as a matter of law and that the Gatto court ultimately “strained to bring a financial business within the definition of a retail or service establishment on the basis that its activities were limited to brokering, not lending.”
The facts in this case are similar to the facts in both Gatto and Saunders. NMC matched customers with lenders in finding residential loans but did not represent the consumer or the lender. Unlike the defendant in Gatto but similar to the defendant in Saunders, NMC engaged in table funding in which the loan closed in NMC’s name. Although NMC did not use its own line of credit for closing loans like the defendant in Saunders, the Court finds the facts more analogous to the facts in Saunders.
Everything about NMC’s business is related to the financial industry. NMC matched consumers with loans. NMC processed the loan applications. NMC engaged in table-funding so the loan closed in the name of NMC. In contrast to Illinois law where mortgage brokers are defined as “nonfinancial intermediaries,” in Kansas, NMC’s name appeared on the closing loan documents as a “lender” because NMC engaged in table-funding. In its annual report to Kansas, NMC had to report that it was a “lender” from 2004 through 2006 on 422 loans totaling $57,653,391. Finally, NMC underwrote these table-funded loans which indicates more than peripheral involvement in the financial aspects of providing the loan to the consumer. Accordingly, this Court concludes that NMC is within the financial industry and therefore should not be considered a “retail or service establishment.”
Even if this Court were to conclude that NMC was not within the financial field, NMC still lacks the characteristics that would qualify it as a “retail or service establishment.” As the Department of Labor’s regulations make clear, the three characteristics of a retail or service establishment include (1) selling to the general public; (2) serving the everyday needs of the public; and (3) being at the very end of the stream of distribution. Examples of such establishments include grocery stores, furniture stores, and restaurants. NMC is not similar to these retail establishments as it does not appear to the Court that matching individuals with residential mortgage lenders would qualify as selling to the “general public” or serving the “everyday needs” of the public. In any event, NMC is not at the very end of the stream of distribution. In Partida v. American Student Loan Corporation, the District of Arizona addressed this third element when determining whether a company in the business of matching individuals with third-party lenders to consolidate student loans was a retail or service establishment. The court stated that the defendant’s business was “an integral and upstream part of the loan origination business and therefore is on the non-retail end of the establishment spectrum.” As the Partida court noted, “[a] loan referral provides the basis for a subsequent transaction in which an individual obtains what he or she ultimately seeks-a [residential] loan.” The court in Partida concluded that because the business was not at the end of the stream of distribution, the business could not be considered a “retail or service establishment.”
NMC’s business was similar to the business in Partida in that it matched individuals with residential loans. NMC was not providing the end product but was directing the individual to the residential loan. The Tenth Circuit has noted that “[b]usinesses that serve only other commercial establishments are generally not within the ‘retail concept’ of the exemption.” This Court cannot conclude that NMC was at the very end of the stream of distribution. As such, it lacks the characteristics of a retail or service establishment.
Finally, this Court finds 29 C.F.R. § 779.317 instructive. This regulation provides a list of establishments that lack a retail concept and includes freight brokers, insurance brokers, and stock or commodity brokers. Although “mortgage brokers” were not included, the regulation specifically states that it is a “partial list” of businesses. A “mortgage broker” is similar to an “insurance broker” or “stock or commodity broker” because the broker assists the customer in obtaining the mortgage, insurance, or stock. The majority, if not all, of Defendant’s business was done as a “broker.” Because a mortgage broker is similar to the brokers listed in section 779.317, the Court finds that NMC lacks the “retail concept” to be qualified as a “retail or service establishment.” Exemptions are to be narrowly construed under the FLSA, and NMC is not a retail or service establishment under 29 U.S.C. § 207(i) and therefore is not entitled to this exemption.”
Casey’s General Stores To Pay Close To $12 Million To Settle Wage and Hour Suits
The Wall Street Journal is reporting that Casey’s General Stores Inc. has agreed to pay $11.7 million to settle two class-action wage lawsuits and said it will record a $9.1 million charge in its fiscal fourth-quarter as a result of the settlement.
The convenience-store chain was sued by plaintiffs representing about 7,800 current and former assistant managers and about 76,000 current and former non-management-level employees over allegations they weren’t paid overtime.
Initially, Casey’s General Stores managers had filed a suit against the company, with cooks and cashiers suing for overtime pay in early 2008. Those employees also claimed they were denied mandatory meal and rest breaks and said they were asked to perform tasks before and after their shifts.
Under the settlement agreement, the company will also pay up to $400,000 in related settlement expenses. The company’s directors and officers insurance company will pay $3 million of the settlement on behalf of the defendants.
For the full article go to: http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20090508-716883.html
D.Kan.: Defendant Not Entitled To Sanctions Due To Plaintiff’s Refusal To Dismiss Certain Claims
Armstrong v. Wackenhut Corp.
Finding that the lead plaintiff in a wage-and-hour suit against G4S Wackenhut Corp. did not unreasonably refuse to dismiss state law claims, a federal judge has refused to grant Wackenhut attorneys’ fees for expenses it incurred filing a motion to dismiss those claims. In an order handed down last week, the District Court Judge in the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas rejected Wackenhut’s bid for attorneys’ fees under Section 1927 and under Rule 11.
EDS Overtime Class Action For “Technical Support” Employees Transferred From Georgia To New York
Azar v. Electronic Data Systems Corp.
Southern District of New York, Case No. 1:09-cv-4005, assigned to Hon. Richard J. Sullivan
Agreeing that the case should be re-assigned to New York, where 2 other related cases are currently pending, the Court in the Northern District of Georgia transferred this case to the Southern District of New York, to be handled alongside the other 2 currently pending cases.
Morgan & Morgan filed this class action to recover unpaid overtime for all current and former EDS salaried technical support employees who were misclassified by EDS as exempt during any period after October 2005, who worked in the State of Georgia and throughout the United States. “Technical Support” employees are those whose primary duties were or are to install, maintain, and/or support computer software and/or hardware for EDS or its clients. The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) requires covered employers to pay employees performing this type of work a premium of 1.5 times their regular rate of pay for hours worked in excess of 40 in a workweek. We contend that EDS improperly classified technical support workers as “exempt” from this requirement and in doing so denied employees their overtime pay in violation of the FLSA.
If you believe you are a “Technical Support” employee who was wrongfully denied overtime pay by EDS within the last 3-4 years, you may qualify to join this class action. For a free consultation regarding your rights, contact Overtime Attorney Andrew Frisch at 1-888-OVERTIME or http://www.overtimeadvocate.com/2.html today.
You can also join the case and submit a claim, by completing a “CONSENT TO JOIN” form, then faxing to (954) 333-3515. You are entitled to consult with an attorney of your choice.